Fresneda v. State, 347 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 1977). · Go Syfert
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Fresneda v. State, 347 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 1977). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
116 citation events (8 in the last 25 years) across 5 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Tara Jeanine Tanksley v. State of Florida (fladistctapp, 2025-02-26)
Treatment trajectory · 1977 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1977 2001 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 27 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Tara Jeanine Tanksley v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
Additionally, we note that the report on its face even failed to state which items involved in Appellant’s suspicious transactions were actually removed from the store, further highlighting the lack of competent evidence. “[A] condition of probation requiring a probationer to pay money to, and for the benefit of, the victim of his crime cannot require payment in excess of the amount of damage the criminal conduct caused the victim.” Fresneda v. State, 347 So. 2d 1021, 1022 (Fla. 1977).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Bernard v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2003 · confidence medium
Fresneda v. State, 347 So.2d 1021, 1022 (Fla.1977).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Montalvo v. State (3×) also: Cited "see", Cited "see, e.g."
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1998 · confidence medium
See Delks v. State, 622 So.2d 624, 625 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (where defendant pled nolo contendere to grand theft for embezzlement of rents collected for absentee landlord, restitution order requiring defendant to pay $4000.00 reversed and amended where the state produced rental receipts totalling only $3000.00); House v. State, 614 So.2d 677, 677-78 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (reversing restitution order due to the lack of any probative evidence demonstrating the amount ordered constituted “ ‘damage or loss caused directly or indirectly by the defendant’s offense’” of grand theft) (quoting §…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Powell v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1992 · confidence medium
Fresneda v. State, 347 So.2d 1021, 1022 (Fla. 1977); Mansingh v. State, 588 So.2d 636 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Hawthorne
Fla. · 1991 · confidence medium
Furthermore, the trial court's restitution order did not require the payment of sums unrelated to the victim's losses, see Fresneda v. State, 347 So.2d 1021, 1022 (Fla. 1977), but rather was correlated to the evidence which was presented by the state and uncontroverted by Hawthorne.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Spivey v. State
Fla. · 1988 · confidence medium
Petitioner cites Fresneda v. State, 347 So.2d 1021, 1022 (Fla. 1977), wherein this Court held "that a condition of probation requiring a probationer to pay money to, and for the benefit of, the victim of his crime cannot require payment in excess of the amount of damage the criminal conduct caused the victim." In Fresneda , a Volkswagen collided with a Cadillac, and Fresneda's car struck the Volkswagen.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Norman v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1985 · confidence medium
In Fresneda v. State, 347 So.2d 1021 (Fla. 1977), it was held that "a condition of probation requiring a probationer to pay money to, and for the benefit of, the victim of his crime cannot require payment in excess of the amount of damage the criminal conduct caused the victim." Fresneda at 1022 (e.s.).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wilson v. State (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1984 · confidence medium
Wilson argues that the $930.00 restitution improperly exceeds the damage caused, citing Fresneda v. State, 347 So.2d 1021 *85 (Fla. 1977).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Pollock v. Bryson
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1984 · confidence medium
Ordinarily, a trial court cannot, over objection, require as a condition of probation that restitution be paid "in excess of the amount of damage the criminal conduct caused the victim." Fresneda v. State, 347 So.2d 1021, 1022 (Fla. 1977) (stating general rule); Goodson v. State, 400 So.2d 791 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981) (stating failure to object generally constitutes a waiver).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Wilson v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1982 · confidence medium
Fresneda v. State, 347 So.2d 1021, 1022 (Fla. 1977).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hamm v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1981 · confidence medium
Lastly, in determining the amount of restitution to be paid, the trial court may not "require payment in excess of the amount of damage the criminal conduct caused the victim." Fresneda v. State, 347 So.2d 1021, 1022 (Fla. 1977).
discussed Cited "see" Del Valle v. State (2×)
Fla. · 2011 · signal: see · confidence high
See Fresneda v. State, 347 So.2d 1021, 1022 (Fla.1977) (stating that before a trial court may order restitution, the trial court “should give the defendant notice of the proposed restitution order and allow the defendant the opportunity to be heard as to the amount of damage or loss ‘caused by his offense.’ ”).
discussed Cited "see" Soriano v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See Fresneda v. State, 347 So.2d 1021, 1022 (Fla.1977) ("[A] condition of probation requiring a probationer to pay money to, and for the benefit of, the victim of his crime cannot require payment in excess of the amount of damage the criminal conduct caused the victim.").
cited Cited "see" Gollattscheck v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See Fresneda v. State, 347 So.2d 1021, 1022 (Fla.1977); Mansingh v. State, 588 So.2d 636 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).
cited Cited "see" Mansingh v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See Fresneda v. State, 347 So.2d 1021, 1022 (Fla. 1977).
cited Cited "see" Williams v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See Fresneda v. State, 347 So.2d 1021 (Fla. 1977); Riner v. State, 389 So.2d 316 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
cited Cited "see" Anderson v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See Fresneda v. State, 347 So.2d 1021 (Fla. 1977); Barnes v. State, 489 So.2d 1182 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986).
cited Cited "see" Adamo v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See Fresneda v. State, 347 So.2d 1021 (Fla. 1977).
discussed Cited "see" Ramos v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1984 · signal: see · confidence high
See Fresneda v. State, 347 So.2d 1021 (Fla.1977); Purvis v. State, 442 So.2d 1085 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); W.N. v. State, 426 So.2d 1206 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); DiOrio v. State, 359 So.2d 45 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
cited Cited "see" Purvis v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1983 · signal: see · confidence high
See Fresneda v. State, 347 So.2d 1021 (Fla. 1977).
cited Cited "see" MAR v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1983 · signal: see · confidence high
See Fresneda v. State, 347 So.2d 1021 (Fla. 1977); T.W. v. State, 395 So.2d 598 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); E.Y. v. State, 390 So.2d 776 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Kroenke v. State, 366 So.2d 46 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
cited Cited "see" M.A.R. v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1983 · signal: see · confidence high
See Fresneda v. State, 347 So.2d 1021 (Fla.1977); T.W. v. State, 395 So.2d 598 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); E.Y. v. State, 390 So.2d 776 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Kroenke v. State, 366 So.2d 46 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
cited Cited "see" Turner v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1983 · signal: see · confidence high
See Fresneda v. State, 347 So.2d 1021 (Fla. 1977).
cited Cited "see" Myers v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1983 · signal: see · confidence high
See Fresneda v. State, 347 So.2d 1021 (Fla. 1977); Bodden v. State, 411 So.2d 1391 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); and Section 948.03(3) Florida Statutes (1981).
cited Cited "see" Cooper v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1978 · signal: see · confidence high
See Fresneda v. State, 347 So.2d 1021 (Fla. 1977).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Glaubius v. State
Fla. · 1997 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Fresneda v. State, 347 So.2d 1021, 1022 (Fla. 1977) (in reviewing constitutionality of section 948.03, Florida Statutes (1975) (governing probation conditions), court held that condition of probation requiring probationer to pay money to, and for benefit of, victim of crime cannot require payment in excess of amount of damage criminal conduct caused victim).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Bausch
N.J. · 1980 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e. g., Fresneda v. Florida, 347 So.2d 1021 (Fla.Sup.Ct.1977) (“reparation or restitution to the aggrieved party for the damage or loss caused by his offense in an amount to be determined by the court.” Fla.Stat. § 948.03(g)).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Jesus FRESNEDA, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
48963.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Apr 21, 1977.
347 So. 2d 1021
Hatchett.
Cited by 96 opinions  |  Published

Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Linnea R. Snyder, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Ira N. Loewy, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

HATCHETT, Justice.

This is an appeal from an order of probation. The prosecution arose out of an automobile accident on July 28, 1974. When a Cadillac stopped abruptly, a Volkswagen skidded into it. The appellant's car then hit the Volkswagen from behind; instead of stopping to offer assistance, the appellant backed up and drove off. He was subsequently apprehended and charged with leaving the scene of an accident resulting in injury to another person, in violation of Section 316.062, Florida Statutes (1975). The trial court concluded that appellant was guilty of the offense, but withheld adjudication of guilt and placed appellant on probation, with the condition that he pay the Parole and Probation Commission in excess of $1,600.00, for the benefit of the occupants of the Volkswagen, who were injured in the accident. The defense challenged the propriety of setting a sum for restitution without "a hearing and opportunity to be fully heard as to the amount." In disposing of the motion to correct illegal sentence, the trial court passed on the constitutionality of Section 948.03, Florida Statutes (1975). Accordingly, we have jurisdiction. Article V, Section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution.

The trial court included the restitution condition in the order of probation, citing Section 948.03(1)(g), Florida Statutes (1975). This subsection authorizes conditioning probation on the probationer's making "reparation or restitution to the aggrieved party for the damage or loss caused by his offense in an amount to be determined by the court." (emphasis supplied). Both appellant and appellee concur, however,[*1022] in the view "that said condition of probation is not authorized by this subsection of the statute." We are likewise persuaded that Section 948.03(1)(g), Florida Statutes (1975), does not authorize the restitution condition imposed in this case. See People v. Becker, 349 Mich. 476, 84 N.W.2d 833 (1957); State v. Barnett, 110 Vt. 221, 3 A.2d 521 (1939). Appellant's offense was leaving the scene of the accident, not causing it. The record does not establish what injury was caused by the collision between appellant's car and the Volkswagen, as opposed to injury caused by the earlier collision between the Volkswagen and the Cadillac. There is no basis in the record for distinguishing between injuries sustained in either of the collisions from aggravation of those injuries attributable to such delay, if any, in securing medical attention as the appellant may have caused.

The State argues that the language of Section 948.03(2), Florida Statutes (1975), supplies the authorization for the restitution condition, which is lacking in subsection one. Subsection two provides:

The enumeration of specific kinds of terms and conditions shall not prevent the court from adding thereto such other or others as it considers proper....

Although, in general, we believe this language should be liberally construed, we glean no legislative intent to authorize trial courts to require probationers to pay over random sums of money. Of course, the figure in the present case presumably bears some relationship to the accident out of which the prosecution arose, but it is not clear what the relationship to appellant's offense is.

We hold that a condition of probation requiring a probationer to pay money to, and for the benefit of, the victim of his crime cannot require payment in excess of the amount of damage the criminal conduct caused the victim. Before ordering a restitution as a condition of probation, the trial judge should give the defendant notice of the proposed restitution order and allow the defendant the opportunity to be heard as to the amount of damage or loss "caused by his offense." The defendant's right to be heard, we believe, is part of the process through which the "amount [is] to be determined by the court" under the statute.

Inasmuch as the State concedes that "the damage or loss incurred by the aggrieved parties was caused by the auto accident itself, not by the defendant's criminal offense of leaving the scene of the accident," there would be no point in conducting a hearing on remand, in the present case.

Accordingly, we find Section 948.03, Florida Statutes (1975), constitutional; we reverse the order appealed and remand the case for resentencing.

OVERTON, C.J., and ADKINS, BOYD, ENGLAND, SUNDBERG and DREW (Retired), JJ., concur.