Brooks v. State, 745 So. 2d 1113 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). · Go Syfert
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Brooks v. State, 745 So. 2d 1113 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
29 citation events (26 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Newkirk v. State (fladistctapp, 2007-09-19)
Treatment trajectory · 1999 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1999 2012 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 9 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Newkirk v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Siplin v. State, 795 So.2d 1010, 1011 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Hrezo v. State, 780 So.2d 194, 195 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Young v. State, 803 So.2d 880, 882 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002); Brooks v. State, 745 So.2d 1113, 1113 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Lawrence M. Williams (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
4th Cir. · 2000 · confidence medium
See Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 594 (1989); McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1073 (Wyo. 1999); Brooks v. State, 745 So. 2d 1113, 1113 (Fla. Dist.
cited Cited "see" G.M. v. State
Fla. · 2009 · signal: see · confidence high
See id. at 536^14.
discussed Cited "see" GM v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See Brooks, 745 So.2d at 1113-14 (observing that section 316.2397, Fla. Stat. (1997), allows only police vehicles to have blue flashing lights and section 316.126, Fla. Stat. (1997), requires all vehicles to pull to the closest edge of the roadway upon the approach of a vehicle displaying blue or red lights).
discussed Cited "see" G.M. v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See Brooks, 745 So.2d at 1113-14 (observing that section 316.2397, Fla. Stat. (1997), allows only police vehicles to have blue flashing lights and section 316.126, Fla. Stat. (1997), requires all vehicles to pull to the closest edge of the roadway upon the approach of a vehicle displaying blue or red lights).
cited Cited "see" Young v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See Brooks v. State, 745 So.2d 1113, 1113-14 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).
cited Cited "see" Finizio v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See Brooks v. State, 745 So.2d 1113 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).
cited Cited "see" Hrezo v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See Brooks v. State, 745 So.2d 1113, 1113-14 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). [1] We emphasize that an officer's use of a spotlight is not the same as the use of emergency lights.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Armatage v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2007 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Brooks v. State, 745 So.2d 1113 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (activating flashing blue lights constitutes a show of authority amounting to an investigatory stop).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Georgia M. BROOKS, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee. Charles E. Roberts, Appellant, v. State of Florida, Appellee.
98-3855, 98-3912.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Dec 8, 1999.
745 So. 2d 1113
Ervin.
Cited by 15 opinions  |  Published

Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, David P. Gauldin, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellants.

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Terri Leon-Benner, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellees.

ERVIN, J.

In these two consolidated appeals, appellants, Georgia M. Brooks and Charles E. Roberts, contend that the trial court erred in denying their motion to suppress evidence which was seized as a result of an unlawful stop. We agree and therefore reverse and remand with directions to discharge appellants.

The state maintained below that Officer Bates approached appellants' vehicle, which had pulled off the side of the road to change drivers, in a consensual police-citizen encounter and that appellants were free to leave at any time. Bates admitted that he did not have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity at the time he approached appellants' vehicle, and he said the encounter was not an investigatory stop. See Popple v. State, 626 So.2d 185, 186 (Fla.1993) (distinguishing consensual police-citizen encounters, in which the citizen may voluntarily comply with the officer's request or choose to ignore it, from investigatory stops, which require the officer to have a well-founded, articulable suspicion of criminal activity before detaining the citizen). And see § 901.151, Fla. Stat. (1997) (Florida's Stop and Frisk Law).

We conclude that the trial court's finding of an consensual encounter is clearly erroneous. Officer Bates activated his flashing blue lights when he pulled up behind appellants' stopped vehicle. As Brooks was driving the vehicle onto the roadway, she stopped when she saw the flashing lights and uniformed police officer approaching the car. Section 316.2397, Florida Statutes (1997), allows only police vehicles to have blue flashing lights, and section 316.126, Florida Statutes (1997), requires all vehicles to pull to the closest edge of the roadway upon the approach of a vehicle displaying blue or red lights. Bates admitted he makes traffic stops with his flashing lights and siren. While Bates testified that he activated the lights as a safety precaution, a reasonable person under such circumstances would not have[*1114] believed he or she was free to leave and terminate the encounter. See State v. Ferrell, 705 So.2d 1051, 1052 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); Jones v. State, 658 So.2d 178, 180 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (both stating that the question of whether there has been a consensual encounter requires a court to consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the encounter to determine whether the police officers' conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that he or she was not free to decline the officers' request or otherwise terminate the encounter).

Based on the show of authority by Bates' use of the flashing blue lights, the encounter constituted an investigatory stop. Because Bates admitted he did not have the requisite reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, he lacked authority under section 901.151, Florida Statutes (1997), to stop appellants. See Graham v. State, 714 So.2d 1142 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). Therefore, the evidence seized as a result of the unlawful detention should have been suppressed. As this issue is dispositive, we remand with directions to set aside the judgments and orders placing appellants on probation.

REVERSED and REMANDED with directions to discharge appellants.

LAWRENCE and PADOVANO, JJ., CONCUR.