The habitual offender statute requires only that the defendant's last prior felony or release from imprisonment be within five years of the current offense.
A defendant convicted of a felony in 1994 challenges his habitual offender sentence, arguing that a 1983 predicate conviction is invalid because his release from that sentence occurred more than five years before the current offense. The court addresses whether the five-year temporal limitation applies to all prior convictions or only the most recent one. Applying the habitual offender statute, the court holds that the requirement is satisfied if the defendant's last prior felony or release from imprisonment is within five years of the current offense. The statute does not require all prior convictions to fall within that period. Because the defendant had a qualifying conviction within five years, the older 1983 conviction was properly included in the count. The court affirms the denial of postconviction relief.
At page 793 “the habitual offender statute 'requires only that a defendant's last prior felony or release from imprisonment . . . be within five years of the date of the current felony offense.”2 citing cases
- Raul J. Mari v. State of Florida, No. 22-0196 (Fla. 3d DCA Nov. 2, 2022).published(The habitual offender statute ‘requires only that a defendant’s last prior felony [or release from imprisonment] . . . be within five years of the date of the current felony offense.’” (quoting Clark v. State, 681 So.…)
- Gutierrez v. State, 854 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003).publishedMiddleton v. State, 721 So.2d 792, 793 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998).
At page 792 “requires only that a defendant's last prior felony (or release from imprisonment) ... be within five years of the date of the current felony offense”1 citing case
- Turner v. State, 91 So. 3d 219 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012).published“requires only that a defendant's last prior felony (or release from imprisonment) ... be within five years of the date of the current felony offense”
Other citing cases
- Smith v. State, 836 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003).published
v.
The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
[*793] Michael Middleton, in proper person.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, for appellee.
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and NESBITT and COPE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Michael Middleton appeals the denial of his motion for postconviction relief, whereby he challenges his sentence as a habitual offender. We affirm.
According to defendant-appellant Middleton's motion, the offense for which defendant was habitualized occurred May 24, 1994. Defendant acknowledges that the State established that defendant was convicted of a qualifying offense within the previous five years, based on felony convictions entered November 30, 1992. See § 775.084(1)(a)2., Fla. Stat. (1993). Defendant acknowledges having another prior felony conviction, in circuit court case number 83-12144. However, defendant argues that the 1983 case cannot be used as a predicate felony because defendant was released from prison on July 15, 1987, more than five years before the 1994 crime. Defendant contends that the 1983 case must be disregarded.
Defendant is in error. The habitual offender statute "requires only that a defendant's last prior felony [or release from imprisonment]... be within five years of the date of the current felony offense." Clark v. State, 681 So.2d 816 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996); see § 775.084(1)(a)2., Fla. Stat. (1993). Thus, only one of the qualifying offenses must have been committed (or the defendant released) within five years of the current offense. The other qualifying offense (or release) can be more than five years from the current offense. It follows that the 1983 case was properly counted as a predicate offense. The trial court correctly denied the motion for postconviction relief.
Affirmed.