section 775.084 habitual violent felony offender in Florida

2018See Lamont v. State, 610 So. 2d 435, 438 (Fla. 1992) (holding that one convicted of a life felony is not subject to enhanced punishment as a habitual offender under section 775.084); Flanders v. State, 217 So. 3d 160, 161 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (explaining that section 775.084 did not provide for enhanced sentencing on life felonies committed prior to October 1, 1995).

2001See Lamont v. State, 610 So.2d 435, 438 (Fla.1992) ("Both the plain language and the history of the relevant statutes lead us to hold that one convicted of a life felony is not subject to enhanced punishment as a habitual offender under section 775.084."); Carter, 704 So.2d at 1070 . [3] Carter filed a postconviction motion pursuant to rule 3.800(a), contending that because life felonies were not subject to habitualization under the statute, his habitual offender sentence was illegal.

2014See King v. State, 681 So.2d 1136, 1139-40 (Fla.1996). .

2010See King v. State, 681 So.2d 1136 (Fla.1996) (holding that a trial court may not impose a fine under section 775.083 when imposing a habitual felony offender sentence under section 775.084), receded from on other grounds in Carter v. State, 786 So.2d 1173 (Fla.2001).

1993Our construction of the statute is consistent with Burdick v. State, 594 So.2d 267 (Fla. 1992), in which the supreme court found that habitual offender sentencing under section 775.084(4)(a)1 is permissive, and not mandatory, despite the legislature's use of the word "shall" in describing the appropriate sentence for a first degree felony, in cases involving an habitual offender.

1992In Burdick v. State, 594 So.2d 267 (Fla.1992), the supreme court held that habitual offender sentencing under Section 775.084(4)(b)(1), Florida Statutes (1989), is permissive rather than mandatory; thus the trial court has the discretion to impose any sentence up to life imprisonment for a first-degree felony.

2001On November 1, 1994, he was sentenced as a habitual violent felony offender and the court imposed concurrent terms of fifteen years' incarceration with a minimum mandatory sentence of ten years pursuant to section 775.084(4)(b). [1] Subsequent *53 to the imposition of petitioner's sentence, this Court issued its opinion in State v. Hudson, 698 So.2d 831, 832 (Fla.1997), wherein we reiterated our previous holding that "sentencing under the habitual offender statute is permissive, not mandatory." [2] We concluded that this sentencing discretion extends to "determining whether to impose a mandato

2001On November 1, 1994, he was sentenced as a habitual violent felony offender and the court imposed concurrent terms of fifteen years' incarceration with a minimum mandatory sentence of ten years pursuant to section 775.084(4)(b). [1] Subsequent *53 to the imposition of petitioner's sentence, this Court issued its opinion in State v. Hudson, 698 So.2d 831, 832 (Fla.1997), wherein we reiterated our previous holding that "sentencing under the habitual offender statute is permissive, not mandatory." [2] We concluded that this sentencing discretion extends to "determining whether to impose a mandato

1996As the Second District Court of Appeal explained in King, [s]hould the trial judge decide, pursuant to subsection 775.084(4)(c), not to sentence a person as an habitual felony offender, even though that person qualifies as an habitual offender, any sentence then imposed must comport with sentencing guidelines or departure rules. 597 So.2d at 315 . [8] It is the decision to not sentence the defendant as an habitual felony offender pursuant to section 775.084 that triggers the sentencing guidelines procedures.

1996See King v. State, 597 So.2d 309 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)(trial court declaring defendant a habitual offender may exercise discretion and decide not to sentence defendant as such).

2021Ed. 2d 391 (1992)); see also Cross v. State, 96 Fla. 768, 782 , 119 So. 380, 385 (1928) (observing that, “[b]ut for the commission of the subsequent offense, the enhanced penalty would not be 4 imposed”); cf. Raulerson v. State, 609 So. 2d 1301 (Fla. 1992) (rejecting ex post facto challenge to the violent habitual felony offender provisions of section 775.084, Florida Statutes).

2021Ed. 2d 391 (1992)); see also Cross v. State, 96 Fla. 768, 782 , 119 So. 380, 385 (1928) (observing that, “[b]ut for the commission of the subsequent offense, the enhanced penalty would not be 4 imposed”); cf. Raulerson v. State, 609 So. 2d 1301 (Fla. 1992) (rejecting ex post facto challenge to the violent habitual felony offender provisions of section 775.084, Florida Statutes).

1992In Roberts v. State, 559 So.2d 289, 290-91 (Fla. 2d DCA), review dismissed, 564 So.2d 488 (Fla. 1990), the court held: Defendant also contends that the enhancement of his sentence as an habitual offender pursuant to section 775.084(3)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1988), was invalid due to the failure of the state to serve defendant personally with the requisite notice of enhancement.

1992See Walker v. State, 462 So.2d 452 (Fla.1985), and Roberts v. State, 559 So.2d 289 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990).

1997See Hale v. State, 630 So.2d 521 (Fla. 1993) (prohibiting imposition of consecutive habitual felony offender sentences under section 775.084, Florida Statutes, for multiple offenses arising out of the same criminal episode), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 909 , 115 S.Ct. 278 , 130 L.Ed.2d 195 (1994).

1995In Hale v. State, 630 So.2d 521 (Fla.1993), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 115 S.Ct. 278 , 130 L.Ed.2d 195 (1994), and Brooks v. State, 630 So.2d 527 (Fla.1993), the Florida' Supreme Court held that a trial court may not impose consecutive enhanced sentences under section 775.084, Florida Statutes, for crimes growing out of a single-criminal episode.

2022See § 316.1935(1), Fla. Stat. (stating that fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer is a third-degree felony and providing for habitual offender sentencing under section 775.084, Florida Statutes); Middleton v. State, 721 So. 2d 792, 793 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (“The habitual offender statute ‘requires only that a defendant’s last prior felony [or release from imprisonment] . . . be within five years of the date of the current felony offense.’” (quoting Clark v. State, 681 So. 2d 816, 816 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996))); Turner v. State, 91 So. 3d 219, 220 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (“[T]he third- d

2005A trial court may impose an habitual offender sentence under section 775.084(l)(a) if the defendant had previously been convicted of two or more felonies, and the felony under consideration was committed within five years of either the conviction date or the date of release from incarceration or supervision imposed as a result of the prior felony. 1 As noted in Middleton v. State, 721 So.2d 792 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) [citations omitted], the habitual offender statute “requires only that a defendant’s last prior felony [or release from imprisonment] ... be within five years of the date of the curre

2000Separation of powers was also the basis for decision in Hudson v. State, 682 So.2d 657 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996), where DOC "wrote to the trial judge and stated that the sentencing documents did not refer to a mandatory term but they had set up the defendant's record to show a twelve year mandatory sentence pursuant to Florida Statute section 775.084." Id. at 658 .

2000Separation of powers was also the basis for decision in Hudson v. State, 682 So.2d 657 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996), where DOC "wrote to the trial judge and stated that the sentencing documents did not refer to a mandatory term but they had set up the defendant's record to show a twelve year mandatory sentence pursuant to Florida Statute section 775.084." Id. at 658 .

1997See Hale v. State, 630 So.2d 521 (Fla. 1993) (prohibiting imposition of consecutive habitual felony offender sentences under section 775.084, Florida Statutes, for multiple offenses arising out of the same criminal episode), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 909 , 115 S.Ct. 278 , 130 L.Ed.2d 195 (1994).

1997See Hale v. State, 630 So.2d 521 (Fla. 1993) (prohibiting imposition of consecutive habitual felony offender sentences under section 775.084, Florida Statutes, for multiple offenses arising out of the same criminal episode), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 909 , 115 S.Ct. 278 , 130 L.Ed.2d 195 (1994).

1992See McNeil v. State, 588 So.2d 303 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).

1991McNeil v. State, 588 So.2d 303 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); King v. State, 585 So.2d 1199 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Wright v. State, 579 So.2d 418 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991).

1992See Walker v. State, 567 So.2d 546 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990).

1991The appellant’s several felony convictions were rendered on the same date, and so they should have been treated as a single offense. 1 Walker v. State, 567 So.2d 546 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990).

2026Thus, based on the record before us, we conclude that any error in failing to submit the habitual violent felony offender factors to a jury was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and affirm.” (footnotes and quotations omitted)); see also Rosa v. State, 696 So. 2d 1299, 1301 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (“[D]efendant made no objection to the trial court’s statements to the jury.

2022See § 316.1935(1), Fla. Stat. (stating that fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer is a third-degree felony and providing for habitual offender sentencing under section 775.084, Florida Statutes); Middleton v. State, 721 So. 2d 792, 793 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (“The habitual offender statute ‘requires only that a defendant’s last prior felony [or release from imprisonment] . . . be within five years of the date of the current felony offense.’” (quoting Clark v. State, 681 So. 2d 816, 816 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996))); Turner v. State, 91 So. 3d 219, 220 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (“[T]he third- d

2022See § 316.1935(1), Fla. Stat. (stating that fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer is a third-degree felony and providing for habitual offender sentencing under section 775.084, Florida Statutes); Middleton v. State, 721 So. 2d 792, 793 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (“The habitual offender statute ‘requires only that a defendant’s last prior felony [or release from imprisonment] . . . be within five years of the date of the current felony offense.’” (quoting Clark v. State, 681 So. 2d 816, 816 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996))); Turner v. State, 91 So. 3d 219, 220 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (“[T]he third- d