A trial court errs in ordering restitution for damages caused by a crash when the defendant's suspended license was not causally related to the accident.
The defendant, whose driving privileges were suspended, backed a vehicle into the path of another car, causing a crash, and was convicted of driving on a suspended license. At sentencing, the trial court ordered the defendant to pay restitution for the resulting vehicle damages. The appellate court addresses whether restitution is appropriate when the specific criminal offense of driving with a suspended license is not causally related to the accident. Applying established precedent, the court determines that the suspension of the license did not cause the crash. Consequently, the court holds that the trial court erred in ordering restitution for damages not causally connected to the offense and quashes the order.
At page 732 Interpreting restitution for damages related to criminal episodes3 citing casesrestitutionary obligation. Ch. 93-37, § 1, Laws of Florida. See J.O.S. v. State, 689 So.2d 1061, 1063, n. 10 (Fla.1997). According to the preamble, one purpose…
- Angela Marie Mahoney v. State of Florida, No. 5D2025-0804 (Fla. 5th DCA Aug. 14, 2026).published Based upon the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Schuette v. State, we reverse and vacate the judgment and restitution order entered by the trial court. 822 So. 2d 1275 , 1283-84 (Fla. 2002) (approving Cheek v. State, 700 So. 2d 731 (Fla…
- Schuette v. State, 822 So. 2d 1275 (Fla. 2002).published In Cheek , the Fifth District quashed a trial court's order of restitution for damages arising from an automobile accident "because the fact that [the defendant's] license was suspended was not causally related to the crash. " 700 So.2d at…
- State v. Schuette, 782 So. 2d 935 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).published Cheek, 700 So.2d at 732 (Sharp, J., dissenting).
At page 731 “the fact that the defendant's license was suspended was not causally related to the crash.”2 citing cases
- Angela Marie Mahoney v. State of Florida, No. 5D2025-0804 (Fla. 5th DCA Aug. 14, 2026).published ([T]he fact that [the defendant’s] license was suspended was not causally related to the crash.)
- Schuette v. State, 822 So. 2d 1275 (Fla. 2002).published In Cheek , the Fifth District quashed a trial court's order of restitution for damages arising from an automobile accident "because the fact that [the defendant's] license was suspended was not causally related to the crash. " 700 So.2d at…
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and M.A. Lucas, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Maximillian J. Changus, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
DAUKSCH, Judge.
This is an appeal from an order of restitution in a driving with a suspended license case. We quash the order.
Appellant backed an automobile into the roadway into the path of another vehicle, causing a crash. At the time he was operating the car his driving privileges had been suspended by the state, so he was charged with driving on a suspended license. At his sentencing the judge ordered him to pay restitution for the damages caused by the crash. Numerous cases hold this was error because the fact that his license was suspended was not causally related to the crash. State v. Williams, 520 So.2d 276 (Fla.1988); Longshore v. State, 655 So.2d 1139 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Ochoa v. State, 596 So.2d 515 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); Stewart v. State, 571 So.2d 485 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). See Glaubius v. State, 688 So.2d 913 (Fla.1997).
Whether one agrees with the cases is not determinative of whether they must be adhered to. The order must be quashed.
ORDER QUASHED.
THOMPSON, J., concurs.
W. SHARP, J., dissents with opinion.
W. SHARP, Judge, dissenting.
I would affirm the order of restitution in this case pursuant to section 775.089(1)(a)2., Florida Statutes (1995). The loss or damage to the victim's vehicle clearly was "related to" the defendant's criminal episode.
Section 775.089 governs restitution in criminal cases. This section had previously required the trial court to order the defendant to make restitution to the victim only for "damage or loss caused directly or indirectly by the defendant's offense." See, e.g., § 775.089(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1992). The Florida Supreme Court interpreted this provision to mean that the trial court must find that the loss or damage was causally connected to the offense and bore a significant relationship to the offense. See Glaubius v. State, 688 So.2d 913 (Fla.1997); State v. Williams, 520 So.2d 276 (Fla.1988).
However, in 1993, section 775.089 was significantly amended to include an additional[*732] restitutionary obligation. Ch. 93-37, § 1, Laws of Florida. See J.O.S. v. State, 689 So.2d 1061, 1063, n. 10 (Fla.1997).
According to the preamble, one purpose of the act was to expand the criteria for ordering restitution. Thus the present restitution statute must be interpreted as requiring the imposition of restitution for 1) any damage or loss caused directly or indirectly by the defendant's offense and 2) for any damage or loss significantly[1] related to the defendant's criminal episode.
Here Cheek hit another vehicle as he was backing his automobile out of his driveway into the road. At the time, Cheek's driver's license had been suspended. Thus, Cheek's criminal episode began when he started driving without a valid license. The restitution imposed by the trial court—the damages to the other vehicle—clearly have a significant relationship to the criminal episode. In these circumstances, I would affirm.