Charleston v. Pate, 194 S.W.3d 89 (Tex. App. 2006). · Go Syfert
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Charleston v. Pate, 194 S.W.3d 89 (Tex. App. 2006). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 4× by 4 distinct cases, 2003–2016 · …district attorneys and other prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability when performing their prosecutorial functions. at p. 90 ✓
37 citation events (37 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Tim James McMahan v. Stephen B. Tyler and Brandon W. Guy (texapp, 2023-02-02)
Treatment trajectory · 2003 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2003 2014 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 19 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Tim James McMahan v. Stephen B. Tyler and Brandon W. Guy
Tex. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
“District attorneys and other prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability when performing their prosecutorial functions.” Charleston v. Pate, 194 S.W.3d 89, 90 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, no pet.). “[A]bsolute immunity extends to . . . prosecutors performing such typical prosecutorial 6 functions as initiating criminal prosecution and presenting the State’s case.” Brown v. Lubbock Cnty.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Carissa L. Beene v. David Puryear, Cynthia Bourland, Scott Field, Keith Henneke, and David Escamilla (2×)
Tex. App. · 2020 · confidence medium
ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY In her second issue, Beene contends the trial court erred in concluding Escamilla and Henneke established absolute immunity as a valid defense “because 1) they were not prosecuting a criminal action and arguably had no role at all at the show cause hearing, 2) they were acting as investigators rather than prosecutorial function [sic], and 3) they were acting as [sic] the role of a witness.” “District attorneys and other prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability when performing their prosecutorial functions.” Charleston v. Pate, 194 S.W.3d 89, 90 (Tex. App.— T…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Alejos Perez v. Stuart Jenkins, Director of Texas Boards of Pardons and Paroles Fort Worth Police Department Texas Department of Public Safety Crime Laboratory And Tarrant County (2×)
Tex. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
Charleston v. Pate, 194 S.W.3d 89, 90 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2006, no pet.).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Timothy Hays v. Chief Campos
Tex. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
Lesher v. Coyel, 435 S.W.3d 423, 430 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, pet. denied) (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)); Charleston v. Pate, 194 S.W.3d 89, 90 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, no pet.); Brown v. Lubbock Cty.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Moore, Aaron Jacob
Tex. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
“Prosecutorial functions are those acts representing the government in filing and presenting criminal cases, as well as other acts that are intimately associated with the judicial process.” Charleston v. Pate, 194 S.W.3d 89, 90 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 2006, no pet.) (internal quotation marks omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Walter Roy v. District Attorney Joe Shannon Jr. and Judge R.E. Thornton (2×) also: Cited "see"
Tex. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 , 430–31, 96 S. Ct. 984, 995 (1976) (recognizing that prosecutors have absolute immunity to suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ); Charleston v. Pate, 194 S.W.3d 89, 91 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, no pet.) (stating that district attorneys and prosecutors are absolutely immune when performing their prosecutorial functions).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Mark and Rhonda Lesher v. Shannon and Gerald Coyel and Val Varley
Tex. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
Charleston v. Pate, 194 S.W.3d 89, 90 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2006, no pet.); Clawson v. Wharton Cnty., 941 S.W.2d 267, 272 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1996, writ denied).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Scott Tidwell v. State
Tex. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 , 96 S.Ct. 984 , 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976); Charleston v. Pate, 194 S.W.3d 89, 90 (Tex.App.--Texarkana 2006, no pet.); Font v. Carr, 867 S.W.2d 873 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ dism’d w.o.j.); Miller v. Curry, 625 S.W.2d 84 , 86–87 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Verlee Albert Jr. v. Sherri Adelstein, Judge Douglas M. Robison, Paul Johnson, and Judge L. Dee Shipman
Tex. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 , 430–31, 96 S. Ct. 984, 995 (1976) (recognizing that prosecutors have absolute immunity to suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ); Charleston v. Pate, 194 S.W.3d 89, 91 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, no pet.) (stating that district attorneys and prosecutors are absolutely immune when performing their prosecutorial functions).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Ricardo Sampson v. Texas Department of Public Safety, Brett Ligon, and Brian Ihnen
Tex. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
Charleston v. Pate, 194 S.W.3d 89, 90 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, no pet.).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lawrence Higgins v. David Blount, Cindy Evans and David Gleason
Tex. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 , 96 S.Ct. 984 , 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976) (recognizing absolute immunity to suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ); Charleston v. Pate, 194 S.W.3d 89, 91 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 2006, no pet.).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Tony Lynn Hailey v. Richard Glaser, Nancy Young, Laurine J. Blake
Tex. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427, 430 (1976) (recognizing absolute immunity to suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ); Charleston v. Pate, 194 S.W.3d 89, 91 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, no pet.); Martinez v. Hardy, 864 S.W.2d 767 , 772 7 A suit against an official in his official capacity “seeks to impose liability against the governmental unit rather than on the individual specifically named and ‘is, in all respects other than name, . . . a suit against the entity.’” Tex. A&M Univ.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) John Wayne Charleston v. Clint Allen, Criminal District Attorney of Cass County
Tex. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
It is well established that prosecutors are entitled to derived judicial immunity, also known as absolute immunity, for actions “intimately associated with the ju *137 dicial phase of the criminal process.” See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427, 480 , 96 S.Ct. 984 , 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976) (recognizing absolute immunity to suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 ); Charleston v. Pate, 194 S.W.3d 89, 91 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2006, no pet.); Hawkins v. Walvoord, 25 S.W.3d 882, 892 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2000, pet. denied) (“A prosecutor’s absolute immunity extends to activities intimately associated wi…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jason Blakeney v. State of Texas, Bill Saban, and Kyle Freeman
Tex. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
"District attorneys and other prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability when performing their prosecutorial functions." Charleston v. Pate , 194 S.W.3d 89, 90 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 2006, no pet.) (citing Imbler v. Pachtman , 424 U.S. 409 (1976); Font v. Carr , 867 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ dism'd w.o.j.); Miller v. Curry , 625 S.W.2d 84, 86-87 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Miller v. Filter
Cal. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
(Cf. Charleston v. Pate (Tex.Ct.App. 2006) 194 S.W.3d 89, 91 [de facto assistant district attorney was entitled to prosecutorial immunity]; Sank v. Poole (1992) 231 Ill.App.3d 780 [ 596 N.E.2d 1198, 1201 , 173 Ill.Dec. 319 ] [de facto police officer was entitled to governmental immunity]; White by Swafford, v. Gerbitz (6th Cir. 1989) 892 F.2d 457 , 462 [judge, whose appointment was procedurally defective, was entitled to absolute judicial immunity as a de facto special city court judge]; Barr v. Abrams (2d Cir. 1987) 810 F.2d 358, 361 [prosecutor was entitled to absolute immunity unless he or …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) in the Matter of the Marriage of Kerry Nathan Parker and Rana Roxanne Parker
Tex. App. · 2003 · confidence medium
"District attorneys and other prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability when performing their prosecutorial functions." Charleston v. Pate , 194 S.W.3d 89, 90 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 2006, no pet.) (citing Imbler v. Pachtman , 424 U.S. 409 (1976); Font v. Carr , 867 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ dism'd w.o.j.); Miller v. Curry , 625 S.W.2d 84, 86-87 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
discussed Cited "see" Stephen Hartman v. the Estate of Joe Alford
Tex. App. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427 (explaining that absolute immunity applies may have caused or the question whether it was lawful.” Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 271 (1993); see Charleston v. Pate, 194 S.W.3d 89, 91 (Tex. App.— Texarkana 2006, no pet.) (holding that “[i]t is the nature of one’s activity, not one’s title or qualifications, that gives rise to the prosecutorial immunity.” An argument that a prosecutor was not properly appointed and failed to take the oath of office is baseless when the attorney “actively assisted the district attorney in filing and prosecuting [t…
discussed Cited "see" Victor Cruz Gonzales v. Maritza Antu
Tex. App. · 2012 · signal: see · confidence high
See Charleston v. Pate , 194 S.W.3d 89, 90 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, no pet.) (“District attorneys and other prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability when performing their prosecutorial functions.”); Bradt v. West , 892 S.W.2d 56 , 69–70 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (“ Under the functional approach, a prosecutor’s acts that are intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process are protected by absolute immunity.”) (citation omitted); see also Blakeney , 2007 WL 2947576 , at *1 (stating that district attorneys and prosecutors are…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Michael Wayne Barnes v. Harris County Assistant District Attorney Maritza Antu and Court Appointed Defense Counsel Mary C. A. Moore
Tex. App. · 2014 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Charleston v. Pate, 194 S.W.3d 89, 91 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, no pet.) (stating that district attorneys and prosecutors are absolutely immune when performing their prosecutorial functions).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
John Wayne CHARLESTON, Appellant,
v.
Kenneth PATE, Et Al., Appellee
06-05-00074-CV.
Court of Appeals of Texas.
May 23, 2006.
194 S.W.3d 89
2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 4382
2006 WL 1389557
John Wayne Charleston, New Boston, pro se., D. Randall Montgomery, Deary, Montgomery, DeFeo & Canada, LLP, Dallas, for appellee.
Morriss, Ross, Cornelius.
Cited by 21 opinions  |  Published

OPINION

Opinion by Justice

CORNELIUS (Retired).

John Wayne Charleston appeals from an adverse judgment in his suit against Randall Lee, Tina M. Richardson, and several other persons for various alleged civil rights violations committed in connection with Charleston’s conviction for aggravated robbery. The trial court dismissed Charleston’s case as to all defendants on the grounds of immunity and failure to state a claim. Charleston appeals only as to Randall Lee and Tina Richardson, the district attorney and assistant district attorney of Cass County, respectively, who represented the State in the prosecution of Charleston.

Charleston raises five issues in which he contends, generally, that Lee failed to properly appoint Richardson as assistant district attorney; Richardson failed to take the oath of office and was therefore not qualified to act as assistant district attorney; these failures violated Charleston’s civil rights under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (2003) and other statutes; and Lee and Richardson are not entitled to immunity. Lee and Richardson raise several defenses other than immunity, but we hold that prosecutorial immunity bars Charleston’s claims, so it is not necessary for us to address the other defenses.

Lee and Richardson collaborated in the filing and prosecution of the aggravated robbery charge against Charleston, and they represented the respondents in three habeas corpus petitions Charleston filed seeking to gain release from incarceration. Charleston first contends that Richardson was not properly appointed or qualified as assistant district attorney and, therefore, the actions of Lee and Richardson in prosecuting him were violations of his due process rights.

District attorneys and other prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability when performing their prosecuto-rial functions. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976); Font v. Carr, 867 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ dism’d w.o.j.); Miller v. Curry, 625 S.W.2d 84, 86-87 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1981, writ refd n.r.e.). This immunity protects not only chief prosecutors, but also their assistants who perform prosecutorial functions. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (deputy district attorney); Font v. Carr, 867 S.W.2d at 874 (assistant district attorney). Prosecutorial functions are those acts representing the government in filing and presenting criminal cases, as well as other acts that are “intimately associated with the judicial process.” Clawson v. Wharton County, [*91] 941 S.W.2d 267 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1996, writ denied); Font v. Carr, 867 S.W.2d at 877. Absolute immunity protects a prosecutor even if the prosecutor acts in bad faith or with ulterior motives, so long as he or she acts within the scope of his or her prosecutorial functions. Clawson v. Wharton County, 941 S.W.2d at 272; Miller v. Curry, 625 S.W.2d at 86.

Charleston argues that Richardson was not legally qualified as assistant district attorney because her appointment was not properly authorized by the Cass County Commissioner’s Court and she did not take the oath of office. We reject this contention. Charleston concedes that Richardson held the office of assistant district attorney and actively assisted the district attorney in filing and prosecuting the robbery charge against him. Consequently, she was the de facto assistant district attorney, and her authority cannot be attacked in a collateral proceeding. Ex parte Grundy, 110 Tex.Crim. 367, 8 S.W.2d 677 (1928) (assistant county attorney); see also Freeman v. State, 556 S.W.2d 287, 304 (Tex.Crim.App.1977); Dane v. State, 36 Tex.Crim. 84, 35 S.W. 661 (1896). It is the nature of one’s activity, not one’s title or qualifications, that gives rise to the prosecutorial immunity. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993).

The acts of Lee and Richardson that Charleston alleged as the basis of his suit were all performed in representing the State in prosecuting the criminal case against Charleston and in representing the respondents in Charleston’s petitions for habeas corpus. As such, they were acts intimately connected to the judicial process. The trial court correctly dismissed Charleston’s suit against Lee and Richardson on the basis of prosecutorial immunity and failure to state a claim.

For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment.