show cause hearing in Texas

2026And a contempt judgment rendered without such notification by personal service is void.13 In re Blumenthal, 2021 WL 4848471 , at *5; see also Ex parte Vetterick, 744 S.W.2d at 599 ; In re Powers, No. 01-21-00466-CR, 2022 WL 16640631 , at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 3, 2022, orig. proceeding) 12 In re Acevedo, No. 13-05-335-CR, 2005 WL 1714310 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi July 22, 2005, orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“Show cause notices must advise the alleged contemnor of the specific acts of contempt and provide notice that criminal

2007Ex parte Vetterick , 744 S.W.2d 598, 599 (Tex. 1988) (notice of contempt allegations "should be by show cause order or equivalent legal process personally served on the alleged contemnor, and it should state when, how and by what means the defendant has been guilty of contempt"); Ex parte Herring , 438 S.W.2d 801, 803 (Tex. 1969) ("it is a denial of due process to commit a person to prison for contempt who is not shown to be avoiding deliberately the service of process, and who has had no personal notice or knowledge of the show-cause hearing at which he was held in contempt"); Gonzalez v. Sta

2025In cases involving criminal contempt, a heightened notice standard applies which requires two distinct forms of notice: (1) timely personal service of the show cause hearing, and (2) full and unambiguous notice of the contempt charges. 4 In re Walmart, 545 S.W.3d at 631–32 (citing Gonzalez v. State, 187 S.W.3d 166, 170 (Tex. App.—Waco 2006, no pet.)).

2007Ex parte Vetterick , 744 S.W.2d 598, 599 (Tex. 1988) (notice of contempt allegations "should be by show cause order or equivalent legal process personally served on the alleged contemnor, and it should state when, how and by what means the defendant has been guilty of contempt"); Ex parte Herring , 438 S.W.2d 801, 803 (Tex. 1969) ("it is a denial of due process to commit a person to prison for contempt who is not shown to be avoiding deliberately the service of process, and who has had no personal notice or knowledge of the show-cause hearing at which he was held in contempt"); Gonzalez v. Sta

2018Ex parte Vetterick, 744 S.W.2d 598, 599 (Tex. 1988) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re Rowe, 113 S.W.3d 749, 752 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, orig. proceeding).

2016Gonzalez v. State, 187 S.W.3d 166, 170 (Tex.App.--Waco 2006, no pet.), citing Ex parte Adell, 769 S.W.2d 521, 522 (Tex. 1989), Ex parte Vetterick, 744 S.W.2d 598, 599 (Tex. 1988); In re Rowe, 113 S.W.3d 749, 752 (Tex.App.--Austin 2003, orig. proceeding.).

2016Gonzalez v. State, 187 S.W.3d 166, 170 (Tex.App.--Waco 2006, no pet.), citing Ex parte Adell, 769 S.W.2d 521, 522 (Tex. 1989), Ex parte Vetterick, 744 S.W.2d 598, 599 (Tex. 1988); In re Rowe, 113 S.W.3d 749, 752 (Tex.App.--Austin 2003, orig. proceeding.).

2016In re Cisneros, 487 S.W.3d at 242 ; In re Warrick, 2014 WL 2466105 , at *6; Gonzalez v. State, 187 S.W.3d 166, 170 (Tex.App.--Waco 2006, no pet.), citing Ex parte Adell, 769 S.W.2d 521, 522 (Tex. 1989) and Ex parte Vetterick, 744 S.W.2d 598, 599 (Tex. 1988); In re Rowe, 113 S.W.3d 749, 752 (Tex.App.--Austin 2003, orig. proceeding.).

2023“A forfeiture proceeding begins when the State presents an affidavit to a magistrate and ends after a show cause hearing in which the magistrate determines whether the seized property should be destroyed or forfeited.” Id. at 127 .

2022Hardy v. State, 102 S.W.3d 123 , 131 n.5 (Tex. 2003). 12 132 (affirming forfeiture of eight-liners that, because they awarded gift certificates as prizes, “[did] not meet the section 47.01(4)(B) exclusion and were [thus] subject to forfeiture or destruction as gambling devices”); see also State v. One Super Cherry Master Video 8-Liner Mach., 102 S.W.3d 132, 133 (Tex. 2003) (referring to Hardy’s same-day holding and reciting that person in possession of alleged gambling device has “the burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, at a show cause hearing either that the machine is not a

2014Cf. Ex parte Sauser, 554 S.W.2d 239, 241 (Tex. 1977) (orig. proceeding) (stating that order directing sheriff to immediately arrest relator and bring him to court for show-cause hearing did not provide due process because it gave insufficient notice with regard to time to prepare for the hearing); Ex parte Herring, 438 S.W.2d 801, 801, 803 (Tex. 1969) (orig. proceeding) (stating that committing a person to jail for contempt when he had no personal notice or knowledge of the show-cause hearing at which he was held in contempt violated due process); Ex parte Bush, 619 S.W.2d 298 , 299–300 (Tex.

2007Ex parte Vetterick , 744 S.W.2d 598, 599 (Tex. 1988) (notice of contempt allegations "should be by show cause order or equivalent legal process personally served on the alleged contemnor, and it should state when, how and by what means the defendant has been guilty of contempt"); Ex parte Herring , 438 S.W.2d 801, 803 (Tex. 1969) ("it is a denial of due process to commit a person to prison for contempt who is not shown to be avoiding deliberately the service of process, and who has had no personal notice or knowledge of the show-cause hearing at which he was held in contempt"); Gonzalez v. Sta

2009Bank , 248 S.W.3d 351, 364-68 (Tex.App.–Corpus Christi 2007, mandamus denied and appeal dism’d), the court held a show cause hearing and determined that sanctions were appropriate under Rule 52.11 in a case with a “long and arduous history.” Counsel misstated the law to the court in Twist’s petition.

2009Bank, 248 S.W.3d 351, 364-68 (Tex.App.–Corpus Christi 2007, mandamus denied and appeal 10 dism’d), the court held a show cause hearing and determined that sanctions were appropriate under Rule 52.11 in a case with a “long and arduous history.” Counsel misstated the law to the court in Twist’s petition.

2007Counsel should not misrepresent, mischaracterize, misquote, or miscite the factual record or legal authorities. 67 In In re Colonial Pipeline Co., this Court ordered the relators to show cause why they should not be sanctioned for failing to disclose controlling case authority and failing to distinguish it from the case at issue. 68 We held that “such failure to disclose pertinent adverse authority might well be a failure of Relators to deal in good faith with this Court and a breach of professional ethics,” and we held that such failure would likely be sanctionable under Texas Rule of Appella

2007Counsel should not misrepresent, mischaracterize, misquote, or miscite the factual record or legal authorities. (67) In In re Colonial Pipeline Co. , this Court ordered the relators to show cause why they should not be sanctioned for failing to disclose controlling case authority and failing to distinguish it from the case at issue. (68) We held that "such failure to disclose pertinent adverse authority might well be a failure of Relators to deal in good faith with this Court and a breach of professional ethics," and we held that such failure would likely be sanctionable under Texas Rule of Ap

2024See id. at 296 (citing Ex parte Harwell, 538 S.W.2d 667 , 668–70 (Tex. Civ.

2016See Ex parte Harwell, 538 S.W.2d 667, 668-70 (Tex.Civ.App.--Waco 1976, orig. proceeding).

2022Hardy v. State, 102 S.W.3d 123 , 131 n.5 (Tex. 2003). 12 132 (affirming forfeiture of eight-liners that, because they awarded gift certificates as prizes, “[did] not meet the section 47.01(4)(B) exclusion and were [thus] subject to forfeiture or destruction as gambling devices”); see also State v. One Super Cherry Master Video 8-Liner Mach., 102 S.W.3d 132, 133 (Tex. 2003) (referring to Hardy’s same-day holding and reciting that person in possession of alleged gambling device has “the burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, at a show cause hearing either that the machine is not a

2015See Hardy, 102 S.W.3d at 129 ; see also State v. One Super Cherry Master Video 8-Liner Machine, 102 S.W.3d 132, 133 (Tex. 2003).

2019Clanton v. Clark, 639 S.W.2d 929, 931 (Tex. 1982); In re Estate of Parrimore, No. 14-14-00820-CV, 2016 WL 750293 , at *10 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 25, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Bagwell v. Ridge at Alta Vista Invs.

2019Clanton v. Clark, 639 S.W.2d 929, 931 (Tex. 1982); In re Estate of Parrimore, No. 14-14-00820-CV, 2016 WL 750293 , at *10 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 25, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Bagwell v. Ridge at Alta Vista Invs.

2009Cf. Armstrong, 233 S.W.3d at 62 (reversing sanctions and noting that the trial court did not hold a hearing before assessing sanctions for bad faith pleadings and thus it heard no evidence about the underlying facts that supported the award of sanctions).

2009Cf. Armstrong, 233 S.W.3d at 62 (reversing sanctions and noting that the trial court did not hold a hearing before assessing sanctions for bad faith pleadings and thus it heard no evidence about the underlying facts that supported the award of sanctions).

2025In cases involving criminal contempt, a heightened notice standard applies which requires two distinct forms of notice: (1) timely personal service of the show cause hearing, and (2) full and unambiguous notice of the contempt charges. 4 In re Walmart, 545 S.W.3d at 631–32 (citing Gonzalez v. State, 187 S.W.3d 166, 170 (Tex. App.—Waco 2006, no pet.)).

2021Id.6 The court of appeals held the “‘notice’ issued by Respondent completely failed” to satisfy the requirements of “timely notice by personal service of the show cause hearing, and full and unambiguous notice of the contempt accusations” that states in writing “when, how, and by what means the person has been guilty of contempt.” Id. at 632 (citing In re Warrick, 2014 WL 2466105 at *6).

2023The Tyler court concluded that the defendant had not waived her motion because the show-cause hearing involved interlocutory orders that had “no relation to an issue of law or fact[] going to the merits of the case” and because it “was forced upon [her] by the [plaintiff].” Id. at 482 .

2006See also Green v. Green, 424 S.W.2d 479, 481 (Tex.Civ.App.-Tyler 1968, no writ) (holding under general venue principles that mother’s appearance at a show cause hearing set by father in change of custody proceeding did not waive her venue challenge). 6 .Former Section 11.06(f) read: A motion to transfer by any other party [than petitioner or movant] is timely if it is made on or before the Monday next after the expiration of 20 days after the date of service of citation or notice of the action or before the commencement of the hearing, whichever is sooner.

2025See Browning v. Prostok, 165 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2005) (“A judgment is void [] when it is apparent that the court rendering judgment ‘had no jurisdiction of the parties or property, no jurisdiction of the subject matter, no jurisdiction to enter the particular judgment, or no capacity to act.’”) (quoting Browning v. Placke, 698 S.W.2d 362, 363 (Tex. 1985). 7.

2025See Browning v. Prostok, 165 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2005) (“A judgment is void [] when it is apparent that the court rendering judgment ‘had no jurisdiction of the parties or property, no jurisdiction of the subject matter, no jurisdiction to enter the particular judgment, or no capacity to act.’”) (quoting Browning v. Placke, 698 S.W.2d 362, 363 (Tex. 1985). 7.

2025Id.; see also Ex parte Gonzales, 945 S.W.2d at 837 (“[I]t is essential that no criminal defendant be subjected to formal adversarial judicial proceedings without a lawyer unless there is a basis for concluding that he knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently relinquished or abandoned his right to the assistance of counsel.”) (quoting North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979)).

2025Id.; see also Ex parte Gonzales, 945 S.W.2d at 837 (“[I]t is essential that no criminal defendant be subjected to formal adversarial judicial proceedings without a lawyer unless there is a basis for concluding that he knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently relinquished or abandoned his right to the assistance of counsel.”) (quoting North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979)).

2024See In re Gabrielova, 527 S.W.3d 290, 295 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016, orig. proceeding).

2024See id. at 296 (citing Ex parte Harwell, 538 S.W.2d 667 , 668–70 (Tex. Civ.

2020ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY In her second issue, Beene contends the trial court erred in concluding Escamilla and Henneke established absolute immunity as a valid defense “because 1) they were not prosecuting a criminal action and arguably had no role at all at the show cause hearing, 2) they were acting as investigators rather than prosecutorial function [sic], and 3) they were acting as [sic] the role of a witness.” “District attorneys and other prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability when performing their prosecutorial functions.” Charleston v. Pate, 194 S.W.3d 89, 90 (Tex. App.— Texarkana 2

2020“This immunity protects not only chief prosecutors, but also their assistants who perform prosecutorial functions.” Id.

2020By emergency motion, relator seeks to stay the underlying proceedings, including a show cause hearing set for January 13, 2019, regarding, inter alia, relator’s failure to comply with the foregoing discovery orders. “[M]andamus is both an extraordinary remedy and a discretionary one.” In re Garza, 544 S.W.3d 836, 840 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).