16 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1982–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Buckley v. Fitzsimmonsgreen2 sentences2019See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427 (explaining that absolute immunity applies may have caused or the question whether it was lawful.” Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 271 (1993); see Charleston v. Pate, 194 S.W.3d 89, 91 (Tex. App.— Texarkana 2006, no pet.) (holding that “[i]t is the nature of one’s activity, not one’s title or qualifications, that gives rise to the prosecutorial immunity.” An argument that a prosecutor was not properly appointed and failed to take the oath of office is baseless when the attorney “actively assisted the district attorney in filing and prosecuting [the case,]” mak 2015Prosecutorial immunity also applies to “[t]hose acts undertaken by a prosecutor in preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the course of his role as an advocate for the State.” Clawson v. Wharton Cty., 941 S.W.2d 267, 272 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1996, writ denied) (citing 5 Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 272 (1993)).3 We conclude that Sheppard is entitled to absolute immunity because appellant’s claims arose from Sheppard’s decision to initiate a case on behalf of the State and from his alleged conduct while acting as an advocate for the S | 3 | 4 |
Clawson v. Wharton Countygreen2 sentences2022See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427 (noting that absolute immunity applies to a prosecutor who engages in “malicious or dishonest action”); see also Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 , 489–90 (1991) (explaining that “prosecutors and other lawyers were absolutely immune from liability for damages at common law for making false or defamatory statements in judicial proceedings . . . and also for eliciting false and defamatory testimony from witnesses”); Lesher, 435 S.W.3d at 430–31 (applying absolute immunity to a prosecutor accused of withholding grand jury handbook from grand jury and presenting inadmissible 2015Prosecutorial immunity also applies to “[t]hose acts undertaken by a prosecutor in preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the course of his role as an advocate for the State.” Clawson v. Wharton Cty., 941 S.W.2d 267, 272 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1996, writ denied) (citing 5 Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 272 (1993)).3 We conclude that Sheppard is entitled to absolute immunity because appellant’s claims arose from Sheppard’s decision to initiate a case on behalf of the State and from his alleged conduct while acting as an advocate for the S | 3 | 3 |
Imbler v. Pachtmangreen2 sentences2022See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427 (noting that absolute immunity applies to a prosecutor who engages in “malicious or dishonest action”); see also Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 , 489–90 (1991) (explaining that “prosecutors and other lawyers were absolutely immune from liability for damages at common law for making false or defamatory statements in judicial proceedings . . . and also for eliciting false and defamatory testimony from witnesses”); Lesher, 435 S.W.3d at 430–31 (applying absolute immunity to a prosecutor accused of withholding grand jury handbook from grand jury and presenting inadmissible 2019See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427 (explaining that absolute immunity applies may have caused or the question whether it was lawful.” Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 271 (1993); see Charleston v. Pate, 194 S.W.3d 89, 91 (Tex. App.— Texarkana 2006, no pet.) (holding that “[i]t is the nature of one’s activity, not one’s title or qualifications, that gives rise to the prosecutorial immunity.” An argument that a prosecutor was not properly appointed and failed to take the oath of office is baseless when the attorney “actively assisted the district attorney in filing and prosecuting [the case,]” mak | 3 | 3 |
Strickland v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2015Taylor v. State, 93 S.W.3d at 501 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.668, 696, 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 90 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). 2003Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 696 (1984). | 2 | 5 |
Burns v. Reedgreen2 sentences2022See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427 (noting that absolute immunity applies to a prosecutor who engages in “malicious or dishonest action”); see also Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 , 489–90 (1991) (explaining that “prosecutors and other lawyers were absolutely immune from liability for damages at common law for making false or defamatory statements in judicial proceedings . . . and also for eliciting false and defamatory testimony from witnesses”); Lesher, 435 S.W.3d at 430–31 (applying absolute immunity to a prosecutor accused of withholding grand jury handbook from grand jury and presenting inadmissible 2020See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427 (noting that absolute immunity applies to a prosecutor who engages in “malicious or dishonest action”); see also Burns v. Reed, 21 500 U.S. 478 , 489–90 (1991) (explaining that “prosecutors and other lawyers were absolutely immune from liability for damages at common law for making false or defamatory statements in judicial proceedings . . . and also for eliciting false and defamatory testimony from witnesses”); Lesher, 435 S.W.3d at 430–31 (applying absolute immunity to a prosecutor accused of withholding grand jury handbook from grand jury and presenting inadmissi | 2 | 2 |
Charleston v. Pategreen2 sentences2019See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427 (explaining that absolute immunity applies may have caused or the question whether it was lawful.” Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 271 (1993); see Charleston v. Pate, 194 S.W.3d 89, 91 (Tex. App.— Texarkana 2006, no pet.) (holding that “[i]t is the nature of one’s activity, not one’s title or qualifications, that gives rise to the prosecutorial immunity.” An argument that a prosecutor was not properly appointed and failed to take the oath of office is baseless when the attorney “actively assisted the district attorney in filing and prosecuting [the case,]” mak 2019See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427 (explaining that absolute immunity applies may have caused or the question whether it was lawful.” Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 271 (1993); see Charleston v. Pate, 194 S.W.3d 89, 91 (Tex. App.— Texarkana 2006, no pet.) (holding that “[i]t is the nature of one’s activity, not one’s title or qualifications, that gives rise to the prosecutorial immunity.” An argument that a prosecutor was not properly appointed and failed to take the oath of office is baseless when the attorney “actively assisted the district attorney in filing and prosecuting [the case,]” mak | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Mark and Rhonda Lesher v. Shannon and Gerald Coyel and Val Varley
green
2 sentences2022See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427 (noting that absolute immunity applies to a prosecutor who engages in “malicious or dishonest action”); see also Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 , 489–90 (1991) (explaining that “prosecutors and other lawyers were absolutely immune from liability for damages at common law for making false or defamatory statements in judicial proceedings . . . and also for eliciting false and defamatory testimony from witnesses”); Lesher, 435 S.W.3d at 430–31 (applying absolute immunity to a prosecutor accused of withholding grand jury handbook from grand jury and presenting inadmissible 2020See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427 (noting that absolute immunity applies to a prosecutor who engages in “malicious or dishonest action”); see also Burns v. Reed, 21 500 U.S. 478 , 489–90 (1991) (explaining that “prosecutors and other lawyers were absolutely immune from liability for damages at common law for making false or defamatory statements in judicial proceedings . . . and also for eliciting false and defamatory testimony from witnesses”); Lesher, 435 S.W.3d at 430–31 (applying absolute immunity to a prosecutor accused of withholding grand jury handbook from grand jury and presenting inadmissi | 2 | 2020–2022 |
Oregon v. Kennedy
green
2 sentences1998Under the United States Constitution, it is not enough that there exist sufficient grounds for a mistrial; the defendant must in essence be forced to move for one: Where the prosecutorial error even of a degree sufficient to warrant a mistrial has occurred, "[t]he important consideration, for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, is that the defendant retain primary control over the course to be followed in the event of such error." Id. at 676 , 102 S.Ct. 2083 (brackets in original; citation omitted). 1998Under the United States Constitution, it is not enough that there exist sufficient grounds for a mistrial; the defendant must in essence be forced to move for one: Where the prosecutorial error even of a degree sufficient to warrant a mistrial has occurred, "[t]he important consideration, for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, is that the defendant retain primary control over the course to be followed in the event of such error." Id. at 676 , 102 S.Ct. 2083 (brackets in original; citation omitted). | 2 | 1994–1998 |
Taylor v. State
green
1 sentence2015Taylor v. State, 93 S.W.3d at 501 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.668, 696, 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 90 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Miller v. Curry
green
2 sentences2013Here, Colston and the Tarrant County District Attorney, acting in their official capacities as Dodson’s petition alleges, [2] are shielded by the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity to Dodson’s claims of negligence and conspiracy related to their prosecution of his murder conviction. [3] Miller v. Curry , 625 S.W.2d 84 , 86–87 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (reasoning that absolute immunity from civil liability pertained to prosecutors acting in their official capacity even where the “prosecutor knowingly used perjured testimony, deliberately withheld exculpatory information or 2013Here, Colston and the Tarrant County District Attorney, acting in their official capacities as Dodson’s petition alleges, [2] are shielded by the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity to Dodson’s claims of negligence and conspiracy related to their prosecution of his murder conviction. [3] Miller v. Curry , 625 S.W.2d 84 , 86–87 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (reasoning that absolute immunity from civil liability pertained to prosecutors acting in their official capacity even where the “prosecutor knowingly used perjured testimony, deliberately withheld exculpatory information or | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Hathorne v. State
green
1 sentence2002Hathorne, 459 S.W.2d at 829 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
United States v. Terry Lewis Davis
green
2 sentences1982In United States v. Davis, 589 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1979), the trial court found that the prosecutorial error which resulted in a mistrial was the result of inadvertence rather than bad faith. 1982In United States v. Davis, 589 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1979), the trial court found that the prosecutorial error which resulted in a mistrial was the result of inadvertence rather than bad faith. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.