Hardy v. State, 705 So. 2d 979 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). · Go Syfert
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Hardy v. State, 705 So. 2d 979 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“ur reading of section 316.027 convinces us that the intended unit of prosecution' for these offenses is not the number of victims, but the number of accidents.”
48 citation events (32 in the last 25 years) across 6 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: YEYE v. State (fladistctapp, 2010-04-28)
Treatment trajectory · 1998 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1998 2012 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 22 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) YEYE v. State (4×) also: Cited as authority (rule)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2010 · signal: see · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence high
in this case 'there was but one scene of the accident and one failure to stop'; thus, there was but one offense
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) McKnight v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2005 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
ur reading of section 316.027 convinces us that the intended unit of prosecution' for these offenses is not the number of victims, but the number of accidents.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Batista v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
Capron v. State, 948 So.2d 954, 961 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007); Hardy v. State, 705 So.2d 979, 981 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Stone
W. Va. · 2012 · confidence medium
App.1995) (reversing four convictions of Alabama’s "leaving the scene of an accident” statute resulting from a single accident on ground that double jeopardy principles violated); Hardy v. State, 705 So.2d 979, 980, 981 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1998) (holding that convictions of two counts of leaving scene of accident involving death and one count of leaving scene of accident involving injury violated double jeopardy principles and that intended "unit of prosecution” for both offenses "is not the number of victims, but the number of accidents.” " '[Tjhere was but one scene of the accident and…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Beahr v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
NOTES [1] See Hardy v. State, 705 So.2d 979, 981 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (holding that when multiple convictions violate the double jeopardy prohibition, "[t]he proper remedy is to vacate the conviction for the lesser offense while affirming the conviction for the greater one"). [2] Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 , 52 S.Ct. 180 , 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). [3] Section 800.04(5)(a) defines specific alternative conduct as lewd or lascivious molestation.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Peer v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
See §§ 316.027(1)(a)(b), Fla. Stat. (2005); Hardy v. State, 705 So.2d 979, 980 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Capron v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
When multiple convictions violate double jeopardy, "[t]he proper remedy is to vacate the conviction for the lesser offense while affirming the conviction for the greater one." Hardy v. State, 705 So.2d 979, 981 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Constantino
Mass. · 2005 · confidence medium
See also State v. Powers, 200 Ariz. 363, 363-364 (2001); Hardy v. State, 705 So. 2d 979, 979-980 (Fla. Dist.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Florida
Fla. · 2005 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Jones v. State, 764 So.2d 659, 660 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (“Both offenses for which appellant was convicted share the same common core criminal conduct, resisting an officer.”); Hardy v. State, 705 So.2d 979, 980 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (observing that because offenses of leaving the scene of an accident involving death and leaving the scene of an accident involving injury “are different degrees of the same crime, the legislature may have intended only a single conviction”); Beltran v. State, 700 So.2d 132, 135 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (“Sexual battery arose from the common law crime …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Florida
Fla. · 2005 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Jones v. State, 764 So.2d 659, 660 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) ("Both offenses for which appellant was convicted share the same common core criminal conduct, resisting an officer."); Hardy v. State, 705 So.2d 979, 980 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (observing that because offenses of leaving the scene of an accident involving death and leaving the scene of an accident involving injury "are different degrees of the same crime, the legislature may have intended only a single conviction"); Beltran v. State, 700 So.2d 132, 135 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) ("Sexual battery arose from the common law crime of rape an…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Olivard v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
When dual convictions violate double jeopardy, "[t]he proper remedy is to vacate the conviction for the lesser offense while affirming the conviction for the greater one." Hardy v. State, 705 So.2d 979, 981 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Webb v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
However, whether a court may impose multiple convictions and sentences for offenses resulting from a single criminal episode is "purely a question of legislative intent." Hardy v. State, 705 So.2d 979, 979 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Sanders v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
Hardy v. State, 705 So.2d 979, 981 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State of Arizona v. Powers
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
See Dake v. State, 675 So.2d 1365, 1368 (Ala.Crim.App.1995) (defendant “cannot be convicted separately for each person injured ... as a result of an accident of which he left the scene”); Hardy v. State, 705 So.2d 979, 981 (Fla.App.1998), quoting Hoag v. State, 511 So.2d 401, 402 (Fla.App.1987) (although he had injured people in two vehicles, defendant could only be convicted once because “ ‘there was but one scene of the accident and one failure to stop’ ”); People v. Sleboda, 166 Ill.App.3d 42 , 116 Ill.Dec. 620 , 519 N.E.2d 512, 522 (1988) (same); Nield v. State, 677 N.E.2d 79, …
discussed Cited "see" Delgado v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2015 · signal: see · confidence high
See Olivard v. State, 831 So.2d 823, 824 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (noting the proper remedy for a double jeopardy .violation through dual convictions is the vacation of the conviction for the lesser offense (quoting Hardy v. State, 705 So.2d 979, 981 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998))).
discussed Cited "see" Holt v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2015 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hardy v. State, 705 So.2d 979, 981 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (stating that the proper remedy for a double jeopardy violation “is to vacate the conviction for the lesser offense while affirming the conviction for the greater one” (citing Williams v. Singletary, 78 F.3d 1510, 1516 (11th Cir.1996))).
discussed Cited "see" Bermudez v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hardy v. State, 705 So.2d 979 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (holding the appropriate remedy for a double jeopardy violation is to vacate the conviction for the lesser offense).
discussed Cited "see" Tellier v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hardy v. State, 705 So.2d 979 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (holding the appropriate remedy for a double jeopardy violation is to vacate the conviction for the lesser offense).
discussed Cited "see" Johnson v. State (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hardy v. State, 705 So.2d 979, 981 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).
discussed Cited "see" Papageorge v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hardy v. State, 705 So.2d 979 , 23 Fla.L.Weekly D345 (Fla. 4th DCA Jan.28, 1998); Hoag v. State, 511 So.2d 401 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) (finding that the "unit of prosecution" for violating the statute requiring a driver to stop when involved in an accident resulting in injury or death was not the number of victims injured, but the number of accidents).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Deontae Palinski Johnson v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2020 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Hardy v. State, 705 So. 2d 979, 981 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (holding that convictions for leaving the scene of a crash involving death and leaving the scene of a crash involving personal injury constituted a single episode of leaving the scene— even though the single crash involved multiple cars and victims); Hoag v. State, 511 So. 2d 401, 402 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) (“[T]he failure of [the defendant] to stop at the scene of his accident constituted but one offense although that accident resulted in injuries to four persons and the death of a fifth.”).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Darby v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1999 · signal: see also · confidence low
See Sessler v. State, 740 So.2d 587 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999); see also Hardy v. State, 705 So.2d 979 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Terry Carnell HARDY, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
97-0402.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Jan 28, 1998.
705 So. 2d 979
Stevenson.
Cited by 36 opinions  |  Published

Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Ian Seldin, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and James J. Carney, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

STEVENSON, Judge.

Appellant, Terry Carnell Hardy, was convicted of various offenses all relating to a traffic accident that occurred on July 16, 1995, on a dark stretch of U.S. 441. While we otherwise affirm, we reverse appellant's conviction for leaving the scene of an accident involving injury, as we hold that appellant's dual convictions for leaving the scene of an accident involving injury, see § 316.027(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1995), and leaving the scene of an accident involving death, see id. § 316.027(1)(b), violated the prohibition against double jeopardy where both convictions related to the same accident.

Appellant was involved in a single traffic accident which resulted in the deaths of both Dr. Daniel Carlton and his wife, Clara, who were travelling together in their automobile. The crash also resulted in serious injury to Harold Drake, who was driving a semi-truck. Count IV of the amended information charges appellant with leaving the scene of an accident involving death in relation to the deaths of both Dr. and Mrs. Carlton. Count V, which charges appellant with leaving the scene of an accident involving injury, relates to the injury suffered by the truck driver.

Whether multiple convictions and sentences may be imposed for offenses resulting from a single criminal episode is purely a question of legislative intent:

In determining the constitutionality of multiple convictions and sentences for offenses arising from the same criminal[*980] transaction, the dispositive question is whether the legislature "intended to authorize separate punishments for the two crimes." Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 334, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 1145, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981); accord State v. Smith, 547 So.2d 613, 614 (Fla.1989).

M.P. v. State, 682 So.2d 79, 81 (Fla.1996). While the Florida legislature has provided that separate crimes committed within a single episode should generally result in a conviction for each applicable offense, it has made an exception where: (1) the offenses require identical elements of proof; (2) the offenses are degrees of the same crime; or (3) one of the offenses is a lesser included offense of the other. See § 775.021(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (1995).

The offenses charged in Counts IV and V are different degrees of the same crime. In this respect, it is noteworthy that the predecessor statute described only a single offense, making it a third degree felony to leave the scene of an accident which involved either injury or death. See § 316.027(1), (2), Fla. Stat. (1985). The current statute separates its predecessor into two discrete offenses, distinguishing accidents on the basis of whether they involve death or mere injury. See § 316.027(1)(a), (b), Fla. Stat. (1995). The two new offenses are defined virtually identically, except that when the accident results in death, rather than mere injury, the offense becomes a second degree felony.[1] Because the two offenses are different degrees of the same crime, the legislature may have intended only a single conviction in this case. See § 775.021(4)(b)2, Fla. Stat. (1995).

The State responds that multiple convictions are appropriate in this case because there were multiple victims. However, our reading of section 316.027 convinces us that the intended "unit of prosecution" for these offenses is not the number of victims, but the number of accidents. The Fifth District addressed this very issue in Hoag v. State, 511 So.2d 401 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987), with regard to the predecessor statute. In Hoag, the defendant was involved in a single automobile accident which resulted in injury to four people and the death of another. The defendant was convicted of four counts of leaving the scene of an accident involving injuries and one count of leaving the scene of an accident involving death. Id. at 401. On appeal, the Fifth District vacated four of these five convictions, holding that the multiple convictions violated the prohibition against double jeopardy:

Section 316.027, Florida Statutes, provides that
The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury or death of any person shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of the accident.
The gist of this statute is the failure of a driver of a vehicle involved to stop at the scene of an accident resulting in injury or death. Although Hoag's accident caused four injuries and one death, there was but one scene of the accident and one failure to stop.... [T]he failure of Hoag to stop at the scene of his accident constituted but one offense although that accident resulted in injuries to four persons and the death of a fifth. Hoag's five convictions of the same statutory offense as to the same factual event violated Hoag's double jeopardy rights.

Id. at 402.

We believe that Hoag`s reasoning and conclusion apply with equal force under the[*981] present statutory scheme. We find that the "gist" of the current statute, like its predecessor, is to prohibit a driver from leaving the scene of an accident that involves injury or death. As in Hoag, in this case "there was but one scene of the accident and one failure to stop"; thus, there was but one offense.

Although appellant did not raise his double jeopardy claim below, a double jeopardy violation is a fundamental error that may be raised for the first time on appeal. See State v. Johnson, 483 So.2d 420 (Fla. 1986). The proper remedy is to vacate the conviction for the lesser offense while affirming the conviction for the greater one. See Williams v. Singletary, 78 F.3d 1510, 1516 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 221, 136 L.Ed.2d 154 (1996). Accordingly, we vacate the conviction for leaving the scene of an accident involving injury, but affirm appellant's other convictions.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART.

POLEN and GROSS, JJ., concur.

1 The relevant statutory sections provide:

The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in the death of any person must immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident, or as close thereto as possible, and must remain at the scene of the accident until he or she has fulfilled the requirements of s. 316.062. Any person who willfully violates this paragraph is guilty of a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

§ 316.027(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (1995)(emphasis added).

The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury of any person must immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident, or as close thereto as possible, and must remain at the scene of the accident until he or she has fulfilled the requirements of s. 316.062. Any person who willfully violates this paragraph is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

§ 316.027(1)(a), Fla. Stat (1995)(emphasis added).