Florida Statutes

Fla. Stat. § 316.027 (2025)

Crash involving death or personal injuries.

✓ 2025 Florida Statutes — current through the 2025 Regular Session

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316.027 Crash involving death or personal injuries.—

(1) As used in this section, the term:

(a) “Serious bodily injury” means an injury to a person, including the driver, which consists of a physical condition that creates a substantial risk of death, serious personal disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member or organ.

(b) “Vulnerable road user” means:

1. A pedestrian, including a person actually engaged in work upon a highway, or in work upon utility facilities along a highway, or engaged in the provision of emergency services within the right-of-way;

2. A person operating a bicycle, an electric bicycle, a motorcycle, a scooter, or a moped lawfully on the roadway;

3. A person riding an animal; or

4. A person lawfully operating on a public right-of-way, crosswalk, or shoulder of the roadway:

a. A farm tractor or similar vehicle designed primarily for farm use;

b. A skateboard, roller skates, or in-line skates;

c. A horse-drawn carriage;

d. An electric personal assistive mobility device; or

e. A wheelchair.

(2)(a) The driver of a vehicle involved in a crash occurring on public or private property which results in injury to a person other than serious bodily injury shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the crash, or as close thereto as possible, and shall remain at the scene of the crash until he or she has fulfilled the requirements of s. 316.062. A person who willfully violates this paragraph commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

(b) The driver of a vehicle involved in a crash occurring on public or private property which results in serious bodily injury to a person shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the crash, or as close thereto as possible, and shall remain at the scene of the crash until he or she has fulfilled the requirements of s. 316.062. A person who willfully violates this paragraph commits a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

(c) The driver of a vehicle involved in a crash occurring on public or private property which results in the death of a person shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the crash, or as close thereto as possible, and shall remain at the scene of the crash until he or she has fulfilled the requirements of s. 316.062. A person who is arrested for a violation of this paragraph and who has previously been convicted of a violation of this section, s. 316.061, s. 316.191, or s. 316.193, or a felony violation of s. 322.34, shall be held in custody until brought before the court for admittance to bail in accordance with chapter 903. A person who willfully violates this paragraph commits a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084, and shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 4 years. A person who willfully commits such a violation while driving under the influence as set forth in s. 316.193(1) shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 4 years.

(d) Notwithstanding s. 775.089(1)(a), if the driver of a vehicle violates paragraph (a), paragraph (b), or paragraph (c), the court shall order the driver to make restitution to the victim for any damage or loss unless the court finds clear and compelling reasons not to order the restitution. Restitution may be monetary or nonmonetary restitution. The court shall make the payment of restitution a condition of probation in accordance with s. 948.03. An order requiring the defendant to make restitution to a victim does not remove or diminish the requirement that the court order payment to the Crimes Compensation Trust Fund under chapter 960. Payment of an award by the Crimes Compensation Trust Fund creates an order of restitution to the Crimes Compensation Trust Fund unless specifically waived in accordance with s. 775.089(1)(b).

(e) A driver who violates paragraph (a), paragraph (b), or paragraph (c) shall have his or her driver license revoked for at least 3 years as provided in s. 322.28(4).

1. A person convicted of violating paragraph (a), paragraph (b), or paragraph (c) shall, before his or her driving privilege may be reinstated, present to the department proof of completion of a victim’s impact panel session in a judicial circuit if such a panel exists, or if such a panel does not exist, a department-approved driver improvement course relating to the rights of vulnerable road users relative to vehicles on the roadway as provided in s. 322.0261(2).

2. The department may reinstate an offender’s driving privilege after he or she satisfies the 3-year revocation period as provided in s. 322.28(4) and successfully completes either a victim’s impact panel session or a department-approved driver improvement course relating to the rights of vulnerable road users relative to vehicles on the roadway as provided in s. 322.0261(2).

3. For purposes of this paragraph, an offender’s driving privilege may be reinstated only after the department verifies that the offender participated in and successfully completed a victim’s impact panel session or a department-approved driver improvement course.

(f) For purposes of sentencing under chapter 921 and determining incentive gain-time eligibility under chapter 944, an offense listed in this subsection is ranked one level above the ranking specified in s. 921.0022 or s. 921.0023 for the offense committed if the victim of the offense was a vulnerable road user.

(g) The defendant may move to depart from the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment prescribed in paragraph (c) unless the violation was committed while the defendant was driving under the influence. The state may object to this departure. The court may grant the motion only if it finds that a factor, consideration, or circumstance clearly demonstrates that imposing a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment would constitute or result in an injustice. The court shall state in open court the basis for granting the motion.

(3) The stops shall be made without unnecessarily obstructing traffic, and, if a damaged vehicle is obstructing traffic, the driver of the vehicle shall make every reasonable effort to move the vehicle or have it moved so as not to obstruct the regular flow of traffic. A person who fails to comply with this subsection shall be cited for a nonmoving violation, punishable as provided in chapter 318.

(4)(a) In addition to any other civil, criminal, or administrative penalty imposed, a person whose commission of a noncriminal traffic infraction or a violation of this chapter or s. 1006.66 causes or results in the death of another person may be required by the court to serve 120 community service hours in a trauma center or hospital that regularly receives victims of vehicle accidents, under the supervision of a registered nurse, an emergency room physician, or an emergency medical technician pursuant to a voluntary community service program operated by the trauma center or hospital.

(b) Notwithstanding paragraph (a), in addition to any other civil, criminal, or administrative penalty imposed, a person whose commission of a violation of s. 316.172(1)(a) or (b) causes or results in serious bodily injury to or death of another person shall be required by the court to:

1. Serve 120 community service hours in a trauma center or hospital that regularly receives victims of vehicle accidents, under the supervision of a registered nurse, an emergency room physician, or an emergency medical technician pursuant to a voluntary community service program operated by the trauma center or hospital.

2. Participate in a victim’s impact panel session in a judicial circuit if such a panel exists, or if such a panel does not exist, attend a department-approved driver improvement course relating to the rights of vulnerable road users relative to vehicles on the roadway as provided in s. 322.0261(2).

(5) This section does not apply to crashes occurring during a motorsports event, as defined in s. 549.10(1), or at a closed-course motorsport facility, as defined in s. 549.09(1).

History.—s. 1, ch. 71-135; s. 1, ch. 75-72; s. 5, ch. 76-31; s. 1, ch. 82-161; s. 51, ch. 89-282; s. 1, ch. 93-140; s. 9, ch. 94-306; s. 894, ch. 95-148; s. 5, ch. 96-350; s. 82, ch. 99-248; s. 956, ch. 2002-387; s. 2, ch. 2006-225; s. 2, ch. 2007-211; s. 2, ch. 2011-80; s. 2, ch. 2014-225; s. 2, ch. 2017-189; s. 83, ch. 2019-167; s. 4, ch. 2020-69; s. 4, ch. 2022-180.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 152 cases (9 in the last 5 years), 1973–2026 · leading case: Jacob Thomas Gaulden v. State of Florida, 195 So. 3d 1123 (Fla. 2016).

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Jacob Thomas Gaulden v. State of Florida, 195 So. 3d 1123 (Fla. 2016). · cites it 28× “Having concluded that a driver’s vehicle may be “involved in a crash” under this statute when a passenger separates from a moving vehicle and lands on the roadway or adjacent area, the district court affirmed Petitioner’s conviction for leaving the scene of a crash resulting in…”

Stanfill v. State, 384 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 1980). · cites it 34× “1st DCA 1978), holding that section 316.027, Florida Statutes (1975), creates but a single crime, that being the felony of "willfully" leaving the scene of an accident.”

State of Florida v. Zachariah Dorsett, 158 So. 3d 557 (Fla. 2015). · cites it 24× “In this case, we answer a certified question regarding the knowledge element of Florida’s hit-and-run statute, section 316.027, Florida Statutes (2006).”

In Re Stand. Jury Instructions in Crim. Cases-report No. 2015-07, 192 So. 3d 1190 (Fla. 2016). · cites it 26× “1995) dealing with § 316.027, Fla. Stat., which, unlike § 316.”

In Re: Stand. Jury Instructions in Crim. Cases-Report 2018-09., 262 So. 3d 59 (Fla. 2019). · cites it 36× “1995), dealing with § 316.027, Fla. Stat., which, unlike § 316.”

State v. Dumas, 700 So. 2d 1223 (Fla. 1997). · cites it 17× “[3] The majority overstates its case by venturing that "requiring proof that a driver had knowledge of death would lead to an absurd result: a driver who callously leaves the scene of a serious accident can avoid a second-degree felony conviction by disavowing knowledge of death.”

McKnight v. State, 906 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005). · cites it 11× “" The obvious distinction between the cases McKnight relies upon and the instant case is that McKnight is not faced with convictions for leaving the scene of an accident pursuant to section 316.027, Florida Statutes (2001), in addition to his convictions for vehicular homicide…”

Hardy v. State, 705 So. 2d 979 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). · cites it 12× “On appeal, the Fifth District vacated four of these five convictions, holding that the multiple convictions violated the prohibition against double jeopardy: Section 316.027, Florida Statutes, provides that The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury or…”

State v. Mancuso, 652 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 1995). · cites it 10× “Dennis Mancuso was charged with leaving the scene of an accident involving death or personal injury under section 316.027, Florida Statutes (1991).”

McCullough v. State, 230 So. 3d 586 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017). · cites it 18× “027(2)(c), we note that the information and judgment list section 316.027(1)(b) as the appropriate statute.”

State v. Gaulden, 134 So. 3d 981 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012). · cites it 14× “§ 316.027, Fla. Stat. (2010). The dispute in this case centers on the meaning of the phrase “involved in a crash.”

In Re Stand. Jury Instructions in Crim. Cases—Report 2011-01, 73 So. 3d 136 (Fla. 2011). · cites it 8× “1935(4)0») and § 316.027, Fla. Stat. To prove the crime of Aggravated Fleeing or Eluding, the State must prove the following seven elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 1.”

Show all 152 citing cases →

— 316.027(1) — 28 cases

Jacob Thomas Gaulden v. State of Florida, 195 So. 3d 1123 (Fla. 2016). “Having concluded that a driver’s vehicle may be “involved in a crash” under this statute when a passenger separates from a moving vehicle and lands on the roadway or adjacent area, the district court affirmed Petitioner’s conviction for leaving the scene of a crash resulting in…”

Wright v. State, 573 So. 2d 998 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).

McKnight v. State, 906 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005). “" The obvious distinction between the cases McKnight relies upon and the instant case is that McKnight is not faced with convictions for leaving the scene of an accident pursuant to section 316.027, Florida Statutes (2001), in addition to his convictions for vehicular homicide…”

Pierce v. State, 744 So. 2d 1193 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).

Stanfill v. State, 384 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 1980). “1st DCA 1978), holding that section 316.027, Florida Statutes (1975), creates but a single crime, that being the felony of "willfully" leaving the scene of an accident.”

— 316.027(1)(2) — 1 case

Tisdale v. State, 498 So. 2d 1280 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986).

— 316.027(1)(a) — 20 cases

Hardy v. State, 705 So. 2d 979 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). “On appeal, the Fifth District vacated four of these five convictions, holding that the multiple convictions violated the prohibition against double jeopardy: Section 316.027, Florida Statutes, provides that The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury or…”

In Re Stand. Jury Instructions in Crim. Cases-report No. 2015-07, 192 So. 3d 1190 (Fla. 2016). “1995) dealing with § 316.027, Fla. Stat., which, unlike § 316.”

Peterson v. State, 775 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).

In Re: Stand. Jury Instructions in Crim. Cases-Report 2018-09., 262 So. 3d 59 (Fla. 2019). “1995), dealing with § 316.027, Fla. Stat., which, unlike § 316.”

Foster v. State, 869 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).

— 316.027(1)(a)(b) — 1 case

Peer v. State, 983 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008).

— 316.027(1)(b) — 14 cases

Sims v. State, 998 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 2008).

State v. Elder, 975 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).

Lawrence v. State, 801 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).

— 316.027(2) — 21 cases

John Goodman v. State of Florida, 229 So. 3d 366 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017).

State of Florida v. Zachariah Dorsett, 158 So. 3d 557 (Fla. 2015). “In this case, we answer a certified question regarding the knowledge element of Florida’s hit-and-run statute, section 316.027, Florida Statutes (2006).”

State v. Dumas, 700 So. 2d 1223 (Fla. 1997). “[3] The majority overstates its case by venturing that "requiring proof that a driver had knowledge of death would lead to an absurd result: a driver who callously leaves the scene of a serious accident can avoid a second-degree felony conviction by disavowing knowledge of death.”

— 316.027(2)(a) — 4 cases

John Goodman v. State of Florida, 229 So. 3d 366 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017).

George Gomillion v. State of Florida, 267 So. 3d 502 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019).

Harvey L. Linen v. State of Florida, 268 So. 3d 874 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019).

Deontae Palinski Johnson v. State of Florida (Fla. 1st DCA 2020).

— 316.027(2)(b) — 4 cases

In Re Stand. Jury Instructions in Crim. Cases-report No. 2015-07, 192 So. 3d 1190 (Fla. 2016). “1995) dealing with § 316.027, Fla. Stat., which, unlike § 316.”

In Re: Stand. Jury Instructions in Crim. Cases-Report 2018-09., 262 So. 3d 59 (Fla. 2019). “1995), dealing with § 316.027, Fla. Stat., which, unlike § 316.”

In Re: Stand. Jury Instructions in Crim. Cases-Report 2017-05., 236 So. 3d 244 (Fla. 2018).

Jesus G. Gonsalez Vs State of Florida (Fla. 1st DCA 2023).

— 316.027(2)(c) — 10 cases

McCullough v. State, 230 So. 3d 586 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017). “027(2)(c), we note that the information and judgment list section 316.027(1)(b) as the appropriate statute.”

Billy Joe Pitts v. State of Florida, 227 So. 3d 674 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017).

Joseph W. Daugherty v. State, 207 So. 3d 980 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016).

In Re: Stand. Jury Instructions in Crim. Cases-Report 2018-09., 262 So. 3d 59 (Fla. 2019). “1995), dealing with § 316.027, Fla. Stat., which, unlike § 316.”

In Re: Stand. Jury Instructions in Crim. Cases-Report 2017-05., 236 So. 3d 244 (Fla. 2018).

— 316.027(2)(d) — 1 case

State of Florida v. Deontae Palinski Johnson (Fla. 2022).

— 316.027(2)(f) — 2 cases

In Re: Stand. Jury Instructions in Crim. Cases-Report 2018-09., 262 So. 3d 59 (Fla. 2019). “1995), dealing with § 316.027, Fla. Stat., which, unlike § 316.”

In Re: Stand. Jury Instructions in Crim. Cases-Report 2017-05., 236 So. 3d 244 (Fla. 2018).

— 316.027(42) — 1 case

In Re Stand. Jury Instructions in Crim. Cases-report No. 2015-07, 192 So. 3d 1190 (Fla. 2016). “1995) dealing with § 316.027, Fla. Stat., which, unlike § 316.”

— 316.027(l)(a) — 12 cases

Dorsett v. State, 147 So. 3d 532 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).

Fudge v. State, 791 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001).

Booker v. State, 103 So. 3d 1035 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012).

K.W. v. State, 78 So. 3d 74 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012).

— 316.027(l)(b) — 15 cases

State v. Gaulden, 134 So. 3d 981 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012). “§ 316.027, Fla. Stat. (2010). The dispute in this case centers on the meaning of the phrase “involved in a crash.”

Gaulden v. State, 132 So. 3d 916 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014).

Ivey v. State, 47 So. 3d 908 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010).

McCullough v. State, 230 So. 3d 586 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017). “027(2)(c), we note that the information and judgment list section 316.027(1)(b) as the appropriate statute.”

— 316.027(l)(c) — 1 case

Latham v. State, 185 So. 3d 686 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016).

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