Duarte v. Disanti, 292 S.W.3d 733 (Tex. App. 2009). · Go Syfert
Duarte v. Disanti, 292 S.W.3d 733 (Tex. App. 2009). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
20 citation events (20 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: Marvella Loya v. Hickory Trail Hospital, L.P. (texapp, 2022-11-30)
Treatment trajectory · 2011 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2011 2018 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 7 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) Marvella Loya v. Hickory Trail Hospital, L.P.
Tex. App. · 2022 · confidence medium
Duarte v. Disanti, 292 S.W.3d 733, 735 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.).
cited Cited as authority (rule) in the Matter of the Marriage of Ephraim Karsagi and Alyssa Lyn Karsagi and in the Interest of E.B.K. and A.Y.K., Children
Tex. App. · 2022 · confidence medium
See State v. Newton, 179 S.W.3d 104, 109 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005, no pet.); Duarte v. Disanti, 292 S.W.3d 733, 735 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Gary S. Bagelman v. Barbara L. Peach
Tex. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
In Duarte v. Disanti, Duarte had purchased a unit in a condominium development that had been created in 1980. 292 S.W.3d 733, 734 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Gary S. Bagelman v. Barbara L. Peach
Tex. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
In Duarte v. Disanti , Duarte had purchased a unit in a condominium development that had been created in 1980. 292 S.W.3d 733, 734 (Tex. App.--Dallas 2009, no pet.).
cited Cited "see" Nicholas Lee v. Hood County Appraisal District
Tex. App. · 2024 · signal: see · confidence high
Salahat v. Kincaid, 195 S.W.3d 342, 343 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, no pet.); see Duarte v. Disanti, 292 S.W.3d 733, 735 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Cecile Erwin Young, in Her Official Capacity as the Executive Commissioner of the Texas Health and Human Services Commission v. Cook Children's Health Plan, Texas Children's Health Plan, Superior HealthPlan, Inc., and Wellpoint Insurance Company
Tex. App. · 2025 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Duarte v. Disanti, 292 S.W.3d 733, 735 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.) (“Finally, we do not give a statute meaning that conflicts with other provisions if we can reasonably harmonize the provi- sions.”); Sw.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Cecile Erwin Young, in Her Official Capacity as the Executive Commissioner of the Texas Health and Human Services Commission; Molina Healthcare of Texas, Inc.; And Aetna Better Health of Texas, Inc. v. Cook Children's Health Plan, Texas Children's Health Plan, Superior Health Plan, Inc., and Wellpoint Insurance Company
Tex. App. · 2025 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Duarte v. Disanti, 292 S.W.3d 733, 735 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.) (“Finally, we do not give a statute meaning that conflicts with other provisions if we can reasonably harmonize the provisions.”); Sw.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Homero DUARTE, Appellant
v.
Mark DISANTI, Appellee
05-08-00967-CV.
Court of Appeals of Texas.
Jun 25, 2009.
292 S.W.3d 733
Juan A. Marquez, Dallas, TX, for Appellant., Richard C. Frasco, McKinney, TX, for Appellee.
Mosely, O'Neill, Murphy.
Cited by 8 opinions  |  Published

OPINION

Opinion By

Justice O’NEILL.

The issue presented in this appeal is whether the redemption rights provided for in the Texas Residential Property Owners Protection Act apply to condominiums. Because we conclude they do not, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Duarte owned a condominium in the Skillman Bend Condominiums. The condominiums were created in 1980. Duarte failed to pay certain assessments, and the condominium association foreclosed on its lien, conducted a foreclosure sale, and sold the property to Disanti, a thud party. Duarte attempted to “redeem” the property pursuant to the provisions of section[*735] 209.011 of the Texas Residential Property Owners Protection Act. Disanti refused to allow Duarte to redeem the property, and Duarte filed suit. The sole basis for Duarte’s claimed right of redemption is chapter 209 of the Texas Property Code. Disanti filed a motion for summary judgment asserting chapter 209 does not apply to condominiums. The trial court agreed and rendered judgment against Duarte. This appeal followed.

Chapter 209 of the property code, known as the Texas Residential Property Owners Protection Act, became effective in 2002. The Property Owners Protection Act contains various provisions concerning when a property owners’ association of a “residential subdivision” may foreclose upon a lien. Section 209.011 of the Property Owners Protection Act also gives property owners certain rights of redemption when a property owners’ association forecloses on such a lien. See Tex. PROP. Code Ann. § 209.011 (Vernon 2007). Section 209.003(d) makes clear that the Act does not apply to condominium developments “governed by Chapter 82” of the property code. Id. 209.003(d).

Chapter 82, which applies only to condominiums, contains its own provisions that concern redemption after foreclosure by a property owners’ association. Chapter 82 became effective in 1994. Condominiums created after that date are governed “exclusively” by chapter 82. Tex. Prop.Code Ann. S 82.002(a) (Vernon 2007). Certain provisions of chapter 82, however, apply to all condominiums, regardless of when they were created. In particular, section 82.113 applies to all condominiums in the State of Texas. Tex. Prop.Code Ann. § 82.002(c) (Vernon 2007). This section contains the provisions that permit a condominium’s property owners’ association to take a lien on a condominium, allow for nonjudicial foreclosure of such liens, and give a property owner a right of redemption when a unit is foreclosed on and purchased by the association. See Tex. Prop.Code Ann. § 82.113 (Vernon 2007).

In his motion for summary judgment, Disanti asserted the redemption provisions of the Property Owner’s Protection Act do not apply to condominiums, which are governed by chapter 82. Matters of statutory construction are questions of law that are appropriately decided in a motion for summary judgment. See Johnson v. City of Fort Worth, 774 S.W.2d 653, 655-56 (Tex.1989); see also Burnett-Dunham v. Spurgin, 245 S.W.3d 14, 16 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2007, pet. filed); New Times, Inc. v. Doe, 183 S.W.3d 122, 124 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.). Our primary objective when construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent. Coleman v. Coleman, 170 S.W.3d 231, 235-36 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2005, pet. denied). We look first to the plain and common meaning of the language of the statute. Bur nett-Dunham, 245 S.W.3d at 16-17. We must read the statute as a whole and not just in isolated portions. Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. City of Sunset Valley, 146 S.W.3d 637, 642 (Tex.2004). Courts should give effect to “every sentence, clause, and word of a statute so that no part thereof [will] be rendered superfluous.” Russell v. Wendy’s Int’l, Inc., 219 S.W.3d 629, 638-39 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2007, pet. dism’d). When construing a statute, it is presumed the entire statute is intended to be effective. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.021(2) (Vernon 2005). We also consider the objective the law seeks to obtain and the consequences of a particular construction. Coleman, 170 S.W.3d at 236. Finally, we do not give a statute meaning that conflicts with other provisions if we can reasonably harmonize the provisions. Id.

[*736] Section 209.011 of the Property Owner’s Protection Act expressly states that chapter 209 does not apply to a condominium “governed by Chapter 82” of the Texas Property Code. According to Duarte, his condominium was not governed by chapter 82 because it was created before January 1, 1994, the effective date of chapter 82. All condominiums in the State of Texas are governed by the redemption provisions of chapter 82. Tex. Prop.Code Ann. § 82.002(a), (c) (Vernon 2007). We. conclude under the plain terms of the Property Owners Protection Act, that the Act does not apply to Duarte’s condominium. We believe this construction is in harmony with the legislature’s clear intent to have different redemption rights for residential subdivisions than for condominiums. We cannot conclude the trial court erred in granting Disanti’s motion for summary judgment. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.