Vose v. Broth. of Corr. Officers, 587 A.2d 913 (R.I. 1991). · Go Syfert
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Vose v. Broth. of Corr. Officers, 587 A.2d 913 (R.I. 1991). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 2007 · …will not issue advisory opinions or rule on abstract questions. ✓
107 citation events (61 in the last 25 years) across 4 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Town of North Kingstown v. International Association of Firefighters, Local 1651 AFL-CIO (ri, 2015-01-09)
Treatment trajectory · 1991 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1991 2008 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 28 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (rule) Town of North Kingstown v. International Association of Firefighters, Local 1651 AFL-CIO (3×) also: Cited "see"
R.I. · 2015 · confidence medium
Cf. State, Department of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hospitals, 692 A.2d at 324 (stating that in light of particular statutory duties “the extent to which the [public employer] is obligated to arbitrate regarding its * * * employees’ hours of work is not boundless”); Vose, 587 A.2d at 916 (holding that CBA “shall not be interpreted as restricting the [public employer’s] statutory power to order mandatory involuntary overtime”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) City of East Providence v. International Ass'n of Firefighters Local 850 (2×) also: Cited "see"
R.I. · 2009 · confidence medium
It is well settled that an arbitrator may “make rulings concerning the applicable law and * * * interpret the law according to the facts before him or her.” Vose v. Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers, 587 A.2d 913, 914 (R.I.1991). “[L]ike a judge sitting without a jury, an arbitrator is called upon not only to make findings of fact but also to apply the law to the facts.” Id.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) North Providence School Committee v. North Providence Federation of Teachers, Local 920
R.I. · 2008 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Pawtucket School Committee v. Pawtucket Teachers' Alliance, 652 A.2d 970, 972 (R.I.1995) (“We have stated clearly that while the school committee can negotiate many items with the professional and nonprofessional employees of the system, it cannot bargain away statutory powers and responsibilities.”); see also Department of Corrections v. Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers, 867 A.2d 823, 829 (R.I.2005); Woonsocket Teachers’ Guild, Local 951, AFT v. Woonsocket School Committee, 770 A.2d 834, 838 (R.I.2001); State Department of Children, Youth and Families v. Rhod…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Yashar
Sup. Ct. R.I. · 2007 · confidence medium
Id. at 916. 45 Rhode Island case law discussing the issue of estoppel against the government sets forth the confusing rationale that an agent who possesses the authority to make representations exceeds his or her authority when the agent acts contrary to state law.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Johnston School Committee v. Rhode Island State Labor Rel Bd, 03-0141 (2004)
Sup. Ct. R.I. · 2004 · confidence medium
Id. at 914.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Woonsocket Teachers' Guild, Local 951 v. Woonsocket School Committee
R.I. · 2001 · confidence medium
We held that “the school committee can negotiate many items with the professional and nonprofessional employees of the system, [but] it cannot bargain away statutory powers and responsibilities.” See id. (citing Vose v. Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers, 587 A.2d 913, 915 (R.I.1991), and Rhode Island Court Reporters Alliance v. State, 591 A.2d 376, 378 (R.I.1991)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) MacEra v. Cerra, P.C. 99-0799 (1999)
Sup. Ct. R.I. · 1999 · confidence medium
Id. at 915; see also Power v. City of Providence, 582 A.2d 895 (R.I. 1990) (contracts entered into in contravention of a state statute are illegal, and no contract rights are created thereby.) This Court finds the holding in Vose controlling.
examined Cited as authority (rule) RI Council 94, Afscme, Afl-Cio v. State (3×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
R.I. · 1998 · confidence medium
Indeed the court is required to do so pursuant to G.L.1956 § 28-9-18(a)(2): “[T]he court must make an order vacating the award * * * [wjhere the arbitrator or arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them, that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.” Thus awards purportedly resolving nonarbitrable issues must be set aside, 2 Rhode Island Court Reporters Alliance v. State, 591 A.2d 376, 379 (R.I.1991); Vose v. Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers, 587 A.2d 913, 914-15 (R.I.1991), as well as awards tainted by fra…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State Department of Children, Youth & Families v. Rhode Island Council 94 (2×) also: Cited "see"
R.I. · 1998 · confidence medium
XX-XXX-XXX. [3] Those regulations provided, in pertinent part, that "[w]ithin ten (10) working days of submission of [an employee's notice of appeal contesting DCYF's written notification of termination], the employee must provide written references attesting to the employee's longstanding record of excellence in child care. * * * If the employee has not demonstrated a record of excellence in child care sufficient to warrant disregard of the otherwise disqualifying information, the Department Administrative Hearing Officer will uphold the termination." (Emphasis added.) Here Howie failed to pr…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers v. State Department of Corrections
R.I. · 1998 · confidence medium
See MHRH, 692 A.2d at 322 (vacating arbitration award when arbitrator exceeded his powers because the dispute was nonarbitrable and the submission of the dispute to arbitration constituted an unlawful usurpation of statutory authority); Vose v. Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers, 587 A.2d 913, 914 (R.I.1991) (holding dispute nonarbitrable and subject instead to judicial determination because CBA provision conflicted with statutorily defined powers of one party to the CBA).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State, Department of Mental Health, Retardation, & Hospitals v. Rhode Island Council 94
R.I. · 1997 · confidence medium
Whereas we acknowledge that an arbitrator is “necessarily * * * called upon to make rulings concerning the applicable law and to interpret the law according to the facts,” Vose v. Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers, 587 A.2d 913, 914 (R.I.1991), and that questions of law are not “per se” nonarbitrable, id., that acknowledgment does not insulate the arbitrator’s interpretation of the law from judicial scrutiny.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State of R.I. v. R.I. Alliance of Soc. Serv. Employees, 95-0490 (1995)
Sup. Ct. R.I. · 1995 · confidence medium
In that case the Supreme Court held that the power of the director of corrections to require involuntary overtime from correctional employees to carry out his statutory duties to "[m]ake and promulgate necessary rules and regulations incidental to the exercise of his or her powers [to provide for]* * * safety, discipline, * * * care, and custody for all persons committed to correctional facilities," Section 42-56-10 (v), quoted in part Id., at 915, could not be stripped away by a collective bargaining agreement.
cited Cited "see" State of Rhode Island, Department of Corrections v. Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board
unknown court · 2025 · signal: see · confidence high
See Vose, 587 A.2d at 915 .
discussed Cited "see" Portsmouth School v. Nea Portsmouth
Sup. Ct. R.I. · 2011 · signal: see · confidence high
See Vose v. Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers , 587 A.2d 913 , 914 (R.I. 1991); see also Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers v. State , 643 A.2d 817 , 820 (R.I. 1994) (limiting the Vose ruling to "critical area[s] of state power," such as maintaining public safety).
cited Cited "see" Ri Airport Corp. v. Ri Council 94
Sup. Ct. R.I. · 2010 · signal: see · confidence high
See Vose v. Rhode Island Broth. of Correctional Officers , 587 A.2d 913 , 913 (R.I. 1991).
discussed Cited "see" Chambers v. Ormiston (2×)
R.I. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See generally Vose v. Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers, 587 A.2d 913, 915 (R.I.1991).
discussed Cited "see" Rhode Island Council 94 v. State
Sup. Ct. R.I. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See Vose v. Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers , 587 A. 2d 913 , 915 (R.I. 1991); Aetna Bridge Company v. State of Rhode Island, Department of Transportation , 795 A.2d 517 , 522-23 (R.I. 2002), See also Shank/Balfour Beatty v. Int'l Brotherhood of Electrical Workers , 497 F.3 rd 83 (1 st Cir. 2007).
cited Cited "see" Town of Burrillville v. Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board
R.I. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See generally Vose v. Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers, 587 A.2d 913, 915 (R.I.1991); Power v. City of Providence, 582 A.2d 895, 900 (R.I.1990).
discussed Cited "see" State v. Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers, 96-5983 (2004)
Sup. Ct. R.I. · 2004 · signal: see · confidence high
See Vose, 587 A.2d at 915 (finding question justiciable but not arbitrable). 8 This Court is also mindful that scholarly works recognize that the decision to fill vacancies generally lies with management.
discussed Cited "see" Durham v. Southwest Developers Joint Venture
N.M. Ct. App. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See Vose v. Rhode Island Bhd. of Correctional Officers, 587 A.2d 913, 914 (R.I.1991); see also Finkelstein v. Security Properties, Inc., 76 Wash. App. 733 , 888 P.2d 161, 166 (1995) (rejecting argument that state statute providing that dissolution is caused by bankruptcy of a partner is superseded by Bankruptcy Code).
cited Cited "see" Town of West Warwick v. Local 2045
R.I. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See Vose v. Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers, 587 A.2d 913 (R.I. 1991).
cited Cited "see" State v. R.I. Brotherhood of Correctional Officers, Pm 97-2527 (1997)
Sup. Ct. R.I. · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
See Vose v. Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers, 587 A.2d 913 (R.I. 1991).
cited Cited "see" School Committee of Town of Johnston v. JOHNSTON FED'N OF TCHRS.
R.I. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See Vose v. Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers, 587 A.2d 913 (R.I.1991).
cited Cited "see" Pawtucket School Committee v. Pawtucket Teachers' Alliance, Local No. 930
R.I. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See Vose v. Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers, 587 A.2d 913 (R.I.1991), and Rhode Island Court Reporters Alliance v. State, 591 A.2d 376 (R.I.1991).
discussed Cited "see" Petition of Almond
R.I. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See Vose v. Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers, 587 A.2d 913 , 915 n. 2 (R.I.1991); Rhode Island Ophthalmological Society v. Cannon, 113 R.I. 16, 28 , 317 A.2d 124, 131 (1974) (“[litigation will be confined to those appropriate situations where the litigant’s concern with the subject matter evidences a real adverseness, i.e., his own injury in fact”).
cited Cited "see" Rhode Island Laborers' District Council v. State
R.I. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See Vose v. Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers, 587 A.2d 913 (R.I.1991).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers
R.I. · 2003 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See Rhode Island Laborers’ District Council, 592 A.2d at 146 (holding that the arbitrator’s award reducing to suspension the chief judge’s discharge of a deputy court clerk was irrational); see also Vose v. Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers, 587 A.2d 913, 915-16 (R.I.1991) (the DOC policy requiring correctional officer to work mandatory involuntary overtime was valid and the issue was not arbi-trable).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State of R.I. (Dep., Cor.) v. R.I. Brotherhood of Cor. Offr., 01-6344 (2003)
Sup. Ct. R.I. · 2003 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Vose v. Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers, 587 A.2d 913 (R.I. 1991); Lee v. Rhode Island Council 94, A.F.S.C.M.E., AFL-CIO, Local 186, 796 A.2d 1080 , 1085 (R.I. 2002) In the instant case the arbitrator concluded that Giles violated department policy by threatening another officer with violence: "I found CO Boutin's version of events to be far more logical and credible. . . .
George A. VOSE, in his capacity as Director of the Rhode Island Department of Corrections
v.
RHODE ISLAND BROTHERHOOD OF CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS.
89-457-Appeal.
Supreme Court of Rhode Island.
Mar 11, 1991.
587 A.2d 913
1991 WL 31992
Murray.
Cited by 61 opinions  |  Published

Stephen Robinson, Dept. of Corrections, for plaintiff.

Gerard P. Cobleigh, Cobleigh, Sprague & Giacobbe, Warwick, for defendant.

OPINION

MURRAY, Justice.

George A. Vose,[1] Director of the Rhode Island Department of Corrections (director and department), has brought this declaratory-judgment action to determine the propriety of his new policy of requiring correctional officers to work mandatory involuntary overtime (policy). The Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers (union) argues that the policy is improper and unauthorized in that it violates the union's collective-bargaining agreement (agreement). The union also argues that this suit must be stayed because the agreement mandates that this issue is subject to mandatory arbitration. For the reasoning that follows, we uphold the Superior Court ruling that the director may properly require officers to work involuntary overtime.

In June of 1988 the department adopted a new policy in regard to requiring officers to work involuntary overtime. Up to that time the department followed the agreement, which allowed the director to mandate involuntary overtime only if an "emergency situation" exists.

[*914] The change in department policy was caused by a spiraling increase in inmates at the Adult Correctional Institutions since 1979. Coincidentally, the department was operating under certain Federal Court-imposed restrictions, because of past litigation over unconstitutional prison conditions. See Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956 (D.R.I. 1977).

To deal with the increased population, the director authorized extensive voluntary overtime. Even though there were many overtime volunteers, apparently staffing was still insufficient. Citing his plenary powers as derived from G.L. 1956 (1988 Reenactment) § 42-56-10, and in particular subsection (v), the director adopted the mandatory-involuntary-overtime policy to counter this shortage. The director asserts that since the agreement limits him to ordering involuntary overtime only in "emergencies," the agreement conflicts with his statutory powers and as such the contract is invalid.

On June 28, 1988, the department directed certain officers to work involuntary overtime. Eight of them refused and were given one-day suspensions. The union filed grievances on their behalf on July 20, 1988. An arbitrator was appointed on November 3, 1988 to hear these grievances. The basis for this grievance is the affirmative defense that the suspensions were improper because the suspensions were pursuant to the policy which itself is improper because it violates the agreement.

On April 19, 1989, the director filed the present declaratory-judgment action. He seeks to declare that the department's new policy is valid and that the agreement is invalid because it conflicts with § 42-56-10. The department further states that the issue in this suit is not arbitrable because questions of law are purportedly not arbitrable.

ARBITRABILITY

The department would have this court declare a per se rule that questions of law are not arbitrable. We distinctly disagree. We recently held in Power v. City of Providence, 582 A.2d 895, 900 (R.I. 1990), that the Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights does not have the authority to negotiate a settlement to an age-discrimination dispute if the settlement would attempt to strike down a statute which purportedly violates the Fair Employment Practices Act. We said that "[a]greements between parties on questions of law * * * are not binding on the judiciary or on third parties" because questions of law are for the judiciary to decide. Id. We further said that we would not necessarily accept an interpretation of law as offered by litigants "because to do so would render the court impotent to protect those not before it from the stare decisis effect of the court's decision." Id. at 901.

However, an arbitrator sits as an alternative to a judicial forum for the purposes of resolving a dispute. Therefore, like a judge sitting without a jury, an arbitrator is called upon not only to make findings of fact but also to apply the law to the facts. In applying the law, the arbitrator will necessarily be called upon to make rulings concerning the applicable law and to interpret the law according to the facts before him or her. Therefore, in this sense we must refute the department's per se suggestion that questions of law are not arbitrable.

If the state is afraid, as it says, that an arbitrator would "interpret Rhode Island State law in a fashion which could run contrary to public policy," then we suggest that it not agree to arbitrate such issues.

With that said, we do agree with the director that the instant issue is not arbitrable. The director filed the instant suit to have a determination of the breadth of his statutory powers under § 42-56-10(v). Section 42-56-10(v) states:

"In addition to exercising the powers and performing the duties which are otherwise given him by law, the director of the department of corrections shall:
* * * * * *
(v) Make and promulgate necessary rules and regulations incident to the exercise of his or her powers and the performance of his or her duties including[*915] but not limited to rules and regulations regarding nutrition, sanitation, safety, discipline, recreation, religious services, communication, and visiting privileges, classification, education, training, employment, care, and custody for all persons committed to correctional facilities."

What makes this case properly justiciable[2] is that there is a conflict between this statute and the agreement. Article 17.7[3] of the agreement defines a "grievance" as "any difference or dispute between the State and the [union] with respect to the interpretation, application, or violation of any of the provisions of this agreement." Article 18.1 of the agreement states that "all matters which involve an employees' * * * suspension, [or] loss of wages * * * shall be submitted to arbitration."

While the existence of the conflict between the agreement and the statute makes this suit justiciable and coincidentally constitutes a "grievance" for purposes of Article 17.7 of the agreement, we do not believe this conflict is subject to the agreement's arbitration clause (clause 18.1). When the scope of a governmental officer's statutory authority is questioned, that officer must be entitled to a judicial determination regarding the nature and the extent of that authority. Accordingly, we rule that the determination of the director's statutory authority is a justiciable but not an arbitrable question, properly determinable in a declaratory-judgment action.

DIRECTOR'S STATUTORY AUTHORITY

We agree with the director that the issue on the merits of this case is whether the department has the authority to bargain away the director's § 42-56-10 statutory powers. We think it does not.

This issue analogously came before the court a few months ago. See Power v. City of Providence, 582 A.2d 895 (R.I. 1990). In Power, the court was called upon to interpret the Providence Retirement Act, P.L. 1923, ch. 489, which states that "`[e]ach class B member [i.e., certain police and fire personnel] who * * * attains the age of sixty shall be retired.'" 582 A.2d at 897 n. 2. The city of Providence had entered into a settlement on an age discrimination lawsuit which provided that the city would not retire police employees before the age of seventy. The appellee in Power argued that the language of the Retirement Act authorized the city to engage in age discrimination but that the city was not required by the Retirement Act to discriminate. Id. at 900. We disagreed and stated that the statute mandated age discrimination. We held that statutory powers and obligations cannot be contractually abdicated. Accordingly we found the settlement agreement in direct conflict with the Retirement Act, and thus it was a nullity because "[c]ontracts entered into in contravention to a state statute * * * are illegal, and no contract rights are created thereby." Id. (citing Birkett v. Chatterton, 13 R.I. 299, 302 (1881)).

We think the facts of this case are similar. Here, the agreement strips the director of his ability to "[m]ake and promulgate necessary rules and regulations incidental to the exercise of his or her powers [to provide for] * * * safety, discipline, * * * care, and custody for all persons committed to correctional facilities." See section 42-56-10(v). Further, due to the exigencies incident to running a correctional[*916] institution, we could not fathom a result that would leave the director unable to provide for adequate security, regardless of whether an emergency is deemed to be present. We speculate that if adequate staffing was not maintained even in a nonemergency situation, that in and of itself could foster an emergency. In any event, we find that the agreement with respect to involuntary mandatory overtime is invalid because it is an improper attempt to contractually restrict the director's statutory powers. Power, 582 A.2d at 900. Accordingly the collective-bargaining agreement shall not be interpreted as restricting the director's statutory power to order mandatory involuntary overtime.

The defendant's appeal is denied and dismissed. The judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed. The papers of the instant case are remanded to Superior Court.

1 John J. Moran originally instituted this action while he held the office of Director of the Rhode Island Department of Corrections. At the time of rendering this opinion, George A. Vose holds that office. Accordingly, we have substituted the latter's name as plaintiff.
2 "Unlike the United States Constitution, there is no express language in the Rhode Island [C]onstitution which confines the exercise of [the Rhode Island Court's] judicial power to actual `cases and controversies.'" Rhode Island Ophthalmological Society v. Cannon, 113 R.I. 16, 28, 317 A.2d 124, 130 (1974). Nevertheless, the court will not issue advisory opinions or rule on abstract questions. Id. at 28, 317 A.2d at 130-31. "Litigation will be confined to those appropriate situations where the litigant's concern with the subject matter evidences a real adverseness, i.e., [a real] injury in fact." Id. at 28, 317 A.2d at 131.
3 For some mystifying reason, the parties to this appeal have not deemed it necessary to submit a copy of the agreement to this court. Neither the lower court record nor the appendices to the appellate briefs contain the agreement. Accordingly we have been forced to resort to quoting from the union's appellate brief for the wording of the various articles of the agreement. The department has not challenged the union's quotations so we assume them to be accurate.