People v. Gabriel, 189 Cal. App. 4th 1070 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010). · Go Syfert
People v. Gabriel, 189 Cal. App. 4th 1070 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 3× by 3 distinct cases, 2022–2023→ Stable · …the oral pronouncement controls.
60 citation events (60 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: People v. Valdez CA2/4 (calctapp, 2022-05-09) · Strongest negative: In re Elijah H. CA1/5 (calctapp, 2016-04-11)
Treatment trajectory · 2011 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2011 2018 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 16 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited "but see" In re Elijah H. CA1/5
Cal. Ct. App. · 2016 · signal: but see · confidence high
It provides: “Submit person, property, any vehicle under [Elijah’s control], and residence to search and seizure by any peace officer any time of the day or night with or without a warrant.” When the reporter’s and clerk’s transcripts differ as to how probation conditions are stated, “the modern rule is not automatic deference to the reporter’s transcript, but rather adoption of the transcript due more credence under all the surrounding circumstances.” (People v. Rodriguez (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 578, 586 ; but see People v. Gabriel (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1070, 1073 [oral pronou…
discussed Cited "but see" People v. Viau CA1/5
Cal. Ct. App. · 2015 · signal: but see · confidence high
(See People v. Rodriguez (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 578, 586 [when reporter’s and clerk’s transcripts differ, “the modern rule is . . . adoption of the transcript due more credence under all the surrounding circumstances”]; People v. Smith (1983) 33 Cal.3d 596, 599 ; People v. Freitas (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 747, 750, fn. 2 [“criminal court’s oral pronouncement of sentence may control over a conflicting document, such as a minute order or an abstract of judgment, but that is because the oral pronouncement constitutes the rendition of judgment and the written document is ministerial”];…
discussed Cited "but see" In re Juan R. CA1/5
Cal. Ct. App. · 2015 · signal: but see · confidence bake:cell
(In re R.P. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 562, 569 ; In re Martinez (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 577, 581 (Martinez).) And, Juan points out that the crime he admitted did not involve the use of a weapon or any violence and contends that the weapons condition therefore fails all three prongs of the Lent test. “[The Lent] test is conjunctive—all three prongs must be satisfied before a reviewing court will invalidate a probation term. [Citations.] As such, even if a condition of probation has no relationship to the crime of which a defendant was convicted and involves conduct that is not itself criminal, th…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Valdez CA2/4
Cal. Ct. App. · 2022 · confidence medium
(See People v. Gabriel (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1070, 1073 [“When there is a discrepancy between the minute order and the oral pronouncement of judgment, the oral pronouncement controls. [Citation.]”]; People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185 [courts may correct clerical errors any time, and appellate courts are authorized to order correction of an abstract of judgment that does not accurately reflect the sentence imposed orally by the trial court].) DISPOSITION The trial court is ordered to correct the sentencing hearing minute order and abstract of judgment to reflect the conduct cred…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Bulich CA4/3
Cal. Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
“When there is a discrepancy between the minute order and the oral pronouncement of judgment, the oral pronouncement controls.” (People v. Gabriel (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1070, 1073 [probation conditions must conform to oral pronouncement].) Respondent concedes the minute order was incorrect, and requests this court “exercise its independent authority to order the trial court to correct the minute order to conform to the trial court’s oral orders.” Accordingly, we will remand the matter and order the trial court to correct the May 13, 2029 minute order to conform to the trial court’…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re J.O. CA6
Cal. Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
The juvenile court, however, also stated that J.O. was subject to “restitution orders,” signifying an intent to impose victim restitution separately.9 (See People v. Gabriel (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1070, 1073 [when there is a discrepancy between minute order and written pronouncement of judgment, oral pronouncement controls].) Accordingly, since J.O. is not subject to probation conditions and since restitution is mandatory, we correct the minute order to clarify that the victim restitution orders are not probation conditions.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Marin County Health & Human Services Department v. K.L.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
“When there is a discrepancy between the minute order and the oral pronouncement of judgment, the oral pronouncement controls.” (People v. Gabriel (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1070, 1073 [ 117 Cal.Rptr.3d 513 ].) 2 Unless otherwise noted, further statutory citations are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Kevin F.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
(See People v. Gabriel (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1070, 1073 [ 117 Cal.Rptr.3d 513 ] [oral probation conditions controlled]; People v. Pirali (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1341, 1346 [ 159 Cal.Rptr.3d 335 ] [whether oral or written conditions prevail depends on circumstances of case]; People v. Thrash (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 898, 901 [ 146 Cal.Rptr. 32 ] [probation conditions “need not be spelled out in great detail in court as long as the defendant knows what they are”].) Even assuming Minor is correct that the court’s oral statement is the operative condition, we modify it to read as stated in the p…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Holston CA3
Cal. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
June 27, 2012, operative July 1, 2013.) The realignment legislation enacting section 3000.08 marked a drastic overhaul in the procedure of holding parole revocation hearings, shifting the responsibility from the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to local courts. (§ 3000.08, subd. (m) [operative date]; Armstrong v. Brown (2013) 732 F.3d 955, 960-961 [noting courts rather than state officials now conduct parole revocation hearings].) 4 1346 [oral pronouncement of probation conditions controls]; People v. Gabriel (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1070, 1073 [same].) We are left with the trial co…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Dupree CA6
Cal. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
(People v. Gabriel (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1070, 1073-1074 [modifying probation condition precluding defendant from associating with individuals engaged in certain activities to include a knowledge element and affirming as modified]; People v. Leon (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 943, 950 [modifying gang-association probation condition to include knowledge requirement and affirming as modified]; People v. Garcia (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 97, 102-103 [modifying probation condition to preclude association with persons known to be users or sellers of narcotics, felons or ex-felons and affirming as modified]; L…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Vega CA3
Cal. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
(See People v. Robertson (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 965, 996 [where cited statute does not authorize imposition of protective order against the defendant, the court cannot impose it].) When there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of a sentence and the written order, the criminal court’s oral pronouncement controls because it “constitutes the rendition of judgment,” whereas “the written document is ministerial.” (People v. Freitas (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 747, 750, fn. 2 ; accord People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1, 89 [oral pronouncement is judgment and written abstract of ju…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re F.M. CA6
Cal. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
This court has often considered whether various probation conditions restricting association require an explicit knowledge element to avoid vagueness. ( Rodriguez, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th 578, 594-595 [requiring avoidance of victim]; People v. Gabriel (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1070, 1073 [prohibiting association with persons known or suspected to be gang members, drug users, paroles, or probationers] ; People v. Leon (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 943, 949-950 [prohibiting association with gang members] (Leon) .) We have also considered precedent involving association conditions in vagueness challenges to…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) P. v. Medina CA3
Cal. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
(See, e.g., Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 890-891, 892 [condition that defendant not associate with anyone disapproved by probation vague without knowledge requirement; condition modified to add knowledge requirement]; In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 911-912 [same]; People v. Gabriel (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1070, 1072-1073 [condition to “ „[n]ot associate with any individuals you know or suspect to be gang members, drugs users, or on any form of probation or parole supervision‟ ” vague because “suspect” insufficiently precise to provide adequate notice of expected …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Barajas
Cal. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
(People v. Smith (1983) 33 Cal.3d 596, 599 [ 189 Cal.Rptr. 862 , 659 P.2d 1152 ]; People v. Harrison (2005) 35 Cal.4th 208, 226 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 224 , 106 P.3d 895 ]; People v. Gabriel (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1070, 1073 [ 117 Cal.Rptr.3d 513 ].) The small differences are not material to the issues on appeal.
discussed Cited "see" People v. Rodriguez (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 2013 · signal: see · confidence high
The defendant in People v. Mathews (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 89 [ 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 330 ] (Mathews) was convicted of drawing or exhibiting a firearm in a rude, angry, or threatening manner in the immediate presence of a peace officer by a person “who knows, or reasonably should know, . . . that [the victim] is a peace officer engaged in the performance of his or her duties.” (§ 417, subd. (c).) The court concluded that “[c]ulpability based on the ‘should have known’ constructive knowledge standard is not vague or overbroad.” (Mathews, supra, at p. 98 ; see In re Jorge M. (2000) 23 Cal.4t…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." In re C.H. CA2/5
Cal. Ct. App. · 2014 · signal: see also · confidence low
(People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn 2 ; see also People v. Gabriel (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1070, 1073 .) The entry of the terms in the minutes is a clerical function and any discrepancy is presumed to be the result of clerical error.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
MARIO GABRIEL, Defendant and Appellant
H035329.
California Court of Appeal.
Nov 4, 2010.
189 Cal. App. 4th 1070
Counsel, Thomas M. Hartnett, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant., Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Assistant Attorney General, Seth K. Schalit and Sharon Wooden, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Mihara.
Cited by 48 opinions  |  Published

Opinion

MIHARA, J.

Defendant Mario Gabriel appeals from judgments of conviction entered after he pleaded guilty to various charges and allegations in two[*1072] cases. [1] In both cases, the trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on probation for three years. On appeal, defendant contends that the gang conditions should be modified to reflect the conditions orally pronounced by the trial court and the conditions are unconstitutionally vague. We agree and affirm the judgments as modified.

I. Statement of Facts

A. Case No. SS091125A

In April 2009, two police officers saw defendant approach a van while holding his front waistband and making confrontational gestures. The officers suspected that defendant was armed based on his behavior and body language. When they attempted to detain defendant, he fled. During the ensuing chase, the officers saw defendant throw a gtm. The officers eventually apprehended defendant and recovered the gun. Defendant admitted that he was known as a Parkside Norteño from Huron, California.

B. Case No. SS091848A

In August 2009, police officers stopped a vehicle that had been speeding. Defendant was the driver of the vehicle and his passenger was Mario Guzman, a Norteño gang member. Though defendant claimed that he had never been arrested in Salinas, a records check informed the officers that defendant had been arrested and was out on bail with conditions to obey all laws and not associate with any gang members. Defendant then apologized and acknowledged that he had violated a court order.

II. Discussion

Defendant contends that the written gang conditions should be modified to reflect the conditions orally imposed by the trial court.

In case No. SS091125A, the trial court suspended imposition of sentence and imposed probation for three years. The trial court imposed various conditions of probation, including that defendant “[n]ot be present at any known gang gathering area” and “[n]ot associate with individuals you know[*1073] to be gang members, drug users, or on probation or parole.” However, the minute order states that defendant must “[n]ot be present in any area you know, suspect, or are told by the [probation [o]fficer to be a gang-gathering area” and “[n]ot associate with any individuals you know or suspect to be gang members, drug users, or on any form of probation or parole supervision.”

When there is a discrepancy between the minute order and the oral pronouncement of judgment, the oral pronouncement controls. (People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 603, 48 P.3d 1155].) Thus, the written gang conditions in case No. SS091125A must be modified to reflect the conditions orally imposed by the court.

In case No. SS091848A, the trial court imposed “the same terms and conditions as outlined on items—pages 18 and 19.” These conditions required defendant, among other things, to “[n]ot associate with any individuals you know or suspect to be gang members, drugs users, or on any form of probation or parole supervision.” Thus, the oral pronouncement is accurately reflected in the minute order. However, defendant argues that “inclusion of the word ‘suspect’ exposes [him] to criminal punishment for associating with individuals he may never know to be gang members,” which renders the condition unconstitutionally vague.

“[Probation is a privilege and not a right, and . . . adult probationers, in preference to incarceration, validly may consent to limitations upon their constitutional rights .... [Citations.]” (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 384 [87 Cal.Rptr.3d 199, 198 P.3d 1].) However, “[a] probation condition ‘must be sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required of him, and for the court to determine whether the condition has been violated,’ if it is to withstand a challenge on the ground of vagueness. [Citation.]” (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890 [55 Cal.Rptr.3d 716, 153 P.3d 282].)

To “suspect” is “to imagine (one) to be guilty or culpable on slight evidence or without proof’ or “to imagine to exist or be true, likely, or probable.” (Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dict. (10th ed. 1999) p. 1187 (Webster’s).) To “imagine” is “to form a notion of without sufficient basis.” (Webster’s, at p. 578.) Given this lack of specificity, the word “suspect” fails to provide defendant with adequate notice of what is expected of him when he lacks actual knowledge that a person is a gang member, drug user, or on probation or parole. Moreover, inclusion of this word renders the condition insufficiently precise for a court to determine whether a violation has occurred. Accordingly, this condition must also be modified to delete the word “suspect.”

[*1074] III. Disposition

The condition in case No. SS091125A is modified to read: “Not be present in any area you know or are told by the probation officer to be a gang gathering area.” In case Nos. SS091125A and SS091848A, the conditions are modified to read: “Not associate with any individuals you know to be gang members, drug users, or on any form of probation or parole supervision.” As modified, the judgments are affirmed.

Bamattre-Manoukian, Acting P. J., and Duffy, J., concurred.

1

In case No. SS091125A, defendant pleaded guilty to having a concealed firearm on his person (Pen. Code, § 12025, subd. (a)(2)) and admitted the special allegations that he was not the registered owner of the firearm (Pen. Code, § 12025, subd. (b)(6)), and that the commission of the offense was for the benefit of, or at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). In case No. SS091848A, defendant pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor charge of disobeying a court order regarding conditions of bail (Pen. Code, § 166).