modern rule in California

1968Co., supra, 56 Cal.2d 596, 601 .) “The modern rule, where amendment is sought after the statute of limitations has run, is that the amended complaint will be deemed filed as of the date of the original complaint so long as recovery is sought in each complaint upon the same general set of facts.” (Wennerholm v. Stanford University School of Medicine, 20 Cal.2d 713, 718 [ 128 P.2d 522 , 141 A.L.R. 1358 ]; Weinstock v. Eissler, 224 Cal.App.2d 212, 234 [ 36 Cal.Rptr. 537 ].) A change in the form or type of contractual obligation alleged may be only a change in legal theory, not affecting the cause

1968Co., supra, 56 Cal.2d 596, 601 .) “The modern rule, where amendment is sought after the statute of limitations has run, is that the amended complaint will be deemed filed as of the date of the original complaint so long as recovery is sought in each complaint upon the same general set of facts.” (Wennerholm v. Stanford University School of Medicine, 20 Cal.2d 713, 718 [ 128 P.2d 522 , 141 A.L.R. 1358 ]; Weinstock v. Eissler, 224 Cal.App.2d 212, 234 [ 36 Cal.Rptr. 537 ].) A change in the form or type of contractual obligation alleged may be only a change in legal theory, not affecting the cause

2026(People v. Smith, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 599 ; see also People v. Contreras (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 868, 880 .) Historically, when a conflict between the court’s oral pronouncement and the written record could not be resolved, the oral pronouncement was “give[n] preference.” (People v. Pirali (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1341, 1346 (Pirali).) However, “the modern rule is that if the clerk’s and reporter’s transcripts cannot be reconciled, the part of the record that will prevail is the one that should be given greater credence in the circumstances of the case.” (Ibid., citing, inter alia, People v. S

2025(People v. Pirali (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1341, 1346 [“the modern rule is that if the clerk’s and reporter’s transcripts cannot be reconciled, the part of the record that will prevail is the one that should be given greater credence in the circumstances of the case,” and here, “the oral conditions of probation control in light of the circumstances”].) 4 DISCUSSION Welfare and Institutions Code section 730, subdivision (b), authorizes the juvenile court to “impose and require any and all reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done[,] and the

1994(E.g., Peiser v. Mettler (1958) 50 Cal.2d 594, 603-606 [ 328 P.2d 953 , 74 A.L.R.2d 1 ].) And before the adoption of the modern rule that a complaint may be amended after the statute of limitations has run provided recovery is sought "on the same general set of facts" ( Austin v. Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co. (1961) 56 Cal.2d 596, 600 [ 15 Cal. Rptr. 817 , 364 P.2d 681 ]), the primary right theory was invoked to determine when such an amendment was permissible because it did not state "a different cause of action." (E.g., Big Boy Drilling Corp. v. Rankin (1931) 213 Cal. 646, 648-649 [

1994(E.g., Peiser v. Mettler (1958) 50 Cal.2d 594, 603-606 [ 328 P.2d 953 , 74 A.L.R.2d 1 ].) And before the adoption of the modern rule that a complaint may be amended after the statute of limitations has run provided recovery is sought "on the same general set of facts" ( Austin v. Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co. (1961) 56 Cal.2d 596, 600 [ 15 Cal. Rptr. 817 , 364 P.2d 681 ]), the primary right theory was invoked to determine when such an amendment was permissible because it did not state "a different cause of action." (E.g., Big Boy Drilling Corp. v. Rankin (1931) 213 Cal. 646, 648-649 [

2022(Ibid.; In re P.O. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 288, 292, fn. 4 ; In re Frankie J. (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 1149, 1154-1155 ; In re Pedro Q. (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1368, 1373 .) Where there are discrepancies between a court’s oral pronouncement granting probation and its written order, “the modern rule is not automatic deference to the reporter’s transcript, but rather adoption of the transcript due more credence under all the surrounding circumstances.” (People v. Rodriguez (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 578, 586 , disapproved on another ground in People v. Hall (2017) 2 5 Cal.5th 494, 503, fn. 2 ; see People

2016“If an irreconcilable conflict exists between the transcripts of the court reporter and the court clerk, the modern rule is not automatic deference to the reporter’s transcript, but rather adoption of the transcript due more credence under all the surrounding circumstances.” (People v. Rodriguez, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at p. 586 ; People v. Smith (1983) 33 Cal.3d 596, 599 ; see also People v. Pirali (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1341, 1345-1346 .) Having found the condition stated on the record is susceptible to overbreadth and ambiguity, we conclude that the version attached to the minute order is c

2016(See also San Diego Service Authority for Freeway Emergencies v. Superior Court (1988) 198 *1313 Cal.App.3d 1466, 1472 [ 244 Cal.Rptr. 440 ] [“A court should not presume the Legislature intended to legislate by implication. [Citation.] Although in years past it may have been necessary for courts to read into a statute provisions not specifically expressed by the Legislature, the modern rule of construction disfavors such practice.”].) Our need to respect the existing statutory language and overall legal scheme is particularly important in light of the Legislature’s demonstrated capacity to ena

2016Auth. for Freeway Emergencies v. Superior Court (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 1466, 1472 [“A court should not presume the Legislature intended to legislate by implication. [Citation.] Although in years past it may have been necessary for courts to read into a statute provisions not specifically expressed by the Legislature, the modern rule of construction disfavors such practice”].) Our need to respect the existing statutory language and overall legal scheme is particularly important in light of the legislature’s demonstrated capacity to enact force account limit statutes that directly say what they m

1977Co. v. Shasta Dam etc. Dist., 135 Cal.App.2d 463, 468 [ 287 P.2d 841 ]: “Much has been written in many decisions upon the somewhat nebulous subject of legislative intent, and while in bygone years, before the Legislature had the advice and assistance of a highly trained and very efficient Legislative Counsel Bureau, it may have been necessary for courts to read something into statutes which was not specifically expressed therein in order to carry into effect the obvious intent of the Legislature, we believe that the better and more modern rule of construction is to construe a legislative enact

1977Co. v. Shasta Dam etc. Dist., 135 Cal.App.2d 463, 468 [ 287 P.2d 841 ]: “Much has been written in many decisions upon the somewhat nebulous subject of legislative intent, and while in bygone years, before the Legislature had the advice and assistance of a highly trained and very efficient Legislative Counsel Bureau, it may have been necessary for courts to read something into statutes which was not specifically expressed therein in order to carry into effect the obvious intent of the Legislature, we believe that the better and more modern rule of construction is to construe a legislative enact

1979(See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 461-462 [ 150 P.2d 436 ], concurring opn. of Traynor, J.; Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 63 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 697 , 377 P.2d 897 , 13 A.L.R.3d 1049 ].) But this does not mean that respondeat superior is merely a justification for reaching a ‘deep pocket’ or that it is based only upon an elaborate economic theory regarding optimal resource allocation.

1979(See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 461-462 [ 150 P.2d 436 ], concurring opn. of Traynor, J.; Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 63 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 697 , 377 P.2d 897 , 13 A.L.R.3d 1049 ].) But this does not mean that respondeat superior is merely a justification for reaching a ‘deep pocket’ or that it is based only upon an elaborate economic theory regarding optimal resource allocation.

2026(People v. Smith, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 599 ; see also People v. Contreras (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 868, 880 .) Historically, when a conflict between the court’s oral pronouncement and the written record could not be resolved, the oral pronouncement was “give[n] preference.” (People v. Pirali (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1341, 1346 (Pirali).) However, “the modern rule is that if the clerk’s and reporter’s transcripts cannot be reconciled, the part of the record that will prevail is the one that should be given greater credence in the circumstances of the case.” (Ibid., citing, inter alia, People v. S

2024“Although the traditional rule was that a court’s oral pronouncement of probation conditions controlled over the written version, ‘the modern rule is that if the clerk’s and reporter’s transcripts cannot be reconciled, the part of the record that will prevail is the one that should be given greater credence in the circumstances of the case.’ ” (In re D.H. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 722, 725 ; see People v. Contreras (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 868, 880 [“if the reporter’s transcript and the clerk’s transcript … cannot be reconciled, we do not automatically defer to the reporter’s transcript, but rather a

2021(Westman, at pp. 30, 34-37; see Stock v. Meek (1950) 35 Cal.2d 809, 817-818 .) The Supreme Court years later in Stock v. Meek (which, like Westman, also involved a claim for refund of usurious interest paid) held, “‘[V]oluntary’ payments of interest do not waive the rights of the payors,” and distinguished Harralson v. Barrett as “not in point” because it 53 “involved a constitutional provision of limited applicability.” (Stock, at p. 817.) More importantly, “‘the more modern doctrine [is] that mistakes of law and fact should be treated alike.’” (Willis v. Bank of America (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d

1971Preliminarily, we point out that recent California cases follow the more modern doctrine that mistakes of law and of fact should be treated alike (First Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Bank of America, 4 Cal.App.3d 393, 395 [ 84 Cal.Rptr. 532 ]); too, “[M]utual mistake is a common ground for restitution, and the ‘innocence’ of the payee does not relieve him of liability in quasi contract.” (Finnegan v. Spiegl Farms, Inc., 234 Cal.App.2d 408, 412 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 645 ].) Cited by the court for the foregoing is the Restatement, Restitution, sections 16, 18 and 20. 1 If the mistake was a material one, upon th

2015Early on, we held that ‘the trial court has at most a limited discretion to determine that the facts show an inability to perform the functions of a juror . . . .’ ([People v.] Compton [(1971)] 6 Cal.3d [55,] 60, italics added [citing People v. Hamilton (1963) 60 Cal.2d 105, 124-127 [32 Cal.Rptr.4, 383 P.2d 412 ]].) Subsequently, however, we revised that holding: ‘The more modern rule provides that, under section 1089, a trial court “has broad discretion to investigate and remove a juror in the midst of trial where it finds that, for any reason, the juror is no longer able or qualified to serv

2015Early on, we held that ‘the trial court has at most a limited discretion to determine that the facts show an inability to perform the functions of a juror . . . .’ ([People v.] Compton [(1971)] 6 Cal.3d [55,] 60, italics added [citing People v. Hamilton (1963) 60 Cal.2d 105, 124-127 [32 Cal.Rptr.4, 383 P.2d 412 ]].) Subsequently, however, we revised that holding: ‘The more modern rule provides that, under section 1089, a trial court “has broad discretion to investigate and remove a juror in the midst of trial where it finds that, for any reason, the juror is no longer able or qualified to serv

2014Now, however, except apparently in two states and except as otherwise provided by statute, the modern rule is that the only alterations which will affect the validity of an instrument are those which are material; that is, alterations which change the legal effect of the instrument.” (III American Law of Property (1974) § 12.85, p. 365, fns. omitted; see Bumb v. Bennett (1958) 51 Cal.2d 294, 303 ; Lee v. Lee (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1553, 1557 ; see also 30 Williston on Contracts (4th ed. 2004) § 75:20, p. 69, § 75:30, p. 111; 1 Patton and Palomar on Land Titles (3d ed. 2013) § 83, pp. 269-272;

2014Now, however, except apparently in two states and except as otherwise provided by statute, the modern rule is that the only alterations which will affect the validity of an instrument are those which are material; that is, alterations which change the legal effect of the instrument.” (3 American Law of Property (2nd printing 1974) § 12.85, p. 365, fns. omitted; see id., § 12.43, pp. 287-288; Bumb v. Bennett (1958) 51 Cal.2d 294, 303 [ 333 P.2d 23 ]; Lee v. Lee (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1553, 1557 [ 97 Cal.Rptr.3d 516 ]; see also 30 Williston on Contracts (4th ed. 2004) §§75:20, 75:30, pp. 69, 111

1991“The modern doctrine of equitable estoppel is a descendent of the ancient equity doctrine that ‘if a representation be made to another who deals upon the faith of it, the former must make the representation good if he knew or was bound to know it to be false.’ [Citations.]” (Lentz v. McMahon (1989) 49 Cal.3d 393, 398-399 [ 261 Cal.Rptr. 310 , 777 P.2d 83 ].) Four elements are required for application of this doctrine: “ ‘(1) the party to be estopped must be apprised of the facts; (2) he must intend that his conduct shall be acted upon, or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel had a

1991“The modern doctrine of equitable estoppel is a descendent of the ancient equity doctrine that ‘if a representation be made to another who deals upon the faith of it, the former must make the representation good if he knew or was bound to know it to be false.’ [Citations.]” (Lentz v. McMahon (1989) 49 Cal.3d 393, 398-399 [ 261 Cal.Rptr. 310 , 777 P.2d 83 ].) Four elements are required for application of this doctrine: “ ‘(1) the party to be estopped must be apprised of the facts; (2) he must intend that his conduct shall be acted upon, or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel had a

1991“The modern doctrine of equitable estoppel is a descendent of the ancient equity doctrine that ‘if a representation be made to another who deals upon the faith of it, the former must make the representation good if he knew or was bound to know it to be false.’ [Citations.]” (Lentz v. McMahon (1989) 49 Cal.3d 393, 398-399 [ 261 Cal.Rptr. 310 , 777 P.2d 83 ].) Four elements are required for application of this doctrine: “ ‘(1) the party to be estopped must be apprised of the facts; (2) he must intend that his conduct shall be acted upon, or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel had a

1991“The modern doctrine of equitable estoppel is a descendent of the ancient equity doctrine that ‘if a representation be made to another who deals upon the faith of it, the former must make the representation good if he knew or was bound to know it to be false.’ [Citations.]” (Lentz v. McMahon (1989) 49 Cal.3d 393, 398-399 [ 261 Cal.Rptr. 310 , 777 P.2d 83 ].) Four elements are required for application of this doctrine: “ ‘(1) the party to be estopped must be apprised of the facts; (2) he must intend that his conduct shall be acted upon, or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel had a

1991“The modern doctrine of equitable estoppel is a descendent of the ancient equity doctrine that ‘if a representation be made to another who deals upon the faith of it, the former must make the representation good if he knew or was bound to know it to be false.’ [Citations.]” (Lentz v. McMahon (1989) 49 Cal.3d 393, 398-399 [ 261 Cal.Rptr. 310 , 777 P.2d 83 ].) Four elements are required for application of this doctrine: “ ‘(1) the party to be estopped must be apprised of the facts; (2) he must intend that his conduct shall be acted upon, or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel had a

1991“The modern doctrine of equitable estoppel is a descendent of the ancient equity doctrine that ‘if a representation be made to another who deals upon the faith of it, the former must make the representation good if he knew or was bound to know it to be false.’ [Citations.]” (Lentz v. McMahon (1989) 49 Cal.3d 393, 398-399 [ 261 Cal.Rptr. 310 , 777 P.2d 83 ].) Four elements are required for application of this doctrine: “ ‘(1) the party to be estopped must be apprised of the facts; (2) he must intend that his conduct shall be acted upon, or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel had a

1984Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945) 326 U.S. 310, 316 [ 90 L.Ed. 95, 101-102 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 161 A.L.R. 1057 ]).

1984Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945) 326 U.S. 310, 316 [ 90 L.Ed. 95, 101-102 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 161 A.L.R. 1057 ]).

1979Co., 26 Cal.App.3d 941, 948-949 [ 103 Cal.Rptr. 487 ].) In some respects this rationale is akin to that underlying the modern doctrine of strict tort liability for defective products.

1979Co., 26 Cal.App.3d 941, 948-949 [ 103 Cal.Rptr. 487 ].) In some respects this rationale is akin to that underlying the modern doctrine of strict tort liability for defective products.

1979(See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 461-462 [ 150 P.2d 436 ], concurring opn. of Traynor, J.; Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 63 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 697 , 377 P.2d 897 , 13 A.L.R.3d 1049 ].) But this does not mean that respondeat superior is merely a justification for reaching a ‘deep pocket’ or that it is based only upon an elaborate economic theory regarding optimal resource allocation.

1979(See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 461-462 [ 150 P.2d 436 ], concurring opn. of Traynor, J.; Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 63 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 697 , 377 P.2d 897 , 13 A.L.R.3d 1049 ].) But this does not mean that respondeat superior is merely a justification for reaching a ‘deep pocket’ or that it is based only upon an elaborate economic theory regarding optimal resource allocation.

2026(People v. Smith, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 599 ; see also People v. Contreras (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 868, 880 .) Historically, when a conflict between the court’s oral pronouncement and the written record could not be resolved, the oral pronouncement was “give[n] preference.” (People v. Pirali (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1341, 1346 (Pirali).) However, “the modern rule is that if the clerk’s and reporter’s transcripts cannot be reconciled, the part of the record that will prevail is the one that should be given greater credence in the circumstances of the case.” (Ibid., citing, inter alia, People v. S

2022(People v. Farrell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2 .) Under “the modern rule,” however, even where the minute order and the transcribed oral pronouncement cannot be reconciled, “the part of the record that will prevail is the one that should be given greater credence in the circumstances of the case.” (People v. Pirali (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1341, 1346 ; People v. Smith (1983) 33 Cal.3d 596, 599 .) 2 Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code. 3 In case number C1914753, the minute order reflects dismissal of the following allegations: two prior strike convictions (§ 1170.12), one

2024Code, 33. § 2317.) “Ostensible authority is based on the principle of estoppel, and requires the essential elements of estoppel …. [Citation.] Ostensible authority must be based on the acts or declarations of the principal and not solely upon the agent’s conduct.” (Taylor v. Roseville Toyota, Inc. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 994, 1005 (Taylor).) “The modern doctrine of equitable estoppel is a descendent of the ancient equity doctrine that ‘if a representation be made to another who deals upon the faith of it, the former must make the representation good if he knew or was bound to know it to be fals

1991“The modern doctrine of equitable estoppel is a descendent of the ancient equity doctrine that ‘if a representation be made to another who deals upon the faith of it, the former must make the representation good if he knew or was bound to know it to be false.’ [Citations.]” (Lentz v. McMahon (1989) 49 Cal.3d 393, 398-399 [ 261 Cal.Rptr. 310 , 777 P.2d 83 ].) Four elements are required for application of this doctrine: “ ‘(1) the party to be estopped must be apprised of the facts; (2) he must intend that his conduct shall be acted upon, or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel had a

2022(Ibid.; In re P.O. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 288, 292, fn. 4 ; In re Frankie J. (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 1149, 1154-1155 ; In re Pedro Q. (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1368, 1373 .) Where there are discrepancies between a court’s oral pronouncement granting probation and its written order, “the modern rule is not automatic deference to the reporter’s transcript, but rather adoption of the transcript due more credence under all the surrounding circumstances.” (People v. Rodriguez (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 578, 586 , disapproved on another ground in People v. Hall (2017) 2 5 Cal.5th 494, 503, fn. 2 ; see People

2016When an irreconcilable conflict exists between the transcripts of the court reporter and the court clerk, the modern rule is not automatic deference to the reporter’s transcript, but rather adoption of the transcript due more credence under all the surrounding circumstances.” (People v. Smith (1983) 33 Cal.3d 596, 599 , fn. omitted; People v. Harrison (2005) 35 Cal.4th 208, 226 ; People v. Pirali (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1341, 1346 (Pirali).)6 Defendant in this case has noted discrepancies between the oral ruling and the signed minute order and wrongly assumes that the oral order is automaticall

2014Now, however, except apparently in two states and except as otherwise provided by statute, the modern rule is that the only alterations which will affect the validity of an instrument are those which are material; that is, alterations which change the legal effect of the instrument.” (III American Law of Property (1974) § 12.85, p. 365, fns. omitted; see Bumb v. Bennett (1958) 51 Cal.2d 294, 303 ; Lee v. Lee (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1553, 1557 ; see also 30 Williston on Contracts (4th ed. 2004) § 75:20, p. 69, § 75:30, p. 111; 1 Patton and Palomar on Land Titles (3d ed. 2013) § 83, pp. 269-272;

2014Now, however, except apparently in two states and except as otherwise provided by statute, the modern rule is that the only alterations which will affect the validity of an instrument are those which are material; that is, alterations which change the legal effect of the instrument.” (3 American Law of Property (2nd printing 1974) § 12.85, p. 365, fns. omitted; see id., § 12.43, pp. 287-288; Bumb v. Bennett (1958) 51 Cal.2d 294, 303 [ 333 P.2d 23 ]; Lee v. Lee (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1553, 1557 [ 97 Cal.Rptr.3d 516 ]; see also 30 Williston on Contracts (4th ed. 2004) §§75:20, 75:30, pp. 69, 111

1984Behavior may be considered outrageous if a defendant (1) abuses a relation or position which gives him power to damage the plaintiff’s interest; (2) knows the plaintiff is susceptible to injuries through mental distress; or (3) acts intentionally or unreasonably with the recognition that the acts are likely to result in illness through mental distress. [Citations.]” (Newby v. Alto Riviera Apartments (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 288, 297 [ 131 Cal.Rptr. 547 ].) Here, plaintiff has alleged facts which are within the purview of the quoted definition.

1984Behavior may be considered outrageous if a defendant (1) abuses a relation or position which gives him power to damage the plaintiff’s interest; (2) knows the plaintiff is susceptible to injuries through mental distress; or (3) acts intentionally or unreasonably with the recognition that the acts are likely to result in illness through mental distress. [Citations.]” (Newby v. Alto Riviera Apartments (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 288, 297 [ 131 Cal.Rptr. 547 ].) Here, plaintiff has alleged facts which are within the purview of the quoted definition.

1980(People v. Daniels, supra, 71 Cal.2d 1119, 1138-1140 ; In re Earley (1975) 14 Cal.3d 122, 129-130 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 881 , 534 P.2d 721 ]: see also People v. Timmons, supra, 4 Cal.3d 411; People v. Mutch (1971) 4 Cal.3d 389 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 721 , 482 P.2d 633 ].) This modern standard defining both the nature and quantum of the harmproducing force establishes binding precedent (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450 [ 20 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 369 P.2d 937 ]) which has been consistently applied by intermediate courts of review.

1980(People v. Daniels, supra, 71 Cal.2d 1119, 1138-1140 ; In re Earley (1975) 14 Cal.3d 122, 129-130 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 881 , 534 P.2d 721 ]: see also People v. Timmons, supra, 4 Cal.3d 411; People v. Mutch (1971) 4 Cal.3d 389 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 721 , 482 P.2d 633 ].) This modern standard defining both the nature and quantum of the harmproducing force establishes binding precedent (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450 [ 20 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 369 P.2d 937 ]) which has been consistently applied by intermediate courts of review.

1962Code, § 1567.) As was said in Lewis v. Fahn, 113 Cal.App.2d 95, 99-100 [ 247 P.2d 831 ], quoting from Corpus Juris Secundum; “ ‘Under the modern doctrine there is no standard of courage or firmness with which the victim of duress must comply at the risk of being without remedy; the question is merely whether the pressure applied did in fact so far affect the individual concerned as to deprive him of contractual volition; if it ■ did there is duress, if it did not there is none.’ ” And quoting from Steffen v. Refrigeration Discount Corp., 91 Cal.App.2d 494, 498 [ 205 P.2d 727 ], “. . .

1962Code, § 1567.) As was said in Lewis v. Fahn, 113 Cal.App.2d 95, 99-100 [ 247 P.2d 831 ], quoting from Corpus Juris Secundum; “ ‘Under the modern doctrine there is no standard of courage or firmness with which the victim of duress must comply at the risk of being without remedy; the question is merely whether the pressure applied did in fact so far affect the individual concerned as to deprive him of contractual volition; if it ■ did there is duress, if it did not there is none.’ ” And quoting from Steffen v. Refrigeration Discount Corp., 91 Cal.App.2d 494, 498 [ 205 P.2d 727 ], “. . .