knowledge requirement in California

2017(Id. at pp. 911-913; see Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 890-892.) Appellant relies upon our discussion in Victor L. of a condition requiring that he “ ‘not be in any areas where gang members are known by Minor to meet or get together, or areas known by Minor for gang-related activity, nor participate in any gang activity.’ ” (Victor L., supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 913, fn. 7 .) The minor challenged the portion of this condition requiring him to stay away from “ ‘areas known by [him] for gang-related activity.’ ” (Ibid.) We held that although it included a knowledge requirement, the condi

2016The weapons condition in Victor L. ordered that the probationer “ ‘not remain in any building, vehicle or in the presence of any person where dangerous or deadly weapons or firearms or ammunition exist.’ ” (Victor L., supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 912 .) The Court of Appeal modified the condition to order that he “not remain in any building, vehicle or in the presence of any person where [he] knows one or more dangerous or deadly weapons or firearms or ammunition exist.” (Id. at p. 931.) The knowledge requirement was added in Victor L. to remedy a condition that required the probationer to avoi

2022(See People v. Turner (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1436 (Turner).) Yet, Allen contends that the constructive knowledge requirement should be stricken from the condition because it is inconsistent with the holding in Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th 875 and the “constitutional requirements of actual notice to the probationer.” However, our high court in 17 Sheena K. “did not discuss whether the required knowledge must be actual or could be constructive.” (People v. Mendez (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1167, 1174 (Mendez) [declining to “interpret the court’s implicit approval of adding actual knowledge as

2021(See In re Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 889-892; In re Vincent G., supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 245 ; In re Justin S. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 811, 816 ; People v. Garcia (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 97, 102-103 .) These are unlike probation conditions barring possession of prohibited items which implicitly include a knowledge requirement.

2016(See In re Kevin F. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 351, 365 [requiring modification to add a scienter requirement]; People v. Freitas (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 747, 752 [same]; People v. Moore (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1185 [modification to add scienter requirement is unnecessary because a knowledge requirement is already “manifestly implied.”]; People v. Rodriguez (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 578, 591 [Challenged probation condition contains implicit scienter requirements, and due process does not require making them explicit.]; People v. Kim (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 836, 847 [“[I]t is not necessary to inclu

2016Appellant is correct that the clause goes far beyond prohibiting unauthorized presence in school buildings or other areas where there can be no doubt the 11 Examples of cases in which the court modified conditions of probation to include a knowledge requirement include: Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 891-892 [probation condition limiting association with anyone disapproved by probation department]; People v. Kim (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 836, 843 [firearm possession clause]; In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 912-913, 931 [weapon and ammunition possession].) 20 area is part of a sch

2020(People v. Rodriguez (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 578, 590-593 , cited with approval in Hall, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 499-500, cited with disapproval to the extent Rodriguez held the knowledge requirement must be express where prohibited item was not criminalized by statute but was merely related to criminality, Hall, at p. 503, fn. 2.) The reasonable and practical construction of the provision is that, subject to the aforementioned exception for medically necessary medications, minor may not willfully possess, consume, inhale, or inject any substance, be it controlled or not, that she knows has an

2016(See In re Kevin F. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 351, 365 [requiring modification to add a scienter requirement]; People v. Freitas (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 747, 752 [same]; People v. Moore (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1185 [modification to add scienter requirement is unnecessary because a knowledge requirement is already “manifestly implied.”]; People v. Rodriguez (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 578, 591 [Challenged probation condition contains implicit scienter requirements, and due process does not require making them explicit.]; People v. Kim (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 836, 847 [“[I]t is not necessary to inclu

2023Respondent proposes that the condition, which currently prohibits appellant’s association “with any person using or trafficking in controlled substances,” be modified to prohibit association “with any person that he knows or reasonably should know is using or trafficking in controlled substances.” (Italics added.) Appellant requests that it be modified so that it prohibits his association “with any person he knows to be a user or trafficker of controlled substances.” (Italics added.) Appellant’s 12 proposal to include an actual knowledge requirement is in line with the majority of cases cited

2021(See In re Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 889-892; In re Vincent G., supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 245 ; In re Justin S. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 811, 816 ; People v. Garcia (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 97, 102-103 .) These are unlike probation conditions barring possession of prohibited items which implicitly include a knowledge requirement.

2016Relying primarily on Kevin F, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th 351 , and People v. Freitas (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 747 [ 102 Cal.Rptr.3d 51 ] {Freitas), she argues that a knowledge requirement “should not be left to implication.” (People v. Garcia (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 97, 102 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 340 ]; see Sheena K. supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890 .) In her view, Kevin F and Freitas correctly apply Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at page 890 , our Supreme Court’s most recent decision addressing “the need for a scienter clause in probation cases.” Without an express scienter requirement, she argues, she might inno

2016Relying primarily on Kevin F, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th 351 , and People v. Freitas (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 747 [ 102 Cal.Rptr.3d 51 ] {Freitas), she argues that a knowledge requirement “should not be left to implication.” (People v. Garcia (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 97, 102 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 340 ]; see Sheena K. supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890 .) In her view, Kevin F and Freitas correctly apply Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at page 890 , our Supreme Court’s most recent decision addressing “the need for a scienter clause in probation cases.” Without an express scienter requirement, she argues, she might inno

2016We believe that the minor has the better argument. 11 First, we do not find a knowledge requirement implicit in the Piercing/Shaving Condition as currently drafted.6 Indeed, a knowledge requirement has routinely been added “to probation conditions restricting the display of gang signs and the possession of gang paraphernalia.” (People v. Kim (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 836, 844 (Kim), citing People v. Leon (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 943, 950, 954 [condition modified with consent of the Attorney General to “ ‘You are not to possess, wear or display any clothing or insignia, tattoo, emblem, button, badge

2016(In re H.C., supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at *949 p. 1072.) Consistent with this reasoning, in People v. Leon (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 943 [ 104 Cal.Rptr.3d 410 ], this court modified a condition that stated “ ‘You’re not to frequent any areas of gang-related activity’ ” to include a scienter element and eliminate the vague term “ ‘frequent.’ ” (Id. at p. 952.) We explained that without a knowledge requirement, the defendant could be punished for unwittingly entering an area of gang-related activity.

2020By prohibiting defendant from associating with persons having a known criminal record, the court [places] a control over defendant which would assist her in successfully completing probation.” (People v. Robinson (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 816, 818 (Robinson).) Similarly, a court may impose probation conditions barring association with gang members to discourage involvement in gang-connected activity. ( Lopez, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at pp. 624–626.) Courts have routinely upheld against constitutional challenge probation conditions like condition Nos. 10 and 15 even though they did not include any sp

2016We believe that the minor has the better argument. 11 First, we do not find a knowledge requirement implicit in the Piercing/Shaving Condition as currently drafted.6 Indeed, a knowledge requirement has routinely been added “to probation conditions restricting the display of gang signs and the possession of gang paraphernalia.” (People v. Kim (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 836, 844 (Kim), citing People v. Leon (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 943, 950, 954 [condition modified with consent of the Attorney General to “ ‘You are not to possess, wear or display any clothing or insignia, tattoo, emblem, button, badge

2016(See In re Kevin F. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 351, 365 [requiring modification to add a scienter requirement]; People v. Freitas (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 747, 752 [same]; People v. Moore (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1185 [modification to add scienter requirement is unnecessary because a knowledge requirement is already “manifestly implied.”]; People v. Rodriguez (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 578, 591 [Challenged probation condition contains implicit scienter requirements, and due process does not require making them explicit.]; People v. Kim (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 836, 847 [“[I]t is not necessary to inclu

2016“California appellate courts have routinely added an explicit knowledge requirement to probation conditions prohibiting a probationer from associating with certain categories of persons, frequenting or remaining in certain areas or establishments, and possessing certain items.” (People v. Moore (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1184 .) There is a distinction between categories “that are not easily amenable to precise definition,” which justify such a knowledge requirement (id. at p. 1185), and categories whose scope is sufficiently apparent, which do not. 4 Based on this distinction, we agree with

2021(See, e.g., In re H.C. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1067, 1071-1072 [modifying gang conditions to add a knowledge requirement]; In re Justin S. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 811, 816 [same].) In sum, this narrowly tailored probation condition designed to prevent M.U.’s interest in gangs from escalating into more serious criminal gang activity is both reasonable and constitutional.

2017(Id. at pp. 916-917, quoting In re H.C. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1067, 1072 [ 96 Cal.Rptr.3d 793 ].) We modified the condition to state that the minor “ ‘shall not be in any areas where gang members are known by Minor to meet or get together, or areas known by Minor for gang-related activity (or specified by his probation officer as involving gang-related activity), nor shall lie participate in any gang activity.’ ” (Victor L., at pp. 917-918, 931-932.) Victor L. did not require modification of the last portion of the condition requiring the minor not to “participate in any gang activity”—the co

2023(Compare People v. Patel (2011) 10 196 Cal.App.4th 956, 960 [frustrated with “dismaying regularity” with which the court needed to address requests to modify probation conditions to add knowledge requirement, and in light of “substantial uncontradicted body of case law” that requires proof of scienter for probation violations involving “presence, possession, association, or other actions,” the court would “now give notice” going forward that it would construe all such probation conditions to have a knowledge requirement] with People v Pirali (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1341, 1351 [declining to foll

2015(Pirali, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 1344 .) Based on the reasoning of Pirali, we conclude the probation condition at issue here is neither overbroad nor vague, provided it is modified to incorporate a knowledge requirement.

2021(See In re Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 889-892; In re Vincent G., supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 245 ; In re Justin S. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 811, 816 ; People v. Garcia (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 97, 102-103 .) These are unlike probation conditions barring possession of prohibited items which implicitly include a knowledge requirement.

2021(See, e.g., In re H.C. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1067, 1071-1072 [modifying gang conditions to add a knowledge requirement]; In re Justin S. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 811, 816 [same].) In sum, this narrowly tailored probation condition designed to prevent M.U.’s interest in gangs from escalating into more serious criminal gang activity is both reasonable and constitutional.

2022(See People v. Turner (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1436 (Turner).) Yet, Allen contends that the constructive knowledge requirement should be stricken from the condition because it is inconsistent with the holding in Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th 875 and the “constitutional requirements of actual notice to the probationer.” However, our high court in 17 Sheena K. “did not discuss whether the required knowledge must be actual or could be constructive.” (People v. Mendez (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1167, 1174 (Mendez) [declining to “interpret the court’s implicit approval of adding actual knowledge as

2015(See., e.g., Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 891-892; Victor L., supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 911 ; Turner, supra, 155 9 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1435-1436.) We note that at least one appellate court has stated that it will no longer entertain these types of appeals—which it characterized as appearing with “dismaying regularity”—because a substantial body of case law now exists which makes clear that “a probationer cannot be punished for presence, possession, association, or other actions absent proof of scienter.” (People v. Patel (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 956, 960 .) Thus, the Patel court now tre

2020(In re Jorge M., supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 885 .) 14 a statute similar to possession of a machine gun, where a knowledge requirement is referenced regarding one act but not the other.

2014(See also In re Jorge M. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 866, 872, 877 .) The court in Moore disagreed with a different approach taken by the court in People v. Freitas (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 747, 752 , which held a specific knowledge requirement was necessary as a condition prohibiting possession of specified items.

2025It is enough for a jury or trier of fact to find the defendant knew or reasonably should have known the person they resisted was a police officer.” (Id. at p. 567, italics added.) Serna cited Yount with a qualification: “Moreover, we note that the near-universal adoption of the knowledge requirement from Lopez, supra, 188 Cal.App.3d 592 , including the (at least 7 implied) imprimatur given the rule by our Supreme Court in Yount v. City of Sacramento, supra, 43 Cal.4th at page 895 , strongly counsels against adopting the contrary holding in A.L.” (Serna, supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at p. 577, italic

2025It is enough for a jury or trier of fact to find the defendant knew or reasonably should have known the person they resisted was a police officer.” (Id. at p. 567, italics added.) Serna cited Yount with a qualification: “Moreover, we note that the near-universal adoption of the knowledge requirement from Lopez, supra, 188 Cal.App.3d 592 , including the (at least 7 implied) imprimatur given the rule by our Supreme Court in Yount v. City of Sacramento, supra, 43 Cal.4th at page 895 , strongly counsels against adopting the contrary holding in A.L.” (Serna, supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at p. 577, italic

2016The weapons condition in Victor L. ordered that the probationer “ ‘not remain in any building, vehicle or in the presence of any person where dangerous or deadly weapons or firearms or ammunition exist.’ ” (Victor L., supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 912 .) The Court of Appeal modified the condition to order that he “not remain in any building, vehicle or in the presence of any person where [he] knows one or more dangerous or deadly weapons or firearms or ammunition exist.” (Id. at p. 931.) The knowledge requirement was added in Victor L. to remedy a condition that required the probationer to avoi

2016The weapons condition in Victor L. ordered that the probationer “ ‘not remain in any building, vehicle or in the presence of any person where dangerous or deadly weapons or firearms or ammunition exist.’ ” (Victor L., supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 912 .) The Court of Appeal modified the condition to order that he “not remain in any building, vehicle or in the presence of any person where [he] knows one or more dangerous or deadly weapons or firearms or ammunition exist.” (Id. at p. 931.) The knowledge requirement was added in Victor L. to remedy a condition that required the probationer to avoi

2011(Id. at p. 521.) Thus, although Corporations Code section 25540 does not explicitly contain a knowledge requirement, we concluded that “knowledge of the falsity or misleading nature of a statement or of the materiality of an omission, or criminal negligence in failing to investigate and discover them, are elements of the criminal offense described in section 25401.” (Simon, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 522.) In People v. Coria (1999) 21 Cal.4th 868 [ 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 650 , 985 P.2d 970 ], we held that manufacturing methamphetamine in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11379.6 requires proof t

2001First, the precedential history was not clear and definitive; the Supreme Court had not spoken on the issue, but had suggested there was a knowledge requirement in other similar contexts. ( Id. at p. 877, 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 466 , 4 P.3d 297 .) Second, the Legislature may have believed there was a significant difference between deadly weapons such as machine guns and sawed-off shotguns, which are easily identifiable, and prohibited assault weapons, which may not be. ( Id. at p. 878, 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 466 , 4 P.3d 297 .) The minor in Jorge M. argued the machine gun cases should be reexamined in light o

2021(See In re Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 889-892; In re Vincent G., supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 245 ; In re Justin S. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 811, 816 ; People v. Garcia (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 97, 102-103 .) These are unlike probation conditions barring possession of prohibited items which implicitly include a knowledge requirement.

2016We believe that the minor has the better argument. 11 First, we do not find a knowledge requirement implicit in the Piercing/Shaving Condition as currently drafted.6 Indeed, a knowledge requirement has routinely been added “to probation conditions restricting the display of gang signs and the possession of gang paraphernalia.” (People v. Kim (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 836, 844 (Kim), citing People v. Leon (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 943, 950, 954 [condition modified with consent of the Attorney General to “ ‘You are not to possess, wear or display any clothing or insignia, tattoo, emblem, button, badge

2023(Compare People v. Patel (2011) 10 196 Cal.App.4th 956, 960 [frustrated with “dismaying regularity” with which the court needed to address requests to modify probation conditions to add knowledge requirement, and in light of “substantial uncontradicted body of case law” that requires proof of scienter for probation violations involving “presence, possession, association, or other actions,” the court would “now give notice” going forward that it would construe all such probation conditions to have a knowledge requirement] with People v Pirali (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1341, 1351 [declining to foll

2016(People v. Hall (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1124 , review granted Sept. 9, 2015, S227193.) In the meantime, the Attorney General urges us to consider the “commonsense approach” taken in Patel, which states, “It will no longer be necessary to seek a modification of a probation order that fails to expressly include” a knowledge requirement. ( Patel, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at pp. 960-961.) Esteban urges us to follow the reasoning adopted by Freitas and In re Kevin F. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 351 , in which the appellate court modified a probation condition that prohibited the possession of weapons to ad

2016We believe that the minor has the better argument. 11 First, we do not find a knowledge requirement implicit in the Piercing/Shaving Condition as currently drafted.6 Indeed, a knowledge requirement has routinely been added “to probation conditions restricting the display of gang signs and the possession of gang paraphernalia.” (People v. Kim (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 836, 844 (Kim), citing People v. Leon (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 943, 950, 954 [condition modified with consent of the Attorney General to “ ‘You are not to possess, wear or display any clothing or insignia, tattoo, emblem, button, badge

2016(Ibid.) We note that a number of the Courts of Appeal have declined to follow the rationale of Patel, including the Fourth Appellate District in People v. Moses (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 374, 381 (Moses), where the court chose to modify the probation conditions to include a knowledge requirement.

2026(Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 621 [“A defendant’s knowledge of factors bearing on a cohort’s likelihood of killing are significant to the analysis of reckless indifference to human life.”].) Appellant’s awareness that Perry was armed and his appreciation of Perry’s dangerousness is substantial evidence supporting the reckless indifference finding.

2024If the defendant fails to act as a restraining influence, then the defendant is arguably more at fault for the resulting murders.’” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 619 .) “A defendant’s knowledge of factors bearing on a cohort’s likelihood 16 of killing are significant to the analysis . . . .

2021As that instruction states, the jury is required to find that “[w]hen the defendant acted, he knew or reasonably should have known, that [the officers] were police officers performing or attempting to perform their duties.” (Italics added.) Nevertheless, in advocating that we depart from the long-standing rule regarding the knowledge required for a violation of section 148, subdivision 33 (a)(1), Castillo-Lopez relies on the Sixth District’s opinion in In re A.L. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 15 (A.L.), which held that “[a] defendant’s actual knowledge that an officer is engaged in the performance of

2021As that instruction states, the jury is required to find that “[w]hen the defendant acted, he knew or reasonably should have known, that [the officers] were police officers performing or attempting to perform their duties.” (Italics added.) Nevertheless, in advocating that we depart from the long-standing rule regarding the knowledge required for a violation of section 148, subdivision 33 (a)(1), Castillo-Lopez relies on the Sixth District’s opinion in In re A.L. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 15 (A.L.), which held that “[a] defendant’s actual knowledge that an officer is engaged in the performance of

2025Recognizing a split in authority on the question of whether section 148(a)(1) includes an element of the perpetrator’s actual knowledge that the person they resisted, delayed, or obstructed was a peace officer (compare In re A.L. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 15 (A.L.) [holding § 148(a)(1) does include an actual knowledge requirement] with People v. Mackreth (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 317 (Mackreth) [disagreeing with A.L., and holding § 148(a)(1) does not require actual knowledge]), the appellate division granted a request from defendant to certify his appeal for transfer to this court, and limited the iss

2025But ‘willfulness’ requires proof of actual and not merely constructive knowledge.” (A.L., supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 23 .) The court criticized Lopez for adopting the knowledge requirement from section 834a.

2015Specifically, the defendant argued that the condition violated his constitutional right to travel and that the knowledge requirement (i.e., “known to him” language) suffers from vagueness or overbreadth because the probationer and the probation officer may have different opinions as to which locations constitute areas of “gang-related activity.” ( Barajas, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at pp. 754, 757.) We rejected defendant’s arguments and found that the language of the condition withstood the constitutional challenges.

2014(Barajas, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 761 .) Further, because both parties agree that a knowledge requirement should be included and that a distance should be specified, and because both parties cite Barajas without objection to the 50-foot distance applied in that case, we will modify the probation condition in this case similarly to state: “That said minor not knowingly be on or within 50 feet of any school campus unless enrolled or with prior administrative approval.” 3.

2011Gallo v. Acuna (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1090, 1117 [ 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 277 , 929 P.2d 596 ] [rejecting vagueness challenge because knowledge requirement was “fairly implied” in the challenged injunction; “[t]o the extent that it might not be, we are confident that the trial court will . . . impose such a limiting construction ... by inserting a knowledge requirement should an attempt be made to enforce that paragraph of the injunction” (citation omitted)].) Under no conceivable theory did the trial court’s actions constitute a denial of due process.

2011Gallo v. Acuna (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1090, 1117 [ 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 277 , 929 P.2d 596 ] [rejecting vagueness challenge because knowledge requirement was “fairly implied” in the challenged injunction; “[t]o the extent that it might not be, we are confident that the trial court will . . . impose such a limiting construction ... by inserting a knowledge requirement should an attempt be made to enforce that paragraph of the injunction” (citation omitted)].) Under no conceivable theory did the trial court’s actions constitute a denial of due process.

2016We also note that, contrary to Jacobs’s claims that the two crimes are different, the knowledge requirement for manufacturing is the same as that for possession. ( Coria, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 878-879.) Accordingly, that Jacobs previously possessed methamphetamine was relevant to show he knew and was aware of the methamphetamine in his trunk.

2011(Id. at p. 521.) Thus, although Corporations Code section 25540 does not explicitly contain a knowledge requirement, we concluded that “knowledge of the falsity or misleading nature of a statement or of the materiality of an omission, or criminal negligence in failing to investigate and discover them, are elements of the criminal offense described in section 25401.” (Simon, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 522.) In People v. Coria (1999) 21 Cal.4th 868 [ 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 650 , 985 P.2d 970 ], we held that manufacturing methamphetamine in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11379.6 requires proof t