Tippins v. State, 530 S.W.2d 110 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975). · Go Syfert
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Tippins v. State, 530 S.W.2d 110 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 1 distinct case, last quoted 1979 · …the accused's connection with an extraneous offense must be shown before evidence of that offense may be admitted, ⚠ not in text
30 citation events (3 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Santhy Inthalangsy v. State (texapp, 2020-09-24)
Treatment trajectory · 1979 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1979 2002 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 9 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Santhy Inthalangsy v. State
Tex. App. · 2020 · confidence medium
App. 1975) (that accused committed extraneous misconduct “must be shown with some degree of certainty before evidence of [it] can come in”); Tippins v. State, 530 S.W.2d 110, 111 (Tex. Crim.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) James Schwing v. State (2×)
Tex. Crim. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
App. 1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Tippins v. State, 530 S.W.2d 110,111 (Tex. Crim.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Scott Eugene Sorrells v. State
Tex. App. · 1997 · confidence medium
App. 1977); Tippins v. State , 530 S.W.2d 110, 111 (Tex. Crim.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Ruiz v. State
Tex. App. · 1995 · confidence medium
Tippins v. State, 530 S.W.2d 110, 111 (Tex.Crim.App.1975); Hobbs v. State, 650 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Harrell v. State (6×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Tex. Crim. App. · 1994 · confidence medium
App.1903) (before evidence of extraneous misconduct can be admitted, "there must be pertinent testimony tending to show that appellant" is the one who committed it, citing Williams ); Fountain v. State, 90 Tex.Crim. 474 , 241 S.W. 489, at 491 (1921) (that accused committed extraneous offense "must be shown ... with reasonable certainty"); Hooks v. State, 97 Tex.Crim. 480 , 261 S.W. 1053 , at 1054-55 (1924) (Opinion on appellant's motion for rehearing) (same as Glenn ); Wells v. State, 118 Tex.Crim. 355 , 42 S.W.2d 607, at 608 (1931) (that accused perpetrated extraneous offense must be "satisfa…
examined Cited as authority (rule) Hafdahl v. State (4×)
Tex. Crim. App. · 1990 · confidence medium
Also see Wallace, supra; Mc Kay, supra; Tippins v. State, 530 S.W.2d 110, 111 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Phillips v. State, 659 S.W.2d 415, 418 (Tex.Cr.App.1983); Bush v. State, 628 S.W.2d 441, 444 (Tex.Cr.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bratcher v. State
Tex. App. · 1989 · confidence medium
On appeal appellant urges for the first time that it was error to admit the extraneous transaction when the defendant was not shown to be the party guilty of the extraneous offense, or unless the State is prepared to clearly prove that the accused committed the same, citing, Tippins v. State, 530 S.W.2d 110, 111 (Tex.Crim.App.1975).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Duwe v. State (2×)
Tex. Crim. App. · 1982 · confidence medium
See Fentis v. State, 528 S.W.2d 590, 592 (Tex. Cr.App.1975); Tippins v. State, 530 S.W.2d 110, 111 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Mounts v. State, 185 S.W.2d 731 (Tex.Cr.App.1945); Sensabaugh v. State, 426 S.W.2d 224, 227 (Tex.Cr.App.1968); Lamm v. State, 94 Tex. Cr.R. 560, 252 S.W. 535 (1923).
cited Cited "see" McCann v. State
Tex. Crim. App. · 1980 · signal: see · confidence high
See Eanes v. State, 546 S.W.2d 312, 315 (Tex.Cr.App.1977), Tomlinson v. State, 422 S.W.2d 474 (Tex.Cr.App.1967), Tippins v. State, 530 S.W.2d 110, 111 (Tex.Cr.App.1975), and 23 T.J.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Obie TIPPINS, Jr., Appellant,
v.
the STATE of Texas, Appellee
50223.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
Nov 26, 1975.
530 S.W.2d 110
Gayle Goldstrich and Edwin L. Davis, Dallas, for appellant., Henry Wade, Dist. Atty. and W. T. West-moreland, Jr., Don Driscoll and Jon Spar-ling, Asst. Dist. Attys., Dallas, Jim D. Vol-lers, State’s Atty. and David S. McAngus, Asst. State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.
Green, Douglas.
Cited by 19 opinions  |  Published

OPINION

GREEN, Commissioner.

In a trial before a jury, appellant was convicted of murder. Punishment was assessed at life.

Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the record reflects that during the night of January 12, 1973, appellant killed the two year old deceased by beating deceased with his hands. The sufficiency of the evidence is not challenged.

In his seventh ground of error, appellant contends the court reversibly erred in admitting a number of instances of prior injuries suffered by deceased over his objection that the evidence did not connect him with such injuries.

Evidence was introduced by State’s witnesses that in the latter part of November, 1972, some “whelps” were found on deceased’s body. About a week later, there were cigarette burns all over deceased. Also, evidence was introduced of external injuries to deceased’s head, discovered about two days before the instant offense.

In none of the above instances was there any direct evidence that appellant had caused these injuries. The evidence does reflect that on each occasion appellant had access to deceased, and could have been the one who injured deceased. However, it also shows that others had equal access to deceased, and could have caused the injuries.

When appellant first raised his objection that the evidence failed to connect him with the prior injuries, the State assured the court that subsequent evidence would furnish the necessary connection. On the basis of this assurance, the court overruled the objection. The State placed on the witness stand several of the persons shown to have had the opportunity to have caused the injuries. Each denied responsibility for them, and each denied being present when[*111] deceased was injured, or knowing anything about their cause. One of these witnesses, a five year old boy, had, prior to the trial, admitted causing the “whelps”, but he retracted his admission at the trial.

The evidence placed a fifteen year old girl in the presence of deceased at or about the time he suffered the injuries on each occasion. It was shown that she had the same opportunity as did appellant to have caused them. However, she was not used as a witness, and the record contains no explanation of her absence. There is no evidence excluding her from responsibility.

After the State had closed its case, appellant in a hearing outside the presence of the jury moved to have the evidence regarding the prior injuries struck from the record and the jury instructed to disregard such evidence. The motion was not granted, and the evidence remained for the jury’s consideration.

Under the provisions of Article 1257a, V.A.P.C. (1925), evidence of the previous relationship between the accused and the deceased, together with all relevant facts and circumstances going to show the condition of the mind of the accused at the time of the homicide, is admissible. See Dunlap v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 462 S.W.2d 591. It has long been the law of Texas, however, that evidence of prior transactions should not be admitted against an accused unless the State is prepared to clearly prove that the accused committed the same. Landers v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 519 S.W.2d 115; Shaver v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 496 S.W.2d 604; Carmean v. State, 163 Tex.Cr.R. 218, 290 S.W.2d 240; Shepherd v. State, 143 Tex.Cr.R. 387, 158 S.W.2d 1010. See Ernster v. State, 165 Tex.Cr.R. 422, 308 S.W.2d 33. See also 23 Tex.Jur.2d, Evidence, Section 195, p. 300.

The proof showed only that the appellant and others had access to the deceased on the four occasions. Further, all of those who had access to the deceased on these occasions were not called to testify. As the appellant was never definitely shown to be connected to the prior injuries to deceased, the evidence of such injuries should not have been admitted. “It is error to admit evidence of another offense when the defendant is not shown to be the party guilty of the offense.” Landers, supra, quoting 1 Branch’s Ann.P.C., 2nd Ed., Sec. 188, p. 204. The evidence was prejudicial to the rights of appellant, and its admission, under these circumstances, was reversible error.

The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded.

Opinion approved by the Court.

DOUGLAS, J., not participating.