judge conducted hearing in Texas

1985The trial judge conducted a hearing pursuant to Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 , 84 S.Ct. 1774 , 12 L.Ed.2d 908 , 1 A.L.R.3d 1205 (1964).

1985The trial judge conducted a hearing pursuant to Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 , 84 S.Ct. 1774 , 12 L.Ed.2d 908 , 1 A.L.R.3d 1205 (1964).

1973In each case the trial judge conducted a hearing outside the presence of the jury in accordance with the opinion of this Court in Martinez v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 437 S.W.2d 842 , and dictated his findings in the record.

1973Before either witness was allowed to make his in-court identification, the trial judge conducted a hearing outside the presence of the jury in accordance with the holding of this Court in Martinez v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 437 S.W.2d 842 .

2024Hoskins v. Hoskins, 497 S.W.3d 490 , 493–94 (Tex. 2016).

1997Id.

1997Id.

1996A similar incident arose in Adams, 768 S.W.2d 281 , where the trial judge conducted a hearing to determine whether a witness’ identification of the defendant had been tainted.

1996A similar incident arose in Adams, 768 S.W.2d 281 , where the trial judge conducted a hearing to determine whether a witness' identification of the defendant had been tainted.

1992As noted, the court of appeals remanded this cause to the trial court to impanel a jury to determine whether appellant was competent to stand trial at the time of his criminal trial in 1988. [1] In the court of appeals, appellant claimed that it was fundamental error for a trial judge in a subsequent competency hearing to testify as to his lay opinion and his opinion of the law on an ultimate issue. [2] In Skelton v. State, the trial court struck the testimony of three of the witnesses for the defense who testified as to the defendant's character and reputation. 655 S.W.2d at 302 .

1991Appellant objected to admission of the statement arguing the State could not prove beyond a reasonable doubt the extraneous offense occurred, that there is no such thing as extraneous offense by party, and given the confession the State had overwhelming evidence upon which to convict appellant. 3 Appellant also stated for the record, after the trial judge ruled the statement was admissible, that the prejudicial value of the statement greatly outweighed its probative value and that it was not admissible under Albrecht v. State, 486 S.W.2d 97 (Tex.Cr.App.1972).

1990Also see Wallace, supra; Mc Kay, supra; Tippins v. State, 530 S.W.2d 110, 111 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Phillips v. State, 659 S.W.2d 415, 418 (Tex.Cr.App.1983); Bush v. State, 628 S.W.2d 441, 444 (Tex.Cr.App.1982); Landers v. State, 519 S.W.2d 115 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Fentis v. State, 528 S.W.2d 590, 592 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Tippins v. State, 530 S.W.2d 110, 111 (Tex.Cr.

1990Also see Wallace, supra; Mc Kay, supra; Tippins v. State, 530 S.W.2d 110, 111 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Phillips v. State, 659 S.W.2d 415, 418 (Tex.Cr.App.1983); Bush v. State, 628 S.W.2d 441, 444 (Tex.Cr.

1990Also see Wallace, supra; Mc Kay, supra; Tippins v. State, 530 S.W.2d 110, 111 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Phillips v. State, 659 S.W.2d 415, 418 (Tex.Cr.App.1983); Bush v. State, 628 S.W.2d 441, 444 (Tex.Cr.App.1982); Landers v. State, 519 S.W.2d 115 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Fentis v. State, 528 S.W.2d 590, 592 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Tippins v. State, 530 S.W.2d 110, 111 (Tex.Cr.

1990Also see Wallace, supra; Mc Kay, supra; Tippins v. State, 530 S.W.2d 110, 111 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Phillips v. State, 659 S.W.2d 415, 418 (Tex.Cr.App.1983); Bush v. State, 628 S.W.2d 441, 444 (Tex.Cr.

1990Also see Wallace, supra; Mc Kay, supra; Tippins v. State, 530 S.W.2d 110, 111 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Phillips v. State, 659 S.W.2d 415, 418 (Tex.Cr.App.1983); Bush v. State, 628 S.W.2d 441, 444 (Tex.Cr.App.1982); Landers v. State, 519 S.W.2d 115 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Fentis v. State, 528 S.W.2d 590, 592 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Tippins v. State, 530 S.W.2d 110, 111 (Tex.Cr.

1983On first blush, both Lee, supra, and Apple, supra, would seem to be directly on point, but a closer examination reveals that in each of those cases, the trial judge conducted a hearing at which the State had the opportunity to retroactively announce ready but did not do so.

1983On first blush, both Lee, supra, and Apple, supra, would seem to be directly on point, but a closer examination reveals that in each of those cases, the trial judge conducted a hearing at which the State had the opportunity to retroactively announce ready but did not do so.

1983On first blush, both Lee, supra, and Apple, supra, would seem to be directly on point, but a closer examination reveals that in each of those cases, the trial judge conducted a hearing at which the State had the opportunity to retroactively announce ready but did not do so.

1983On first blush, both Lee, supra, and Apple, supra, would seem to be directly on point, but a closer examination reveals that in each of those cases, the trial judge conducted a hearing at which the State had the opportunity to retroactively announce ready but did not do so.

1973In Johnson v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 462 S.W.2d 955 , where a witness was shown two pictures of the appellant on the day of trial, we quoted Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 , 88 S.Ct. 967 , 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 , in which the Court concluded: “ . . .we hold that each case must be considered on its own facts, and that convictions based on eyewitness identification at trial following a pretrial identification by photograph will be set aside on that ground only if the photographic identification procedure was so imper-missibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irrepara

1973In Johnson v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 462 S.W.2d 955 , where a witness was shown two pictures of the appellant on the day of trial, we quoted Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 , 88 S.Ct. 967 , 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 , in which the Court concluded: “ . . .we hold that each case must be considered on its own facts, and that convictions based on eyewitness identification at trial following a pretrial identification by photograph will be set aside on that ground only if the photographic identification procedure was so imper-missibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irrepara

1973In Johnson v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 462 S.W.2d 955 , where a witness was shown two pictures of the appellant on the day of trial, we quoted Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 , 88 S.Ct. 967 , 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 , in which the Court concluded: “ . . .we hold that each case must be considered on its own facts, and that convictions based on eyewitness identification at trial following a pretrial identification by photograph will be set aside on that ground only if the photographic identification procedure was so imper-missibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irrepara