demanding standard in Texas

2015There is no mention of “probable cause,” which is a different, more demanding legal standard. 13 See, e.g., Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 , 110 S. Ct. 2412, 2416 (1990) (“Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.”).

2015There is no mention of “probable cause,” which is a different, more demanding legal standard. 13 See, e.g., Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 , 110 S. Ct. 2412, 2416 (1990) (“Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.”).

2015United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 , 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1585 , 104 L.

2015United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 , 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1585 , 104 L.

2023Reasonable suspicion “is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000).

2019“While ‘reasonable suspicion’ is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, the Fourth Amendment requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop.” Id. (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000)).

2023Reasonable suspicion “looks to the totality of the circumstances; those circumstances may all seem innocent enough in isolation, but if they combine to reasonably suggest the imminence of criminal conduct, an investigative detention is justified.” Derichsweiler v. State, 348 S.W.3d 906, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).

2019In re A.T.H., 106 S.W.3d 338 , 343 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, no pet.) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see Derichsweiler v. State, 348 S.W.3d 906, 916 (Tex. Crim.

2025It is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing “considerably less than preponderance of the evidence.” Furr v. State, 499 S.W.3d 872, 878 (Tex. Crim.

2022“While ‘reasonable suspicion’ is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, the Fourth Amendment requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for making [a] stop.” Furr v. State, 499 S.W.3d 872, 878 (Tex. Crim.

2019In re A.T.H., 106 S.W.3d 338 , 343 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, no pet.) (internal citations and quotations omitted); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968); Derichsweiler v. State, 348 S.W.3d 906, 916 (Tex. Crim.

2017In re A.T.H., 106 S.W.3d 338, 343 (Tex. App.-Austin 2003, no pet.) (internal citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).

2016Code Ann. § 41.003 (a) (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. , 418 U.S. 323 , 350, 94 S.Ct. 2997 , 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974) ("[T]he private defamation plaintiff who establishes liability under a less demanding standard than [knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth] may recover only such damages as are sufficient to compensate him for actual injury.").

2016Code Ann. § 41.003 (a) (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. , 418 U.S. 323 , 350, 94 S.Ct. 2997 , 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974) ("[T]he private defamation plaintiff who establishes liability under a less demanding standard than [knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth] may recover only such damages as are sufficient to compensate him for actual injury.").

2022See, e.g., Osborne, 68 F.3d at 98-99 (noting that the Fifth Circuit along with several other federal circuit courts “have all found that Waller’s stringent standard does not apply to partial closures, and have adopted a less demanding test.”); Garcia, 470 F.3d at 752 (“Many courts, including this one, have distinguished the complete closure in Waller from partial closures.”).

2022See id. at 414 (noting that in Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, for situations involving partial closure, a less stringent “substantial reason” test replaces the first Waller factor that ordinarily requires an “overriding interest;” other three Waller factors remain the same); Bucci v. United States, 662 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 2011) (explaining that First Circuit and others require only a “substantial interest” rather than a “compelling” one in partial closure Williams - 14 cases); Osborne, 68 F.3d at 98-99 (noting that at least five other federal circuit courts “have all found that Waller’s str

2019Mance v. Sessions, 896 F.3d 699, 705 (5th Cir. 2018).

2019Mance v. Sessions, 896 F.3d 699, 705 (5th Cir. 2018).

1997See White , 496 U.S. at 330 ("reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause"); Johnson v. State , 912 S.W.2d 227, 235 (Tex. Crim.

1997See White, 496 U.S. at 330 , 110 S.Ct. at 2416 (“reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause”); Johnson v. State, 912 S.W.2d 227, 235 (Tex.Crim.App.1995) (officers may stop and briefly detain persons suspected of criminal activity on less information than is constitutionally required for probable cause to arrest).

2019In re A.T.H., 106 S.W.3d 338 , 343 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, no pet.) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see Derichsweiler v. State, 348 S.W.3d 906, 916 (Tex. Crim.

2019In re A.T.H., 106 S.W.3d 338 , 343 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, no pet.) (internal citations and quotations omitted); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968); Derichsweiler v. State, 348 S.W.3d 906, 916 (Tex. Crim.

2011App. 1983) (emphasis added). [39] Derichsweiler v. State, supra, at 811. [40] Id. at 814 (Gardner dissenting). [41] See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 , 110 S.Ct. 2412 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990) ("Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause."). [42] Meeks v.

2011App. 1983) (emphasis added). [39] Derichsweiler v. State, supra, at 811. [40] Id. at 814 (Gardner dissenting). [41] See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 , 110 S.Ct. 2412 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990) ("Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause."). [42] Meeks v.

2026“Good cause is a demanding standard, not an impossible one.” Id. 1 ANALYSIS Under the second DCO, Relators’ deadline to designate experts fell on March 7, 2025, but the parties agreed to a mutual extension, which then made Relators’ expert designations due on March 17, 2025, and bumped the defendants’ expert deadline to April 21, 2025.

2026“Good cause is a demanding standard, not an impossible one.” Id. 1 ANALYSIS Under the second DCO, Relators’ deadline to designate experts fell on March 7, 2025, but the parties agreed to a mutual extension, which then made Relators’ expert designations due on March 17, 2025, and bumped the defendants’ expert deadline to April 21, 2025.

2026Applicant is raising a Herrera claim—“a ‘bare claim of innocence’ based solely on newly discovered evidence.” Brown, 205 S.W.3d at 544 (discussing Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993)).

2025The Court has described this “strict scrutiny” standard—permitting governmental restrictions only if they are narrowly tailored to promote a compelling governmental interest—as “the most demanding test known to constitutional law.” City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997); see Cath.

2022See id. at 414 (noting that in Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, for situations involving partial closure, a less stringent “substantial reason” test replaces the first Waller factor that ordinarily requires an “overriding interest;” other three Waller factors remain the same); Bucci v. United States, 662 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 2011) (explaining that First Circuit and others require only a “substantial interest” rather than a “compelling” one in partial closure Williams - 14 cases); Osborne, 68 F.3d at 98-99 (noting that at least five other federal circuit courts “have all found that Waller’s str

2022See, e.g., Osborne, 68 F.3d at 98-99 (noting that the Fifth Circuit along with several other federal circuit courts “have all found that Waller’s stringent standard does not apply to partial closures, and have adopted a less demanding test.”); Garcia, 470 F.3d at 752 (“Many courts, including this one, have distinguished the complete closure in Waller from partial closures.”).

2022We have previously held that a lay witness’s opinion testimony supported a finding of serious bodily injury, which suggests that lay opinion testimony can also be used to negate that element. 50 For example, in Hart v. State, the defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for aggravated assault by arguing that the State failed to prove serious bodily injury. 51 The evidence at trial included the victim’s testimony that the defendant had attacked her with a knife and stabbed her in both the stomach and shoulder, as well as medical records corroborating her de

2022App. 1996), overruled on other grounds by Castillo-Fuentes v. State, 707 S.W.2d 559, 563 (Tex. Crim.

2022Egregious harm is a demanding standard, “and such a determination must be done on a case-by-case basis.” Id. (citing Hutch v. State, 922 S.W.2d 166, 171 (Tex. Crim.