At page 682 Establishing prima facie showing for reopening compensation cases11 citing cases“cjompensation cases may be reopened on grounds that would not be sufficient to authorize the disturbance of judgments in common law or equity proceedings.”
- Ford Motor Co. v. Joseph Badall, 707 S.W.3d 10 (Ky. Ct. App. 2025).publishedGroup Louisville v. Jimenez, 653 S.W.3d 580 , 587 (Ky. 2022) (quoting Stambaugh v. Cedar Creek Mining Co., 488 S.W.2d 681, 682 (Ky. 1972)).2 Moreover, the plain language of KRS 342.730(1)(c)2. clearly provides that if claimants return to w…
- Francisco Rodarte v. Bluelinx Corp., 677 S.W.3d 469 (Ky. 2023).publishedHe contends that he 22 KRS 342.125(1). 23 KRS 342.125(4). 24 Stambaugh v. Cedar Creek Mining Co., 488 S.W.2d 681, 682 (Ky. 1972). 14 and BlueLinx were mutually mistaken on a material fact regarding the 2016 settlement agreement.
- Alevia Green v. North Cent. Iowa Reg'l Solid Waste Auth. & IMWCA, 989 N.W.2d 144 (Iowa 2023).publishedBecause the workers’ compensation “statute expressly provides for reopening under specified conditions”—such as a worsening of the worker’s disability—“the rule of res adjudicata has no application when the prescribed conditions are presen…
- Lakshmi Narayan Hosp. Grp. Louisville v. Maria Jimenez, 653 S.W.3d 580 (Ky. 2022).publishedThe appellate court noted, quoting Stambaugh v. Cedar Creek Mining Co., 488 S.W.2d 681, 682 (Ky. 1972), that “[w]here the statute expressly provides for reopening under specific conditions, the rule of res adjudicata has no application whe…
- Maria Jimenez v. Lakshmi Narayan Hosp. Grp. Louisville, 666 S.W.3d 902 (Ky. Ct. App. 2021).publishedStambaugh v. Cedar Creek Mining Co., 488 S.W.2d 681, 682 (Ky. 1972). -12- We also note Newberg v. Cash, 854 S.W.2d 791 (Ky. App. 1993).
- Basin Energy Co. v. Howard, 447 S.W.3d 179 (Ky. Ct. App. 2014).published“[cjompensation cases may be reopened on grounds that would not be sufficient to authorize the disturbance of judgments in common law or equity proceedings”
- Turner v. Bluegrass Tire Co., 331 S.W.3d 605 (Ky. 2010).publishedStambaugh v. Cedar Creek Mining Co., 488 S.W.2d 681, 682 (Ky.1972). 12 .
- Hall v. Hosp. Resources, Inc., 276 S.W.3d 775 (Ky. 2008).published Cf., Evans Elkhorn Coal Co. v. Ousley, 388 S.W.2d 130, 131 (Ky.1965) and Stambaugh v. Cedar Creek Mining Co., 488 S.W.2d 681, 682 (Ky. 1972).
- Colwell v. Dresser Instrument Div., 217 S.W.3d 213 (Ky. 2006).publishedTo prevent parties from being put to the expense of defending unwarranted motions to reopen, the court determined in Stambaugh v. Cedar Creek Mining Co., 488 S.W.2d 681, 682 (Ky.1972), that reopening should be a two-step process in which t…
- Farris v. City of Louisville, 209 S.W.3d 486 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006).published“should be required to make a reasonable prima facie preliminary showing of the existence of a substantial possibility of the presence of one or more of the prescribed conditions that warrant a change in the Board’s deci…”
Show 1 more citing case
- Hodges v. Sager Corp., 182 S.W.3d 497 (Ky. 2006).publishedThe Stambaugh court described what it envisioned as being “a reasonable prima facie preliminary showing of the existence of a substantial possibility of the presence of one or more of the prescribed conditions ” from KRS 342.125 before an…
Other citing cases
- Pikeville Coal Co./Chisholm Coal Co. v. Sullivan, 895 S.W.2d 574 (Ky. 1995).published
- Beale v. Rolley, 777 S.W.2d 921 (Ky. 1989).published
- Allene Hall v. Hosp. Resources, Inc., No. 2007 SC 000153 (Ky. Nov. 26, 2008).
v.
CEDAR CREEK MINING COMPANY Et Al., Appellees
On October 26, 1966, Ervin Stambaugh, a coal miner, filed a claim with the Workmen’s Compensation Board alleging total and permanent disability resulting from the occupational disease of silicosis. The Board, in an opinion and order dated May 20, 1968, found that Stambaugh was, in fact, totally and permanently disabled, but that his disability was not caused by silicosis or pneumoconiosis, and dismissed the claim. On appeal the Floyd Circuit Court affirmed the Board. Stambaugh did not appeal that judgment.
On October 9, 1969, Stambaugh filed a motion requesting the Board to reopen and review the dismissal of his claim. In support of the motion, Stambaugh filed an affidavit of Dr. William H. Anderson. On October 17, 1969, Stambaugh also filed with the Board a new application for adjustment of claim alleging total and permanent disability due to the occupational disease of silicosis. On October 20, 1969, Stambaugh filed a motion to consolidate this claim with his original claim. On December 8, 1969, the Board overruled the motion to reopen, dismissed the new application, and overruled the motion to consolidate the claims. On appeal to the Floyd Circuit Court the action of the Board was affirmed. Stambaugh appeals.
The Board held that a reopening would violate the rule of res adjudicata. Compensation cases may be reopened on grounds that would not be sufficient to authorize the disturbance of judgments in common law or equity proceedings. A “change of condition,” for example, would not overcome the defense of res adjudicata in a tort case as it does in a compensation case. Cf. KRS 342.125. The Board erred in its dismissal of Stambaugh’s claim solely on the basis of res adjudicata. Where the statute expressly provides for reopening under specified conditions, the rule of res adjudicata has no application when the prescribed conditions are present.
Although the Board erred in its refusal to consider the application to reopen, we are not holding that Stambaugh was automatically entitled to an administrative determination of the merits of his application to change the Board’s previous decision. The party who seeks to change the Workmen’s Compensation Board’s decision in favor of his adversary on an application to reopen should be required to make a reasonable prima facie preliminary showing of the existence of a substantial possibility of the presence of one or more of the prescribed conditions that warrant a change in the Board’s decision before his adversary is put to the additional expense of relitigation. The Board should formulate reasonable standards for the form and content of such a preliminary showing. Whether Stambaugh’s showing is sufficient to cause a re-examination of the Board’s previous decision and the taking of evidence we leave to the Board’s reasonable discretion as it applies the policy decisions necessary to establish the standards required.
The judgment is reversed to the extent that the case be remanded to the Board with directions that the Board determine whether or not Stambaugh has made a sufficient showing to justify a reopening of his claim.
EDWARD P. HILL, Jr., MILLIKEN, OSBORNE, PALMORE and REED, JJ., concur.