At page 163 Alleging manner and means to establish criminal offense37 citing casesholding that “if it is the manner and means by which an act is done that makes the otherwise innocent act a criminal offense, it is necessary to allege facts showing the manner and means which make the act a criminal offense
- Kristopher Black v. State, No. 08-19-00259-CR (Tex. App.—El Paso Sept. 15, 2020).published “[a]lthough it is generally sufficient to allege an offense in the terms of the statute without alleging additional facts, if it is the manner and means by which an act is done that makes the otherwise innocent act a cri…”
- Jeffery Scott Estrada v. State, 570 S.W.3d 402 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2019).published(holding that “if it is the manner and means by which an act is done that makes the otherwise innocent act a criminal offense, it is necessary to allege facts showing the manner and means which make the act a criminal of…)
- Shanna Lynn Hughitt v. State, No. 11-15-00277-CR (Tex. App.—Eastland Oct. 31, 2017).publishedPosey v. State, 545 S.W.2d 162, 163 (Tex. Crim.
- John Peter Pullis v. State, No. 10-13-00135-CR (Tex. App.—Waco Jan. 2, 2014).unpublishedPosey v. State, 545 S.W.2d 162, 163 (Tex. Crim.
- David Len Moulton v. State, 360 S.W.3d 540 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2011).publishedPosey v. State, 545 S.W.2d 162, 163 (Tex.Crim.App.1977).
- Miller v. State, 333 S.W.3d 352 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011).publishedPosey v. State, 545 S.W.2d 162, 163 (Tex.Crim.App.1977); State v. Williams, 780 S.W.2d 891, 894 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1989, no pet.).
- Cruz Duenas v. State, No. 02-10-00126-CR (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 8, 2010).publishedPosey v. State , 545 S.W.2d 162, 163 (Tex. Crim.
- Barbara Holz v. State, 418 S.W.3d 651 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2009).published Posey v. State, 545 S.W.2d 162, 163 (Tex.Crim.App.1977).
- Rotenberry v. State, 245 S.W.3d 583 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007).published Posey v. State, 545 S.W.2d 162, 163 (Tex.Crim.App.1977); State v. Williams, 780 S.W.2d 891, 894 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1989, no pet.).
- Kevin Wayne Rotenberry v. State, No. 02-06-00164-CR (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 18, 2007).publishedPosey v. State , 545 S.W.2d 162, 163 (Tex. Crim.
Show 25 more citing cases
- Natasha Kay Hollis v. State, No. 06-06-00123-CR (Tex. App.—Texarkana Mar. 7, 2007).publishedPosey v. State , 545 S.W.2d 162, 163 (Tex. Crim.
- State v. Frank Ford, No. 04-03-00628-CR (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 24, 2005).publishedPosey v. State , 545 S.W.2d 162, 163 (Tex. Crim.
- State v. Tom Newton, No. 04-03-00634-CR (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 24, 2005).publishedPosey v. State , 545 S.W.2d 162, 163 (Tex. Crim.
- State v. Ford, 179 S.W.3d 117 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005).publishedPosey v. State, 545 S.W.2d 162, 163 (Tex.Crim.App.1977); State v. Williams, 780 S.W.2d 891, 894 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1989, no pet.).
- State v. Newton, 179 S.W.3d 104 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005).publishedPosey v. State, 545 S.W.2d 162, 163 (Tex.Crim.App.1977); State v. Williams, 780 S.W.2d 891, 894 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1989, no pet.).
- State v. Mays, 942 S.W.2d 84 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1997).published“If it is the maimer and means by which an act is done that makes an otherwise innocent act a criminal offense, it is necessary to allege facts showing the manner and means which makes the act a criminal offense.” Giddings v. State, 816 S.…
- State v. Edmond, 903 S.W.2d 856 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995).publishedIf the State alleges these otherwise innocent or routine activities were, in this instance, criminal, the State must further allege the manner and means by which Edmond performed these acts. “[I]f it is the manner and means by which an act…
- State v. Eugene Jackie Lanzl, No. 03-94-00631-CR (Tex. App.—Austin June 21, 1995).unpublishedPosey v. State , 545 S.W.2d 162, 163 (Tex. Crim.
- State v. Bartee, 894 S.W.2d 34 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1995).published Posey v. State, 545 S.W.2d 162, 163 (Tex. Crim.App.1977).
- Cook v. State, 824 S.W.2d 334 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992).publishedEx parte Holbrook, 609 S.W.2d 541, 543 (Tex.Crim.App.1980); Posey v. State, 545 S.W.2d 162, 163 (Tex.Crim.App.1977).
- Giddings v. State, 816 S.W.2d 538 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992).published Posey v. State, 545 S.W.2d 162, 163 (Tex.Crim.App.1977).
- Sabine Consol., Inc. v. State, 816 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. App.—Austin 1991).publishedThere are two circumstances in which the State must allege manner and means: (1) when it is the manner and means that makes otherwise innocent activity criminal, Posey v. State, 545 S.W.2d 162, 163 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); (2) when the statute t…
- Kinkade v. State, 787 S.W.2d 507 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990).publishedPosey v. State, 545 S.W.2d 162, 163 (Tex.Crim.App.1977).
- State v. Williams, 780 S.W.2d 891 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1989).publishedPosey v. State, 545 S.W.2d 162, 163 (Tex.Crim.App.1977).
- Prevo v. State, 778 S.W.2d 520 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1989).publishedPosey v. State, 545 S.W.2d 162, 163 (Tex.Crim.App.1977). *524 Appellant argues that the Posey exception applies here because the alleged conduct of “causing the Complainant to place her hand on [appellant’s] penis” is an innocent act in th…
- Bush v. State, 628 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1982).publishedPosey v. State, 545 S.W.2d 162,163 (Tex.Cr.App.1977).
- Ex Parte Holbrook, 609 S.W.2d 541 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).published Though not absolute, the general rule is that an indictment which tracks the statutory language proscribing conduct as penal is sufficient to charge an offense, Clark v. State, 577 S.W.2d 238, 240 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); but if the manner or me…
- Ex Parte Millard, 587 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).published If in this fashion the pleading states facts which if true show a violation of the law by the accused, it is not fundamentally defective. [2] Posey v. State, 545 S.W.2d 162, 163 (Tex.Cr.
- Crystal Mason v. State, 598 S.W.3d 755 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2020).publishedSee Posey v. State, 545 S.W.2d 162, 163 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Rotenberry v. State, 245 S.W.3d 583, 586 (Tex. App.––Fort Worth 2007, pet. ref’d); see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc.
- Ryan Adam Fritz v. State, No. 02-08-00432-CR (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 16, 2009).unpublished See Posey v. State , 545 S.W.2d 162, 163 (Tex. Crim.
- Sanchez v. State, 32 S.W.3d 687 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000).publishedSee Posey v. State, 545 S.W.2d 162, 163 (Tex.Crim.App.1977). *696 As a general rule, any element of the offense that must be proved should be stated in an indictment.
- Gary Edward Vines v. State, No. 09-14-00487-CR (Tex. App.—Beaumont Apr. 11, 2018).unpublished(an indictment must be dismissed if the facts alleged would not constitute a criminal offense)
- State v. Campbell, 113 S.W.3d 9 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2000).publishedEx parte Holbrook, 609 S.W.2d 541, 543 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); see also Posey v. State, 545 S.W.2d 162, 163 (Tex.Cr.App.1977).
- Tullous v. State, 23 S.W.3d 195 (Tex. App.—Waco 2000).publishedAdditionally, “[a] statute which uses an undefined term of indeterminate or variable meaning requires more specific pleading in order to notify the defendant of the nature of the charges against him.” Mays, 967 S.W.2d at 407 ; see also Gid…
- Gibson v. State, 623 S.W.2d 324 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).published App.1980); see also Posey v. State, 545 S.W.2d 162, 163 (Tex.Cr.App.1977): “The pleading must state facts which if true show a violation of the law.” .
At page 164 Insufficiency of indictment to prove criminal offense4 citing cases“it is not a criminal offense to obtain a controlled substance for a friend or family member by presenting to a pharmacist a prescription prescribing a controlled substance for that friend or family member which had been properly obtained,”
- Whetstone v. State, 739 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987).publishedPosey v. State, 545 S.W.2d 162, 164 (Tex.Crim.App.1977).
- Ex Parte Holbrook, 609 S.W.2d 541 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).published Though not absolute, the general rule is that an indictment which tracks the statutory language proscribing conduct as penal is sufficient to charge an offense, Clark v. State, 577 S.W.2d 238, 240 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); but if the manner or me…
- Brewster v. State, 606 S.W.2d 325 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).published Dugger had acknowledged that as he watched the first two suspects claim their sacks he could not “in fact tell what was in the bottle,” nor whether they were getting prescriptions filled for someone else-a perfectly legal procedure, Posey…
- Scott v. State, 600 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).publishedThe appellant also relies on the statement in Posey v. State, 545 S.W.2d 162, 164 (Tex.Cr.App.1977): “It is not a criminal offense to obtain a controlled substance for a friend or family member by presenting to a pharmacist a prescription…
Other citing cases
- Evans v. State, 623 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).published
v.
the STATE of Texas, Appellee
OPINION
DALLY, Commissioner.These are appeals from convictions for the offense of obtaining a controlled substance by misrepresentation, fraud, deception, and subterfuge, in violation of Section 4.09(a)(3) of the Controlled Substances Act. The punishment assessed in each case is imprisonment for 5 years.
In Cause No. 53,191, the appellant waived indictment and was prosecuted on an information. He then waived a jury trial, entered a plea of guilty before the court, and made a judicial confession that the allegations in the information were true and correct. In Cause Nos. 53,207 and 53,208, the appellant was prosecuted by indictment; he waived jury trials, entered pleas of guilty before the court, and made judicial confessions that the allegations in the indictments were true and correct.
Briefs filed in Cause Nos. 53,207 and 53,208 state that the appeals are wholly without merit and are frivolous. We agree that these appeals are frivolous and they will be affirmed. In Cause No. 53,191, the appellant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support the judgment. We do not reach this contention since in our review in the interest of justice as required by Article 40.09, Sec. 13, Y.A.C.C.P., we find the information in Cause No. 53,191 is fatally defective; the judgment in that cause must be reversed.
Section 4.09(a)(3) of the Controlled Substances Act provides:
“(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally:
“(3) to acquire or obtain possession of a controlled substance by misrepresentation, fraud, forgery, deception or subterfuge.”
The information, omitting its formal parts, alleges that the appellant on or about January 31, 1976, did unlawfully
“. . . then and there knowingly and intentionally acquire and obtain possession of a controlled substance, namely: Parest, by misrepresentation, fraud, deception, and subterfuge, in that he, the said defendant, did then and there present to Paul Kamleiter, a pharmacist, a prescription purporting to prescribe said controlled substance for Donna Ren-ner.”
The facts constituting an offense denounced by a statute should be alleged so that the conclusion of law may be arrived at from the facts stated. Stribling v. State, 129 Tex.Cr.R. 656, 91 S.W.2d 735 (1936); Pond v. State, 116 Tex.Cr.R. 54, 32 S.W.2d 855 (1930); Jones v. State, 118 Tex.Cr.R. 106, 38 S.W.2d 587 (1931). The pleading must state facts which if true show a violation of the law. Ex parte Vasquez, 122 Tex.Cr.R. 475, 56 S.W.2d 190 (1933); Bassett v. State, 139 Tex.Cr.R. 65, 139 S.W.2d 267 (1940); Taubert v. State, 146 Tex.Cr.R. 582, 176 S.W.2d 955 (1944). Although it is generally sufficient to allege an offense in the terms of the statute without alleging additional facts, if it is the manner and means by which an act is done that makes the otherwise innocent act a criminal offense, it is necessary to allege facts showing the manner and means which make the act a criminal offense. See Bush v. State, 97 Tex.Cr.R. 219, 260 S.W. 574 (1924); Terry v. State, 471 S.W.2d 848 (Tex.Cr.App.1971); Reeves v. State, 144 Tex.Cr.R. 270, 162 S.W.2d 705 (1942); Parker v. State, 114 S.W.2d 906 (Tex.Cr.App.1938); Kennedy v. State, 86 Tex.Cr.R. 450, 216 S.W. 1086 (1919).
The State recognized that it was necessary to allege additional facts which would lead to the legal conclusion that the appellant knowingly and intentionally acquired and obtained possession of a controlled substance by misrepresentation, fraud, deception, or subterfuge. In attempting to allege these additional facts[*164] the State alleged “. . .in that he, the said defendant, did then and there present to Paul Kamleiter, a pharmacist, a prescription purporting to prescribe said controlled substance for Donna Renner . . . ,” but those facts alleged without more, allege only a non-criminal act — not a criminal offense. It is not a criminal offense to obtain a controlled substance for a friend or family member by presenting to a pharmacist a prescription prescribing a controlled substance for that friend or family member which had been properly obtained.
Proof of the facts alleged in the instant information would not show that the controlled substance was obtained by misrepresentation, fraud, deception, or subterfuge. In order to prove that a criminal offense was committed it would be necessary to prove additional facts. Article 21.03, V.A. C.C.P., provides that everything should be stated in an indictment which is necessary to be proved. The information in Cause No. 53,191 fails to allege a criminal offense, and even though it was not attacked in the trial court, it is fundamentally defective and requires that we reverse this judgment of conviction. American Plant Food Corporation v. State, 508 S.W.2d 598 (Tex.Cr.App.1974).
In contrast with the information in Cause No. 53,191, the indictments in Cause Nos. 53,207 and 53,208 do allege sufficient facts. The indictment in Cause No. 53,207, in pertinent part, alleges that the appellant:
“. . . did unlawfully, then and there knowingly and intentionally acquire and obtain possession of a controlled substance, namely, PHENMATRAZINE, by misrepresentation, fraud, deception and subterfuge, in that he, the said defendant, did then and there present to Gary Yenn, a pharmacist, a prescription for said controlled substance, said prescription purporting to prescribe said controlled substance for Beverly Cole, but which said prescription was then and there forged in that it then and there purported to be but had not been written and signed by Kenneth H. Baldwin, and the said prescription was then and there of the tenor following:”
This count of the indictment then incorporated a photographic copy of the prescription purportedly signed by Kenneth H. Baldwin. The indictment in Cause No. 53,-208 is substantially the same as that in Cause No. 53,207. See also the forms suggested in 4 Branch’s P.C., 3rd ed., p. 258, and Morrison and Blackwell, New Penal Code Forms, Sec. 4.09, p. 85.
The judgments are affirmed in Cause Nos. 53,207 and 53,208.
The judgment in Cause No. 53,191 is reversed and the information is ordered dismissed.
Opinion approved by the Court.