Stufflebean v. Crete Carrier Corp., 895 S.W.2d 115 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995). · Go Syfert
Stufflebean v. Crete Carrier Corp., 895 S.W.2d 115 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
27 citation events (12 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Rader v. WERNER ENTERPRISES, INC. (moctapp, 2012-01-10)
Treatment trajectory · 1996 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1996 2011 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 14 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rader v. WERNER ENTERPRISES, INC. (2×)
Mo. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
Jurisdiction Employer contends in point one that the Commission did not possess jurisdiction because, by virtue of the Owner-Operator Coverage Agreement, Claimant: (1) agreed to be bound solely by Nebraska’s workers’ compensation law; and (2) waived jurisdiction of the workers’ compensation laws of any other state. 3 Claimant counters that the Commission properly exercised jurisdiction over his claim because he was injured in Missouri and the “consent to State of Nebraska Worker’s Compensation” was executed outside of Missouri and was a mandatory condition of “work for Werner.”…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Norman v. Phelps County Regional Medical Center
Mo. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
S.D.1991); Hillenburg, 879 S.W.2d at 656 ; Stufflebean v. Crete Carrier Corp., 895 S.W.2d 115,116 (Mo.App.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Braswell v. Missouri State Highway Patrol
Mo. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
S.D. 1991); Hillenburg, 879 S.W.2d at 656 ; Stufflebean v. Crete Carrier Corp., 895 S.W.2d 115, 116 (Mo.App.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Alcorn v. McAninch Corp. (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Mo. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
S.D.1991); Hillenburg, 879 S.W.2d at 656 ; Stufflebean v. Crete Carrier Corp., 895 S.W.2d 115, 116 (Mo.App.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Rupard v. Kiesendahl
Mo. Ct. App. · 2003 · confidence medium
Stufflebean v. Crete Carrier Corp., 895 S.W.2d 115, 116 (Mo.App.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Parker v. Action Contracting Corp.
Mo. Ct. App. · 2003 · confidence medium
Standard of Review In workers’ compensation cases, appellate review on the issue of liability is permissible even though the relief granted is “temporary or partial.” Stufflebean v. Crete Carrier Corp., 895 S.W.2d 115, 116 (Mo.App.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Marston v. Juvenile Justice Center of the 13th Judicial Circuit
Mo. Ct. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
Stufflebean v. Crete Carrier Corporation, 895 S.W.2d 115, 116 (Mo.App.1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sanderson v. Porta-Fab Corp.
Mo. Ct. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
"However, appellate review on the issue of liability in a workers’ compensation case is permissible although an award is denominated 'temporary or partial.' ” Id., citing Stufflebean v. Crete Carrier Corp., 895 S.W.2d 115, 116 (Mo.App.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cahall v. Cahall
Mo. Ct. App. · 1998 · confidence medium
“However, appellate review on the issue of liability in a workers’ compensation case is permissible although an award is denominated ‘temporary or partial.’ ” Stufflebean v. Crete Carrier Corp., 895 S.W.2d 115, 116 (Mo.App.1995)(citing Woodburn v. May Distributing Co., 815 S.W.2d 477, 481 (Mo.App.1991); Smith v. Fabricated Metal Prods., 883 S.W.2d 537 , 538 n. 3 (Mo.App.1994)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Leslie v. School Services & Leasing, Inc.
Mo. Ct. App. · 1997 · confidence medium
Stufflebean v. Crete Cartier Corp., 895 S.W.2d 115, 116 (Mo.App.1995).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Shaffer v. St. John's Regional Health Center
Mo. Ct. App. · 1997 · confidence medium
S.D.1996); Stufflebean v. Crete Carrier Corp., 895 S.W.2d 115, 116 (Mo.App.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Fravel v. Guaranty Land Title
Mo. Ct. App. · 1996 · confidence medium
Stufflebean v. Crete Carrier Corp., 895 S.W.2d 115, 116 (Mo.App.1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Marrone v. Modine Heat and Transfer (2×)
Mo. Ct. App. · 1996 · confidence medium
That holding was cited with approval by the Western District of this Court in Stufflebean v. Crete Carrier Corp., 895 S.W.2d 115, 116 (Mo.App.W.D.1995), which held that appellate review on the issue of liability in a workers’ compensation ease is permissible although an award is denominated “temporary or partial.” As additional authority for that proposition, Stufflebean cited Woodburn.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Shelden v. Texas County Memorial Hospital
Mo. Ct. App. · 1996 · confidence medium
Because this is an appeal on the issue of liability in a Workers’ Compensation case, we have jurisdiction, even though the award is denominated "temporary or partial.” Stufflebean v. Crete Carrier Corp., 895 S.W.2d 115, 116 (Mo.App.1995). "[Ajwards of the Commission denominated 'temporary or partial’ are final and reviewable as to issues of liability (as opposed to issues of the extent and duration of an award).” Smith v. Fabricated Metal Products, 883 S.W.2d 537 , 538 n. 3 (Mo.App.1994). .
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
David STUFFLEBEAN, Respondent,
v.
CRETE CARRIER CORPORATION, Appellant
WD 49850.
Missouri Court of Appeals.
Jan 24, 1995.
895 S.W.2d 115
1995 Mo. App. LEXIS 90
1995 WL 23597
Brian J. Fowler, Kansas City, for appellant., Michael A. Knepper, Kansas City, for respondent.
Fenner, Kennedy, Berrey.
Cited by 19 opinions  |  Published
FENNER, Chief Judge.

Appellant, Crete Carrier Corporation, appeals from the decision of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission (Commission) awarding temporary workers’ compensation benefits to respondent, David Stuffie-bean.

Stuffiebean was employed by Crete Carrier Corporation as an over-the-road truck driver. On May 17, 1991, he sustained a back injury while loading a flat trailer tire onto a holder in order to return it to his employer. This injury occurred in Norfolk, Nebraska. It is undisputed that the injury arose out of and in the course of Stufflebe-an’s employment with Crete. After the accident, Stuffiebean notified Crete of the accident and timely filed a claim with the Missouri Division of Workers’ Compensation. [1] In March 1994, the administrative law judge dismissed the claim on the basis that the Missouri Division of Workers’ Compensation did not have jurisdiction. Stuffiebean subsequently filed a petition for review with the Commission. The Commission concluded that Missouri had jurisdiction based upon a finding that Stufflebean’s employment contract had been entered into in Missouri and because his employment was principally localized in Missouri. The Commission reversed the ALJ’s dismissal order and issued a temporary award for compensation. On appeal, Crete contends that the Commission erred in finding that the Missouri Division of Workers’ Compensation had jurisdiction over Stufflebean’s claim.

Stuffiebean claims that this court has no jurisdiction to review the Commission’s action because the award issued by the Commission was not final.

This court has no appellate jurisdiction in workers’ compensation cases except as expressly conferred by statute. Hillenburg v. Lester E. Cox Medical Ctr., 879 S.W.2d 652, 655 (Mo.App.1994). Section 287.495 authorizes an appeal from the final award of the Commission. Id. “An order lacks finality where it remains tentative, provisional, contingent, subject to recall, revision or reconsideration by the issuing agency.” Id. “A final award is one which disposes of the entire controversy between the parties.” Lewis v. Container Port Group, 872 S.W.2d 134, 136 (Mo.App.1994). “No appeal lies from a temporary or partial award.” Hillenburg, 879 S.W.2d at 655. However, appellate review on the issue of liability in a workers’ compensation case is permissible although an award is denominated “temporary or partial.” Woo dburn v. May Distributing Co., 815 S.W.2d 477, 481 (Mo.App.1991); Smith v. Fabricated Metal Prods., 883 S.W.2d 537, 538 (Mo.App.1994). The question presented in the case at bar is one of liability. Therefore, review of the Commission’s decision is appropriate by way of appeal.

On appellate review of a workers’ compensation award, the evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence are viewed in the light most favorable to the finding and award of compensation. Lieneke v. Evangelical Deaconess Hosp., 418 S.W.2d 142 (Mo. banc 1967). Evidence which might support a different finding is to be disregarded. Rector v. City of Springfield, 820 S.W.2d 639, 640 (Mo.App.1991). Furthermore, where a question of jurisdiction is in doubt, it should be determined in favor of the Commission. Ringeisen v. Insulation Servs., Inc., 539 S.W.2d 621, 626 (Mo.App.1976).

[*117] Appellant argues that the jurisdictional requirements of section 287.110(2), RSMo 1986 [2] were not established under the record. As relevant herein, section 287.110(2) provides that the Missouri Workers’ Compensation Law applies as follows:

(1) When an injury is received within the state of Missouri;
(2) To all injuries regardless of where received, if the contract of employment was entered into in the state of Missouri, unless the contract of employment provides otherwise; and
(3) To all injuries received outside Missouri where the employee’s employment was principally localized in Missouri.

In the case at bar, there is no dispute but that respondent’s injury was received in the state of Nebraska. However, the Commission found that the employment contract was entered into in Missouri and further that respondent’s employment was principally localized in Missouri.

In a workers’ compensation proceeding, the question of where a contract is made is one of fact. Redden v. Dan Redden Co., 859 S.W.2d 207, 209 (Mo.App.1993). Considered in the light most favorable to the Commission’s decision, the record in the case at bar reflects that respondent’s contract of employment was entered into in Missouri. [3]

The record reflects that appellant is a trucking company with terminals across the United States. At the time he was hired by appellant, respondent Stufflebean was a resident of St. Joseph, Missouri. Stufflebean responding to an ad in the St. Joseph newspaper called appellant’s central dispatch facility in Lincoln, Nebraska. Stufflebean was instructed to contact Bill Sobotka at appellant’s terminal at Kansas City, Missouri. So-botka arranged for Stufflebean to travel to Kansas City for an interview. Stufflebean went to Kansas City for his interview. Stuf-flebean also filled out an application in Kansas City, took a written test as well as a driving test in Kansas City, and underwent a physical examination by a doctor in Kansas City. Stufflebean testified that it was his understanding, at the conclusion of these tests, that Sobotka hired him as a driver for appellant. Stufflebean testified that after he was hired, Sobotka advised him that he would have to go to Lincoln, Nebraska for an orientation session. Stufflebean stated that Sobotka told him that after the orientation session Stufflebean would report back to Kansas City where he would be based and be assigned a truck.

Sobotka maintained that he did not offer the job to Stufflebean in Kansas City, but that Stufflebean was hired in Nebraska at the conclusion of the orientation session. Appellant also offered other evidence including the testimony of its Vice-President of Safety who testified that the Lincoln Safety Department makes the final determination of employment. Appellant’s evidence was in conflict with the testimony of Stufflebean and the Commission chose to believe Stufflebean.

Judgment affirmed.

All concur.

1

. The record indicates that Stuffiebean is currently receiving temporary benefits in the amount of $22.88 per week pursuant to the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act.

2

. All statutory references are to RSMo 1986 unless otherwise specified.

3

. Since we find that there was sufficient evidence to support the Commission’s determination the contract was entered into in Missouri, we need not address whether respondent’s employment was principally localized in Missouri.