history doctrine in Missouri

2018RSMo 1986 At oral argument, Employer noted that this exception was recognized and adopted by this Court in Stufflebean v. Crete Carrier Corp. , 895 S.W.2d 115 (Mo. App. W.D. 1995), overruled on other grounds by Hampton , 121 S.W.3d 220 .

2018RSMo 1986 At oral argument, Employer noted that this exception was recognized and adopted by this Court in Stufflebean v. Crete Carrier Corp. , 895 S.W.2d 115 (Mo. App. W.D. 1995), overruled on other grounds by Hampton , 121 S.W.3d 220 .

2013“Household Exclusion Clause” in Missouri While generally disfavored, [household exclusion] clauses are permissible ‘to exempt the insurer from being required to cover claims by those persons to whom the insured, on account of close family ties, would be apt to be partial in the case of injury; the exclusion serves to protect the insurer against collusive or cozy claims.’ Shahan, 988 S.W.2d at 539 -40 (quoting “8 Couch on Insurance 3d 114:25-26”).

2001As noted by Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 , 117 S.Ct. 644 , 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1996): “The fact that juries have expectations as to what evidence ought to be presented by a party, and may well hold the absence of that evidence against the party, is also recognized in the case law of the Fifth Amendment, which explicitly supposes that, despite the venerable history of the privilege against self-incrimination, jurors may not recall that someone accused of crime need not explain the evidence or avow innocence beyond making his plea ....

2001As noted by Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 , 117 S.Ct. 644 , 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1996): “The fact that juries have expectations as to what evidence ought to be presented by a party, and may well hold the absence of that evidence against the party, is also recognized in the case law of the Fifth Amendment, which explicitly supposes that, despite the venerable history of the privilege against self-incrimination, jurors may not recall that someone accused of crime need not explain the evidence or avow innocence beyond making his plea ....

1999The court examined the language: “A copy of the application and notice of the time when it will be presented to the court shall be served on all parties.” After reviewing the history of the rule, the court noted that these precedents “clearly indicate” that such motions “must be accompanied by a reasonable notice of the time when the motions will be presented to the court.” Id. at 679 .

1997In 1877, the United States Supreme Court decided that a provision of the Louisiana constitution prohibiting retrospective laws did not apply “to legislation recognizing or affirming binding obligations of the State.” New Orleans v. Clark, 95 U.S. 644, 655 , 24 L.Ed. 521 (1877).

1997In 1877, the United States Supreme Court decided that a provision of the Louisiana constitution prohibiting retrospective laws did not apply “to legislation recognizing or affirming binding obligations of the State.” New Orleans v. Clark, 95 U.S. 644, 655 , 24 L.Ed. 521 (1877).

1992Jackson v. Thompson, 661 S.W.2d 677 (Mo.App.1983).

1992Jackson v. Thompson, 661 S.W.2d 677 (Mo.App.1983).

1991For a history of the doctrine, see United States v. Bradshaw, 787 F.2d 1385 (10th Cir.1986).

1991State v. Simmons, supra at 91 .

1991The history of such a defense has been incisively reviewed in State v. Simmons, 751 S.W.2d 85 (Mo.App.1988), in which the court said: “Furthermore, while words, gestures or other actions may give rise to provocation it was the rule at common law and the general long-standing rule in Missouri that words, no matter how opprobrious or insulting are not sufficient to show ‘adequate provocation.’ ” (Footnote omitted).

1987Bandag, supra This history and analysis has been reviewed in Bandag and Porter, supra. Our Supreme Court has said “[n]o case resulting in a verdict for the plaintiff on a prima facie tort theory has been affirmed by the Missouri appellate courts”, 7 Brown v. Missouri Pacific R.

1986The evolved rule as expounded in Potashnick, Kraus and McIntyre, supra, derives from Parker-Washington Co. v. Dennison, 267 Mo. 199 , 183 S.W. 1041 (1916), which accommodated the variant precedents from Menefee v. Arnold, 51 Mo. 536 (1873) to Knisely v. Leathe, 256 Mo. 341 , 166 S.W. 257 (1914) 2 into the present exemplar [Id. 183 S.W. at 1042 ]: In order to bring an “action upon any writing for the payment of money or property,” it must appear in the statement of the cause of action that the money or property sued for is promised to be paid or given by the language of the writing, and that su

1986The evolved rule as expounded in Potashnick, Kraus and McIntyre, supra, derives from Parker-Washington Co. v. Dennison, 267 Mo. 199 , 183 S.W. 1041 (1916), which accommodated the variant precedents from Menefee v. Arnold, 51 Mo. 536 (1873) to Knisely v. Leathe, 256 Mo. 341 , 166 S.W. 257 (1914) 2 into the present exemplar [Id. 183 S.W. at 1042 ]: In order to bring an “action upon any writing for the payment of money or property,” it must appear in the statement of the cause of action that the money or property sued for is promised to be paid or given by the language of the writing, and that su

1986The evolved rule as expounded in Potashnick, Kraus and McIntyre, supra, derives from Parker-Washington Co. v. Dennison, 267 Mo. 199 , 183 S.W. 1041 (1916), which accommodated the variant precedents from Menefee v. Arnold, 51 Mo. 536 (1873) to Knisely v. Leathe, 256 Mo. 341 , 166 S.W. 257 (1914) 2 into the present exemplar [Id. 183 S.W. at 1042 ]: In order to bring an “action upon any writing for the payment of money or property,” it must appear in the statement of the cause of action that the money or property sued for is promised to be paid or given by the language of the writing, and that su

1986The evolved rule as expounded in Potashnick, Kraus and McIntyre, supra, derives from Parker-Washington Co. v. Dennison, 267 Mo. 199 , 183 S.W. 1041 (1916), which accommodated the variant precedents from Menefee v. Arnold, 51 Mo. 536 (1873) to Knisely v. Leathe, 256 Mo. 341 , 166 S.W. 257 (1914) 2 into the present exemplar [Id. 183 S.W. at 1042 ]: In order to bring an “action upon any writing for the payment of money or property,” it must appear in the statement of the cause of action that the money or property sued for is promised to be paid or given by the language of the writing, and that su

1986The evolved rule as expounded in Potashnick, Kraus and McIntyre, supra, derives from Parker-Washington Co. v. Dennison, 267 Mo. 199 , 183 S.W. 1041 (1916), which accommodated the variant precedents from Menefee v. Arnold, 51 Mo. 536 (1873) to Knisely v. Leathe, 256 Mo. 341 , 166 S.W. 257 (1914) 2 into the present exemplar [Id. 183 S.W. at 1042 ]: In order to bring an “action upon any writing for the payment of money or property,” it must appear in the statement of the cause of action that the money or property sued for is promised to be paid or given by the language of the writing, and that su

1982Protection Mutual Insurance Co. v. Kansas City, 504 S.W.2d 127 [8, 3] (Mo.1974).

1981From the facts submitted by the parties, it is clear that the respondent believed the scope of the privilege afforded a judgment debtor in a § 513.380 examination was outlined in Cantor v. Saitz, supra. In Cantor , after noting that the privilege against self-incrimination has been extended by the Missouri courts to judgment debtors in § 513.380 proceedings, the Court of Appeals surveyed the history of the privilege: “The seminal case on the subject appears to have resulted from the historic trial of Aaron Burr in the early years of the 19th century.

1970“The history of the doctrine reveals that it was established in the constitutional law of England in the year of 1586, during the reign of Queen Elizabeth.” Lucas v. McAfee, 217 Ind. 534 , 29 N.E.2d 403, 405 .

1970“The history of the doctrine reveals that it was established in the constitutional law of England in the year of 1586, during the reign of Queen Elizabeth.” Lucas v. McAfee, 217 Ind. 534 , 29 N.E.2d 403, 405 .

1888L. [S. C.] 234, and Ransone v. Christian, 56 Ga. 351 ) hold that, in actions for libel and slander, where the defendant pleads justification, he assumes the affirmative, and the right to begin and reply is with him ; but both are contrary to sound principle, and the former is overruled in the state in which it was pronounced, by Burckhalter v. Coward, supra. This conclusion is in conformity with a rule settled in England after a great controversy and generally followed in this country, that the right to open and close is with the plaintiff in every case where, in order to recover, he has somet