Jack L. Inselman & Co., Inc. v. FNB Fin. Co., 364 N.E.2d 1119 (N.Y. 1977). · Go Syfert
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Jack L. Inselman & Co., Inc. v. FNB Fin. Co., 364 N.E.2d 1119 (N.Y. 1977). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
124 citation events (48 in the last 25 years) across 14 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Davis v. Odn I Gmbh, No. 25-860 (2d Cir. Nov. 21, 2025)
Treatment trajectory · 1977 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1977 2001 2026
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364 N.E.2d at 1120 Affirming no actual breach on summary judgment16 citing casesaffirming finding of no actual breach on summary judgment1 citing court put it this way · also cited as 396 N.Y.S.2d at 349
Show 6 more citing cases
  • Hartford Fire Ins. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 723 F. Supp. 976 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).published
    Co., 41 N.Y.2d 1078 , 364 N.E.2d 1119 , 396 N.Y.S.2d 347, 349 (1977), and courts repeatedly have dismissed claims of tortious interference with contractual relations on that ground.
  • Sharma v. Skaarup Ship Mgmt. Corp., 699 F. Supp. 440 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).published 2 cites
    Inselman & Co. v. FNB Financial Co., 41 N.Y.2d 1078 , 396 N.Y.S.2d 347, 349 , 364 N.E.2d 1119, 1120 (1977).
  • Wymer v. New York State Div. for Youth, 671 F. Supp. 210 (W.D.N.Y. 1987).published
    They assert that they are entitled to maintain claims for both intentional inference with contract rights, Inselman v. FNB Financial Company, 41 N.Y.2d 1078, 1080 , 396 N.Y.S.2d 347, 349 , 364 N.E.2d 1119, 1120 (1977); and intentional infl…
  • Gerard Colby Zilg, Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant v. Prentice-Hall, Inc., & E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., Inc., Defendant-Cross-Appellee, 717 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1983).published 2 cites
    Inselman & Co. v. FNB Financial Co., 41 N.Y.2d 1078, 1080 , 364 N.E.2d 1119, 1120 , 396 N.Y.S.2d 347, 349 (1977). 70 I concur in the result reached by Judge Winter.
  • Beacon Syracuse Assocs. v. City of Syracuse, 560 F. Supp. 188 (N.D.N.Y. 1983).published
    Inselman & Co. v. FNB Financial Company, 41 N.Y.2d 1078, 1080 , 364 N.E.2d 1119 , 396 N.Y.S.2d 347, 349 (1977); Israel v. Wood Dolson Co., supra, 151 N.Y.S.2d at 5 , 134 N.E.2d 99 .
  • Fury Imports, Inc. v. Shakespeare Co., 625 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1980).published
    Inselman & Co. v. FNB Financial Co., 41 N.Y.2d 1078, 1080 , 364 N.E.2d 1119, 1120 , 396 N.Y.S.2d 347, 349 (1977); accord, Torrey Delivery, Inc. v. Chautauqua Truck Sales and Service, Inc., 47 App.Div. 279 , 366 N.Y.S.2d 506 (1975).
41 N.Y.2d at 1080 Establishing breach for tortious interference of contract15 citing cases“in order for the plaintiff to have a cause of action for tortious interference of contract, it is axiomatic that there must be a breach of that contract by the other party.”9 citing courts quote it
  • Davis v. Odn I Gmbh, No. 25-860 (2d Cir. Nov. 21, 2025).unpublished
    (In order for the plaintiff to have a cause of action for tortious interference of contract, it is axiomatic that there must be a breach of that contract by the other party . . . .)
  • Davis v. Odn I Gmbh, No. 1:24-cv-01463 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2025).
    (In order for the plaintiff to have a cause of action for tortious interference of contract, it is axiomatic that there must be a breach of that contract by the other party.)
  • Roadrunner Charters, Inc. v. New York City, et al., No. 1:25-cv-01285 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2026).
    Co., 41 N.Y.2d, 1078, 1080 (1977) (emphasis added).
  • Koffel v. Cook, 2024 NY Slip Op 31694(U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct., New York Cty. 2024).unpublished
    Co., 41 NY2d 1078, 1080 [1977]).
  • Sharkey v. Zimmer USA, Inc., No. 1:20-cv-08258, 2021 WL 3501160 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2021).
    Co., 41 N.Y.2d 1078, 1080 (1977).
  • Landmark Ventures, Inc. v. InSightec, Ltd., 179 A.D.3d 493 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 2020).published
    Co. , 41 NY2d 1078, 1080 [1977]).
  • O'Connor v. Shultz, 2018 NY Slip Op 7380 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep't 2018).published
    Co. , 41 NY2d 1078, 1080 [1977]; Central Park Sightseeing LLC v New Yorkers for Clean, Livable & Safe Sts., Inc. , 157 AD3d 28 , 33 [2017]; Ulysses I & Co., Inc. v Feldstein , 75 AD3d 990, 992 [2010], lv dismissed 15 NY3d 944 [2010]).
  • Ulysses I & Co. v. Feldstein, 75 A.D.3d 990 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2010).published
    Co., 41 NY2d 1078, 1080 [1977]).
  • Lawley Serv., Inc. v. Progressive Weatherproofing, Inc., 30 A.D.3d 977 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep't 2006).published
    Co., 41 NY2d 1078, 1080 [1977]; Foster Wheeler Broome County v County of Broome, 275 AD2d 592, 595-596 [2000], lv denied 95 NY2d 769 [2000]; Portofino Ristorante & Catering v Michigan Millers Mut.
  • J & J Sheet Metal Works, Inc. v. Picarazzi, 793 F. Supp. 1104 (N.D.N.Y. 1992).published
    Inselman & Co. v. F & B Financial Co., 41 N.Y.2d 1078, 1080 , 364 N.E.2d 1119, 1120 , 396 N.Y.S.2d 347, 349 (1977) (citations omitted); see also Baylis v. Mariott Corp., 906 F.2d 874 (2d Cir.1990); Hartford Fire Ins.
Show 5 more citing cases
396 N.Y.S.2d at 349 As federal courts applying New York law have recognized, conduct constituting tortious interference with business relations is, by definition, conduct directed not at the plaintiff itself, but at the party with which the plaintiff has or seeks to have a relationship.6 citing cases1 citing court put it this way
  • Mancuso v. L'oreal USA, Inc., No. 1:21-cv-00989, 2021 WL 1240328 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2021).
    (As federal courts applying New York law have recognized, conduct constituting tortious interference with business relations is, by definition, conduct directed not at the plaintiff itself, but at the party with which t…)
  • J & J Sheet Metal Works, Inc. v. Picarazzi, 793 F. Supp. 1104 (N.D.N.Y. 1992).published
    Inselman & Co. v. F & B Financial Co., 41 N.Y.2d 1078, 1080 , 364 N.E.2d 1119, 1120 , 396 N.Y.S.2d 347, 349 (1977) (citations omitted); see also Baylis v. Mariott Corp., 906 F.2d 874 (2d Cir.1990); Hartford Fire Ins.
  • Hartford Fire Ins. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 723 F. Supp. 976 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).published
    Co., 41 N.Y.2d 1078 , 364 N.E.2d 1119 , 396 N.Y.S.2d 347, 349 (1977), and courts repeatedly have dismissed claims of tortious interference with contractual relations on that ground.
  • Gerard Colby Zilg, Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant v. Prentice-Hall, Inc., & E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., Inc., Defendant-Cross-Appellee, 717 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1983).published 2 cites
    Inselman & Co. v. FNB Financial Co., 41 N.Y.2d 1078, 1080 , 364 N.E.2d 1119, 1120 , 396 N.Y.S.2d 347, 349 (1977). 70 I concur in the result reached by Judge Winter.
  • Beacon Syracuse Assocs. v. City of Syracuse, 560 F. Supp. 188 (N.D.N.Y. 1983).published
    Inselman & Co. v. FNB Financial Company, 41 N.Y.2d 1078, 1080 , 364 N.E.2d 1119 , 396 N.Y.S.2d 347, 349 (1977); Israel v. Wood Dolson Co., supra, 151 N.Y.S.2d at 5 , 134 N.E.2d 99 .
  • Fury Imports, Inc. v. Shakespeare Co., 625 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1980).published
    Inselman & Co. v. FNB Financial Co., 41 N.Y.2d 1078, 1080 , 364 N.E.2d 1119, 1120 , 396 N.Y.S.2d 347, 349 (1977); accord, Torrey Delivery, Inc. v. Chautauqua Truck Sales and Service, Inc., 47 App.Div. 279 , 366 N.Y.S.2d 506 (1975).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Jack L. Inselman & Co., Inc., Appellant,
v.
FNB Financial Company, Respondent
New York Court of Appeals.
May 5, 1977.
Published opinion
364 N.E.2d 1119
1977 N.Y. LEXIS 2119
Benedict Ginsberg and Charles E. Ramos for appellant., Joel Salon for respondent.
Breitel and Judges Jasen, Gabrielli, Jones, Wachtler, Fuchsberg and Cooke Concur in Memorandum.
Cited by 54 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 77%
Citer courts: S.D. New York (1)

[*1079] Memorandum. The order of the Appellate Division is affirmed, with costs.

Guilford Industries, a manufacturer of fabric, had a factoring agreement with FNB Financial Company (FNB) whereby the latter would guarantee payment of certain accounts receivable owed by purchasers whom it deemed credit worthy. FNB had, accordingly, approved the credit of one such purchaser, plaintiff Jack L. Inselman & Co, up to a maximum of $60,000. The agreement between Guilford and FNB in no way restricted or altered the rights of Guilford to enter into purchase and sale contracts involving credit transactions but merely defined the limits of guarantee imposed by FNB.

Guilford also made certain contracts with Inselman which included, as credit terms, that "If Buyer’s [Inselman] * * * credit limit becomes exhausted by deliveries under this or any other orders * * * Buyer thereafter shall pay cash, less allowed discounts, if any, on or before delivery. If Buyer fails, within a reasonable time, to pay cash in advance when so required, Seller [Guilford] may, at its option, cancel the undelivered portion of this order or contract.” The contracts specifically defined delivery as "acceptance of goods by common carrier.”

During the summer of 1974 Guilford sold and delivered to Inselman various fabrics for the sum of $54,300.18. The invoices were assigned to and guaranteed by FNB as provided in the factoring agreement, and the purchase of these goods depleted the bulk of its line of credit. Additional goods, valued at $76,273.75 were manufactured by Guilford, stored in its warehouse and identified to additional purchase contracts with Inselman. In accordance with the agreement, identification of the goods to the contracts, while in such warehouse storage, obligated Inselman to pay the purchase price even though this occurred prior to actual delivery. FNB, under the terms of its factoring agreement, refused to extend credit approval beyond the initial $60,000 limit. Consequently Guilford refused to deliver these additional goods unless Inselman paid cash, as provided under the terms of their contracts. Inselman unjustifiably insisted on immediate delivery without cash payment, else it would consider the contract canceled, and the demand was properly rejected by Guilford. Subsequently, FNB, under the belief that it had a repurchase agreement with Inselman, bought the goods from Guilford thereby releasing Inselman from liability to Guilford for the purchase price. Inselman did not repurchase the fabrics but[*1080] rather instituted this action for tortious interference with the contract between plaintiff and Guilford.

Inselman argues that FNB’s imposition of credit limitations with a concomitant request for payment before credit would be extended, and its subsequent purchase of the goods, forms the basis for a claim of tortious interference with the contract between Inselman and Guilford. FNB asserts, and correctly we think, that the actions taken by it and Guilford were entirely within their rights under the respective agreements. In addition it counterclaimed (1) for damages sustained as a result of Inselman’s refusal to repurchase, (2) for $54,300.18 on invoices assigned to it by Guilford, covering goods sold and delivered and (3) for $10,510.26 on invoices assigned to it by Malden Mills, Inc., another factoring client, covering other goods sold and delivered. The defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and for judgment on its second and third counterclaims. Special Term denied defendant’s motion in all respects and the Appellate Division reversed, dismissed the complaint and granted judgment on the second and third counterclaims. We affirm.

When Inselman exhausted its line of credit, Guilford was entitled, under the credit terms of the agreement, to demand cash payment before delivery. FNB had no obligation to extend further credit and was fully within its rights in demanding payment of the outstanding invoices before further credit would be extended. As to its subsequent purchase of the goods, this occurred well after the plaintiff had repudiated its contract. In order for the plaintiff to have a cause of action for tortious interference of contract, it is axiomatic that there must be a breach of that contract by the other party (Israel v Wood Dolson Co, 1 NY2d 116, 120; Campbell v Gates, 236 NY 457; Lamb v Cheney & Son, 227 NY 418; 32 NY Jur, Interference, § 20), a situation not here present. An essential element of the case against FNB, then, is a breach by Guilford. No such breach had occurred and thus the complaint was properly dismissed. Summary judgment on the second and third counterclaims involving goods sold and delivered, in the absence of evidence disputing liability, was correctly granted.

Chief Judge Breitel and Judges Jasen, Gabrielli, Jones, Wachtler, Fuchsberg and Cooke concur in memorandum.

Order affirmed.