employment-at-will doctrine in New York

2018To apply the presumption under these circumstances would run headlong into "principles of contract interpretation and the employment-at-will doctrine" ( id. ), and Supreme Court correctly determined that, as of 2016, "there was no contract in effect for [Carlini] to breach, nor could [Lawnsense] have interfered with plaintiff's contractual relations" ( Curren v Carbonic Sys., Inc. , 58 AD3d at 1108-1109 ; see Holahan v 488 Performance Group, Inc. , 140 AD3d at 414 ; Wood v Long Is.

2018Pipe Supply, Inc. , 82 AD3d at 1089 ).

2018To apply the presumption under these circumstances would run headlong into "principles of contract interpretation and the employment-at-will doctrine" ( id. ), and Supreme Court correctly determined that, as of 2016, "there was no contract in effect for [Carlini] to breach, nor could [Lawnsense] have interfered with plaintiff's contractual relations" ( Curren v Carbonic Sys., Inc. , 58 AD3d at 1108-1109 ; see Holahan v 488 Performance Group, Inc. , 140 AD3d at 414 ; Wood v Long Is.

2010They take note of case law which holds that the employment-at-will doctrine “cannot be circumvented by casting the cause of action in terms of tortious interference with employment” (see Barcellos v Robbins, 50 AD3d 934, 935 [2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 705 [2008]).

2010As an at-will employee Steinberg may not “evade the employment-at-will rule by recasting [his] cause of action in the garb of tortious interference with [his] employment” (Marino v Vunk, 39 AD3d 339, 340 [2007], citing Ingle v Glamore Motor Sales, 73 NY2d 183, 189 [1989]), particularly in the absence of any support in the record for his contention that Schnapp resorted to “the requisite unlawful means or malicious intent to sustain such a claim” (Interweb, Inc. v iPayment, Inc., 12 AD3d 164 , 165 [2004], lv dismissed 4 NY3d 776 [2005]; see also Snyder v Sony Music Entertainment, 252 AD2d 294,

2010As an at-will employee Steinberg may not “evade the employment-at-will rule by recasting [his] cause of action in the garb of tortious interference with [his] employment” (Marino v Vunk, 39 AD3d 339, 340 [2007], citing Ingle v Glamore Motor Sales, 73 NY2d 183, 189 [1989]), particularly in the absence of any support in the record for his contention that Schnapp resorted to “the requisite unlawful means or malicious intent to sustain such a claim” (Interweb, Inc. v iPayment, Inc., 12 AD3d 164 , 165 [2004], lv dismissed 4 NY3d 776 [2005]; see also Snyder v Sony Music Entertainment, 252 AD2d 294,

2007Moreover, where, as here, the individual defendants are coemployees of plaintiff, in order for a claim of tortious interference with an employment relationship to lie, it must be alleged that defendant coemployees acted outside the scope of their authority (Kosson v “Algaze”, 203 AD2d 112, 113 [1994], affd 84 NY2d 1019 [1995]).

2003Supreme Court dismissed his complaint on account of the employment-at-will doctrine ( 144 Misc 2d 346 [1989]) and the Appellate Division affirmed ( 167 AD2d 265 [1990]).

2003Supreme Court dismissed his complaint on account of the employment-at-will doctrine ( 144 Misc 2d 346 [1989]) and the Appellate Division affirmed ( 167 AD2d 265 [1990]).

2003Supreme Court dismissed his complaint on account of the employment-at-will doctrine ( 144 Misc 2d 346 [1989]) and the Appellate Division affirmed ( 167 AD2d 265 [1990]).

2003Supreme Court dismissed his complaint on account of the employment-at-will doctrine ( 144 Misc 2d 346 [1989]) and the Appellate Division affirmed ( 167 AD2d 265 [1990]).

2000To the extent that plaintiff points to our decision in Waldman v NYNEX Corp. ( 265 AD2d 164 ) in support of his claim, that case is clearly distinguishable.

1998We have noted that the "original purposes of the employment at-will doctrine were to afford employees the freedom to contract to suit their needs and to allow employers to exercise their best judgment with regard to employment matters" ( Sabetay v Sterling Drug , 69 N.Y.2d 329, 333 , supra ).

1998We have noted that the “original purposes of the employment at-will doctrine were to afford employees the freedom to contract to suit their needs and to allow employers to exercise their best judgment with regard to employment matters” (Sabetay v Sterling Drug, 69 NY2d 329, 333 , supra).

1992We also view this cause of action as an effort to escape the consequences of the employment at-will rule (see, Mansour v Abrams, supra) and, thus, its dismissal was not improper (see, Ingle v Glamore Motor Sales, supra, at 188-189).

1989Commenting on the freedom of contract underpinnings of the employment at-will rule, Justice Holmes, in dissent, stated: "I confess that I think that the right to make contracts at will that has been derived from the word liberty in the amendments has been stretched to its extreme by the decisions; but they agree that sometimes the right may be restrained” ( 208 US, at 191 ). .

1989Thus, Bevilacque v Ford Motor Co. ( 125 AD2d 516 ), Coleman v Taub (638 F2d 628) and Jenkins v Haworth, Inc. ( 572 F Supp 591 ), cited by the majority (majority opn, at 190), are not in point, since they involve employment contracts in which the stockholder-employee expressly agreed with the corporate employer that the hiring was at will. 2 Upholding the corporation’s right to discharge plaintiff here, therefore, must rest squarely on the application of the employment at-will doctrine, "that where an employment is for an indefinite term it is presumed to be a hiring at will which may be freely

1989Co., 41 NY2d 1078,1080 ).

1989Thus, Bevilacque v Ford Motor Co. ( 125 AD2d 516 ), Coleman v Taub (638 F2d 628) and Jenkins v Haworth, Inc. ( 572 F Supp 591 ), cited by the majority (majority opn, at 190), are not in point, since they involve employment contracts in which the stockholder-employee expressly agreed with the corporate employer that the hiring was at will. 2 Upholding the corporation’s right to discharge plaintiff here, therefore, must rest squarely on the application of the employment at-will doctrine, "that where an employment is for an indefinite term it is presumed to be a hiring at will which may be freely

1989In A. S. Rampell, Inc. v Hyster Co. ( 3 NY2d 369 ), plaintiff distributor sued one of its suppliers (Hyster), the supplier’s district manager (Shaffer), and one its own salesmen (Chester) for tortious interference with contracts.