83 New York opinions name it 13 courts 1889–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Leonardgreen2 sentences2015And “[w]hen [a] property is ‘open to the public’ at the time of the alleged trespass . . . the accused is presumed to have a license and privilege to be present” (People v Leonard, 62 NY2d 404, 408 [1984] [holding that the defendant could not be banished from a State University of New York campus, a publicly-owned and maintained property, absent proof of a lawful order excluding him from the premises]). 2007In such a case, the People have the burden of proving that a lawful order excluding the defendant from the premises issued, that the order was communicated to the defendant by a person with authority to make the order, and that the defendant defied that order (id.; see People v Brown, 25 NY2d 374, 377 )” (People v Leonard, 62 NY2d 404, 408 [1984]). | 6 | 6 |
People v. Browngreen2 sentences2021However, the evidence failed to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant lacked a license or privilege to enter or remain in the dwelling ( see People v Brown , 25 NY2d 374, 377 [1969]; Matter of Quanel M. , 8 AD3d 386, 386-387 [2004]; Matter of Daniel B. , 2 AD3d 440, 441 [2003]; Matter of Paul N. , 244 AD2d 489 [1997]). 1995(People v Brown, 25 NY2d, at 376 , supra [emphasis in original]; see, People v Powell, 58 NY2d 1009 [1983]; Penal Law § 140.00 [5].) In addition, the license and privilege to enter premises open to the public may not be terminated absent a lawful order, personally communicated by an appropriate authority. | 4 | 4 |
People v. Powellgreen2 sentences1995(People v Brown, 25 NY2d, at 376 , supra [emphasis in original]; see, People v Powell, 58 NY2d 1009 [1983]; Penal Law § 140.00 [5].) In addition, the license and privilege to enter premises open to the public may not be terminated absent a lawful order, personally communicated by an appropriate authority. 1989The word "remain” in the phrase "enter or remain” is designed to apply to those cases in which a person enters a building with a license or privilege, but remains in the building after the termination of such license or privilege (People v Licata, 28 NY2d 113, 117 ; Donnino, Practice Commentary, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 39, Penal Law art 140; Rothblatt, Revised Penal Law, Criminal Law of New York, § 257; see also, People v Powell, 58 NY2d 1009 ). | 3 | 3 |
People v. Quinonesgreen2 sentences2016Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]; Matter of Dayshawn S., 122 AD3d 748, 749 [2014]), we find that there was legally sufficient evidence to prove that the appellant was attempting to open a window of the subject building and that he did not have a license or privilege to enter the building (see Matter of Lonique M., 93 AD3d 203, 207 [2012]; People v Thornton, 4 AD3d 561 [2004]; People v Battle, 202 AD2d 1045 [1994]; People v Quinones, 173 AD2d 395, 396 [1991]). 2012The lack of a license or privilege to enter may be established by circumstantial evidence (People v Quinones, 173 AD2d 395, 396 [1991], lv denied 78 NY2d 972 [1991]). | 2 | 7 |
People v. Gravesgreen2 sentences2004Indeed, not a scintilla of evidence suggested defendant had obtained the consent of the occupants or anyone else (see People v Graves, 76 NY2d 16, 20 [1990]; People v Francis, supra) or that defendant reasonably believed that he had a license or privilege to enter these homes (see People v Luck, 294 AD2d 618, 619 [2002], lv denied 98 NY2d 699 [2002]; People v Webster, supra; People v Tennant, 285 AD2d 817, 818-819 [2001]). 2001The People were required to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant knowingly entered or remained in the Leonards’ home without a license or privilege to do so (see, Penal Law § 140.25; see also, Penal Law § 140.00 [5]), to wit, without their consent (see, People v Graves, 76 NY2d 16, 20 ; People v Reed, 121 AD2d 574, 575 ). | 2 | 4 |
Peters Griffin Woodward, Inc. v. WCSC, Inc.green2 sentences2016Stated otherwise, the OFAC license, whatever its proper construction, did not turn Sabena into the owner of a bank credit not otherwise owed to it under New York law. [FN23] Finally, because Article 4-A of the UCC governs this matter exclusively and, assuming the truth of the allegations of the complaint, it is plain, as previously discussed, that DBTCA acted properly with respect to the subject EFT, in which Sabena had no ownership or possessory interest, Sabena's cause of action for conversion, which seeks to impose liability inconsistent with the rights and liabilities expressly created by 2016Stated otherwise, the OFAC license, whatever its proper construction, did not turn Sabena into the owner of a bank credit not otherwise owed to it under New York law. 23 Finally, because article 4-A of the UCC governs this matter exclusively and, assuming the truth of the allegations of the complaint, it is plain, as previously discussed, that DBTCA acted properly with respect to the subject EFT, in which Sa-bena had no ownership or possessory interest, Sabena’s cause of action for conversion, which seeks to impose liability inconsistent with the rights and liabilities expressly created by art | 2 | 2 |
People v. Varasgreen2 sentences2003The evidence adduced at trial demonstrated that the codefendant, Ana Marie Santi, practiced medicine without a license in violation of Education Law § 6512 (1) by administering anesthesia to three patients in the care of the defendant, a duly-licensed physician who was her employer, and that the defendant was aware that Santi was a suspended doctor, and aided and abetted Santi in her unlicensed practice of medicine (see People v Varas, 110 AD2d 646, 648 [1985]). 2003The evidence adduced at trial demonstrated that the defendant practiced medicine without a license in violation of Education Law § 6512 (1) by administering anesthesia to three patients in the care of her employer, the codefendant, Peter Corines (see People v Varas, 110 AD2d 646, 648 [1985]). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Bleakleygreen2 sentences2016Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see Matter of Dayshawn S., 122 AD3d at 749 ; Matter of Michale A.C., 73 AD3d 1042, 1043 [2010]; cf. CPL 470.15 [5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342 [2007]), we nevertheless accord great deference to the opportunity of the finder of fact to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see Matter of Hasan C., 59 AD3d 617, 617-618 [2009]; cf. People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410 [2004]; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). 2004Our independent review of the evidence also leads us to conclude that the jury accorded the evidence its proper weight and, thus, the verdict is not against the weight of the credible evidence (see People v Bleakley, supra; People v Luck, supra; People v Webster, supra). | 1 | 3 |
People v. Bellgreen2 sentences2001The complainant did not give him permission to enter, nor did the facts and circumstances provide the defendant with a reasonable basis to believe that he had a license or privilege to enter the premises (see, People v Diaz, 173 AD2d 554 ; People v Dela Cruz, 162 AD2d 312, 313 ; People v Sandore, 148 AD2d 1000, 1001 ; People v Bell, 131 AD2d 859, 861 ; cf., People v McCargo, 226 AD2d 480, 481 ; People v Insogna, 86 AD2d 979 ). 1989She did not give defendant permission to enter her house and the facts and circumstances did not provide defendant with a reasonable basis to believe that he had a license or privilege to enter (see, People v Bull, 136 AD2d 929 ; People v Bell, 131 AD2d 859, 861 ; cf., People v Insogna, 86 AD2d 979 ). | 1 | 3 |
In re Daniel B.green2 sentences2021However, the evidence failed to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant lacked a license or privilege to enter or remain in the dwelling ( see People v Brown , 25 NY2d 374, 377 [1969]; Matter of Quanel M. , 8 AD3d 386, 386-387 [2004]; Matter of Daniel B. , 2 AD3d 440, 441 [2003]; Matter of Paul N. , 244 AD2d 489 [1997]). 2004Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792 [1987]), we find that it was not legally sufficient to establish that the appellant lacked a license or privilege to be in or upon the premises (see Matter of Daniel B., 2 AD3d 440 [2003]). | 1 | 2 |
Matter of H.green2 sentences2016Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]; Matter of Dayshawn S., 122 AD3d 748, 749 [2014]), we find that there was legally sufficient evidence to prove that the appellant was attempting to open a window of the subject building and that he did not have a license or privilege to enter the building (see Matter of Lonique M., 93 AD3d 203, 207 [2012]; People v Thornton, 4 AD3d 561 [2004]; People v Battle, 202 AD2d 1045 [1994]; People v Quinones, 173 AD2d 395, 396 [1991]). 2004Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792 [1987]), we find that it was not legally sufficient to establish that the appellant lacked a license or privilege to be in or upon the premises (see Matter of Daniel B., 2 AD3d 440 [2003]). | 1 | 2 |
Barton v. Hultsgreen2 sentences1976The earlier cases, relying on the "right-privilege” distinction (People v Rosenheimer, 209 NY 115, 121 ), viewed the possession of a driver’s license as a privilege which could be revoked in the absence of due process procedures (Matter of Barton v Hults, supra, pp 862-863; People v Rosenheimer, supra). 1968It may be argued that a license is a privilege (Matter of Barton v. Hults, 23 Misc 2d 861, 862 , and cases cited therein) or that it is a vested property right (Matter of Moore v. Macduff, 309 N. Y. 35, 38 ) and hence this added possible penalty is not a real penalty at all, but merely a chance of lessening his privileges. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Hargettgreen2 sentences2025"Generally, meaningful representation is not compromised where counsel fails to pursue a potentially futile endeavor" ( People v Hargett , 11 AD3d at 815 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). 2025"Generally, meaningful representation is not compromised where counsel fails to pursue a potentially futile endeavor" ( People v Hargett , 11 AD3d at 815 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). | 1 | 1 |
In re Quanel M.green1 sentence2021However, the evidence failed to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant lacked a license or privilege to enter or remain in the dwelling ( see People v Brown , 25 NY2d 374, 377 [1969]; Matter of Quanel M. , 8 AD3d 386, 386-387 [2004]; Matter of Daniel B. , 2 AD3d 440, 441 [2003]; Matter of Paul N. , 244 AD2d 489 [1997]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Bibbesgreen1 sentence2018On these points, entry into a victim's home is unlawful if the defendant does not have a license or privilege to enter ( see Penal Law § 140.00 [5]), and a defendant's intent may be properly inferred from, among other things, the circumstances of the entry, his or her unexplained presence in the building and his or her actions and statements while on the premises ( see People v Lara , 130 AD3d 463, 464 [2015], lv denied 27 NY3d 1001 [2016]; People v Pierce , 106 AD3d 1198, 1199 [2013]; People v Bibbes , 98 AD3d 1267, 1269 [2012], lv denied 20 NY3d 931 [2012]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Piercegreen1 sentence2018On these points, entry into a victim's home is unlawful if the defendant does not have a license or privilege to enter ( see Penal Law § 140.00 [5]), and a defendant's intent may be properly inferred from, among other things, the circumstances of the entry, his or her unexplained presence in the building and his or her actions and statements while on the premises ( see People v Lara , 130 AD3d 463, 464 [2015], lv denied 27 NY3d 1001 [2016]; People v Pierce , 106 AD3d 1198, 1199 [2013]; People v Bibbes , 98 AD3d 1267, 1269 [2012], lv denied 20 NY3d 931 [2012]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Laragreen1 sentence2018On these points, entry into a victim's home is unlawful if the defendant does not have a license or privilege to enter ( see Penal Law § 140.00 [5]), and a defendant's intent may be properly inferred from, among other things, the circumstances of the entry, his or her unexplained presence in the building and his or her actions and statements while on the premises ( see People v Lara , 130 AD3d 463, 464 [2015], lv denied 27 NY3d 1001 [2016]; People v Pierce , 106 AD3d 1198, 1199 [2013]; People v Bibbes , 98 AD3d 1267, 1269 [2012], lv denied 20 NY3d 931 [2012]). | 1 | 1 |
In re Hasan C.green1 sentence2016Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see Matter of Dayshawn S., 122 AD3d at 749 ; Matter of Michale A.C., 73 AD3d 1042, 1043 [2010]; cf. CPL 470.15 [5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342 [2007]), we nevertheless accord great deference to the opportunity of the finder of fact to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see Matter of Hasan C., 59 AD3d 617, 617-618 [2009]; cf. People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410 [2004]; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). | 1 | 1 |
| In re Michale A.C.green | 1 | 1 |
| In re Lonique M.green | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Mateogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Mastrovincenzo v. City Of New Yorkgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Matter of Dayshawn S.green | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Sukramgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Waltersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Shapiro v. Thompsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| In re Ashley M.green | 1 | 1 |
| Wolfson v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Maliziagreen | 1 | 1 |
| In re Kohngreen | 1 | 1 |
| County of Nassau v. South Farmingdale Water Districtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People Ex Rel. Price v. Sheffield Farms-Slawson-Decker Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Watergate II Apartments v. Buffalo Sewer Authoritygreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Ayusogreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Durecotgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Paz-Cabreragreen | 1 | 1 |
| In re Nastigreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bery v. City Of New Yorkgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Novey v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Insogna
green
2 sentences2001The complainant did not give him permission to enter, nor did the facts and circumstances provide the defendant with a reasonable basis to believe that he had a license or privilege to enter the premises (see, People v Diaz, 173 AD2d 554 ; People v Dela Cruz, 162 AD2d 312, 313 ; People v Sandore, 148 AD2d 1000, 1001 ; People v Bell, 131 AD2d 859, 861 ; cf., People v McCargo, 226 AD2d 480, 481 ; People v Insogna, 86 AD2d 979 ). 1989She did not give defendant permission to enter her house and the facts and circumstances did not provide defendant with a reasonable basis to believe that he had a license or privilege to enter (see, People v Bull, 136 AD2d 929 ; People v Bell, 131 AD2d 859, 861 ; cf., People v Insogna, 86 AD2d 979 ). | 4 | 1988–2002 |
Smith v. Passidomo
neutral
2 sentences2024If an ERPO hearing was merely a collateral proceeding that carried with it the threat of loss of a license or privilege, those potential consequences would not [*4]constitute a sufficient private interest to rebut the presumption against a right to assigned counsel [ see Matter of Smith v Passidomo , 120 AD2d 599 (2d Dept. 1986) (DMV revocation hearing)]. 2024If an ERPO hearing was merely a collateral proceeding that carried with it the threat of loss of a license or privilege, those potential consequences would not [*4]constitute a sufficient private interest to rebut the presumption against a right to assigned counsel [ see Matter of Smith v Passidomo , 120 AD2d 599 (2d Dept. 1986) (DMV revocation hearing)]. | 2 | 2024–2024 |
Grain Traders, Inc. v. Citibank, N.A.
green
2 sentences2016Stated otherwise, the OFAC license, whatever its proper construction, did not turn Sabena into the owner of a bank credit not otherwise owed to it under New York law. [FN23] Finally, because Article 4-A of the UCC governs this matter exclusively and, assuming the truth of the allegations of the complaint, it is plain, as previously discussed, that DBTCA acted properly with respect to the subject EFT, in which Sabena had no ownership or possessory interest, Sabena's cause of action for conversion, which seeks to impose liability inconsistent with the rights and liabilities expressly created by 2016Stated otherwise, the OFAC license, whatever its proper construction, did not turn Sabena into the owner of a bank credit not otherwise owed to it under New York law. 23 Finally, because article 4-A of the UCC governs this matter exclusively and, assuming the truth of the allegations of the complaint, it is plain, as previously discussed, that DBTCA acted properly with respect to the subject EFT, in which Sa-bena had no ownership or possessory interest, Sabena’s cause of action for conversion, which seeks to impose liability inconsistent with the rights and liabilities expressly created by art | 2 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Jones
green
2 sentences2012For example, in People v Lewis ( 13 AD3d at 211 ), the Appellate Division, First Department, held that the trial court properly instructed the jury that “the complainant could not grant defendant a license or privilege to enter premises from which he had been excluded by a court order” and that “the individual must comply with the order while it remains in effect, regardless of anything said or done by the occupant of the premises.” Hence, “[i]n the absence of a stay, the parties are generally obligated to obey a court order until it is vacated or reversed on appeal” (id. at 219; see Penal Law 2012For example, in People v Lewis ( 13 AD3d at 211 ), the Appellate Division, First Department, held that the trial court properly instructed the jury that “the complainant could not grant defendant a license or privilege to enter premises from which he had been excluded by a court order” and that “the individual must comply with the order while it remains in effect, regardless of anything said or done by the occupant of the premises.” Hence, “[i]n the absence of a stay, the parties are generally obligated to obey a court order until it is vacated or reversed on appeal” (id. at 219; see Penal Law | 2 | 2012–2012 |
People v. Lewis
green
2 sentences2012For example, in People v Lewis ( 13 AD3d at 211 ), the Appellate Division, First Department, held that the trial court properly instructed the jury that “the complainant could not grant defendant a license or privilege to enter premises from which he had been excluded by a court order” and that “the individual must comply with the order while it remains in effect, regardless of anything said or done by the occupant of the premises.” Hence, “[i]n the absence of a stay, the parties are generally obligated to obey a court order until it is vacated or reversed on appeal” (id. at 219; see Penal Law 2012For example, in People v Lewis ( 13 AD3d at 211 ), the Appellate Division, First Department, held that the trial court properly instructed the jury that “the complainant could not grant defendant a license or privilege to enter premises from which he had been excluded by a court order” and that “the individual must comply with the order while it remains in effect, regardless of anything said or done by the occupant of the premises.” Hence, “[i]n the absence of a stay, the parties are generally obligated to obey a court order until it is vacated or reversed on appeal” (id. at 219; see Penal Law | 2 | 2012–2012 |
People v. Liotta
green
2 sentences2012For example, in People v Lewis ( 13 AD3d at 211 ), the Appellate Division, First Department, held that the trial court properly instructed the jury that “the complainant could not grant defendant a license or privilege to enter premises from which he had been excluded by a court order” and that “the individual must comply with the order while it remains in effect, regardless of anything said or done by the occupant of the premises.” Hence, “[i]n the absence of a stay, the parties are generally obligated to obey a court order until it is vacated or reversed on appeal” (id. at 219; see Penal Law 2012For example, in People v Lewis ( 13 AD3d at 211 ), the Appellate Division, First Department, held that the trial court properly instructed the jury that “the complainant could not grant defendant a license or privilege to enter premises from which he had been excluded by a court order” and that “the individual must comply with the order while it remains in effect, regardless of anything said or done by the occupant of the premises.” Hence, “[i]n the absence of a stay, the parties are generally obligated to obey a court order until it is vacated or reversed on appeal” (id. at 219; see Penal Law | 2 | 2012–2012 |
People v. Williams
green
2 sentences2003Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Presentment Agency (see People v Williams, 84 NY2d 925 [1994]), we find that it was not legally sufficient to establish that the appellant lacked a license or privilege to be in or upon the premises (cf. People v Quinones, supra). 1997Viewing the circumstantial evidence in the light most favorable to the presenting agency (see, People v Williams, 84 NY2d 925 ), we find that it was legally insufficient to establish that the appellant lacked a license or privilege to be in or upon the premises (cf., People v Quinones, supra). | 2 | 1997–2003 |
People v. Basch
green
2 sentences1998(People v Ranieri, 144 AD2d 1006, 1008 [4th Dept 1988], supra; People v Basch, 36 NY2d 154 .) The attempt by the complaining witness to remove the defendant by an unauthorized order to leave does not, in this case, serve as a lawful predicate for establishing an unlawful trespass. 1982Such belief, even if mistaken, negates the element of “knowing unlawful entry” necessary for a conviction of burglary (see People v Basch, 36 NY2d 154, 159 ; People v Barton, 18 AD2d 612 ; Hechtman, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 39, Penal Law, §§ 140.20, 140.25). | 2 | 1982–1998 |
Durant v. Durant
green
2 sentences1987Licensing requirements which protect the public health and safety must be strictly complied with and a contract in violation of such statutes cannot be enforced (Millington v Rapoport, 98 AD2d 765 [2d Dept 1983]; Matter of Schwartz [American Swim Pools], 74 AD2d 638 [2d Dept 1980]; George Piersa, Inc. v Rosenthal, 72 AD2d 593 [2d Dept 1979]; Wineman v Blueprint 100, 75 Misc 2d 665 [Civ Ct, NY County 1973, Blyn, J.]). 1986We reject the argument that because Mr. La Barca is a licensed architect so as to be exempted from the license requirement (see, Administrative Code of City of New York § B32-361.0 [2]), the corporations in which he is a principal must be similarly exempted (see, George Piersa, Inc. v Rosenthal, supra). | 2 | 1986–1987 |
F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Tax Commission of New York
neutral
2 sentences1983The People have not proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant lacked a license or privilege to enter or remain in the building (People v Barton, 18 AD2d 612 ; Beedenbender v Midtown Props., 4 AD2d 276,281 ). 1982Such belief, even if mistaken, negates the element of “knowing unlawful entry” necessary for a conviction of burglary (see People v Basch, 36 NY2d 154, 159 ; People v Barton, 18 AD2d 612 ; Hechtman, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 39, Penal Law, §§ 140.20, 140.25). | 2 | 1982–1983 |
Moore v. Macduff
green
2 sentences1968It may be argued that a license is a privilege (Matter of Barton v. Hults, 23 Misc 2d 861, 862 , and cases cited therein) or that it is a vested property right (Matter of Moore v. Macduff, 309 N. Y. 35, 38 ) and hence this added possible penalty is not a real penalty at all, but merely a chance of lessening his privileges. 1961(Matter of Moore v. Macduff, 309 N. Y. 35 .) The moving affidavit in this case discloses that the defendant is a self-employed businessman with a distinct need for a license to drive in order to operate such business. | 2 | 1961–1968 |
In re Paul N.
green
1 sentence2021However, the evidence failed to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant lacked a license or privilege to enter or remain in the dwelling ( see People v Brown , 25 NY2d 374, 377 [1969]; Matter of Quanel M. , 8 AD3d 386, 386-387 [2004]; Matter of Daniel B. , 2 AD3d 440, 441 [2003]; Matter of Paul N. , 244 AD2d 489 [1997]). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. Battle green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| People v. Thornton green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| People v. Danielson green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Brady v. Department of Motor Vehicles green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Brady v. Department of Motor Vehicles neutral | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| United States v. Guest green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Papaioannou v. Kelly green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| People v. Butler green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| County of Nassau v. South Farmingdale Water District green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Migliaccio v. O'Connell green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| People v. Bopp neutral | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| People v. Salvatore green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| In re Power green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| People v. Webster green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| People v. Sanchez green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| People v. Rodriguez neutral | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| People v. Mason neutral | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| People v. Marrero green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| People v. Brown green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| People v. Crowell green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| People v. DeLarosa green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| People v. Burnett green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| People v. Mensah green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| People v. McCargo green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Levine v. Lacher & Lovell-Taylor green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.