Rusty McCoy pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). Finding that McCoy was an armed career criminal, the district court ^[1] sentenced him to the statutory minimum of 15 years in prison. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1); U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4. On appeal, McCoy challenges one of the predicate offenses underlying his armed-career-criminal status, arguing that aiding and abetting felony theft of a vehicle in violation of Kansas law should not automatically be deemed a “violent felony.” See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (defining “violent felony” as a crime that is punishable by more than one year in prison and “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another”). Reviewing de novo, see United States v. Mincks, 409 F.3d 898, 900 (8th Cir.2005), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 1345, 164 L.Ed.2d 59 (2006), we conclude that McCoy’s challenge is unavailing. See United States v. Barbour, 395 F.3d 826, 827-28 (8th Cir.) (under controlling precedent, Kansas vehicle theft is violent felony within meaning of § 924(e)), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 133, 163 L.Ed.2d 137 (2005). Accordingly, we affirm.