Heart Disease Rsch. Found., a Charitable Trust of the State of New York v. Gen. Motors Corp., 463 F.2d 98 (2d Cir. 1972). · Go Syfert
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Heart Disease Rsch. Found., a Charitable Trust of the State of New York v. Gen. Motors Corp., 463 F.2d 98 (2d Cir. 1972). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
86 citation events (18 in the last 25 years) across 23 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: In Re Treasury Sec. Auction Antitrust Litig., No. 22-943 (2d Cir. Feb. 1, 2024)
Treatment trajectory · 1972 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1972 1999 2026
Statutes interpreted (leading-cases list)
#6 42 U.S.C. § 4371 cited 1× in this case · 43 total citations of statute
How cited ↗
Cited for
At page 100 Dismissal for failure to state claims under environmental statutes61 citing casesAlthough the Federal Rules permit statement of ultimate facts, a bare bones statement of conspiracy or of injury under the antitrust laws without any supporting facts permits dismissal.14 citing courts put it this way · 55 listed here
Show 45 more citing cases
  • In Re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litig., 265 F. Supp. 2d 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).published
    “[although the Federal Rules permit statements of ultimate facts, a bare bones statement of conspiracy or of injury under the antitrust laws without any supporting facts permits dismissal”
  • Astroworks, Inc. v. Astroexhibit, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 609 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).published
    “[e]ven under the liberal Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, there is a limit to how much a court may be called upon to divine in assessing the sufficiency of the complaint before it, particularly when the plaintiff is re…”
  • Beyer Farms, Inc. v. Elmhurst Dairy, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 296 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).published
    Heart Disease Research Foundation v. General Motors Corp., 463 F.2d 98, 100 (2d Cir.1972); Mover’s & Warehousemen’s Ass’n v. Long Isl.
  • Moore U.S.A. Inc. v. Stand. Register Co., 139 F. Supp. 2d 348 (W.D.N.Y. 2001).published
    “[A] bare bones statement of conspiracy or of injury under the antitrust laws permits dismissal”
  • Granite Partners, L.P. v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 58 F. Supp. 2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).published
    The plaintiff “must do more than merely allege that a conspiracy exists, it must provide some factual basis for that allegation.” Fort Wayne Telsat v. Entertainment & Sports Programming Network, 753 F.Supp. 109, 115 (S.D.N.Y.1990); see Gar…
  • Granite Partners, LP v. Bear, Stearns & Co. Inc., 17 F. Supp. 2d 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).published
    Additionally, the plaintiff “must do more than merely allege that a conspiracy exists, it must provide some factual basis for that allegation.” Fort Wayne Telsat v. Entertainment and Sports Programming Network, 753 F.Supp. 109, 115 (S.D.N.…
  • African Am. Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. New York State Dep't of Educ., 8 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).published
    Motors Corp., 463 F.2d 98, 100 (2d Cir.1972).
  • Ezekwo v. Am. Bd. of Internal Med., 18 F. Supp. 2d 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).published
    “[ejven under the liberal Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, there is a limit to how much a court may be called upon to divine in assessing the sufficiency of the complaint before it, particularly when the plaintiff is re…”
  • Kramer v. Pollock-Krasner Found., 890 F. Supp. 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).published
    “[A] bare bones statement of conspiracy or of injury under the antitrust laws without any supporting facts permits dismissal”
  • Est. Constr. Co. v. Miller & Smith Holding Co., 14 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 1994).published 4 cites
    Dismissal of a “‘bare bones’ allegation of antitrust conspiracy without any supporting facts is appropriate.... ” Pepsico, 836 F.2d at 180 (quoting Heart Disease Research Found. v. General Motors Corp., 463 F.2d 98, 100 (2d Cir.1972)).
  • Haber v. Brown, 774 F. Supp. 877 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).published
    E.g., Heart Disease Research Found, v. General Motors Corp., 463 F.2d 98, 100 (1972); see also Ostrer v. Aronwald, 567 F.2d 551, 553 (2d Cir.1977) (dismissing complaint containing “unsupported allegations, which fail to specify in detail t…
  • Oreman Sales, Inc. v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 768 F. Supp. 1174 (E.D. La. 1991).published
    See Lombard’s, 753 F.2d at 975 ; Heart Disease Research Foundation v. General Motors Corp., 463 F.2d 98, 100 (2d Cir.1972). 32 .
  • Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Hearst/ABC Viacom Ent. Servs., 746 F. Supp. 320 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).published
    “a bare bones statement of conspiracy or injury under the antitrust laws without any supporting facts permits dismissal”
  • Friedman v. Arizona World Nurseries Ltd. P'ship, 730 F. Supp. 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).published
    “[A] bare bones statement of ‘conspiracy’ ... without any supporting facts permits dismissal”
  • Telectronics Proprietary, Ltd. v. Medtronic, Inc., 687 F. Supp. 832 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).published
    “Although the Federal Rules permit statement of ultimate facts, a bare bones statement of conspiracy or of injury under the antitrust laws without any supporting facts permits dismissal”
  • United States v. Bonanno Organized Crime Fam. of La Cosa Nostra, 683 F. Supp. 1411 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).published
    See Ostrer v. Aronwald, 567 F.2d 551, 553 (2d Cir.1977) *1440 (p er curiam); Heart Disease Research Foundation v. General Motors Corp., 463 F.2d 98, 100 (2d Cir.1972); Waller v. Butkovich, 584 F.Supp. 909, 931 (M.D.N.C.1984); Cairo v. Skow…
  • Pennsylvania ex rel. Zimmerman v. Pepsico, Inc., 836 F.2d 173 (3d Cir. 1988).published 2 cites
    Heart Disease Research Found. v. General Motors Corp., 463 F.2d 98, 100 (2d Cir.1972).
  • CBS, Inc. v. Ahern, 108 F.R.D. 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).published
    “bare bones statements of conspiracy or of injury under the antitrust laws without any facts permit dismissal”
  • Rosenberg v. Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, 598 F. Supp. 642 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).published
    George Sales Co. v. Cool Attic Corp., 587 F.2d 266, 273 (5th Cir.1979); Heart Disease Research Foundation v. General Motors Corp., 463 F.2d 98, 100 (2d Cir.1972).
  • Kravetz v. Brukenfeld, 591 F. Supp. 1383 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).published
    Thus, a complaint must be dismissed if it merely quotes words from the statute such as the existence of a “scheme and conspiracy,” Segal v. Gordon, supra, 476 F.2d at 608, or states the bare bones of a conspiracy without any supporting fac…
  • NCR Credit Corp. v. Underground Camera, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 609 (D. Mass. 1984).published
    Heart Disease Research Foundation v. General Motors Corp., 463 F.2d 98, 100 (2d Cir.1972); Bass v. Boston Five Cent Savings Bank, 478 F.Supp. 741, 745 (D.Mass.1979).
  • United States v. Cent. State Bank, 564 F. Supp. 1478 (W.D. Mich. 1983).published
    Although it is well-established that a “bare bones statement of conspiracy” will not withstand a motion for dismissal, Heart Disease Research Foundation v. General Motors Corp., 463 F.2d 98,100 (2d Cir.1972), the complaint which is the sub…
  • Balogh's of Coral Gables, Inc. v. Getz, 510 F. Supp. 741 (S.D. Fla. 1981).published 4 cites
    E. g., Heart Disease Research Foundation v. General Motors Corp., 463 F.2d 98, 100 (2d Cir. 1972).
  • Mountain View Pharmacy v. Abbott Labs., 630 F.2d 1383 (10th Cir. 1980).published
    This is particularly true when, as here, the original plaintiff has already amended his complaint once with the approval of the court.” Heart Disease Research Foundation v. General Motors Corp., 463 F.2d 98, 100 (2d Cir. 1972).
  • Sims v. MacK Truck Corp., 488 F. Supp. 592 (E.D. Pa. 1980).published
    Heart Disease Research Foundation v. General Motors Corp., 463 F.2d 98, 100 (2d Cir. 1972); see also Keco Industries, Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 334 F.Supp. 1240, 1244 (M.D.Pa.1971).
  • Speed Auto Sales, Inc. v. Am. Motors Corp., 477 F. Supp. 1193 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).published
    “bare bones statements of conspiracy or of injury under the antitrust laws without any supporting facts permits dismissal”
  • Dowling v. United States, 476 F. Supp. 1018 (D. Mass. 1979).published
    Heart Disease Research Foundation v. General Motors Corp., 463 F.2d 98, 100 (2d Cir. 1972); Adams v. American Bar Association, 400 F.Supp. 219, 223 (E.D.Pa.1975).
  • Troyer v. Karcagi, 476 F. Supp. 1142 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).published
    (involving an allegation of a conspiracy under the anti-trust laws)
  • Eye Encounter, Inc. v. Contour Art, Ltd., 81 F.R.D. 683 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).published
    “bare bones statement of conspiracy or of injury under the antitrust laws without any supporting facts permits dismissal”
  • Dewitt v. Am. Stock Tr. Co., 433 F. Supp. 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).published 2 cites
    Defendant relies, however, upon Heart Disease Research Found. v. General Motors Corp., 463 F.2d 98, 100 (2d Cir. 1972) which held that “a bare bones statement of conspiracy . . . without any supporting facts permits dismissal.” The instant…
  • Summey v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 449 F. Supp. 132 (D.S.C. 1976).published
    As stated in Heart Disease Research Foundation v. General Motors Corp., 463 F.2d 98, 100 (2d Cir. 1972): 17 *141 Although the Federal Rules permit statement of ultimate facts, a bare bones statement of conspiracy or of injury under the ant…
  • Robertson v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 67 F.R.D. 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).published
    Accordingly, the NBA’s motion to dismiss amended Count Three with prejudice is granted. 6 Felton, supra, 508 F.2d at 582 ; Mooney v. Vitolo, 435 F.2d 838, 839 (2d Cir. 1970); Cf. Heart Disease Research Foundation v. General Motors Corp., 4…
  • Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 93,590 David Segal v. Lawrence Gordon, & Coburn Corp. of Am., 467 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1972).published
  • Duncan v. At & T Commc'ns, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).published
  • Weiner v. Bank of King of Prussia, 358 F. Supp. 684 (E.D. Pa. 1973).published
  • North Jersey Secretarial Sch., Inc. v. McKiernan, 713 F. Supp. 577 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).published
  • Aquatherm Indus., Inc. v. Florida Power & Light Co., 971 F. Supp. 1419 (M.D. Fla. 1997).published
  • Vermilion Foam Prods. Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 386 F. Supp. 255 (E.D. Mich. 1974).published
  • Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 558 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).published
  • Floors-N-More, Inc. v. Freight Liquidators, 142 F. Supp. 2d 496 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).published
  • Hanoch Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Repub., 517 F. Supp. 542 (D.D.C. 1981).published
  • Invamed, Inc. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 210 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).published
  • Wolf Concept S.A.R.L. v. Eber Bros. Wine & Liquor Corp., 736 F. Supp. 2d 661 (W.D.N.Y. 2010).published
  • In Re Nine West Shoes Antitrust Litig., 80 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).published
  • duPont v. W.Y.L.Y., 61 F.R.D. 615 (D. Del. 1973).published
At page 99 construing antitrust complaint1 citing case1 citing court put it this way
At page 101 “We hold only that the amended complaint before us was so insufficiently and frivolously drawn that Judge Tyler could properly dismiss the action without granting plaintiffs further opportunity to amend.”1 citing casethe opinion's own words at *101
  • In Re Digit. Music Antitrust Litig., 812 F. Supp. 2d 390 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).published
    Motors Corp., 463 F.2d 98, 101 (2d Cir.1972); Invamed, Inc. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 22 F.Supp.2d 210, 221 (S.D.N.Y.1998); see also De Jesus v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 87 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir.1996) (reiterating that related corporations are presu…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
HEART DISEASE RESEARCH FOUNDATION, a Charitable Trust of the State of New York, Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
GENERAL MOTORS CORP. Et Al., Defendants-Appellees
763, Docket 72-1259.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Jul 5, 1972.
Published opinion
463 F.2d 98
I. Walton Bader, New York City, for plaintiffs-appellants., Simon H. Rifkind, New York City (Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, Jay H. Topkis, New York City, on the brief), for General Motors Corp., Robert Ehrenbard, New York City (Kelley, Drye, Warren, Clark, Carr & Ellis, New York City, on the brief), for Chrysler Corporation., Wright Tisdale, Dearborn, Mich., for Ford Motor Co., Walter J. Williams, Detroit, Mich., for American Motors Sales Corp.
Leventhal, Feinberg, Timbers.
Cited by 73 opinions  |  Published
FEINBERG, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiffs Heart Disease Research Foundation, a charitable trust, and Robert R. Peters and Henry Sassone, two of the Foundation’s trustees, appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Harold R. Tyler, Jr., J., dismissing plaintiffs’ amended complaint against General Motors Corp., Chrysler Corporation, Ford Motor Co. and American Motors Sales Corp. Plaintiffs seek to represent a class consisting of “the population of the United States residing in the metropolitan areas of the United States, amounting to approximately 125,000,000 persons.” [1] The amended complaint contains three counts: Count 1 alleges that defendants have committed antitrust violations by conspiring to suppress the development of motor vehicle pollution control devices; jurisdiction is grounded on the antitrust laws, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, 15. Count 2 purports to add another cause of action “pursuant[*100] to common law principles of liability”; jurisdiction is based on “the ‘general welfare’ provisions of the Constitution of the United States . . . Count 3 asserts that the “United States Government is significantly involved in the production, manufacture and distribution of motor vehicles by' reason of . . . [its] substantial purchases of motor vehicles . . . ” and that such “continued purchase and operation of present motor vehicles ... is adversely affecting the environment of the United States”; jurisdiction for this “claim” is premised on the “Environmental Quality Act,” not otherwise identified. Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief and damages of “one hundred twenty five trillion dollars (trebled to three hundred and seventy five trillion dollars with respect to Count One)” and an attorney’s fee of $3,000,000. Judge Tyler dismissed the complaint on the grounds that it failed to state any claims upon which relief could be granted and that plaintiffs’ attorney failed to comply with Fed.R.Civ.P. II. [2] We affirm on t5ie former ground.

Counts 2 and 3 of the complaint do not allege the essential elements of any cause of action. The purported jurisdictional basis for the former — the “general welfare” clause — is frivolous. As to count 3, plaintiffs now claim that “the sufficiency of this count need not be considered at this time” since count 2 “is also specifically bottomed on the ‘Clean Air Act.’ ” This assertion is typical of the sloppy, scatter-shot manner in which this complaint was thrown together. Count 2 does not mention the “Clean Air Act.” Neither does count 3 for that matter. The latter does refer to the “Environmental Quality Act,” which Judge Tyler understandably took to mean the Environmental Quality Improvement Act of 1970, 42 U. S.C. § 4371 et seq. Plaintiffs now tell us they really were referring to 42 U.S. C. § 1857, which the complaint nowhere mentions and which requires, in any event, allegations as yet unmade. Plaintiffs also now argue that count 2 is actually a nuisance or negligence action based upon diversity, allegations that they never bothered to make in the complaint. Even under the liberal Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, there is a limit to how much a court may be called upon to divine in assessing the sufficiency of the complaint before it, particularly when the plaintiff is represented by counsel.

As to count 1, it was well within the district court’s discretion to dismiss the claim since no facts are alleged supporting an antitrust conspiracy. Although the Federal Rules permit statement of ultimate facts, a bare bones statement of conspiracy or of injury under the antitrust laws without any supporting facts permits dismissal. See generally, 2A Moore, Federal Practice fl 12.08 (2d ed. 1968). This is particularly true when, as here, the original plaintiff has already amended his complaint once with the approval of the court.

We are aware that a number of cases are now pending in the District Court for the Central District of California in which the plaintiffs, mostly political entities suing parens patriae on behalf of their citizens, are charging these defendants with antitrust violations in connection with the development of air pollution control devices. At least one of these actions was transferred to that court from the Southern District of New York. See In re Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Equipment, 311 F.Supp. 1349, 1352 (J.P.M.L.1970). We certainly express no view as to the merits of those cases or of any action that might be brought by any private party proper-[*101] ]y alleging common law negligence or nuisance. We hold only that the amended complaint before us was so insufficiently and frivolously drawn that Judge Tyler could properly dismiss the action without granting plaintiffs further opportunity to amend.

Judgment affirmed.

1

. The original complaint -was on behalf of “the entire population of the United States, amounting to approximately 225,000,000 persons.”

2

. Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 provides, inter alia, that:

The signature of an attorney [on a pleading] constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay. If a pleading is signed with intent to defeat the purpose of this rule, it may be stricken as sham and false ....