People v. Murdock, 748 N.E.2d 683 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2001). · Go Syfert
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People v. Murdock, 748 N.E.2d 683 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2001). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
75 citation events (75 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
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321 Ill. App. 3d at 177 Reversing conviction voids imposed fines and penalties7 citing casesnoting that, when a conviction is reversed, any fines imposed on the conviction no longer exist1 citing court put it this way · 6 listed here
  • People v. Castellanos (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2021).unpublished
    People v. Murdock, 321 Ill. App. 3d 175, 177 (2001).
  • People v. Lewis (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2020).unpublished
    People v. Murdock, 321 Ill. App. 3d 175, 177 (2001). ¶ 30 Having reversed defendant’s conviction for burglary, we turn to defendant’s contention that the guilty finding for violation of an order of protection must be reduced from a felony…
  • People v. Robinson, 2013 IL App (2d) 120087, 373 Ill. Dec. 727.published
    Where the evidence is so unsatisfactory as to justify a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt (People v. Ehlert, 211 Ill. 2d 192, 203 (2004)), or where proof of an element is wholly lacking (e.g., People v. Murdock, 321 Ill.
  • People v. O'MALLEY, 828 N.E.2d 376 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2005).published 2 cites
    As we wrote in People v. Murdock, 321 Ill.
  • People v. Coleman (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2023).unpublished 2 cites
    See People v. Murdock, 321 Ill. App. 3d 175, 177 (2001). -9- ¶ 24 Having determined that a rational trier of fact could reasonably conclude that defendant caused damage to one vehicle, we turn to the issue of whether the evidence supports…
  • People v. Martino, 2012 IL App (1st) 101244.published
    (noting that, when a conviction is reversed, any fines imposed on the conviction no longer exist)
321 Ill. App. 3d at 176 Reversing conviction lacking evidence of officer's identity6 citing casesreversing conviction where no evidence was presented concerning the officer’s clothing and rejecting argument that the defendant should have known pursuer was a police officer because lights and siren were activated3 citing courts put it this way · 4 listed here
  • People v. Cavitt (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2021).published 3 cites
    (reversing conviction where no evidence was presented concerning the officer’s clothing and rejecting argument that the defendant should have known pursuer was a police officer because lights and siren were activated)
  • People v. Smith (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2020).unpublished 2 cites
    In support of this claim defendant cites to People v. Maxey, 2018 IL App (1st) 130698-B, ¶¶ 117-122 , People v. Williams, 2015 IL App (1st) 133582 , ¶¶ 8-20 and People v. Murdock, 321 Ill. App. 3d 175, 176 (2001). ¶ 39 In response, the Sta…
  • People v. Hardnett (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2020).unpublished
    Cavitt, 2019 IL App (2d) 170149, ¶ 176 (citing People v. Williams, 2015 IL App (1st) 133582, ¶¶ 14, 16 ; People v. Murdock, 321 Ill. App. 3d 175, 176 (2001)).
  • People v. Cavitt (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2019).published
    (reversing conviction where no evidence was presented concerning the officer’s clothing and rejecting argument that the defendant should have known pursuer was a police officer because lights and siren were activated)
q1 “because the officer activated his overhead emergency lights and siren, defendant should have known that the pursuer was a police officer and the purpose of the statute would be fulfilled by upholding the conviction.”4 citing cases4 citing courts quote it · 3 listed here
q2 “proof of an essential element of the offense is lacking in this case”3 citing cases3 citing courts quote it · 2 listed here
321 Ill. App. 3d at 175 reversing conviction for aggravated fleeing or attempting to elude a peace officer where no evidence was presented concerning the officer’s clothing and rejecting the argument that the defendant should have known he was being pursued by a police officer because lights and sirens were activated1 citing case1 citing court put it this way
  • People v. Brown (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2020).unpublished
    (reversing conviction for aggravated fleeing or attempting to elude a peace officer where no evidence was presented concerning the officer’s clothing and rejecting the argument that the defendant should have known he was…)
At page 684 cited at this page1 citing case
  • United States v. Kizeart, Judious, 251 F. App'x 352 (7th Cir. 2007).unpublished
    Stat. 5/11-204; People v. Murdock, 321 Ill.App.3d 175 , 254 Ill.Dec. 965 , 748 N.E.2d 683, 684-85 (2001).
Other citing cases2 with no pin cite or quoted language on record
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
The PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
HUNTER K. MURDOCK, Defendant-Appellant
2-00-0112 Rel.
Appellate Court of Illinois.
Apr 11, 2001.
Published opinion
748 N.E.2d 683
2001 Ill. App. LEXIS 277
G. Joseph Weller and Linda A. Johnson, both of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Elgin, for appellant., Joseph E. Birkett, State’s Attorney, of Wheaton (Martin P. Moltz and Lawrence M. Bauer, both of State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.
Rapp.
Cited by 25 opinions  |  Published
JUSTICE RAPP

delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a bench trial, defendant, Hunter K. Murdock, was found guilty of aggravated fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer (count I) (625 ILCS 5/11—204.1(a) (West 1998)) and unlawful possession of an altered temporary registration permit (count II) (625 ILCS 5/4—104(a)(3) (West 1998)). The trial court denied defendant’s post-trial motion. With respect to count I, the circuit court sentenced defendant to serve four days in the county jail with credit for time served, five days in the Sheriffs Work Alternative Program, and two years’ probation. The court also ordered defendant to pay a fine of $100. With respect to count II, the court sentenced defendant to two years’ court supervision to be served concurrently with the sentence in count I-

Defendant appeals, arguing that he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer where there was no evidence presented that the officer pursuing him was in police uniform. Alternatively, he argues that, if this conviction is upheld, he is entitled to a $10 credit against his fine for time served. Defendant does not appeal his conviction with respect to count II. We reverse the conviction of aggravated fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer and vacate the sentence as to that offense.

In defining the elements of the underlying offense of fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer, section 11—204(a) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11—204(a) (West 1998)) provides:

“(a) Any driver or operator of a motor vehicle who, having been given a visual or audible signal by a peace officer directing such driver or operator to bring his vehicle to a stop, wilfully fails or refuses to obey such direction, increases his speed, extinguishes his lights, or otherwise flees or attempts to elude the officer, is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor. The signal given by the peace officer may be by hand, voice, siren, red or blue light. Provided, the officer giving such signal shall be in police uniform, and, if driving a vehicle, such vehicle shall display illuminated oscillating, rotating or flashing red or blue lights which when used in conjunction with an audible horn or siren would indicate the vehicle to be an official police vehicle.” (Emphasis added).

We have carefully reviewed the evidentiary record and can find ho evidence presented concerning the clothing the officer wore on the day in question. Moreover, the State failed to ask the arresting officer whether he was wearing a police uniform at the time of the pursuit.

The State argues that because the officer activated his overhead emergency lights and siren, defendant should have known that the pursuer was a police officer and the purpose of the statute would be fulfilled by upholding the conviction. We do not agree.

We are not free to rewrite the language of the legislature, which speaks for itself. See People ex rel. Gibson v. Cannon, 65 Ill. 2d 366, 369 (1976) (where the language of a statute is unambiguous, the court’s function is to enforce the statute as enacted). The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Perez, 189 Ill. 2d 254, 265-66 (2000). Because proof of an essential element of the offense is lacking in this .case, we must reverse the conviction and vacate the corresponding sentence.

Although defendant argues alternatively that we should grant him a $10 credit against his fine for time served if the aggravated fleeing to elude a peace officer conviction is upheld, there is nothing against which to award the credit in view of our decision to reverse the judgment and vacate the sentence.

Accordingly, with respect to the aggravated fleeing offense, the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is reversed and the corresponding sentence is vacated.

Reversed; sentence vacated.

McLaren and GROMETER, JJ., concur.