conviction rule in Illinois

2005Ed. 2d 426, 434 , 98 S. Ct. 1173, 1178 .) If such steps are not taken, the fact of a'potential or possible conflict may deprive the defendant of the guaranteed assistance of counsel.’ (Emphasis in original.) (People v. Jones (1988), 121 Ill. 2d 21, 28 .) While this rule is not per se ***, reversal of a conviction under this rule does not require a showing that the attorney’s actual performance was in any way affected by the purported conflict.

2005Ed. 2d 426, 434 , 98 S. Ct. 1173, 1178 .) If such steps are not taken, the fact of a ‘ potential or possible conflict may deprive the defendant of the guaranteed assistance of counsel.’ (Emphasis in original.) ( People v. Jones (1988), 121 Ill. 2d 21, 28 .) While this rule is not per se ***, reversal of a conviction under this rule does not require a showing that the attorney’s actual performance was in any way affected by the purported conflict.

1994Ed. 2d 426, 434 , 98 S. Ct. 1173, 1178 ; Spreitzer, 123 Ill. 2d at 18 .) Reversal of a conviction under this rule does not require a showing that the attorney’s actual performance was in any way affected by the purported conflict or a showing of "specific prejudice.” (Holloway, 435 U.S. at 487 , 55 L.

1992Ed. 2d at 434 , 98 S. Ct. at 1178 , Spreitzer, 123 Ill. 2d at 18 .) Reversal of a conviction under this rule does not require a showing that the attorney’s actual performance was in any way affected by the purported conflict.

2021Although “this rule is not per se ***, reversal of a conviction under this rule does not require a showing that the attorney’s actual performance was in any way affected by the purported conflict.” Id. - 13 - 1-18-0995 ¶ 30 It’s a different story if, as here, the circuit court was never informed about a potential non-per se conflict. “[I]f the trial court is not apprised of the potential conflict, then reversal of the conviction will only be had upon a showing that ‘an actual conflict of interest adversely affected’ counsel’s performance.” Id. (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (19

2021Although “this rule is not per se ***, reversal of a conviction under this rule does not require a showing that the attorney’s actual performance was in any way affected by the purported conflict.” Id. - 13 - 1-18-0995 ¶ 30 It’s a different story if, as here, the circuit court was never informed about a potential non-per se conflict. “[I]f the trial court is not apprised of the potential conflict, then reversal of the conviction will only be had upon a showing that ‘an actual conflict of interest adversely affected’ counsel’s performance.” Id. (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (19

2006Ed. 2d 205 , 125 S. Ct. 1254 (2005), indicates that cases such as Bell have extended the prior conviction exception too far.

2006Ed. 2d 205 , 125 S. Ct. 1254 (2005), indicates that cases such as Bell have extended the prior conviction exception too far.

1992App. 3d 469, 471-72 , 592 N.E.2d 668, 669 , the decisions in People v. Pujoue (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 335, 339 , 335 N.E.2d 437, 440 , and People v. Gilmore (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 23, 29 , 344 N.E.2d 456, 460 , had held that the sufficiency of those charges, when raised first on appeal need only be sufficient to enable a defendant to prepare a defense and to plead a conviction in bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same conduct.

1992App. 3d 469, 471-72 , 592 N.E.2d 668, 669 , the decisions in People v. Pujoue (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 335, 339 , 335 N.E.2d 437, 440 , and People v. Gilmore (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 23, 29 , 344 N.E.2d 456, 460 , had held that the sufficiency of those charges, when raised first on appeal need only be sufficient to enable a defendant to prepare a defense and to plead a conviction in bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same conduct.

1992App. 3d 469, 471-72 , 592 N.E.2d 668, 669 , the decisions in People v. Pujoue (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 335, 339 , 335 N.E.2d 437, 440 , and People v. Gilmore (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 23, 29 , 344 N.E.2d 456, 460 , had held that the sufficiency of those charges, when raised first on appeal need only be sufficient to enable a defendant to prepare a defense and to plead a conviction in bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same conduct.

1992App. 3d 469, 471-72 , 592 N.E.2d 668, 669 , the decisions in People v. Pujoue (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 335, 339 , 335 N.E.2d 437, 440 , and People v. Gilmore (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 23, 29 , 344 N.E.2d 456, 460 , had held that the sufficiency of those charges, when raised first on appeal need only be sufficient to enable a defendant to prepare a defense and to plead a conviction in bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same conduct.

1980Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period of more than 10 years has elapsed since the date of conviction or of the release of the witness from confinement, whichever is the later date.” (Emphasis added.) ( 47 Ill. 2d 510, 516 , 268 N.E.2d 695, 698 .) Two years later in People v. Ray (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 377 , 297 N.E.2d 168 , our supreme court, in dealing with a related issue, again made reference to Rule 609, but this time quoted the time-limitation portions from the rule as it was finally adopted and which reads as follows: “Time Limit. — Evidence of a conviction u

1980Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period of more than 10 years has elapsed since the date of conviction or of the release of the witness from confinement, whichever is the later date.” (Emphasis added.) ( 47 Ill. 2d 510, 516 , 268 N.E.2d 695, 698 .) Two years later in People v. Ray (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 377 , 297 N.E.2d 168 , our supreme court, in dealing with a related issue, again made reference to Rule 609, but this time quoted the time-limitation portions from the rule as it was finally adopted and which reads as follows: “Time Limit. — Evidence of a conviction u

2021Id. ¶ 34 To secure a conviction for attempted first degree murder, the State must prove that the defendant performed an act that constituted a substantial step toward the commission of first degree murder and that the defendant did so with the specific intent to kill the victim.

2021Id. ¶ 34 To secure a conviction for attempted first degree murder, the State must prove that the defendant performed an act that constituted a substantial step toward the commission of first degree murder and that the defendant did so with the specific intent to kill the victim.

1980Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period of more than 10 years has elapsed since the date of conviction or of the release of the witness from confinement, whichever is the later date. ’’ °’” People v. Montgomery (1971), 47 Ill. 2d 510 , 268 N.E.2d 695, 698 ; People v. Yost (1980), 78 Ill. 2d 292, 294 , 399 N.E.2d 1283, 1284 .

1980Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period of more than 10 years has elapsed since the date of conviction or of the release of the witness from confinement, whichever is the later date. ’’ °’” People v. Montgomery (1971), 47 Ill. 2d 510 , 268 N.E.2d 695, 698 ; People v. Yost (1980), 78 Ill. 2d 292, 294 , 399 N.E.2d 1283, 1284 .

2018McKinley, 2017 IL App (3d) 140752, ¶ 36 , 74 N.E.3d 482 (O’Brien, J., specially concurring).

2017McKinley , 2017 IL App (3d) 140752 , ¶ 36, 412 Ill.Dec. 15 , 74 N.E.3d 482 (O'Brien, J., specially concurring).

2016Additionally -7- illustrative of the policy and purpose of the statute is Clark v. State, 739 P.2d 777 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987), where the Alaska court explained: “It appears to us that sound policy supports what we perceive to be the intent of the legislature. *** We see no reason why the legislature would want to encourage a person who has formerly been convicted of a felony to gamble by possessing a concealable firearm, hoping that if he or she is arrested for being a felon in possession that he or she can defend against that offense by having the former conviction set aside.” Id. at 781 .

2016Additionally -7- illustrative of the policy and purpose of the statute is Clark v. State, 739 P.2d 777 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987), where the Alaska court explained: “It appears to us that sound policy supports what we perceive to be the intent of the legislature. *** We see no reason why the legislature would want to encourage a person who has formerly been convicted of a felony to gamble by possessing a concealable firearm, hoping that if he or she is arrested for being a felon in possession that he or she can defend against that offense by having the former conviction set aside.” Id. at 781 .

2003Because of this uncertainty as to “whose ox has been gored” {Powell, 469 U.S. at 65 , 83 L.

2003Because of this uncertainty as to “whose ox has been gored” {Powell, 469 U.S. at 65 , 83 L.

1992The appellate court interpreted this section to require both a conviction for a Class X or Class 1 felony plus an additional conviction for a violation of section 12 — 13 or 12 — 14 of the Criminal Code of 1961 before a consecutive sentence can be imposed. ( 216 Ill.

1992App. 3d 1042, 1047-48 , 576 N.E.2d 528, 531-32 , appeal allowed (1991), 142 Ill. 2d 664 , 584 N.E.2d 139 : “We interpret section 5 — 8—4(a) to require both a conviction for a Class X or Class 1 felony plus an additional conviction for a violation of section 12 — 13 or 12 — 14 before a consecutive sentence can be imposed.

1986Although the appellate court reversed the conviction as a violation of due process of law because of Lang’s apparent unfitness, nonetheless, the trial afforded an opportunity to determine from the evidence whether or not he should be released as an innocent person. [Citation.] Thus the due process issue inherent in holding pending charges indefinitely over one who will not have a chance to prove his innocence is not present in this case.” ( 76 Ill. 2d 311, 330 .) Thus, as the appellate court observed, the court in Lang held that respondent’s 1972 criminal trial provided him with an “innocent o

1984In its 1979 Lang decision, our supreme court held that: “Although the appellate court reversed the conviction as a violation of due process of law because of Lang’s apparent unfitness, nonetheless, the trial afforded an opportunity to determine from the evidence whether or not he should be released as an innocent person.” ( 76 Ill. 2d 311, 330 .) It was the supreme court’s conclusion, therefore, that the due process issue inherent in holding pending charges over indefinitely was not present in this case.

1975Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 , 23 L.Ed.2d 284 , 89 S.Ct. 1726 ; Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , 87 S.Ct. 824 .

1975Ed. 2d 705 , 87 S. Ct. 824 , for the principle that the commission of an error of constitutional dimension does not require reversal of the conviction if the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

1950The testimony of the prosecutrix is not of that clear and convincing character required to support the conviction under the rule in the cases of People v. Sciales, 345 Ill. 118 , and People v. DeFrates, 395 Ill. 439 , relied upon by the People.

1950Such testimony is not of that clear and convincing character required to support the conviction under the rule in the case of People v. De Frates, 395 Ill. 439 .

1910In McKevitt v. People, 208 Ill. 460 , we said concerning similar conduct (p. 468) : “The prosecuting attorney, who thus violated a fundamental rule of practice, should not be permitted to sustain a verdict if his conduct has contributed to the conviction of the defendant.” And in the earlier case of Raggio v. People, 135 Ill. 533 , in discussing the same subject, we said (p. 545) : “The trial court erred in overruling defendant’s objections to these statements, and while a court of review will always hesitate to set aside a conviction for such error alone, yet in a case like this, where there

1903In Raggio v. People, 135 Ill. 533 , the Supreme Court, in speaking of erroneous remarks and statements of the state’s attorney, said: “ The trial court erred in overruling defendant’s objections to these statements, and while a court qf review will always hesitate to set aside a conviction for such error alone, yet in a case like this, where there is much reason to fear that the verdict was not the result of a dispassionate consideration of all the evidence in the case, it becomes material and substantial error.” To the same effect in principle are: McDonald v. People, 126 Ill. 150 -5; Feinber

2026The court further observed that nothing had impeded Davis from presenting the improper conviction claim in his postconviction petition, and concluded that “[b]ecause the improper conviction, which now forms the basis of the defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, was not raised below it is waived.” Id. ¶ 24 The defendant asks this court to reverse the judgment of the circuit court on essentially the same theory as the defendant in Davis.

2025Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period of more than 10 years has elapsed since the date of conviction or of the release of the witness from confinement, whichever is the later date.” ¶ 28 Montgomery’s third prong “requires a trial judge to conduct a balancing test, weighing the prior conviction’s probative value against its potential prejudice.” Mullins, 242 Ill. 2d at 14 .

2025In so doing, “the trial court should consider, inter alia, the nature of the prior conviction, the nearness or remoteness of that crime to the present charge, the subsequent career of the person, the length of the witness’ criminal record, and whether the crime was similar to the one charged.” Id. at 14- 15. ¶ 29 Defendant argues that the trial court’s decision to admit the unlawful restraint conviction under Montgomery was erroneous because (1) the State made no argument as to how the conviction was probative, either in its motion in limine or during the hearing, despite the State’s burden to

2025People v. McNeal, 2019 IL App (1st) 180015, ¶ 31 .