. A discussion of the other six issues follows:

1. Appellants contend that § 1955 cannot constitutionally be applied to them, because the government stipulated that investigation had disclosed no contacts with organized crime, interstate gamblers or police corruption. Our decision in United States v. Sacco, 491 F.2d 995 (9th Cir. 1974), disposed of this contention. “If the class of activities is within the reach of the federal power and the regulation imposed is reasonable, a court’s investigation is concluded. There is no need for inquiring on a case-by-case basis or proof that a particular activity had an effect on commerce, [citations omitted]” 491 F.2d at 999. This holding that § 1955 is a valid exercise of Congressional power under the Interstate Commerce Clause disposes of appellants’ Tenth Amendment objections that the statute impermissibly invades the reserved powers of the states.

2. Appellants claim that the classification of § 1955 violations as felonies violates equal protection since the very same conduct might only result in a misdemeanor conviction in state court. (See Cal.Penal Code § 337a.) Congress’ power to proscribe conduct carries with it the power to impose appropriate penalties without attempting to match them to varying state punishments for similar conduct. Hence, the potentially different treatment of § 1955 violators as compared to California Penal Code § 337a violators raises no cognizable equal protection infringement nor does it invade any power reserved under the Tenth Amendment to the state to prosecute violations of penal laws within its borders.

3. Appellant Kerrigan’s assertion that her prior state conviction was for the exact same conduct as the federal indictment is not clear from the stipulated facts. Her further contention that the double jeopardy clause makes it a bar to the federal prosecution is completely contrary to law. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 195, 79 S.Ct. 666, 3 L.Ed.2d 729 (1959); see Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 136-158, 79 S.Ct. 676, 3 L.Ed.2d 684 (1959).

4. Appellant Berk asserts that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he “conducted” an illegal gambling business. The evidence of his activity in settling bets and in disseminating a phone number and code name for placing bets was substantial; thus, the lower court properly concluded that the test of Sacco, supra, 491 F.2d at 1002-1003, had been met.

5. Appellants’ convictions were based in large part on evidence gained through two court-ordered wiretaps. Appellants’ claim of privilege for the wiretapped conversations is based upon a wholly unsupportable construction of both California Penal Code § 631 and 18 U.S.C. § 2517(4). We find no basis for believing that California attempted to prohibit the use of federally authorized wiretaps in federal prosecutions, or that Congress intended to sanction such a prohibition by the preservation of privilege set forth at § 2517(4).

6. Appellants claim that the United States Attorneys making the wiretap applications failed to use independent judgment in determining the need for the interceptions, as required by United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 515, 94 S.Ct. 1820, 40 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974). The application disclosed that the United States Attorneys fulfilled their obligations by engaging in extensive .discussions with special FBI agents assigned to the case as well as officials of the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section, Criminal Division, Department of Justice, prior to making the wiretap application.

. The issue of whether the Attorney General’s automatic signature upon recommendation of a Deputy Assistant Attorney General constitutes compliance with the further requisites of Giordano was alluded to in appellants’ reply brief. However, since it was neither raised in appellants’ initial brief nor urged at oral argument, we do not consider it one of the issues presented on appeal.