necessity requirement in Arizona

2001The necessity requirement also "is to be interpreted in a commonsense fashion with an eye toward the practicalities of investigative work." Id. at 447 , 641 P.2d at 1231 .

2001The necessity requirement also "is to be interpreted in a commonsense fashion with an eye toward the practicalities of investigative work." Id. at 447 , 641 P.2d at 1231 .

2017See A.R.S. § 13-401(B); State v. Fell, 203 Ariz. 186, 187, ¶ 1 (App. 2002) (the necessity defense does not apply to criminal offenses defined outside Title 13). 4 STATE v. J.V.

2014In Fell, this court addressed whether the necessity defense, as codified in A.R.S. § 13-417, was applicable “to defend against charges filed under Title 28, specifically, driving while under the influence of an intoxicant.” Id. at 219, ¶ 1, 52 P.3d at 187 .

2025See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 410 (1980). ¶19 Second, the detective gave Cruz ample opportunity to change course and comply with his demands before deploying his Taser.

2024Cf. Bailey, 444 U.S. at 410 (“Under any definition of these defenses [of duress and necessity] one principle remains constant: if there was a reasonable, legal alternative to violating the law . . . the defenses will fail.”). ¶20 Leonard submits that a duress instruction was warranted because “the assailants’ application of force against him, coupled with the inherent danger of the situation, rendered him incapable of resisting the pressure exerted upon him.” But Leonard could make that same argument in support of a necessity defense because being “incapable of resisting the pressure” to take

2017See Ariz. State Hosp./Ariz. Cmty. Prot. & Treatment Ctr. v. Klein, 231 Ariz. 467, 474, ¶¶ 31-32 , 296 P.3d 1003 (App. 2013) (citing Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 , 119 S.Ct. 1167 , 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999)). ¶ 30 Although the trial court may hold an evidentiary hearing to evaluate proposed expert testimony, it is not required to do so.

2017See Ariz. State Hosp./Ariz. Cmty. Prot. & Treatment Ctr. v. Klein, 231 Ariz. 467, 474, ¶¶ 31-32 , 296 P.3d 1003 (App. 2013) (citing Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 , 119 S.Ct. 1167 , 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999)). ¶ 30 Although the trial court may hold an evidentiary hearing to evaluate proposed expert testimony, it is not required to do so.

2017See Ariz. State Hosp./Ariz. Cmty. Prot. & Treatment Ctr. v. Klein, 231 Ariz. 467, 474, ¶¶ 31-32 , 296 P.3d 1003 (App. 2013) (citing Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 , 119 S.Ct. 1167 , 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999)). ¶ 30 Although the trial court may hold an evidentiary hearing to evaluate proposed expert testimony, it is not required to do so.

2017See Ariz. State Hosp./Ariz. Cmty. Prot. & Treatment Ctr. v. Klein, 231 Ariz. 467, 474, ¶¶ 31-32 , 296 P.3d 1003 (App. 2013) (citing Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 , 119 S.Ct. 1167 , 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999)). ¶ 30 Although the trial court may hold an evidentiary hearing to evaluate proposed expert testimony, it is not required to do so.

1983See also Politte, 664 P.2d at 670 .

1983See also Politte, 664 P.2d at 670 .

2025We review a superior court’s refusal to give a jury instruction for an abuse of discretion, but “we independently assess whether the evidence supported a justification instruction[.]” Id. at 80 ¶ 9. ¶16 To establish a necessity defense under § 13-417, the defendant must show he “was compelled to engage in the proscribed conduct and the [defendant] had no reasonable alternative to avoid imminent public or private injury greater than the injury that might reasonably result from the [defendant’s] own conduct.” A.R.S. § 13-417(A); State v. Medina, 244 Ariz. 361 , 364 ¶ 8 (App. 2018).

2024State v. Almeida, 238 Ariz. 77, 81, ¶ 17 (App. 2015) (“A trial court is not required to give a requested jury instruction if its other instructions adequately cover the issue.”). ¶17 The court gave the jurors the following instruction on the defense of necessity: Now, the defendant was justified in engaging in conduct that constituted the offense of misconduct involving weapons if 1, a reasonable person in the defendant’s situation would be compelled to engage in the conduct; And 2, the defendant had no reasonable alternative to avoid imminent public or private injury greater than the injury t

2025He maintains his testimony demonstrated he had no reasonable alternative but to escape the situation immediately. ¶22 We review for abuse of discretion the superior court’s decision whether to provide a jury instruction, State v. Bolton, 182 Ariz. 290, 309 (1995), and whether to grant a new trial, State v. Fischer, 242 Ariz. 44 , 48 ¶ 10 (2017).

2024See State v. Speers, 209 Ariz. 125, 132, ¶ 27 (App. 2004) (“A trial court commits reversible error when it instructs on an issue or theory that is not supported by evidence because it invites the jury to speculate as to possible non-existent circumstances.”) (cleaned up). ¶16 In any event, even if the facts of this case could be said to support a duress instruction, the superior court’s refusal to instruct the jurors on duress entitles Leonard to no relief because the necessity instruction adequately covered the issue of whether Leonard was justified in taking possession of the gun when confro

2018“In all cases . . . the accused must be given an opportunity to respond, either orally or in writing, to justify his or her actions.” Id. (quotation omitted); see also Robinson v. Higuera, 157 Ariz. 622, 624 (App. 1988) (“[d]ue process does not require that a hearing be held in every case,” even where “sanctions of dismissal or entry of default judgment” are entered); Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. v. Superior Court, 176 Ariz. 619, 622 (App. 1993) (“The heavier the sanction contemplated, the more deliberate the process that is due and the more thorough the findings that should be made.”). ¶20 In

2018“In all cases . . . the accused must be given an opportunity to respond, either orally or in writing, to justify his or her actions.” Id. (quotation omitted); see also Robinson v. Higuera, 157 Ariz. 622, 624 (App. 1988) (“[d]ue process does not require that a hearing be held in every case,” even where “sanctions of dismissal or entry of default judgment” are entered); Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. v. Superior Court, 176 Ariz. 619, 622 (App. 1993) (“The heavier the sanction contemplated, the more deliberate the process that is due and the more thorough the findings that should be made.”). ¶20 In

2018See State v. Gaynor-Fonte , 211 Ariz. 516 , ¶ 13, 123 P.3d 1153 , 1155 (App. 2005) (we interpret individual provisions in context of entire statute).

2018See State v. Gaynor-Fonte , 211 Ariz. 516 , ¶ 13, 123 P.3d 1153 , 1155 (App. 2005) (we interpret individual provisions in context of entire statute).

2016State v. Riggs, 189 Ariz. 327, 331 (1997) (citing U.S. Const. amend.

2002In Reeve v. State, 764 P.2d 324, 326 (Alaska Ct.App.1988), the appellate court affirmed the defendant’s DUI conviction, finding insufficient evidence to support her requested jury instruction on the necessity defense.

2002In Reeve v. State, 764 P.2d 324, 326 (Alaska Ct.App.1988), the appellate court affirmed the defendant’s DUI conviction, finding insufficient evidence to support her requested jury instruction on the necessity defense.

2002And, although the court in State v. Olson, 79 Or.App. 302 , 719 P.2d 55, 57 (1986), vacated the defendant’s DUI conviction after finding sufficient evidence to support a “choice of evils” defense, the court remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether the state had disproved the defense beyond a reasonable doubt.

2002And, although the court in State v. Olson, 79 Or.App. 302 , 719 P.2d 55, 57 (1986), vacated the defendant’s DUI conviction after finding sufficient evidence to support a “choice of evils” defense, the court remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether the state had disproved the defense beyond a reasonable doubt.

2002Fund, 194 Ariz. 488, ¶ 18 , 984 P.2d 574, ¶ 18 (App.1999). ¶ 7 Waldstein argues that, although § 13-401(B) does not specifically extend application of the necessity defense outside Title 13, it does not expressly preclude that extension.

2002Fund, 194 Ariz. 488, ¶ 18 , 984 P.2d 574, ¶ 18 (App.1999). ¶ 7 Waldstein argues that, although § 13-401(B) does not specifically extend application of the necessity defense outside Title 13, it does not expressly preclude that extension.

2002See Vo v. Superior Court, 172 Ariz. 195, 204-05 , 836 P.2d 408, 417-18 (App. 1992) (“Arizona is a ‘code state,’ and ... we cannot consider the wisdom or soundness of policy of legislative enactments, because such matters are clearly addressed to the legislature, not to the courts.”). ¶ 14 Because we conclude that the respondent judge erred in ruling that the necessity defense in § 13-417 applies to a DUI charge under Title 28, we reverse his order.

2002See Vo v. Superior Court, 172 Ariz. 195, 204-05 , 836 P.2d 408, 417-18 (App. 1992) (“Arizona is a ‘code state,’ and ... we cannot consider the wisdom or soundness of policy of legislative enactments, because such matters are clearly addressed to the legislature, not to the courts.”). ¶ 14 Because we conclude that the respondent judge erred in ruling that the necessity defense in § 13-417 applies to a DUI charge under Title 28, we reverse his order.

1998In Patton v. Hutchinson Wil-Rich Manufacturing Co., 253 Kan. 741 , 861 P.2d 1299 (1993), the Kansas Supreme Court listed multiple factors to consider in determining whether a post-sale warning should be required, emphasizing the necessity of analysis on a case-by-case basis.

1998In Patton v. Hutchinson Wil-Rich Manufacturing Co., 253 Kan. 741 , 861 P.2d 1299 (1993), the Kansas Supreme Court listed multiple factors to consider in determining whether a post-sale warning should be required, emphasizing the necessity of analysis on a case-by-case basis.