green
Positive treatment
24.3 score
Treatment trajectory · 1976 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1976
2001
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
ANTINI v. ANTINI
(2×)
The court further noted that the purpose of the award of attorney fees (in that case) was to "sanction [the] defendants" and that compelling them to pay plaintiff's fees "serve[s] that purpose," and further cited many cases upholding fees for legal service providers: Rodriguez v. Taylor , 569 F.2d 1231, 1244-46 (3d Cir. 1977); Torres v. Sachs , 538 F.2d 10, 12 (2d Cir. 1976); New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey , 447 U.S. 54 , 70 n.9 (1980); and Blum v. Stenson , 465 U.S. 886, 894-95 (1984). ¶23 Expanding the Martinez ruling, the Third Circuit in Rodriguez noted that "[a]ssessing fees again…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Saldivar v. Rodela
See, e.g., Sellers v. Wollman, 510 F.2d 119, 123 (5th Cir.1975) (fees under the Truth-in-Lending Act) (“[P]laintiffs should not be denied attorney’s fees because their attorney was employed by a legal aid society.”); Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1244-46 (3d Cir.1977) (fee award in ADEA case); Torres v. Sachs, 538 F.2d 10, 11-13 (2d Cir.1976) (fee award under Voting Rights Act) (rejecting the argument that “because publicly financed legal services entities supply counsel ... some measure of fees should be used less than the going rates for similar services received by privately e…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Martinez v. Roscoe
Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231 , 1244—46 (3d Cir.1977) (attorney’s fees in ADEA case paid to nonprofit, federally funded legal services provider), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 , 98 S.Ct. 2254 , 56 L.Ed.2d 414 (1978); Torres v. Sachs, 538 F.2d 10, 12 (2d Cir.1976) (federal statute provided for fees in voting rights case; no congressional limitation on amount payable to publicly funded organizations); see also New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54 , 70 n. 9, 100 S.Ct. 2024 , 2034 n. 9, 64 L.Ed.2d 723 (1980) (attorney’s fees in Title VII case paid to public interest legal ser…
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Williams v. North Carolina Department of Correction
Ed. 2d 723, 738 (1980); Torres v. Sachs, 538 F.2d 10, 13 (2nd Cir. 1976).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Kelber v. Forest Electric Corp.
That is, a court is required to apply the law in effect when it renders a decision, absent a congressional directive to the contrary.”); Louis Vuitton S.A. v. Spencer Handbags Corp., 765 F.2d 966 , 972 n. 2 (2d Cir.1985) (agreeing with district court’s conclusion that Bradley governed case); Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps. of Engineers, 732 F.2d 253, 258 (2d Cir.1984) (citing Bradley rule); N.L.R.B. v. Koenig Iron Works, Inc., 681 F.2d 130 , 147 (2d Cir.1982) (citing Bradley with approval, but finding it does not apply to facts of case); Von Allmen, 613 F.2d at 360 (citing Bradley…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Spoto v. McCarroll
In Torres v. Sachs, 538 F. 2d 10, 13 (2d Cir.1976), fees were awarded to a legal services agency representing plaintiffs who successfully challenged city election procedures on constitutional grounds under the Voting Rights Act.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Lee v. Green
Torres v. Sachs, 538 F.2d 10, 13 (2d Cir.1976); Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885, 889 (9th Cir.1974).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
DiGennaro v. Bowen
See Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 898-900 (D.C.Cir.1980) (en banc); Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 616 F.2d 598, 601-02 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839 , 101 S.Ct. 115 , 66 L.Ed.2d 45 (1980); Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1245 (3rd Cir.1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 , 98 S.Ct. 2254 , 56 L.Ed.2d 414 (1978); Torres v. Sachs, 538 F.2d 10, 13 (2d Cir.1976) (“We agree ... that allowable *431 fees and expenses may not be reduced because [the prevailing party’s] attorney was employed ... by a civil rights organization ... or because the attorney does not exact a fee.”) (citations …
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Benavides v. Benavides
Cir. 1980) (en banc); Perez v. Rodriguez Bou, 575 F.2d 21, 24 (1st Cir. 1978); Torres v. Sachs, 538 F.2d 10, 12 (2d Cir. 1976) (attorney’s fees under Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 19731 [e]); Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Assn., Inc., 517 F.2d 1141, 1147-48 (4th Cir. 1975).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Ramos v. Lamm
See, e.g., Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 899-900 (D.C.Cir.1980) (en banc); Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 616 F.2d 598, 601-03 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839 , 101 S.Ct. 115 , 66 L.Ed.2d 45 (1980); Reynolds v. Coomey, 567 F.2d 1166, 1167 (1st Cir.1978); Torres v. Sachs, 538 F.2d 10, 13-14 (2d Cir.1976); see also New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54 , 70 n. 9, 100 S.Ct. 2024 , 2034 n. 9, 64 L.Ed.2d 723 (1980); Love v. Mayor of Cheyenne, 620 F.2d 235, 237 (10th Cir.1980) (citing Reynolds v. Coomey ).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
New York State Association for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Hugh L. Carey, Individually and as Governor of the State of New York
(2×)
Courts seem to have become bemused by the apparent simplicity of "hourly billing rates" and apply these mechanically, without knowing just what they reflect 2 or to what use they are put. 3 65 I recognize, however, that our decisions in Torres v. Sachs, 538 F.2d 10, 13 (2 Cir.1976) and Beazer v. New York City Transit Authority, 558 F.2d 97, 100 (2 Cir.1977), rev'd on other grounds, 440 U.S. 568 , 99 S.Ct. 1355 , 59 L.Ed.2d 587 (1979), look the other way, although the former, in a case where the award was $23,252, made no real analysis of the problem and the latter simply followed in its path.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Ramos v. Lamm
See, e.g., Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880 , 899 — 900 (D.C.Cir.1980) (en banc); Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 616 F.2d 598, 601-03 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839 , 101 S.Ct. 115 , 66 L.Ed.2d 45 (1980); Reynolds v. Coomey, 567 F.2d 1166, 1167 (1st Cir.1978); Torres v. Sachs, 538 F.2d 10, 13-14 (2d Cir.1976); see also New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54 , 70 n. 9, 100 S.Ct. 2024 , 2034 n. 9, 64 L.Ed.2d 723 (1980); Love v. Mayor of Cheyenne, 620 F.2d 235, 237 (10th Cir.1980) (citing Reynolds v. Coomey).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Alexander v. Hill
Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 898-900 (D.C.Cir.1980) (en banc); Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 616 F.2d 598, 601-02 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839 , 101 S.Ct. 115 , 66 L.Ed.2d 45 (1980); Torres v. Sachs, 538 F.2d 10, 13 (2d Cir.1976); Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1247-48 (3d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 , 98 S.Ct. 2254 , 56 L.Ed.2d 414 (1978); Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass’n., Inc., 517 F.2d 1141, 1148 (4th Cir.1975); Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d 598, 606-07 (5th Cir.1974); Hairston v. R & R Apartments, 510 F.2d 1090, 1092 (7th Cir.1975); Oldham v. Ehrlich, …
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey
Beazer, 558 *337 F.2d at 100; Torres v. Sachs, 538 F.2d 10, 13 (2d Cir. 1976); Mid-Hudson Legal Services v. G & U Inc., 465 F.Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y.1978).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Goodman v. Heublein, Inc.
In deciding whether Sikorsky & Mott have standing, we note that awards of attorney’s fees have played an important role in “encourag[ing] people to seek judicial redress of unlawful discrimination.” Torres v. Sachs, 538 F.2d 10, 13 (2d Cir. 1976).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
43 Fair empl.prac.cas. 247, 29 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 32,841 Eugene B. Goodman, and Sikorsky & Mott, Intervenor-Appellee v. Heublein, Inc. And Heublein International Division of Heublein, Inc.
Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 413 F.Supp. 1230 (E.D.Mo.1976), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 553 F.2d 561 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966 , 98 S.Ct. 506 , 54 L.Ed.2d 451 (1977), on remand, 474 F.Supp. 193 (E.D.Mo.1979), rev'd in part and aff'd in part, 627 F.2d 858 (8th Cir. 1980). 11 In deciding whether Sikorsky & Mott have standing, we note that awards of attorney's fees have played an important role in "encourag(ing) people to seek judicial redress of unlawful discrimination." Torres v. Sachs, 538 F.2d 10, 13 (2d Cir. 1976).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
National Lawyers Guild v. Attorney General
See, e.g., Miller v. Apartments & Homes of New Jersey, Inc., 646 F.2d 101 (3d Cir. 1981); Torres v. Sachs, 538 F.2d 10, 12-13 (2d Cir. 1976), or should receive a reduced amount, Miller, supra; EEOC v. Sage Realty, 521 F.Supp. 263 , 507 F.Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y.1981).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and Hospital
Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1245 (3d Cir. 1977), citing Torres v. Sachs, 538 F.2d 10, 13 (2d Cir. 1976), Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1974), Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 426 F.2d 534, 538-39 (5th Cir. 1970); Hairston v. R&R Apartments, 510 F.2d 1090, 1093 (7th Cir. 1975).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
McMurry v. Phelps
Accord: Torre v. Sachs, 538 F.2d 10, 11-12 (2d Cir. 1976) (voting rights case; publicly financed legal services attorney entitled to full going rate).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Gibbs v. Housing Authority of New Haven (In Re Gibbs)
Torres v. Sachs, 538 F.2d 10, 13 (2d Cir. 1976); followed, New York Gaslight Club v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 70-71, n.9 , 100 S.Ct. 2024, 2034, n.9 , 64 L.Ed.2d 723, 738, n.9 (1980).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
National Treasury Employees Union v. United States Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service
(2×)
See Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 616 F.2d 598, 602 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839 , 101 S.Ct. 115 , 66 L.Ed.2d 45 (1980); Torres v. Sachs, 538 F.2d 10, 13 (2d Cir. 1976); Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1245 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 , 98 S.Ct. 2254 , 56 L.Ed.2d 414 (1978); Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass’n, Inc., 517 F.2d 1141, 1148 (4th Cir. 1975); Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d 598, 607 (5th Cir. 1974); Incarcerated Men of Allen County Jail v. Fair, 507 F.2d 281, 286 (6th Cir. 1974); Hairston v. R & R Apartments, 510 F.2d 1090, 1092 (7th Cir. 1975); Oldham v…
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Schwabenbauer v. Board of Education
New York Gaslight Club v. Carey, supra, 100 S.Ct. at 2027 n.1, 2034 & n.9, Torres v. Sachs, 538 F.2d 10, 13 (2nd Cir. 1976).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Common Cause v. Stirling
(2×)
(For example, Torres v. Sachs (2d Cir.1976) 538 F.2d 10, 12-13, fn. 2 [Voting Rights Act]; Northcross v. Memphis Board of Education (1973) 412 U.S. 427, 428 [ 37 L.Ed.2d 48, 50-51 , 93 S.Ct. 2201, 2202 ] [Emergency School Aid Act]; Save our Sound Fisheries Ass'n v. Callaway (D.R.I. 1977) 429 F. Supp. 1136, 1145-1146 [Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972].) Like all these cases, the Brown Act provides specific legislative authorization for attorney's fees in actions brought to enforce a public policy in a context where actual recoverable damages are likely to be trivial.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Farris v. Cox
Torres v. Sachs, 538 F.2d 10, 12 (2d Cir. 1976); Imprisoned Citizens Union v. Shapp, 473 F.Supp. 1017, 1028 (E.D.Penn.1979); Meyer, The Social Utility of Class Actions, 42 Brooklyn L.Rev. 189, 202 (1975). 2 .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Cohen v. West Haven Board of Police Commissioners
In addition, we have held that, in setting a fee, the court may take into account the relative wealth of the parties, Faraci v. Hickey-Freeman Co., 607 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1979), although it is improper to reduce an award of fees on the basis of either a defendant’s municipal status, Torres v. Sachs, 538 F.2d 10, 12-13 (2d Cir. 1976); see also Beazer v. New York City Transit Authority, 558 F.2d 97, 100 (2d Cir. 1977), rev’d on other grounds, 440 U.S. 568 , 99 S.Ct. 1355 , 59 L.Ed.2d 587 (1979), or the unintentional character of the violation, see Mid-Hudson Legal Services, Inc. v. G & U, In…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
24 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1133, 24 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 31,441 Barbra Cohen, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. West Haven Board of Police Commissioners, Louis D'onofrio, Morton Hecht, Eugene McCarthy Alex Botte, and Joseph Celentano, Individually and in Their Capacity as West Haven Police Commissioners, the West Haven Police Department, Joseph Harvey, Individually and in His Capacity as Chief of the West Haven Police Department, and Robert Johnson, Individually and in His Capacity as Mayor of the City of West Haven, Connecticut
Under these procedures, a different rate of compensation may well be set for different types of litigation tasks, and an attorney whose rates are higher than those prevailing in the community may well receive less than his own usual charges. 29 In addition, we have held that, in setting a fee, the court may take into account the relative wealth of the parties, Faraci v. Hickey-Freeman Co., 607 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1979), although it is improper to reduce an award of fees on the basis of either a defendant's municipal status, Torres v. Sachs, 538 F.2d 10, 12-13 (2d Cir. 1976); see also Beazer v. …
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Dolores J. Copeland, Individually and on Behalf of the Class of All Others Similarly Situated v. F. Ray Marshall, Secretary of Labor
(6×)
Oldham v. Ehrlich, at 168-169 (8th Cir. March 12, 1980); Palmigiano v. Garrahy, at 599-603 (1st Cir. 1980); Dennis v. Chang, 611 F.2d 1302, 1309 (9th Cir. 1980); Carey v. New York Gaslight Club, Inc., 598 F.2d 1253 , 1255 n. 1 (2d Cir. 1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 54 , 100 S.Ct. 2024 , 64 L.Ed.2d 723 (1980); Reynolds v. Coomey, 567 F.2d 1166, 1167 (1st Cir. 1978); Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1248 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 , 98 S.Ct. 2254 , 56 L.Ed. 414 (1978); Torres v. Sachs, 538 F.2d 10, 13 (2d Cir. 1976); Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d 598, 606-07 (5th Cir. 1974), disappr…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey
(2×)
See, e. g., Reynolds v. Coomey, 567 F. 2d 1166 (CA1 1978); Torres v. Sachs, 538 F. 2d 10, 13 (CA2 1976).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Sharrock v. Harris
Beazer v. New York City Transit Authority, 558 F.2d 97, 100 (2d Cir. 1977), rev’d on other grounds, 440 U.S. 568 , 99 S.Ct. 1355 , 59 L.Ed.2d 587 (1979); Torres v. Sachs, 538 F.2d 10, 12 (2d Cir. 1976); Becker v. Blum, supra, 487 F.Supp. at 875 ; Mid-Hudson Legal Services v. G & U, Inc., 465 F.Supp. 261, 270 (S.D.N.Y.1978).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Nicholas Palmigiano v. J. Joseph Garrahy, Leonard Jefferson v. Bradford E. Southworth
Torres v. Sachs, 538 F.2d 10, 13 (2d Cir. 1976) (award for services of Puerto Rico Legal Defense and Education Fund upheld); Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d 598, 606-07 (5th Cir. 1974) (award to Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law reversed as too small).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Becker v. Blum
Reasonable Rates for Legal Services Attorneys The defendants have suggested that legal services attorneys should be paid, not at an hourly rate comparable to that of private attorneys, but at a rate which would reflect the legal services attorneys’ generally lower salaries and overhead expenses. *875 I reject this suggestion, see Beazer v. NYCTA, 558 F.2d 97 , 100 (2d Cir. 1977), rev’d on other grounds, 440 U.S. 568 , 99 S.Ct. 1355 , 59 L.Ed.2d 587 (1979); Torres v. Sachs, 538 F.2d 10, 13 (2d Cir. 1976).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Darmetko v. Boston Housing Authority
See, e.g., Perez v. Rodriguez Bou, 575 F.2d 21, 24 (1st Cir. 1978); Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1244 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978); Torres v. Sachs, 538 F.2d 10, 12-13 (2d Cir. 1976); Gregory v. Sauser, 574 P.2d 445 (Alas. 1978); Winters v. Security Pac.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Woodland Hills Residents Ass'n v. City Council of Los Angeles
(2×)
(See, e.g., Gore v. Turner (5th Cir. 1977) 563 F.2d 159 , 163 [applying 42 U.S.C. § 1988 ]; Alphin v. Henson (4th Cir. 1977) 552 F.2d 1033, 1034 [ 15 U.S.C. § 26 ]; Torres v. Sachs (2d Cir. 1976) 538 F.2d 10, 12-13 [ 42 U.S.C. § 19737 (e)].) The California decisions are in accord with the governing federal rule.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Population Services International v. Carey
See Beazer v. New York City Transit Authority, 558 F.2d 97, 100 (2d Cir. 1977) cert. granted, 440 U.S. 568 , 99 S.Ct. 1355 , 59 L.Ed.2d 587 (1978); Torres v. Sachs, 538 F.2d 10, 12-13 (2d Cir. 1976).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Mid-Hudson Legal Services v. G & U, INC.
Torres v. Sachs, 538 F.2d 10, 13 (2d Cir. 1976); Beazer v. New York City Transit Authority, 558 F.2d 97, 100 (2d Cir. 1977), petition for cert. granted, 438 U.S. 904 , 98 S.Ct. 3121 , 57 L.Ed.2d 1146 (1978).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Mid-Hudson Legal Services, Inc. v. G & U, Inc.
We therefore reverse and remand to that court for the purpose of determining the appropriate counsel fee to be awarded after an evidentiary hearing in accordance with our decision in City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 468-74 (2d Cir. 1974); see Beazer v. New York City Transit Authority, supra, at 100-01; Torres v. Sachs, 538 F.2d 10, 13 (2d Cir. 1976).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Stephenson v. Simon
The prevailing view was articulated by the Second Circuit in Torres v. Sachs, 538 F.2d 10, 13-14 (1976): We agree with the courts which have held that the “allowable fees and expenses may not be reduced because [the prevailing party’s] attorney was employed ... by a civil rights organization ... or because the attorney does not exact a fee.” Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d 598, 606 (5th Cir. 1974); Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass’n, [ 517 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir. 1975)] Application of the [Act’s attorneys’ fees] provision to furnish full recompense for the value of services in su…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Richardson v. Civil Serv. Com'n of State of NY
The same argument was advanced and completely dismissed by this circuit in Torres v. Sachs, supra. The Torres holding is absolutely dispositive of defendants’ argument here, even though that argument be artfully phrased in terms of “windfall” fees to otherwise minimally compensated or voluntary counsel: “We agree with the courts which have held that the ‘allowable fees and expenses may not be reduced because [the prevailing party’s] attorney was employed . . . by a civil rights organization ... or because the attorney does not exact a fee.’ ” Torres v. Sachs, supra, 538 F.2d at…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Mid-Hudson Legal Services, Inc. v. G & U Inc.
For example, the Second Circuit in Torres v. Sachs, 538 F.2d 10, 13 (2d Cir. 1976) observed: “, . . [F]ees are now authorized in an employment discrimination suit under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act; but not in the same suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 , which protects similar rights but involves fewer technical prerequisites to the filing of an action.
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Rodriguez v. Taylor
(3×)
also: Cited "see", Cited "see, e.g."
Torres v. Sachs, 538 F.2d 10, 13 (2d Cir. 1976); Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1974); Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 426 F.2d 534, 538-39 (5th Cir. 1970).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
16 Fair empl.prac.cas. 533, 15 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 8029 Luis A. Rodriguez, on Behalf of Himself and All Other Persons Similarly Situated, in No. 76-2609 v. Lewis S. Taylor, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Director of Personnel of the City of Philadelphia, Hillel S. Levinson, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Managing Director of the City of Philadelphia, Frank L. Rizzo, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Mayor of the City of Philadelphia and the City of Philadelphia, in Nos. 76-2610 and 76-2611
(3×)
also: Cited "see", Cited "see, e.g."
Torres v. Sachs, 538 F.2d 10, 13 (2d Cir. 1976); Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885 , 889 (9th Cir. 1974); Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 426 F.2d 534, 538-39 (5th Cir. 1970).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Kulkarni v. Nyquist
(2×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
This Court finds additional support for the above conclusion in a recent decision of the Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, Torres v. Sachs, 538 F.2d 10, 12-13 (2d Cir. 1976), in which the principles of Bradley were extended to the 1975 amendment of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 by providing the prevailing party with the opportunity to acquire attorney’s fees. 42 U.S.C. § 19737 (e).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Firebird Society v. Members of the Board of Fire Commissioners
Parker v. Matthews, 411 F.Supp. 1059 (D.Col.1976); cf. Torres v. Sachs, 538 F.2d 10, 12-13 (2 Cir.), (1976).
cited
Cited "see"
Pitts v. Holt
See Torres v. Sachs, 538 F.2d 10, 13 (2d Cir. 1976); Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1245 (3d Cir. 1977).
cited
Cited "see"
Pitts v. Holt
See Torres v. Sachs, 538 F.2d 10, 13 (2d Cir., 1976); Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1245 (3d Cir., 1977).
cited
Cited "see"
Vulcan Society of Westchester County, Inc. v. Fire Department of White Plains
See generally Torres v. Sachs, 69 F.R.D. 343, 347 (S.D.N.Y.1975), aff’d, 538 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1976).
discussed
Cited "see"
Ross v. Saltmarsh
See Torres v. Sach, 538 F.2d 10, 13 (2d Cir. 1976); Beazer v. New York City Transit Authority, 558 F.2d 97, 100 (2d Cir. 1977), rev’d on other grounds, 440 U.S. 568 , 99 S.Ct. 1335 , 59 L.Ed.2d 587 (1979); see also Carey v. New York Gaslight Club, Inc., 598 F.2d 1253 , 1255 n.1 (2d Cir. 1979), aff’d 447 U.S. 54 , 70 n.9, 100 S.Ct. 2024 , 2034 n.9, 64 L.Ed.2d 723 (1980).
cited
Cited "see"
Stenson v. Blum
See Torres v. Sachs, supra; Population Services International v. Carey, supra, at 9 n.5.
discussed
Cited "see"
Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory
(2×)
See, Torres v. Sachs, 538 F.2d 10, 12-13 (2d Cir. 1976); Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass’n Inc., 517 F.2d 1141, 1148 (4th Cir. 1975); Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 426 F.2d 534 , 538-539 n.14 (5th Cir. 1970).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Rosa TORRES Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
Alice SACHS Et Al., Defendants-Appellants; Raymond S. VELEZ Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Patrick CUNNINGHAM Et Al., Defendants-Appellants; Juana LOPEZ Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. David DINKINS Et Al., Defendants-Appellants
v.
Alice SACHS Et Al., Defendants-Appellants; Raymond S. VELEZ Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Patrick CUNNINGHAM Et Al., Defendants-Appellants; Juana LOPEZ Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. David DINKINS Et Al., Defendants-Appellants
1033, 1034, Dockets 76-7002, 76-7072.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Jun 25, 1976.
Francis Caputo, New York City (W. Bernard Richlánd, Corp. Counsel of the City of New York, New York City, L. Kevin Sheridan, New York City, of counsel), for defendants-appellants., Herbert Teitelbaum, New York City (Oscar Garcia-Rivera, M. D. Taracido, Kenneth Kimerling, Richard J. Hiller, Puerto Rican Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc., New York City, of counsel), for plaintiffsappellees.
Smith, Mansfield, Van Graafeiland.
Cited by 105 opinions | Published
J. JOSEPH SMITH, Circuit Judge:
The municipal defendants appeal from an award by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Charles E. Stewart, Jr., Judge, of $23,252 in attorneys’ fees to successful plaintiffs in two voting rights class actions seeking bilingual school board and general election officials and materials. We find no error and affirm the judgment.
Appellants on this appeal attack neither the underlying voting rights judgment nor the entitlement of the successful plaintiffs to attorneys’ fees. They question rather the measure of allowable fees. Essentially they contend that because publicly financed legal services organizations supply counsel, and tax supported governmental bodies bear the burden of appellants’ costs, some measure of fees should be used less than the going rates for similar services received by privately employed counsel for work of comparable importance, extent and complexity.
There is support for such a discounting of the value of similar services, see Souza v. [*12] Travisono, 512 F.2d 1137 (1st Cir. 1975), vacated on other grounds, 423 U.S. 809, 96 S.Ct. 19, 46 L.Ed.2d 29 (1975); Gilpin v. Kansas State High School Activities Ass’n, 377 F.Supp. 1233, 1253 (D.Kan.1974). The unanticipated burden on public treasuries on the one hand and the duty of the bar to provide services pro bono publico on the other are among the reasons given for reductions.
We disagree on two grounds. First, the statute and its legislative history make it quite plain that the Congress rejected any such limitation. Second, we consider that such voting rights enforcement by litigation, in common with other similar essential minority civil rights enforcement, is to be encouraged by reasonable fee awards rather than discouraged by requiring successful plaintiffs to bear litigation costs.
The Congress provided for attorneys’ fees in § 402 of the 1975 extension of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, P.L. 94-73, 42 U.S.C. § 19737 (e). [1] The legislative history of this section leaves no question as to congressional intent in its enactment. The language of the Senate bill was substituted for the language of the House bill and adopted by the House. The Senate Report is persuasive. [2] The fees are to be measured by the same standards as in other complex federal litigation and are intended to be[*13] collectible from offending municipal officials and bodies. The Act is concededly applicable to cases pending at the time of its enactment under the principles of Bradley v. School Board of City of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 94 S.Ct. 2006, 40 L.Ed.2d 476 (1974).
Litigation to secure the law’s protection has frequently dépended on the exertions of organizations dedicated to the enforcement of the Civil Rights Acts. See Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass’n, 517 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir. 1975). We agree with the courts which have held that the “allowable fees and expenses may not be reduced because [the prevailing party’s] attorney was employed . . . by a civil rights organization ... or because the attorney does not exact a fee.” Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d 598, 606 (5th Cir. 1974); Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass’n, supra. Non-profit public interest law firms have been recognized as properly entitled to attorneys’ fees, Jordan v. Fusari, 496 F.2d 646, 649 (2d Cir. 1974); Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1974), and the receipt of such fees promotes their continued existence and service to the public in this field.
Application of the provision to furnish full recompense for the value of services in successful litigation helps assure the continued availability of the services to those most in need of assistance in translating the promise of the Act into actually functioning voting rights, often grudgingly yielded to minorities by those reluctant to give up or dilute political power or to impose on the majority necessary expenses of implementation.
Attorneys’ fees are not awarded necessarily to punish for bad faith, but to recompense those who by helping to protect basic rights are thought to have served the public interest. A principal purpose of the legislation is to encourage people to seek judicial redress of unlawful discrimination.
In short, imposition of full attorneys’ fees is a useful and needed tool of the court to[*14] fully protect plaintiffs’ rights as American citizens and voters, and we agree with the court’s use of it in this case.
We find no merit in appellants’ other claims.
Affirmed.
1
. 42 U.S.C. § 19731(e) provides:
In any action or proceeding to enforce the voting guarantees of the fourteenth or fifteenth amendment, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.
2
. See, e. g., the following excerpts:
Section 402 allows a court, in its discretion, to award attorneys’ fees to a prevailing party in suits to enforce the voting guarantees of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments, and statutes enacted under those amendments. This section is similar to provisions in Titles II and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibit discrimination in public accommodations and employment, and to Section 403 of this act (the coverage of which is described below). Such a provision is appropriate in voting rights cases because there, as in employment and public accommodations cases, and other civil rights cases, Congress depends heavily upon private citizens to enforce the fundamental rights involved. Fee awards are a necessary means of enabling private citizens to vindicate these Federal rights.
It is intended that the standards for awarding fees under sections 402 and 403 be generally the same as under the fee provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. A party seeking to enforce the rights protected by the Constitutional clause or statute under which fees are authorized by these sections, if successful, “should ordinarily recover an attorney’s fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust.” Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402, 88 S.Ct. 964, 19 L.Ed.2d 1263 (1968). . . .
In several hearings held over a period of years, the Committee has found that fee awards are essential if the Constitutional requirements and Federal statutes to which sections 402 and 403 apply are to be fully enforced. We find that the effects of such fee awards are ancilliary (sic) and incident to securing compliance with these laws, and that fee awards are an integral part of the remedies necessary to obtain such compliance. Fee awards are therefore provided in cases covered by sections 402 and 403 in accordance with Congress’ powers under, inter alia, the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 5. As with cases brought under 20 U.S.C. § 1617, the Emergency School Aid Act of 1972, defendants in these cases are frequently state or local bodies or state or local officials. In such cases it is intended that the attorneys’ fees, like other items of costs, will be collected either from the official directly, from funds of his agency or under his control, or from the State or local government (whether or not the agency or government is a named party).
It is intended that the amount of fees awarded under sections 402 and 403 be governed by the same standards which prevail in other types of equally complex Federal litigation, and not be reduced because the rights involved may be nonpecuniary in nature. Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680 (N.D.Cal.1974); Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 8 E.P.D. ¶ 9444 (C.D.Cal.1974); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg [sic] Board of Education, 66 F.R.D. 483 (W.D.N.C., order entered Feb. 24, 1975).
Section 403 allows a court, in its discretion, to award attorneys’ fees to a prevailing party in suits to enforce the civil rights acts which Congress has passed since 1866. This section follows the language of section 402 of this Act, and of Titles II and VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. All of these acts depend heavily upon private enforcement, and fee awards are an essential remedy if private citizens are to have a meaningful opportunity to vindicate these important Congressional policies.
[*13] Courts have been instructed, since the passage of our first civil rights laws, to use the broadest and most effective remedies available to achieve the goals of these laws, and these remedies have included awards of attorneys’ fees as costs. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 directed courts to use whatever combination of federal, state, and common law is most suitable to enforce civil rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1988. In 1870 Congress passed three separate provisions mandating counsel fee awards to victims of certain election law violations. Enforcement Act of 1870, 16 Stat. 140. One year after enacting that law, Congress directed that remedies provided in such laws should be available in all cases involving official violations of civil rights. Sec. 1, Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 (predecessor of 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
In several recent civil rights laws, Congress has 'included the effective remedy of attorneys [sic] fees. Fee-shifting provisions have been successful in enabling vigorous enforcement of these laws. Before May 12, 1975, when the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society [421 U.S. 240], 95 S.Ct. 1612 [44 L.Ed.2d 141] (1975), many lower Federal courts followed these Congressional policies and exercised their traditional equity powers to award attorneys’ fees under earlier civil rights laws as well.
These pre-Alyeska decisions remedied a gap in the specific statutory provisions and restored an important historic remedy for civil rights violations. However, in Alyeska, the Supreme Court held that the federal courts did not have the power to grant fees to “private attorneys general,” or private enforcers of civil rights laws, except under statutes whose language specifically authorizes such fee awards.
The Alyeska decision created an unexpected and anomalous gap in our civil rights laws whereby awards of fees are barred in the most fundamental civil rights cases. For instance, fees are now authorized in an employment discrimination suit under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, but not in the same suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which protects similar rights but involves fewer technical prerequisites to the filing of an action. Fees are allowed in a suit under Title II of the 1964 Act challenging discrimination in a private restaurant, but not in suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 redressing violations of the Federal Constitution or laws by officials who are sworn to uphold the laws.
Section 403, like section 402, provides the specific statutory authorization required by the court in Alyeska. .
U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News (1975) at pp. 807-809 (footnotes omitted).