Thomas Alvin Logan v. R. C. Marshall, Supt., S. Ohio Corr. Facility, 680 F.2d 1121 (6th Cir. 1982). · Go Syfert
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Thomas Alvin Logan v. R. C. Marshall, Supt., S. Ohio Corr. Facility, 680 F.2d 1121 (6th Cir. 1982). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
63 citation events (29 in the last 25 years) across 12 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Prater v. Storey (mied, 2025-07-07)
Treatment trajectory · 1982 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1982 2004 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 38 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Prater v. Storey
E.D. Mich. · 2025 · confidence medium
“Errors by a state court in the admission of evidence are not cognizable in habeas corpus proceedings unless they so perniciously affect the prosecution of a criminal case as to deny the defendant the fundamental right to a fair trial.” Kelly v. Withrow, 25 F.3d 363, 370 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing Logan v. Marshall, 680 F.2d 1121, 1123 (6th Cir. 1982)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Sanchez
10th Cir. · 2024 · confidence medium
See United States v. Herrera, 51 F.4th 1226 , 1277 (10th Cir. 2022) (stating that “we evaluate the district court’s exercise of discretion based on the information presented at the time of the ruling”); see also United States v. Sanchez, 790 F.2d 245, 251 (2d Cir. 1986) (“Our review of the district judge’s exercise of discretion . . . must be based on the relevant circumstances confronting the judge at the time of his ruling, without the benefit of hindsight.”); Logan v. Marshall, 680 F.2d 1121, 1123 (6th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (“We must evaluate the validity of the court’s ru…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hollingsworth v. Floyd
E.D. Mich. · 2024 · confidence medium
“Errors by a state court in the admission of evidence are not cognizable in habeas corpus proceedings unless they so perniciously affect the prosecution of a criminal case as to deny the defendant the fundamental right to a fair trial.” Kelly v. Withrow, 25 F.3d 363, 370 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing Logan v. Marshall, 680 F.2d 1121, 1123 (6th Cir. 1982)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Herrera
10th Cir. · 2022 · confidence medium
See United States v. Sanchez, 790 F.2d 245, 251 (2d Cir. 1986) (“Our review of the district judge’s exercise of discretion [to try the defendant in absentia rather than conduct separate trials or continue both trials] must be based on the relevant circumstances confronting the judge at the time of his ruling, without the benefit of hindsight.”); Logan v. Marshall, 680 F.2d 1121, 1123 (6th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (“We must evaluate the validity of the court’s ruling in light of the information available to the trial judge at the time of his ruling.”). 97 Appellate Case: 19-2126 Docu…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Smith v. Rewerts
E.D. Mich. · 2022 · confidence medium
A habeas “[c]ourt’s duty ‘is not to determine whether the exclusion of the evidence by the trial judge was correct or incorrect under state law, but rather whether such exclusion rendered [the] petitioner’s trial so fundamentally unfair as to constitute a denial of federal constitutional rights.’” Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413, 420 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Logan v. Marshall, 680 F.2d 1121, 1123 (6th Cir. 1982)). b.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) William-Salmon v. Skipper
E.D. Mich. · 2021 · confidence medium
“Errors by a state court in the admission of evidence are not cognizable in habeas corpus proceedings unless they so perniciously affect the prosecution of a criminal case as to deny the defendant the fundamental right to a fair trial.” Kelly v. Withrow, 25 F.3d 363, 370 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing Logan v. Marshall, 680 F.2d 1121, 1123 (6th Cir. 1982)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Schiefelbein v. Phillips
M.D. Tenn. · 2021 · confidence medium
Petitioner’s burden is to show that the ruling was “so fundamentally unfair as to constitute a denial of federal constitutional rights,” Logan v. Marshall, 680 F.2d 1121, 1123 (6th Cir.1982), and he has not shown that the judge’s reading of this jury-submitted question did so.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mason v. Rivard
E.D. Mich. · 2020 · confidence medium
A reviewing “court’s duty ‘is not to determine whether the exclusion of the evidence by the trial judge was correct or incorrect under state law, but rather whether such exclusion rendered [the] petitioner’s trial so fundamentally unfair as to constitute a denial of federal constitutional rights.’ ” Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413, 420 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Logan v. Marshall, 680 F.2d 1121, 1123 (6th Cir. 1982)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Theriot v. MacLaren
E.D. Mich. · 2019 · confidence medium
A habeas “court’s duty ‘is not to determine whether the exclusion of the evidence by the trial judge was correct or incorrect under state law, but rather whether such exclusion rendered [the] petitioner’s trial so fundamentally unfair as to constitute a denial of federal constitutional rights.’ ” Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413, 420 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Logan v. Marshall, 680 F.2d 1121, 1123 (6th Cir. 1982)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rogers v. Hampton (2×)
E.D. Tenn. · 2019 · confidence medium
Amongst other claims which are not cognizable, challenges to the admission of evidence will not be grounds for habeas relief “unless they so perniciously affect the prosecution of a criminal case as to deny the defendant the fundamental right to a fair trial.” Kelly v. Withrow, 25 F.3d 363, 370 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing Logan v. Marshall, 680 F.2d 1121, 1123 (6th Cir. 1982)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Landers v. Romanowski
6th Cir. · 2017 · confidence medium
“This court’s duty ‘is not to determine whether the exclusion of the evidence by the trial judge was correct or incorrect under state law, but rather whether such exclusion rendered petitioner’s trial so fundamentally unfair as to constitute a denial of federal constitutional rights.’ ” Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413, 420 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Logan v. Marshall, 680 F.2d 1121, 1123 (6th Cir. 1982)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) George Burger v. Jeffrey Woods
6th Cir. · 2013 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Sanborn v. Parker, 629 F.3d 554, 576 (6th Cir.2010) (finding no constitutional violation when a state trial court admitted a defendant’s confession to a minister); Bey v. Bagley, 500 F.3d 514, 523 (6th Cir.2007) (holding that a defendant’s “disagreement” with state-court rulings on the admissibility of character evidence was “not cognizable on federal habeas review”); Clemmons v. Sowders, 34 F.3d 352, 358 (6th Cir.1994) (stating that a habeas petitioner’s claim that his trial court erroneously admitted evidence of his past convictions “raises no constitutional infirm…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gennaro Piscopo v. State of Michigan
6th Cir. · 2012 · confidence medium
However, in our habeas review we do not "determine whether the exclusion of the evidence by the trial judge was correct or incorrect under state law, but rather whether such exclusion rendered petitioner’s trial so fundamentally unfair as to constitute a denial of federal constitutional rights." Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413, 420 (6th Cir.2002) (quoting Logan v. Marshall, 680 F.2d 1121, 1123 (6th Cir.1982)). 9 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Sutton v. Bell
E.D. Tenn. · 2010 · confidence medium
Webster v. Rees, 729 F.2d 1078, 1079-80 (6th Cir.1984) (citing Logan v. Marshall, 680 F.2d 1121, 1123 (6th Cir.1982)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) John Glenn Roe v. Dennis Baker (2×)
6th Cir. · 2003 · confidence medium
Kelly v. Withrow, 25 F.3d 363, 370 (6th Cir.1994) (citing Logan v. Marshall, 680 F.2d 1121, 1123 (6th Cir.1982)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Nathaniel M. Lewis v. Reginald A. Wilkinson, Director Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General of State of Ohio
6th Cir. · 2002 · confidence medium
This court’s duty “is not to determine whether the exclusion of the evidence by the trial judge was correct or incorrect under state law, but rather whether such exclusion rendered petitioner’s trial so fundamentally unfair as to constitute a denial of federal constitutional rights.” Logan v. Marshall, 680 F.2d 1121, 1123 (6th Cir.1982).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gordon v. Morgan (2×) also: Cited "see"
6th Cir. · 2001 · confidence medium
Id. at 1123 (approving Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2907.-02(E)); Bell v. Harrison, 670 F.2d 656, 659 (6th Cir.1982) (upholding Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-2445); Haley v. Wilson, No. 88-5389, 1988 WL 131496, at *1 (6th Cir. Dec.12, 1988) (upholding Ky.Rev.Stat. § 510.145).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Frazier v. Mitchell
N.D. Ohio · 2001 · confidence medium
Even if the evidence were erroneously admitted, habeas relief would not be appropriate “unless the admission of the evidence rendered the trial ‘so fundamentally unfair as to constitute a denial of federal *814 rights.’ ” Webster v. Rees, 729 F.2d 1078, 1079-80 (6th Cir.1984) (citing Logan v. Marshall, 680 F.2d 1121, 1123 (6th Cir. 1982)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cecilia Diane Garrett v. Christine Money, Warden
6th Cir. · 1994 · confidence medium
Moreover, "[i]t is a well-established rule that state court rulings on the admission or exclusion of evidence' ... may not be questioned in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, unless they render the trial so fundamentally unfair as to constitute a denial of federal rights.' " Logan v. Marshall, 680 F.2d 1121, 1123 (6th Cir.1982) (quoting Gillihan v. Rodriquez, 551 F.2d 1182, 1193 (10th Cir.1977)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Elizabeth Turpin v. Betty Kassulke, Warden, Cross-Appellee (2×)
6th Cir. · 1994 · confidence medium
An appellate court "must evaluate the validity of the [trial] court's ruling in light of the information available to the trial judge at the time of his ruling[,]" Logan v. Marshall, 680 F.2d 1121, 1123 (6th Cir.1982), and we see no reason why the trial judge should have known that the prosecutor might refer to this evidence in an arguably improper manner. 34 Finally, we note that neither the letter excerpt nor the diary entry were inadmissible hearsay.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Joseph C. Saade v. David Trippett (2×)
6th Cir. · 1994 · confidence medium
Thus it is that erroneous state court rulings on evidentiary questions are not cognizable in federal habeas corpus proceedings "unless they render the trial so fundamentally unfair as to constitute a denial of federal rights." Logan v. Marshall, 680 F.2d 1121, 1123 (6th Cir.1982) (citation and internal quotes omitted). 68 If it were up to us to say whether the legal analysis employed by the Michigan courts was erroneous as a matter of state law, we should not hesitate to say that it was indeed erroneous.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Leo Kelly, Jr. v. Pamela Withrow, Warden
6th Cir. · 1994 · confidence medium
Logan v. Marshall, 680 F.2d 1121, 1123 (6th Cir.1982).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Jerry Allen Moneymaker v. Walter Chapleau, Warden
6th Cir. · 1994 · confidence medium
Cooper v. Sowders, 837 F.2d 284, 286 (6th Cir.1988); Logan v. Marshall, 680 F.2d 1121, 1123 (6th Cir.1982).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ronald E. Starks v. Norris W. McMackin
6th Cir. · 1991 · confidence medium
"It is a well-established rule that state court rulings on the admission of evidence '... may not be questioned in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, unless they render the trial so fundamentally unfair as to constitute a denial of federal rights.' " Logan v. Marshall, 680 F.2d 1121, 1123 (6th Cir.1982) (citation omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dean Vincent v. Al Parke (2×)
6th Cir. · 1991 · confidence medium
Because Detective Gaddie’s remarks (in light of the trial court judge’s immediate admonitions to the jury) did not render Vincent’s trial “so fundamentally unfair as to constitute a denial of federal rights,” Logan v. Marshall, 680 F.2d 1121, 1123 (6th Cir.1982) (per curiam) (citation omitted), I would reject Vincent’s fourth assignment of error.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Phillip Haley v. George Wilson, Secretary, Corrections Cabinet (2×) also: Cited "see"
6th Cir. · 1988 · confidence medium
Logan, 680 F.2d at 1123 (approving Ohio Rev.Code Ann.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Thomas Davis v. Norris W. McMackin
6th Cir. · 1987 · confidence medium
See Duffel v. Dutton, 785 F.2d 131, 133 (6th Cir. 1986); Logan v. Marshall, 680 F.2d 1121, 1123 (6th Cir. 1982).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Silas Bennett v. Dewey Sowders, Warden
6th Cir. · 1987 · confidence medium
Logan v. Marshall, 680 F.2d 1121, 1123 (6th Cir.1982) (per curiam). 4 The district court adopted the magistrate's report and denied the petition.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Henry Buford v. E.P. Perini
6th Cir. · 1986 · confidence medium
Cf. Duffel v. Dutton, 785 F.2d 131, 133 (6th Cir.1986); Logan v. Marshall, 680 F.2d 1121, 1123 (6th Cir.1982).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Melvin Keith Jackson v. David Trippett
6th Cir. · 1986 · confidence medium
So the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed the juror to continue to serve. 7 Concerning the other issues in the case, the trial court held that any illegal arrest would not void a subsequent conviction, Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119 (1975), that the hearsay evidence did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation, Logan v. Marshall, 680 F.2d 1121, 1123 (6th Cir. 1982) (per curiam), and that the evidence was sufficient under Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Frank Bonarrigo v. Joseph Janesz, Chief Probation Officer, Cuyahoga Court of Common Pleas
6th Cir. · 1986 · confidence medium
While such evidence arguably may have had a more prejudicial effect than its probative value, we do not believe this alleged evidentiary error rendered the trial "so fundamentally unfair as to constitute a denial of federal rights." Logan v. Marshall, 680 F.2d 1121, 1123 (6th Cir.1982) (per curiam) (quoting Gillihan v. Rodriguez, 551 F.2d 1182, 1193 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 845 (1977) ). 24 Appellant's next claim of error is utterly frivolous.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Government of the Virgin Islands v. Jacobs
D.V.I. · 1986 · confidence medium
See also Bell v. Harrison, 670 F.2d 656, 658 (6th Cir. 1982); Logan v. Marshall, 680 F.2d 1121, 1123 (6th Cir. 1982); Government of the Virgin Islands v. Sciuto, 623 F.2d 869, 875-76 (3d Cir. 1980).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Roy Allen Webster v. John D. Rees, Warden Steven Beshear, Attorney General of the State of Kentucky
6th Cir. · 1984 · confidence medium
However, even if the evidence had been erroneously admitted this would not be a proper basis for granting habeas relief unless the admission of the evidence rendered the trial “so fun *1080 damentally unfair as to constitute a denial of federal rights.” Logan v. Marshall, 680 F.2d 1121, 1123 (6th Cir.1983) (per curiam), quoting Gillihan v. Rodriguez, 551 F.2d 1182, 1193 (10th Cir.) cert. denied, 434 U.S. 845 , 98 S.Ct. 148 , 54 L.Ed.2d 111 (1977).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Brown (2×)
Mo. · 1982 · confidence medium
An appellate court will not overturn a conviction on such an allegation of error whenever "it appears that the [asserted theory of relevance] was developed on appeal rather than as an integral part of [a defendant's] trial strategy." Logan v. Marshall, 680 F.2d 1121, 1123 (6th Cir. 1982).
examined Cited "see" Gagne v. Booker (4×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
6th Cir. · 2012 · signal: see · confidence high
See Logan v. Marshall, 680 F.2d 1121, 1123 (6th Cir.1982) (per curiam) (finding that it is not the court’s responsibility to determine whether the exclusion of the evidence by the trial judge was correct or incorrect under state law, but rather whether such exclusion rendered petitioner’s “trial so fundamentally unfair as to constitute a denial of federal constitutional rights”) (citation omitted).
discussed Cited "see" Melvin Daniels v. Arthur Tate, Superintendent (2×)
6th Cir. · 1989 · signal: see · confidence high
See id. at 1122 .
discussed Cited "see" Kenneth Huie Davis v. United States
8th Cir. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
See Logan v. Marshall, 680 F.2d 1121, 1123 (6th Cir.1982) (defendant’s proffered scientific evidence showed twenty-five per cent probability that a male will contract gonorrhea from an infected female after one act of intercourse); State v. Carmichael, 240 Kan. 149, 152 , 727 P.2d 918, 923 (1986) (study showed that less than twenty-five per cent of noninfected males would contract gonorrhea as a result of nonconsensual contact with infected female); Miller v. State, 67 Md.App. 666, 669 , 509 A.2d 135, 136 (nurse with twelve years of experience in venereal disease clinic testified that statis…
cited Cited "see, e.g." Love v. Carter
6th Cir. · 2002 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Logan v. Marshall, 680 F.2d 1121, 1123 (6th Cir.1982).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Thomas Alvin LOGAN, Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
R. C. MARSHALL, Supt., Southern Ohio Correctional Facility, Respondent-Appellee
81-3597.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
Jun 18, 1982.
680 F.2d 1121
J. Dean Carro, School of Law, University of Akron, Akron, Ohio, for petitioner-appellant., Dain N. Deveny, Asst. Atty. Gen., Columbus, Ohio, for respondent-appellee.
Gilmore, Keith, Lively, Per Curiam.
Cited by 49 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM.

On April 18, 1978, Theresa Riley, a 17 year old minor, left her residence at approximately 11:00 a. m. to purchase cigarettes. While walking on the street, she was approached by the defendant-petitioner, Thomas Alvin Logan. Logan was a social acquaintance of Riley. Logan offered Riley librium tranquilizer pills. Riley refused to accept the pills. Subsequently, Logan produced a knife and held it at her throat. Logan forced Riley to accompany him into an alley around a corner, and down a flight of stairs. Riley was raped at knifepoint at the base of the stairs. Logan released Riley immediately after the rape.

Physicians examined Riley following the rape and determined that semen was present. Physicians also discovered that Riley had gonorrhea. This venereal disease was present in Riley prior to the time of the alleged rape.

Under Ohio law, a pre-trial hearing must be held before evidence is received regarding the sexual activities of the alleged rape victim. See Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2907.-02(E). In compliance with this requirement, an in-chambers hearing was conducted to determine the admissibility of certain evidence under Ohio’s Rape Shield Statute, Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2907.02(D). Defense counsel read several questions he intended to ask Riley. The questions were inflammatory and evidenced an attempt to attack the character of the alleged victim. After a brief discussion, the prosecution agreed to allow defense counsel to question Riley concerning her sexual activity during the three days prior to the alleged rape. The prosecution, however, vigorously maintained that the evidence of venereal disease was not relevant or probative. Subsequently, the court ruled that Logan could not question the alleged victim regarding the presence of gonorrhea.

Later, the prosecution sought clarification of the court’s ruling. Defense counsel argued that the gonorrhea evidence was relevant to the issue of the origin of the semen. The prosecution disagreed, stating defense counsel was again attempting to attack the character and credibility of Riley. The court ruled that the issue of gonorrhea could not be mentioned during the trial.

At trial, Logan and Riley each reiterated their respective stories. Logan maintained that he did not have intercourse with Riley and was, in fact, elsewhere at the time of the alleged rape. Logan took the stand and explained the significant events in his alibi defense. Riley, on the other hand, took the stand and testified that Logan attempted to give her drugs and raped her. There was no direct or circumstantial evidence other than the testimony of Riley which linked Logan to the alleged rape. A jury convicted Logan.

Logan brought this habeas corpus action after exhausting his state court remedies. Logan’s basic contentions are that 1) his right to confrontation was violated by the trial court’s refusal to permit cross-ex-[*1123] animation concerning the presence of gonorrhea in Riley; and 2) the court’s ruling prevented counsel from fully developing his defense. Logan argues that his defense would have been that he did not commit the rape because he did not get gonorrhea:

1. The alleged victim had venereal disease at the time of her rape.
2. Mr. Logan did not subsequently contract the venereal disease.
3. Scientific evidence indicates there is a 25% probability that a male will contract gonorrhea from an infected female after a single intercourse.

Unfortunately, the record indicates that defense counsel never informed the trial court that the gonorrhea evidence would be used in the above manner. In fact, a fair reading of the record reveals that defense counsel sought to use the gonorrhea evidence to attack the character of the alleged victim. Therefore, it appears that the gonorrhea theory articulated above was developed on appeal rather than as an integral part of Logan’s trial strategy.

We must evaluate the validity of the court’s ruling in light of the information available to the trial judge at the time of his ruling. On the special facts in this case, it is clear from the list of questions offered by defense counsel and his objection to the exclusion of the gonorrhea evidence that he intended to attack the credibility of the victim with this evidence. The exclusion of such inflammatory evidence is within the discretion of the trial judge. Oliphant v. Koehler, 594 F.2d 547 (6th Cir. 1979). Logan was not denied his constitutional right to raise a defense in light of defense counsel’s failure to inform the trial judge of the proposed relevance of the gonorrhea evidence.

All that is involved in this action is an evidentiary ruling by a state trial court judge. It is not this Court’s function to supervise the courts of the State of Ohio. It is a well-established rule that state court rulings on the admission or exclusion of evidence “... may not be questioned in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, unless they render the trial so fundamentally unfair as to constitute a denial of federal rights.” Gillihan v. Rodriguez, 551 F.2d 1182,1193 (10th Cir. 1977). See Bell v. Am, 536 F.2d 123, 125 (6th Cir. 1976). The evi-dentiary ruling of the state trial court judge in the present case does not give rise to a constitutional violation.

Upon consideration of the briefs, arguments of counsel, and the record, we affirm the judgment of the district court. District Judge Leroy Contie’s well-reasoned opinion displayed a sensitivity to the position of federal courts in habeas matters.