durational residency requirement in Connecticut

2001The principal case upon which he relies explains, however, that the privileges and immunities clause involves “a nonresident’s exercise of the right to move into another State and become a resident of that State.” Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502 , 119 S. Ct. 1518 , 143 L.

2001The principal case upon which he relies explains, however, that the privileges and immunities clause involves “a nonresident’s exercise of the right to move into another State and become a resident of that State.” Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502 , 119 S. Ct. 1518 , 143 L.

1993Then in 1984, in Bruno v. Civil Service Commission, 192 Conn. 335 , 472 A.2d 328 (1984), yet another case examining a durational residency requirement, the Connecticut Supreme Court explicitly recognized “a fundamental right to intrastate travel. . . .” Id., 347 .

1993Then in 1984, in Bruno v. Civil Service Commission, 192 Conn. 335 , 472 A.2d 328 (1984), yet another case examining a durational residency requirement, the Connecticut Supreme Court explicitly recognized “a fundamental right to intrastate travel. . . .” Id., 347 .

1993In 1971, faced with a challenge to a durational residency requirement imposed by the municipal housing authority of New Rochelle, New York, for admission to public housing, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that “[i]t would be meaningless to describe the right to travel between states as a fundamental precept of personal liberty and not to acknowledge a correlative constitutional right to travel within a state.” King v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing Authority, 442 F.2d 646 , 648 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 404 U.S. 863 , 92 S. Ct. 113 , 30 L.

1993In 1971, faced with a challenge to a durational residency requirement imposed by the municipal housing authority of New Rochelle, New York, for admission to public housing, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that “[i]t would be meaningless to describe the right to travel between states as a fundamental precept of personal liberty and not to acknowledge a correlative constitutional right to travel within a state.” King v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing Authority, 442 F.2d 646 , 648 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 404 U.S. 863 , 92 S. Ct. 113 , 30 L.

1993In 1971, faced with a challenge to a durational residency requirement imposed by the municipal housing authority of New Rochelle, New York, for admission to public housing, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that “[i]t would be meaningless to describe the right to travel between states as a fundamental precept of personal liberty and not to acknowledge a correlative constitutional right to travel within a state.” King v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing Authority, 442 F.2d 646 , 648 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 404 U.S. 863 , 92 S. Ct. 113 , 30 L.

1993In 1971, faced with a challenge to a durational residency requirement imposed by the municipal housing authority of New Rochelle, New York, for admission to public housing, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that “[i]t would be meaningless to describe the right to travel between states as a fundamental precept of personal liberty and not to acknowledge a correlative constitutional right to travel within a state.” King v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing Authority, 442 F.2d 646 , 648 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 404 U.S. 863 , 92 S. Ct. 113 , 30 L.

1979McDermott v. Commissioner of Children Youth Services, 168 Conn. 435, 440 . 8 “This so-called substantial evidence rule is similar to the 'sufficiency of the evidence’ standard applied in judicial review of jury verdicts, and evidence is sufficient to sustain an agency finding if it affords 'a substantial basis of fact from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred. . . . [I]t must be enough to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict when the conclusion sought to be drawn from it is one of fact for the jury.’ [Citations omitted.]” Lawrence v. Koslowski, 171

1979McDermott v. Commissioner of Children Youth Services, 168 Conn. 435, 440 . 8 “This so-called substantial evidence rule is similar to the 'sufficiency of the evidence’ standard applied in judicial review of jury verdicts, and evidence is sufficient to sustain an agency finding if it affords 'a substantial basis of fact from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred. . . . [I]t must be enough to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict when the conclusion sought to be drawn from it is one of fact for the jury.’ [Citations omitted.]” Lawrence v. Koslowski, 171

1979See Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 269 . 10 The plaintiffs in that ease contended the ordinance imposed “an unconstitutional burden on and impairment of their right to travel freely, both interstate and intrastate, and on their right to live and work where they choose and that it discriminates between them and a few other city employees on the one hand and the 'vast majority’ of city employees on the other, depriving them of the equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; that the requirement that employees seeking waiver show 'extreme hardship’

1979See Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 269 . 10 The plaintiffs in that ease contended the ordinance imposed “an unconstitutional burden on and impairment of their right to travel freely, both interstate and intrastate, and on their right to live and work where they choose and that it discriminates between them and a few other city employees on the one hand and the 'vast majority’ of city employees on the other, depriving them of the equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; that the requirement that employees seeking waiver show 'extreme hardship’

1979McDermott v. Commissioner of Children Youth Services, 168 Conn. 435, 440 . 8 “This so-called substantial evidence rule is similar to the 'sufficiency of the evidence’ standard applied in judicial review of jury verdicts, and evidence is sufficient to sustain an agency finding if it affords 'a substantial basis of fact from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred. . . . [I]t must be enough to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict when the conclusion sought to be drawn from it is one of fact for the jury.’ [Citations omitted.]” Lawrence v. Koslowski, 171

1979See Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 269 . 10 The plaintiffs in that ease contended the ordinance imposed “an unconstitutional burden on and impairment of their right to travel freely, both interstate and intrastate, and on their right to live and work where they choose and that it discriminates between them and a few other city employees on the one hand and the 'vast majority’ of city employees on the other, depriving them of the equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; that the requirement that employees seeking waiver show 'extreme hardship’