capital penalty hearing in Nevada

2022First, this court held in Johnson v. State that juvenile convictions are admissible during a capital penalty hearing. 122 Nev. 1344, 1353 , 148 P.3d 767, 774 (2006).

2022First, this court held in Johnson v. State that juvenile convictions are admissible during a capital penalty hearing. 122 Nev. 1344, 1353 , 148 P.3d 767, 774 (2006).

2022Pursuant to NRS 175.552(3), during a capital penalty hearing “evidence may be presented concerning aggravating and mitigating circumstances relative to the offense, defendant or victim and on any other matter which the court deems relevant to the sentence, whether or not the evidence is ordinarily admissible.” In this vein, “other matter” evidence may be introduced by the State “for jurors to consider in deciding on an appropriate sentence after they have determined whether the defendant is or is not eligible for death.” Hollaway v. State, 116 Nev. 732 , 746, 6 P.3d 987, 997 (2000), overruled

2022Pursuant to NRS 175.552(3), during a capital penalty hearing "evidence may be presented concerning aggravating and mitigating circumstances relative to the offense, defendant or victim and on any other matter which the court deems relevant to the sentence, whether or not the evidence is ordinarily admissible." In this vein, "other mattee evidence may be introduced by the State "for jurors to consider in deciding on an appropriate sentence after they have determined whether the defendant is or is not eligible for death." Hollaway v. State, 116 Nev. 732, 746, 6 P.3d 987, 997 (2000), overruled on

2022Johnson v. State, 122 Nev. 1344, 1353 , 148 P.3d 767, 774 (2006); see Gallego v. State, 117 Nev. 348, 369 , 23 P.38d 227, 241 (2001) (recognizing that evidence of police investigations and uncharged crimes may be admissible in a capital penalty hearing), overruled on other grounds by Nunnery v. State, 127 Nev. 749 , 263 P.3d 235 (2011); Emil v. State, 105 Nev. 858, 866 , 784 P.2d 956, 961 (1989) (concluding that district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting SuPREME GouRT oF NEvaDA 10) MATA eS testimony about prior murder conviction during penalty hearing).

2022Johnson v. State, 122 Nev. 1344, 1353 , 148 P.3d 767, 774 (2006); see Gallego v. State, 117 Nev. 348, 369 , 23 P.38d 227, 241 (2001) (recognizing that evidence of police investigations and uncharged crimes may be admissible in a capital penalty hearing), overruled on other grounds by Nunnery v. State, 127 Nev. 749 , 263 P.3d 235 (2011); Emil v. State, 105 Nev. 858, 866 , 784 P.2d 956, 961 (1989) (concluding that district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting SuPREME GouRT oF NEvaDA 10) MATA eS testimony about prior murder conviction during penalty hearing).

2022Johnson v. State, 122 Nev. 1344, 1353 , 148 P.3d 767, 774 (2006); see Gallego v. State, 117 Nev. 348, 369 , 23 P.38d 227, 241 (2001) (recognizing that evidence of police investigations and uncharged crimes may be admissible in a capital penalty hearing), overruled on other grounds by Nunnery v. State, 127 Nev. 749 , 263 P.3d 235 (2011); Emil v. State, 105 Nev. 858, 866 , 784 P.2d 956, 961 (1989) (concluding that district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting SuPREME GouRT oF NEvaDA 10) MATA eS testimony about prior murder conviction during penalty hearing).

2022Johnson v. State, 122 Nev. 1344, 1353, 148 P.3d 767, 774 (2006); see Gallego v. State, 117 Nev. 348, 369, 23 P.3d 227, 241 (2001) (recognizing that evidence of police investigations and uncharged crimes may be achnissible in a capital penalty hearing), overruled on other grounds by Nunnery v. State, 127 Nev. 749, 263 P.3d 235 (2011); Emil v. State, 105 Nev. 858, 866, 784 P.2d 956, 961 (1989) (concluding that district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 3 (0) 1947A testimony about prior murder conviction during penalty hearing).

2020As to the hearsay instruction, Belcher acknowledges that the language is a correct statement of the law, as hearsay is generally admissible at a capital penalty hearing under NRS 175.552(3), and that neither the Confrontation Clause nor Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), apply to evidence admitted at a capital penalty hearing, see, e.g., Summers v. State, 122 Nev. 1326, 1332-33, 148 P.3d 778, 783 (2006).

2020As to the hearsay instruction, Belcher acknowledges that the language is a correct statement of the law, as hearsay is generally admissible at a capital penalty hearing under NRS 175.552(3), and that neither the Confrontation Clause nor Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), apply to evidence admitted at a capital penalty hearing, see, e.g., Summers v. State, 122 Nev. 1326, 1332-33, 148 P.3d 778, 783 (2006).

2022Johnson v. State, 122 Nev. 1344, 1353 , 148 P.3d 767, 774 (2006); see Gallego v. State, 117 Nev. 348, 369 , 23 P.38d 227, 241 (2001) (recognizing that evidence of police investigations and uncharged crimes may be admissible in a capital penalty hearing), overruled on other grounds by Nunnery v. State, 127 Nev. 749 , 263 P.3d 235 (2011); Emil v. State, 105 Nev. 858, 866 , 784 P.2d 956, 961 (1989) (concluding that district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting SuPREME GouRT oF NEvaDA 10) MATA eS testimony about prior murder conviction during penalty hearing).

2022Johnson v. State, 122 Nev. 1344, 1353 , 148 P.3d 767, 774 (2006); see Gallego v. State, 117 Nev. 348, 369 , 23 P.38d 227, 241 (2001) (recognizing that evidence of police investigations and uncharged crimes may be admissible in a capital penalty hearing), overruled on other grounds by Nunnery v. State, 127 Nev. 749 , 263 P.3d 235 (2011); Emil v. State, 105 Nev. 858, 866 , 784 P.2d 956, 961 (1989) (concluding that district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting SuPREME GouRT oF NEvaDA 10) MATA eS testimony about prior murder conviction during penalty hearing).

2022Prior bad acts are relevant penalty phase evidence because a sentencing decision “should be based on the entirety of a defendant’s character, record, and the circumstances of the offense.” Nunnery, 127 Nev. at 769 , 263 P.3d at 249 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Mason v. State, 118 Nev. 554, 562 , 51 P.3d 521, 526 (2002) (recognizing that evidence of unrelated offenses may be admissible during a capital penalty hearing).

2022Prior bad acts are relevant penalty phase evidence because a sentencing decision “should be based on the entirety of a defendant’s character, record, and the circumstances of the offense.” Nunnery, 127 Nev. at 769 , 263 P.3d at 249 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Mason v. State, 118 Nev. 554, 562 , 51 P.3d 521, 526 (2002) (recognizing that evidence of unrelated offenses may be admissible during a capital penalty hearing).

2016See Browning v. State, 124 Nev. 517, 526 , 188 P.3d 60, 67 (2008) ("The focus of a capital penalty hearing is not the defendant's guilt, but rather his character, record, and the circumstances of the offense.").

2016See Browning v. State, 124 Nev. 517, 526 , 188 P.3d 60, 67 (2008) ("The focus of a capital penalty hearing is not the defendant's guilt, but rather his character, record, and the circumstances of the offense.").

2006See Buschauer v. State, 106 Nev. 890, 894 , 804 P.2d 1046, 1048-49 (1990) (holding that where a victim-impact statement refers to specific prior acts of the defendant, due process requires, among other things, an opportunity to cross-examine the accuser, but declining to bar all hearsay evidence in an impact statement). [6] Cf. Kaczmarek v. State, 120 Nev. 314, 335-36 , 91 P.3d 16, 31 (2004) (concluding that barring a defendant from cross-examining a witness regarding her opinion on the proper sentence during a capital penalty hearing did not violate the Sixth Amendment). [7] Buchanan v. Angel

2006See Buschauer v. State, 106 Nev. 890, 894 , 804 P.2d 1046, 1048-49 (1990) (holding that where a victim-impact statement refers to specific prior acts of the defendant, due process requires, among other things, an opportunity to cross-examine the accuser, but declining to bar all hearsay evidence in an impact statement). [6] Cf. Kaczmarek v. State, 120 Nev. 314, 335-36 , 91 P.3d 16, 31 (2004) (concluding that barring a defendant from cross-examining a witness regarding her opinion on the proper sentence during a capital penalty hearing did not violate the Sixth Amendment). [7] Buchanan v. Angel

2015Neither Hollaway nor cases citing to it analyzed whether the weighing determination was a necessary part of the "constitutional narrowing process." See, e.g., Butler v. State, 120 Nev. 879, 895 , 102 P.3d 71, 82 (2004); Evans v. State, 117 Nev. 609, 637 , 28 P.3d 498, 517 (2001).

2015Neither Hollaway nor cases citing to it analyzed whether the weighing determination was a necessary part of the "constitutional narrowing process." See, e.g., Butler v. State, 120 Nev. 879, 895 , 102 P.3d 71, 82 (2004); Evans v. State, 117 Nev. 609, 637 , 28 P.3d 498, 517 (2001).

2022NRS 175.552(3); McKenna v. State, 114 Nev. 1044, 1051 , 968 P.2d 739, 744 (1998).

2022NRS 175.552(3); McKenna v. State, 114 Nev. 1044, 1051 , 968 P.2d 739, 744 (1998).

2015See NRS 175.552(3); Thomas v. State, 114 Nev. 1127, 1147 , 967 P.2d 1111, 1124 (1998).

2015See NRS 175.552(3); Thomas v. State, 114 Nev. 1127, 1147 , 967 P.2d 1111, 1124 (1998).

2012Blake v. State, 121 Nev. 779, 796 , 121 P.3d 567, 578 (2005); Thomas v. State, 120 Nev. 37, 47 , 83 P.3d 818, 825 (2004).

2012Blake v. State, 121 Nev. 779, 796 , 121 P.3d 567, 578 (2005); Thomas v. State, 120 Nev. 37, 47 , 83 P.3d 818, 825 (2004).

2011Such evidence is relevant because a sentencing determination should be based on the entirety of a defendant’s “character, record, and the circumstances of the offense,” Browning v. State, 124 Nev. 517, 526 , 188 P.3d 60, 67 (2008), but it may be excluded from a capital penalty hearing if it is “impalpable or highly suspect.” Gallego v. State, 117 Nev. 348, 369 , 23 P.3d 227, 241 (2001) (police investigations of other crimes); see also Leonard v. State, 114 Nev. 1196, 1214 , 969 P.2d 288, 299 (1998) (police investigation of crimes for which defendant has not been convicted); Homick v. State, 10

2011Such evidence is relevant because a sentencing determination should be based on the entirety of a defendant’s “character, record, and the circumstances of the offense,” Browning v. State, 124 Nev. 517, 526 , 188 P.3d 60, 67 (2008), but it may be excluded from a capital penalty hearing if it is “impalpable or highly suspect.” Gallego v. State, 117 Nev. 348, 369 , 23 P.3d 227, 241 (2001) (police investigations of other crimes); see also Leonard v. State, 114 Nev. 1196, 1214 , 969 P.2d 288, 299 (1998) (police investigation of crimes for which defendant has not been convicted); Homick v. State, 10

1998PENALTY PHASE ISSUES First, Sherman argues that the district court erred by instructing the jury, during the penalty phase, that “[a] verdict may never be influenced by sympathy, prejudice, or public opinion.” Sherman argues that this instruction “violated [his] Eighth Amendment rights because it undermined the jury’s constitutionally mandated consideration of mitigating evidence.” This court has recently held that “[a] district court may instruct the jury not to consider sympathy during a capital penalty hearing, as long as the court also instructs the jury to consider mitigating facts.” Ripp

1998PENALTY PHASE ISSUES First, Sherman argues that the district court erred by instructing the jury, during the penalty phase, that “[a] verdict may never be influenced by sympathy, prejudice, or public opinion.” Sherman argues that this instruction “violated [his] Eighth Amendment rights because it undermined the jury’s constitutionally mandated consideration of mitigating evidence.” This court has recently held that “[a] district court may instruct the jury not to consider sympathy during a capital penalty hearing, as long as the court also instructs the jury to consider mitigating facts.” Ripp

2022But other bad act evidence may not be unfairly prejudicial when introduced during a capital penalty hearing because it can be “probative of [a defendant’s] cruel and violent character and lack of remorse,” McConnell, 120 Nev. at 1058 , 102 P.3d at 617 , or “reveal[s] a pattern of escalating violent criminal behavior,” Johnson, 122 Nev. at 1354 , 148 P.3d at 774 .

2022But other bad act evidence may not be unfairly prejudicial when introduced during a capital penalty hearing because it can be "probative of [a defendant's] cruel and violent character and lack of remorse," McConnell, 120 Nev. at 1058, 102 P.3d at 617, or "reveal[s] a pattern of escalating violent criminal behavior," Johnson, 122 Nev. at 1354, 148 P.3d at 774.

1998Wesley, 112 Nev. at 519 , 916 P.2d at 804 ; Lay v. State, 110 Nev. 1189, 1195 , 886 P.2d 448, 451-52 (1994).

1998Wesley, 112 Nev. at 519 , 916 P.2d at 804 ; Lay v. State, 110 Nev. 1189, 1195 , 886 P.2d 448, 451-52 (1994).

2022See Bennett, 111 Nev. at 1110 , 901 P.2d at 683 ("[T]he death penalty is only a sentencing option if, after balancing and evaluating the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the former are found to outweigh the latter.") see also Rippo v. State, 122 Nev. 1086, 1095 , 146 P.3d 279, 285 (2006) (disapproving of a jury instruction that "implied that jurors had to agree unanimously that mitigating circumstances outweigh aggravating circumstances, when actually a jury's finding of mitigating circumstances in a capital penalty hearing does not have to be unanimoue (internal quotation marks omitt

2022See Bennett, 111 Nev. at 1110 , 901 P.2d at 683 ("[T]he death penalty is only a sentencing option if, after balancing and evaluating the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the former are found to outweigh the latter.") see also Rippo v. State, 122 Nev. 1086, 1095 , 146 P.3d 279, 285 (2006) (disapproving of a jury instruction that "implied that jurors had to agree unanimously that mitigating circumstances outweigh aggravating circumstances, when actually a jury's finding of mitigating circumstances in a capital penalty hearing does not have to be unanimoue (internal quotation marks omitt

2022See Bennett, 111 Nev. at 1110 , 901 P.2d at 683 ("[T]he death penalty is only a sentencing option if, after balancing and evaluating the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the former are found to outweigh the latter.") see also Rippo v. State, 122 Nev. 1086, 1095 , 146 P.3d 279, 285 (2006) (disapproving of a jury instruction that "implied that jurors had to agree unanimously that mitigating circumstances outweigh aggravating circumstances, when actually a jury's finding of mitigating circumstances in a capital penalty hearing does not have to be unanimoue (internal quotation marks omitt

2022See Bennett, 111 Nev. at 1110 , 901 P.2d at 683 ("[T]he death penalty is only a sentencing option if, after balancing and evaluating the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the former are found to outweigh the latter.") see also Rippo v. State, 122 Nev. 1086, 1095 , 146 P.3d 279, 285 (2006) (disapproving of a jury instruction that "implied that jurors had to agree unanimously that mitigating circumstances outweigh aggravating circumstances, when actually a jury's finding of mitigating circumstances in a capital penalty hearing does not have to be unanimoue (internal quotation marks omitt

2022See Bennett, 111 Nev. at 1110 , 901 P.2d at 683 ("[T]he death penalty is only a sentencing option if, after balancing and evaluating the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the former are found to outweigh the latter.") see also Rippo v. State, 122 Nev. 1086, 1095 , 146 P.3d 279, 285 (2006) (disapproving of a jury instruction that "implied that jurors had to agree unanimously that mitigating circumstances outweigh aggravating circumstances, when actually a jury's finding of mitigating circumstances in a capital penalty hearing does not have to be unanimoue (internal quotation marks omitt

2022See Bennett, 111 Nev. at 1110 , 901 P.2d at 683 ("[T]he death penalty is only a sentencing option if, after balancing and evaluating the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the former are found to outweigh the latter.") see also Rippo v. State, 122 Nev. 1086, 1095 , 146 P.3d 279, 285 (2006) (disapproving of a jury instruction that "implied that jurors had to agree unanimously that mitigating circumstances outweigh aggravating circumstances, when actually a jury's finding of mitigating circumstances in a capital penalty hearing does not have to be unanimoue (internal quotation marks omitt

2016"When an appellate court states a principle or rule of law necessary to a decision, the principle or rule becomes the law of the case and must be followed throughout its subsequent progress, both in the lower court and upon subsequent appeal." Wickliffe v. Sunrise Hospital, 104 Nev. 777, 780 , 766 P.2d 1322, 1324 (1988).

2016"When an appellate court states a principle or rule of law necessary to a decision, the principle or rule becomes the law of the case and must be followed throughout its subsequent progress, both in the lower court and upon subsequent appeal." Wickliffe v. Sunrise Hospital, 104 Nev. 777, 780 , 766 P.2d 1322, 1324 (1988).

2016Preparing for a capital penalty hearing generally includes a duty to thoroughly investigate a defendant's background for possible mitigating evidence, see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000), but "reasonable" does not mean that an investigation must be so exhaustive as to uncover all conceivable mitigating evidence, see Waldrop v. Thigpen, 857 F. Supp. 872, 915 (N.D.

2016Preparing for a capital penalty hearing generally includes a duty to thoroughly investigate a defendant's background for possible mitigating evidence, see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000), but "reasonable" does not mean that an investigation must be so exhaustive as to uncover all conceivable mitigating evidence, see Waldrop v. Thigpen, 857 F. Supp. 872, 915 (N.D.

2012First, he urges us to overrule prior decisions holding that neither the Confrontation Clause nor Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), apply to evidence admitted at a capital penalty hearing, see Thomas v. State, 122 Nev. 1361, 1367 , 148 P.3d 727, 732 (2006); Johnson v. State, 122 Nev. 1344, 1353 , 148 P.3d 767, 773 (2006); Summers v. State, 122 Nev. 1326, 1333 , 148 P.3d 778, 783 (2006).

2012First, he urges us to overrule prior decisions holding that neither the Confrontation Clause nor Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), apply to evidence admitted at a capital penalty hearing, see Thomas v. State, 122 Nev. 1361, 1367 , 148 P.3d 727, 732 (2006); Johnson v. State, 122 Nev. 1344, 1353 , 148 P.3d 767, 773 (2006); Summers v. State, 122 Nev. 1326, 1333 , 148 P.3d 778, 783 (2006).