At page 65 Determining finality of judgment when claims are unresolved15 citing casesTex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.
- City of Edinburg, Texas v. Rodolfo Campos, No. 13-24-00313-CV (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Nov. 13, 2025).published(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.)
- Daphne Kanas v. Carlos Garcia, Individually & as an Emp./Contractor of Superior Home Real Est. Inspections, No. 02-25-00238-CV (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 17, 2025).published(holding failure to rule on claims for attorney’s fees prevented order from being final)
- VicNRG LLC v. FCStone, LLC, FCStone Trading, LLC & FCStone Grp., Inc., No. 14-15-00194-CV (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 16, 2015).published See, e.g., In the Interest of J.D., 304 S.W.3d 522, 525 (Tex. App.—Waco 2009, no pet.) (holding that because the court’s intent controls, the court’s expression that an intervention was still active meant the judgment was not final and app…
- John Margetis, John Margetis D/B/A Christian Soldiers, Louis A. Margetis, & Louis A. Margetis D/B/A Adelphia Custom Homes v. Shailesh R. Parikh & Sandhya S. Parikh, No. 02-04-00051-CV (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 22, 2004).published(Tex. App.—Houston [14 th Dist.] 2001, no pet.)
- Dewayne Murray, in His Capacity as the Chapter 7 Tr. of the Bankr. Est. of Sherman Robinson v. Desmond Pollard, Schneider Nat'l Carriers, Inc., Old Repub. Ins. Co., & INS Ins., Inc., No. 09-24-00004-CV (Tex. App.—Beaumont June 19, 2025).published(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.)
- Karen Bass & Lynn Smith, in Their Capacity as Successor Co-Trs. on Behalf of the Amended & Restated George E. Bogle & Nancy T. Bogle Jt. Revocable Trust, Dated March 2, 2021 v. George Michael Bogle & Katherine Leigh Bogle Leavitt, No. 03-23-00319-CV, 2024 WL 3446921 (Tex. App.—Austin July 18, 2024).published(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.)
- Donald Quinonez v. Seaton Collard, No. 03-23-00452-CV (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 3, 2024).published(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.)
- Love & Joy Servs., LLC, & Lovers Est., LLC v. Unity Nat'l Bank, JC Worrell's Ins. Agency A/K/A J. Ceaser's Farmers Ins. Agency, Jose Rodriguez D/B/A A&A Constr. Mgmt. Corp., & Waterstone LSP, LLC, No. 14-18-01015-CV (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 17, 2019).published(Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.)
- Rucker Law Firm, P.L.L.C. & Hamilton G. Rucker v. Jan Woodard Fox, P.L.C., Jan Woodard Fox, Dennis C. Reich & Reich & Binstock, LLP, No. 01-17-00435-CV (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 7, 2017).published(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.)
- Gerardus J. Smith v. J. Darrell Brewer, No. 01-16-00029-CV (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 23, 2016).published(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.)
Show 4 more citing cases
- Fleming & Assocs., L.L.P N/K/A Fleming, Nolen & Jez, L.L.P. v. Charels Kirklin, Stephen Kirklin, Paul Kirklin, & the Kirklin Law Firm, P.C., No. 14-15-00369-CV (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 23, 2015).published(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.)
- Jonathan Wasserberg v. RES-TX One, LLC., No. 14-13-00674-CV, 2014 WL 6922545 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 9, 2014).published(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.)
- Vansteen Marine Supply, Inc. v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 93 S.W.3d 516 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002).published(Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.)
- Vansteen Marine Supply Inc., Kopcke Int'l, USA Inc., Curtis L. Cronkhite, & Ron Fausett v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., & Hartford Fire Ins. Co., No. 14-01-00901-CV (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 24, 2002).published(Tex. App. C Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.)
Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.
- Mary Melinda Palacio AKA Melinda Palacio Dependent for the Est. of Luicio A. Palacio v. Paul Palacio & Mary Ann Palacio, No. 05-18-00357-CV (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 24, 2019).published(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.)
- Eugene L. Butler, Robert E. Chamberlain, Ronald E. Smith & Ship & Sail, Inc. v. Amegy Bank, N.A., Successor to MaximBank, No. 14-15-00410-CV, 2016 WL 3574685 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 30, 2016).published(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.)
- Pirochem Int'l, L.L.C. v. Xelia Pharm. APS, F/K/A Axellia Pharm., APS, No. 14-14-00518-CV (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 25, 2015).published(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.)
v.
Robert DUHON, Jr.
OPINION
WITTIG, Justice.This is an appeal from a summary judgment order. Appellant claims the trial court erred in refusing to award attorney’s fees. Because we find the summary judgment order is interlocutory, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Appellant is a law firm that brought suit against appellee for breach of contract and on sworn account for payment for legal services rendered. The amount owed to appellant was $2,001.70. In the original petition, appellant also pled for reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in bringing suit. Appellant filed a motion for summary judgment on the claims of breach of contract and sworn a account. In this motion, appellant sought payment of the debt of $2,001.70 plus “prejudgment interest, taxable court cost, as well as attorneys fees in an amount of $7,602..00 [sic] for legal services rendered and $500.00 for services to be rendered through the hearing on the motion for summary judgment and entry of final judgment for total attorneys fees of $8,102.00, and $302.41 for costs incurred throught final hearing on this motion and entry of judgment for a total amount due[*65] for prejudgment attorneys fees and expenses of $8,404.41.” In support of the motion for summary judgment, appellant attached an affidavit regarding the amount of the account and setting forth appellant’s hourly fee, the hourly fee of an associate attorney, and that of a legal assistant, and stated the total hours spent by both attorneys and legal assistant in prosecuting the case. Appellant further stated these fees were reasonable, necessary, and appropriate considering appellee’s refusal to pay the debt in question and by his actions including evasion of service, a vigorous defense, conduct of discovery, and avoidance of early resolution.
In response to appellant’s motion, appel-lee disputed the amount of the debt and attached the affidavit of appellee’s counsel setting forth counsel’s opinion that appellant’s prayer of $8,102.00 in attorney’s fees was neither customary nor reasonable for the collection of a debt of $2,001.70. In the affidavit, appellee’s counsel states that a fee of $7,602.00 for these activities was clearly unreasonable, and, given the amount of the debt sought to be collected, was neither usual nor customary.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of appellant for the debt of $2,001.70, plus prejudgment and post-judgment interest, but the order contained no ruling on attorney’s fees. Appellant brings two points of error, challenging the trial court’s failure to award attorney’s fees. Because we find the summary judgment order is not a final, appealable judgment, we do not address appellant’s points of error.
“[A]n order or judgment is not final for purposes of appeal unless it actually disposes of every pending claim and party or unless it clearly and unequivocally states that it finally disposes of all claims and all parties.” Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 205 (Tex.2001). An order that does not dispose of all issues and parties is interlocutory and not appeal-able absent a severance. Mafrige v. Ross, 866 S.W.2d 590, 591 (Tex.1993), overruled on other grounds, Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 204 (Tex.2001). Simply labeling the order “Final Judgment” is not enough-there must be some clear indication the trial court intended to completely dispose of the entire case. Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 205. Furthermore, the inclusion of Mother Hubbard language is no longer determinative of finality. Id. at 203-4. An appellate court may review the record to determine whether an order disposes of all claims and parties. Id. at 205-6.
In this case, the order appealed from is entitled, “FINAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT” and it includes Mother Hubbard language. The order states, “Final summary judgment is granted in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant Robert G. Duhon, Jr., on Plaintiffs claims for breach of contract and suit on sworn account. ...” Thus, the order disposes of all parties and appellant’s two claims for recovery of the debt, but the order contains no ruling on appellant’s claim for recovery of attorney’s fees. Thus, the order does not dispose of all claims. Appellant filed a motion to modify the judgment to include a ruling on appellant’s claim for attorney’s fees. Although no order issued in response to this motion, the docket sheet indicates the trial court denied this motion. The motion to modify alerted the trial court to the outstanding claim. The denial of the motion to modify indicates that the trial court did not intend to rule on all claims and, thus, did not intend the summary judgment order to be final, despite the language in the order to the contrary.
Because the order appealed from is not a final, appealable judgment and there is[*66] no severance in the record, we must dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.