Mother Hubbard clause in Texas

2026Moreover, the inclusion of a Mother Hubbard clause, which includes the statement that “all relief not granted is denied” or similar words, “does not indicate that a judgment rendered without a conventional trial is final for purposes of appeal.” Id. at 203–04; see In re R.R.K., 590 S.W.3d 535 , 543 (Tex. 2019).

2026Instead, “a trial court may express its intent to render a final judgment by describing its action as (1) final, (2) a disposition of all claims and parties, and (3) appealable.” Bella Palma, LLC, 601 S.W.3d at 801 (citing In re R.R.K., 590 S.W.3d 535 , 543 (Tex. 2019)); Interest of C.K.M., 709 S.W.3d 613 , 617 (Tex. 2025) (explaining that no “talismanic phrases” are required to render an 11 A Mother Hubbard clause is “a recitation that all relief not expressly granted is denied.” Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 192 (Tex. 2001) 10 order final as long as “on its face . . . it finally d

2023In his brief, he argues that the court erred in granting DPS’s motion to quash and raises issues as to whether appellees had the authority to make their decisions related to 4 Caldwell quotes Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191 (Tex. 2001), as holding that a Mother Hubbard clause provides an “irrebuttable finality presumption.” However, the language he quotes is found in Justice Baker’s concurring opinion, when he observes that in Mafrige v. Ross, 866 S.W.2d 590 (Tex. 1993), the supreme court had “carved out an exception to what we had said in [an earlier case] by holding that an irrebutta

2021See Mafrige v. Ross, 866 S.W.2d 590 , 590 n.1 (Tex. 1993) (noting Mother Hubbard Clause is considered “equivalent” to statement granting judgment as to all plaintiff’s claims or statement that plaintiff takes nothing), overruled by Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191 , 192–93 (Tex. 2001) (“We no longer believe that a Mother Hubbard clause in an order or in a judgment issued without a full trial can be taken to indicate finality.

2000In Inglish v. Union State Bank , 945 S.W.2d 810 (Tex.1997), the supreme court held that even if a summary judgment grants more relief than was requested, if it contains a Mother Hubbard clause or "clearly purports to be final," it is final and appealable .

1998Inglish. .The supreme court notes that although the language of the order in Inglish "does not contain a true Mother Hubbard clause, it clearly purports to be final.” Inglish, 945 S.W.2d at 811 .

2025The Texas Supreme Court has “rejected the notion that a Mother Hubbard clause gives ‘any indicia of finality in any order not issued after a conventional trial.’” Id. (quoting Lehmann v. Har- Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 204 (Tex. 2001)).

2022See Farm Bureau, 455 S.W.3d at 164 ; Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 206 (“The Mother Hubbard clause proved to give no indication of finality not just because it found its way into every kind of order, but because it was inherently ambiguous.”).

2015What happens in the next case when, on facts all parties to a case, and vice versa.” Kaigler, 961 S.W.2d at identical to Lehmann, a trial court signs an interlocutory 276; see also Lehmann v. Har–Con Corp., 988 S.W.2d 415 , summary judgment with the Court's new magic language 416–17 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. granted); rather than a Mother Hubbard clause?

2015Other this Court's admonishment that a Mother Hubbard clause courts have followed Bandera 's mandate, holding that finality language—such as “plaintiff takes nothing” *212 indicates finality. 4 988 S.W.2d at 416 .

2026In re Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse of McAllen, Inc., 167 S.W.3d 827, 830 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding); see Meadors v. Makowski, 658 S.W.3d 420 , 425 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2022, pet. denied) (rejecting argument that trial court’s judgment was a final judgment merely because it contained language permitting execution to issue). 7 Morrell also argues that the Fee Order’s Mother Hubbard clause is a clear sign of finality.

2020Id. at 203–04 (noting that a Mother Hubbard clause—“all other relief not expressly granted herein is denied”—is ambiguous as to the court’s intention and overruling precedent approving of Mother Hubbard clause to indicate finality, but also noting that “[a] statement like, ‘This judgment finally disposes of all parties and all claims and is appealable’, would leave no doubt about the court’s intention.”); see also In re Elizondo, 544 S.W.3d 824, 825, 827 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding) (holding order was final for purposes of appeal when it stated, “This judgment is final, disposes of all claim

2015Parkway Dental Associates, P.A. v. Ho and Huang Properties, L.P., 391 S.W.3d 596 , 603- 04 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.); See also SSP Partners v. Gladstrong Investments (USA) Corporation, 169 S.W.3d 27, 34 (Tex. App.-Corpus 13 Christi-Edinburg 2005, pet. granted) (“A “Mother Hubbard” clause in a summary judgment is of no import to show the court implicitly ruled on objections.”); Well Solutions, Inc. v. Stafford, 32 S.W.3d 313, 317 (Tex. App.-San Antonio, 2000, no pet.) (“A Mother Hubbard clause operates on claims, not objections to summary judgment evidence.”) In this case,

2005See Well Solutions, Inc. v. Stafford, 32 S.W.3d 313, 317 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2000, no pet.) (stating that a Mother Hubbard clause operates on claims, not objections to summary judgment evidence).

2015No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 12 Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191 (2001) 44 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 364 should return to the principle we announced in Teer v. Duddlesten—that a Mother Hubbard clause simply “has no ***** place in a partial summary judgment,” and that a summary For the reasons we have explained, the judgments of the judgment order is not an appealable, final judgment unless it court of appeals in these cases are reversed, and the cases are actually disposes of all parties and issues. 664 S.W.2d 702 , remanded to that court for further proceedings. 703–04 (Tex.1984)

2015Co., 658 S.W.2d 563, 564 (Tex.1983) (per curiam). 55 Teer v. Duddlesten, 664 S.W.2d 702, 704 (Tex.1984). 56 Id. 57 E.g., Bethurum v. Holland, 771 S.W.2d 719 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1989, no writ); Sakser v. Fitze, 708 S.W.2d 40, 42 (Tex.App. —Dallas 1986, no writ) (declaring that a Mother Hubbard clause in an order does not convert an intrinsically interlocutory partial summary judgment into a final judgment). 58 E.g., Georgetown Assoc., Ltd. v. Home Fed.

2001If an otherwise outstanding claim logically cannot be brought within the grasp of the Mother Hubbard clause, the order is interlocutory.”); • Vanderwiele v. Llano Trucks, Inc., 885 S.W.2d 843, 844-45 (Tex.App.—Austin 1994, no writ) (holding that a summary judgment order granted in favor of one defendant and including a standard Mother Hubbard clause did not purport to dispose of the claims against the other defendant and was thus interlocutory); and • Hinojosa v. Hinojosa, 866 S.W.2d 67, 69-70 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1993, no writ) (holding that a summary judgment made no pretense at disposing of a

1999See Vanderwiele v. Llano Trucks, Inc., 885 S.W.2d 843, 845 (Tex.App.-Austin 1994, no writ) (where order expressly references one defendant’s motion for summary judgment and grants that motion, the Mother Hubbard clause could do no more than dispose of issues raised in that motion).

2023See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195, 205 (Tex. 2001) (a judgment is final for purposes of appellate jurisdiction if it disposes of all claims and parties in a case); Davis v. ESC II, LP, No. 05-15-00551-CV, 2015 Tex. 6 App. LEXIS 8021, **2-3 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 30, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (the trial court’s order granting a motion to dismiss for failure to comply with Chapter 74’s requirements was not a final judgment, despite stating it was final and including a Mother Hubbard clause, because it expressly reserved attorney’s fees for future determination) (citing McNally v.

2018RCBS’s motion for summary judgment did not in any way ask for or seek judgment on this declaratory claim, and there is nothing else in the record—nor does RCBS point us to anything other than the Mother Hubbard clause— supporting RCBS’s contention that the judgment disposed of this declaratory claim. “[A] party’s omission of one of his claims from a motion for summary judgment does not waive the claim because a party can always move for partial summary judgment . . . .” McNally, 5 52 S.W.3d at 196 (citing TEX.

2026See Lowe v. Teator, 1 S.W.3d 819, 823 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1999, pet. denied) (“If . . . the language preceding the Mother Hubbard clause is limited in its scope, such that it evidences the intent of the trial court not to dispose of all the claims . . . , a Mother Hubbard clause will not convert the otherwise interlocutory summary judgment order into a final judgment” (emphasis in original).). 7 While GEC expressly stated it would “not be pursuing” its motion for summary judgment as to Barrera’s negligence, and only implied the motion was “gone” as to negligent maintenance, GEC’s cross-appeal ca

2015The second part provides those against whom [*211] summary judgment was that a Mother Hubbard clause is no longer enough to not sought, regardless of the inclusion of a Mother Hub- invoke the fiction that an otherwise interlocutory order is bard clause." Lowe v. Teator, 1 S.W.3d 819, 823-24 (Tex. treated as final for purposes of appeal.

2016See id. (holding that the partial summary judgment was interlocutory even though it contained a Mother Hubbard clause).

2007See generally Parking Co. of Am. v. Wilson , 58 S.W.3d 742 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam) (concluding the trial court's order granting partial summary judgment which included a Mother Hubbard clause was interlocutory).

2001Faced with a similar situation, the Beaumont Court recognized that Mafrige v. Ross does not “automatically render all orders [containing a Mother Hubbard clause] final for appellate purposes.” Id. at 415 (discussing Mafrige, 866 S.W.2d 590 (Tex.1993)). 2 “If an otherwise outstanding claim logically cannot be brought within the grasp of the Mother Hubbard clause, the order is interlocutory.” Id. at 416.

2001E.g., Rodriguez, 5 S.W.3d at 763-64 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1999, no pet.) (“Looking within the four corners of the summary judgment order, the plain language of the Mother Hubbard clause did not, and could not, purport to grant or deny any more relief than the relief which [the defendant] sought.”); Midkiff, 996 S.W.2d at 416 (looking to order “as a whole” to conclude that summary judgment order containing Mother Hubbard clause did not purport to be final).

2000Our sister court in Kaigler v. General Electric Mortgage Insurance Corporation, 961 S.W.2d 273 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no writ) discussed a similar situation to ours, holding that “The issue in this appeal is whether a Mother Hubbard clause in a summary judgment disposes of all parties and all issues in a case.

1998Corp., 961 S.W.2d 273, 276 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, writ denied); also see Coastal Refining, 838 S.W.2d at 572 (although the intervenor is not specifically named in the judgment, it includes a Mother Hubbard clause which alleviates any doubt as to the trial court’s intention of finality).

2015Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 795 S.W.2d 252, 253 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ dism'd w.o.j.); Hodde v. Young, 672 S.W.2d 45, 47 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] ) (holding that a judgment was final and appealable because it contained a Mother Hubbard clause), writ ref'd, n.r.e., 682 S.W.2d 236 (Tex.1984) (per curiam) (noting that the erroneous rendition of a final judgment is not fundamental error). 59 866 S.W.2d 590 (Tex.1993). 60 Id. at 590 . 61 Id. 62 Ross v. Arkwright Mut.

2015After a full trial on the merits, the w.o.j.); Hodde v. Young, 672 S.W.2d 45, 47 (Tex. statement in a judgment that all relief not requested is App.--Houston [14th Dist.]) (holding that a denied signifies finality; there is no expectation that the judgment was final and appealable because it court tried only part of the case, absent an order for sev- contained a Mother Hubbard clause), writ ref'd, erance or separate trials.

2009Sam correctly points out that generally "any change in a judgment during the trial court's period of plenary power should be treated as a modified, corrected, or reformed judgment that 'presumptively vacates' the trial court's former judgment unless the record indicates a contrary intent." Quanaim v. Frasco Restaurant & Catering , 17 S.W.3d 30, 38 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied).

2009Sam correctly points out that generally “any change in a judgment during the trial court’s period of plenary power should be treated as a modified, corrected, or reformed judgment that ‘presumptively vacates’ the trial court’s former judgment unless the record indicates a contrary intent.” Quanaim v. Frasco Restaurant & Catering, 17 S.W.3d 30, 38 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied).

2007Therefore, without clear indication that relator was waiving its claim of attorney fees, see Dallas Fire Fighters Ass'n v. Booth Research Group, Inc. , 156 S.W.3d 188, 198 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2005, pet. denied) (party waived attorney fees by letter prior to entry of summary judgment), and without a clear indication of the trial court's intention to dispose of all issues, we conclude that the issues of attorney fees and court costs remain unresolved.

2007Therefore, without clear indication that relator was waiving its claim of attorney fees, see Dallas Fire Fighters Ass’n v. Booth Research Group, Inc., 156 S.W.3d 188, 198 (Tex.App.–Dallas 2005, pet. denied) (party waived attorney fees by letter prior to entry of summary judgment), and without a clear indication of the trial court’s intention to dispose of all issues, we conclude that the issues of attorney fees and court costs remain unresolved.

2002Dist. v. Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex.1966), Lefever asserts that the Mother Hubbard clause disposes of all issues that were before the trial court prior to its April order, including Hargrave’s motion.

1995Dist. v. Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d 893, 897-98 (Tex.1966) (discussing circumstances under which a judgment will be presumed final and appealable notwithstanding the omission of a Mother Hubbard clause); see also Stoner v. Thompson, 578 S.W.2d 679, 682 (Tex.1979) (defining post-answer default as failure to appear at trial after filing answer).

2015The trial court *203 granted the plaintiff's be practical in application and effect; motion by order that included a Mother Hubbard clause. litigants should be able to recognize We concluded that the order was final, albeit erroneous. 76 a judgment which on its face purports We attempted to explain that our ruling was consistent with to be final, and courts should be able Martinez because the conflict in the orders involved in that to treat such a judgment as final for case showed that they were not final even though “a Mother purposes of appeal. 68 Hubbard clause ... would have created a fina

2001While the Court recognizes that the “routine inclusion of [a Mother Hubbard clause] in otherwise plainly interlocutory orders and its ambiguity in many contexts have rendered it inapt for determining finality,” 39 S.W.3d at 192, it ignores the obvious problems courts have faced interpreting other language “purporting to dispose of all claims or parties.” Mafrige, 866 S.W.2d at 592 .

2021Cf. Lissiak v. SW Loan OO, L.P., 499 S.W.3d 481, 488 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2016, no pet.) (“[A] Mother Hubbard clause in the judgment does not act to show the trial court ruled on objections to the summary judgment evidence.”); Well Sols., Inc. v. Stafford, 32 S.W.3d 313, 317 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000, no pet.) (holding error was not preserved by Mother Hubbard clause because “[a] Mother Hubbard clause operates on claims, not objections to summary judgment evidence”). 9 no pet.) (mem. op.).

2018See Lissiak v. SW Loan OO, L.P., 499 S.W.3d 481, 488 (Tex.App.--Tyler 2016, no pet.).

2015Loan Ass'n, 795 S.W.2d 252, 253 (Tex.App.—Houston 66 Ross, 834 S.W.2d at 394 . [14th Dist.] 1990, writ dism'd w.o.j.); Hodde v. Young, 672 S.W.2d 45, 47 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] ) 67 Id. at 393–395. (holding that a judgment was final and appealable because it contained a Mother Hubbard clause), writ We reversed, holding that the “take nothing” language in ref'd, n.r.e., 682 S.W.2d 236 (Tex.1984) (per curiam) the eight summary judgment orders disposed of all claims (noting that the erroneous rendition of a final judgment asserted by both plaintiffs against each of the defendants and is no

2015Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 795 S.W.2d 252, 253 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ dism'd w.o.j.); Hodde v. Young, 672 S.W.2d 45, 47 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] ) (holding that a judgment was final and appealable because it contained a Mother Hubbard clause), writ ref'd, n.r.e., 682 S.W.2d 236 (Tex.1984) (per curiam) (noting that the erroneous rendition of a final judgment is not fundamental error). 59 866 S.W.2d 590 (Tex.1993). 60 Id. at 590 . 61 Id. 62 Ross v. Arkwright Mut.

2015This Court explained that language does not suggest that all “[b]ecause the order contained a Mother Hubbard clause of the plaintiffs' claims were denied. denying all other relief, it also purported to dispose of [the As the order recites and as the defendant's] counterclaims.” Bandera, 946 S.W.2d at 337 . record demonstrates, the defendant But several courts have refused to apply Mafrige in this named in the order was not the only situation, maintaining that a summary judgment that does defendant remaining in the case.

2015We think this explaining the result in Martinez, this explanation sug- rule to be practical in application and effect; litigants gested that a Mother Hubbard clause would by itself should be able to recognize a judgment which on its face make any summary judgment final, contrary to our purports to be final, and courts should be able to treat holding in Teer. such a judgment as final for purposes of appeal. 68 74 946 S.W.2d 336 (Tex. 1997) (per curiam). 68 Mafrige, 866 S.W.2d at 592 ; accord 75 Id. at 337.

2024It cannot be read to reserve particular interests to the grantor, 15 Davis v. Mueller, 528 S.W.3d 97, 100, 102 (Tex. 2017) (citing Jones v. Colle, 727 S.W.2d 262, 263 (Tex. 1987)). 16 Id. at 99 (emphasis added). 17 Id. at 102. 11 and it cannot be read as a Mother Hubbard clause covering only overlooked interests. 18 The broad granting language is followed by an express reservation: “This paragraph shall not apply to any purchases or acquisitions by SHELL WESTERN hereafter when SHELL WESTERN acquires an interest in the properties described herein by giving new consideration therefor.” After not

2022In Davis, the Supreme Court of Texas refused to consider the third sentence as being part of the Mother Hubbard clause; rather, interpreting the plain language, Davis held: “All means all.” Id. at 102 .

2024It cannot be read to reserve particular interests to the grantor, 15 Davis v. Mueller, 528 S.W.3d 97, 100, 102 (Tex. 2017) (citing Jones v. Colle, 727 S.W.2d 262, 263 (Tex. 1987)). 16 Id. at 99 (emphasis added). 17 Id. at 102. 11 and it cannot be read as a Mother Hubbard clause covering only overlooked interests. 18 The broad granting language is followed by an express reservation: “This paragraph shall not apply to any purchases or acquisitions by SHELL WESTERN hereafter when SHELL WESTERN acquires an interest in the properties described herein by giving new consideration therefor.” After not

2015In Jones v. Colle, 727 S.W.2d 262, 263 (Tex. 1987) the court upheld the longstanding position that “a Mother Hubbard clause would only serve to cover property not described in the deed when the other property consists of small unleased piece or strips of land which may exist without the knowledge of one or both of the parties.” Id at 263.

2015Co., 658 S.W.2d 563, 564 (Tex.1983) (per curiam). 55 Teer v. Duddlesten, 664 S.W.2d 702, 704 (Tex.1984). 56 Id. 57 E.g., Bethurum v. Holland, 771 S.W.2d 719 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1989, no writ); Sakser v. Fitze, 708 S.W.2d 40, 42 (Tex.App. —Dallas 1986, no writ) (declaring that a Mother Hubbard clause in an order does not convert an intrinsically interlocutory partial summary judgment into a final judgment). 58 E.g., Georgetown Assoc., Ltd. v. Home Fed.

2001Co., 658 S.W.2d 563, 564 (Tex.1983) (per curiam). [55] Teer v. Duddlesten, 664 S.W.2d 702, 704 (Tex.1984). [56] Id. [57] E.g., Bethurum v. Holland, 771 S.W.2d 719 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1989, no writ); Sakser v. Fitze, 708 S.W.2d 40, 42 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1986, no writ) (declaring that a Mother Hubbard clause in an order does not convert an intrinsically interlocutory partial summary judgment into a final judgment). [58] E.g., Georgetown Assoc., Ltd. v. Home Fed.

2000The judgment included a Mother Hubbard clause. 3 Id.

1997Cf. Schlipf v. Exxon Corp., 644 S.W.2d 453 (Tex.1982)(the Mother Hubbard clause, even when used in a summary judgment ease, expressly disposes of all parties and claims and constitutes a final judgment).

1986Appellant relies on the language in Smith v. Allison, supra, in which the supreme court stated the purpose of the Mother Hubbard clause is: “to prevent the leaving of small unleased pieces or strips of land ... which may exist without the knowledge of one or both of the parties by reason of incorrect surveying, careless location of fences, or other mistakes.” Smith, supra at 615 (quoting Sun Oil Co. v. Bennett, 125 Tex. 540 , 84 S.W.2d 447 (1935).

1986Appellant relies on the language in Smith v. Allison, supra, in which the supreme court stated the purpose of the Mother Hubbard clause is: “to prevent the leaving of small unleased pieces or strips of land ... which may exist without the knowledge of one or both of the parties by reason of incorrect surveying, careless location of fences, or other mistakes.” Smith, supra at 615 (quoting Sun Oil Co. v. Bennett, 125 Tex. 540 , 84 S.W.2d 447 (1935).

2002Jones points out that the additional acreage not described in the Receivership Lease equals 73% of the acreage actually described in the lease and thus does not come within the purview of the Mother Hubbard clause, citing Smith v. Allison, 157 Tex. 220 , 301 S.W.2d 608 (1957) in which we held in pertinent part: Its [the general or Mother Hubbard clause] apparent reasonable purpose is to prevent the leaving of small unleased pieces or strips of land, like the tract here in controversy, which may exist without the knowledge of one or both of the parties by reason of incorrect surveying, careless

2002Jones points out that the additional acreage not described in the Receivership Lease equals 73% of the acreage actually described in the lease and thus does not come within the purview of the Mother Hubbard clause, citing Smith v. Allison, 157 Tex. 220 , 301 S.W.2d 608 (1957) in which we held in pertinent part: Its [the general or Mother Hubbard clause] apparent reasonable purpose is to prevent the leaving of small unleased pieces or strips of land, like the tract here in controversy, which may exist without the knowledge of one or both of the parties by reason of incorrect surveying, careless

2015Co., 658 S.W.2d 563, 564 (Tex.1983) (per curiam). 55 Teer v. Duddlesten, 664 S.W.2d 702, 704 (Tex.1984). 56 Id. 57 E.g., Bethurum v. Holland, 771 S.W.2d 719 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1989, no writ); Sakser v. Fitze, 708 S.W.2d 40, 42 (Tex.App. —Dallas 1986, no writ) (declaring that a Mother Hubbard clause in an order does not convert an intrinsically interlocutory partial summary judgment into a final judgment). 58 E.g., Georgetown Assoc., Ltd. v. Home Fed.

2001E.g., Bethurum v. Holland, 771 S.W.2d 719 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1989, no writ); Sakser v. Fitze, 708 S.W.2d 40, 42 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1986, no writ) (declaring that a Mother Hubbard clause in an order does not convert an intrinsically interlocutory partial summary judgment into a final judgment). .