Harris v. Armstrong, 474 N.E.2d 1191 (N.Y. 1984). · Go Syfert
Search
Harris v. Armstrong, 474 N.E.2d 1191 (N.Y. 1984). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
G Cite
cited 2× by 2 distinct cases · …in consequence of the failure to register any protest to the charge to the jury, the law as stated in that charge becomes the law applicable to the determination of the rights of the parties in the litigation at p. 702 ✓
62 citation events (27 in the last 25 years) across 4 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Atkins v. Metronome Events, Inc. (nyappdiv, 2020-10-06)
Treatment trajectory · 1986 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1986 2006 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 18 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Atkins v. Metronome Events, Inc.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2020 · confidence medium
Pereira's failure to object to the jury charge and interrogatories, which did not ask the jury to determine whether he was plaintiff's employer, render this argument unpreserved ( Harris v Armstrong , 64 NY2d 700, 702 [1984]; Ganaj v New York City Health & Hosps.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Douglas F. v. Williamsville Cent. Sch. Dist.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2019 · confidence medium
That evidence, which we have evaluated in light of the [*2]unchallenged jury instructions given by the court ( see Harris v Armstrong , 64 NY2d 700, 702 [1984]; Doolittle , 155 AD3d at 1655 ; see also Bradley v Earl B.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Wilson
NY · 2018 · confidence medium
This is because the actor had the opportunity to regret his actions and display caring, but failed to take the opportunity" ( 21 NY3d at 403 ).{**32 NY3d at 10} Here, the trial court instructed the jury, in accordance with Suarez , that they could find defendant acted with depraved indifference to human life if, "having a conscious objective not to kill but to harm, he engages in . . . a brutal, prolonged and potentially fatal course of conduct against a particularly vulnerable victim." The failure of either party to object to the charge meant that "the law as stated in that charge became the …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Doolittle v. Nixon Peabody LLP
N.Y. App. Div. · 2017 · confidence medium
Here, notwithstanding the foregoing legal principles, the law as stated in the court’s unchallenged jury charge “became the law applicable to the determination of the rights of the parties in this litigation . . . and thus established the legal standard by which the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict must be judged” (Harris v Armstrong, 64 NY2d 700, 702 [1984]; see Murdock v Stewart’s Ice Cream Co., 5 AD3d 1100, 1101 [4th Dept 2004]; see also Kroupova v Hill, 242 AD2d 218, 220 [1st Dept 1997], lv dismissed 92 NY2d 843 [1998], lv dismissed in part and denied in part 92 N…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Stephens v. U.S.A. General Contractors Corp.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2013 · confidence medium
“In consequence of the failure to register any protest to the charge to the jury, the law as stated in that charge [becomes] the law applicable to the determination of the rights of the parties in [the] litigation” (Harris v Armstrong, 64 NY2d 700, 702 [1984]; see Up-Front Indus. v U.S. Indus., 63 NY2d 1004 [1984]; see also Love v Rockwell’s Intl.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Stephens v. U.S.A. General Contractors Corp.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2013 · confidence medium
“In consequence of the failure to register any protest to the charge to the jury, the law as stated in that charge [becomes] the law applicable to the determination of the rights of the parties in [the] litigation” (Harris v Armstrong, 64 NY2d 700, 702 [1984]; see Up-Front Indus. v U.S. Indus., 63 NY2d 1004 [1984]; see also Love v Rockwell’s Intl.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Schaefer v. New York City Transit Authority
N.Y. App. Div. · 2012 · confidence medium
Defendants failed to preserve their argument that a particular ANSI/AMSE standard did not form a proper basis for liability under General Municipal Law § 205-e, and we decline to review it in the interest of justice (Harris v Armstrong, 64 NY2d 700, 702 [1984]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Schaefer v. New York City Transit Authority
N.Y. App. Div. · 2012 · confidence medium
Defendants failed to preserve their argument that a particular ANSI/AMSE standard did not form a proper basis for liability under General Municipal Law § 205-e, and we decline to review it in the interest of justice (Harris v Armstrong, 64 NY2d 700, 702 [1984]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cuadrado v. New York City Transit Authority
N.Y. App. Div. · 2009 · confidence medium
Thus, “the law as stated in th[e] charge became the law applicable to the determination of the rights of the parties in this litigation and thus established the legal standard by which the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict must be judged” (Harris v Armstrong, 64 NY2d 700, 702 [1984] [citation omitted]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Peguero v. 601 Realty Corp. (2×)
N.Y. App. Div. · 2009 · confidence medium
Because Jeffrey Farkas did not object to this portion of the charge or request contrary instructions, “the law as stated in that charge became the law applicable to the determination of the rights of the parties in this litigation . . . and thus established the legal standard by which the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict must be judged” (Harris v Armstrong, 64 NY2d 700, 702 [1984], citing Up-Front Indus. v U.S. Indus., 63 NY2d 1004 [1984]; Rajeev Sindhwani, M.D., PLLC v Coe Bus.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Sindhwani v. Coe Business Service, Inc.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2008 · confidence medium
Corp., 273 AD2d 891 , 892 [2000], quoting Harris v Armstrong, 64 NY2d 700, 702 [1984]; see Up-Front Indus. v US.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Howell v. Cecilia
N.Y. App. Div. · 2007 · confidence medium
Defendant failed to preserve for our review his challenges to the court’s charge (see CPLR 4110-b; Harris v Armstrong, 64 NY2d 700, 702 [1984]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Arms v. Halsey
N.Y. App. Div. · 2007 · confidence medium
That instruction “became the law applicable to the determination of the rights of the parties in this litigation . . . and thus established the legal standard by which the sufficiency of the! evidence to support the verdict must be judged” (Harris v Armstrong, 64 NY2d 700, 702 [1984]; see Wittman v Marotta, 272 AD2d 876 [2000]; Stepanian v Rozanski, 195 AD2d 973 [1993], lv dismissed 82 NY2d 802 [1993]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) McClure v. Schindler Elevator Corp.
N.Y. App. Term. · 2007 · confidence medium
Where, as here, a party fails to preserve its objection to a jury charge, the law, as stated in the charge, becomes “the law applicable to the determination of the rights of the parties” in the litigation and establishes the legal standard by which the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict must be judged (Harris v Armstrong, 64 NY2d 700, 702 [1984]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Murphy v. Holzinger
N.Y. App. Div. · 2004 · confidence medium
Also, contrary to the court’s determination, the jury’s findings cannot be reconciled on the basis of the testimony of Ruggles’ examining physician who acknowledged that, at the very least, being struck by the pole caused plaintiff to suffer a temporary aggravation of the degenerative disease in her cervical spine (cf. Harris v Armstrong, 64 NY2d 700, 702 [1984]; Rosas v Ishack, 219 AD2d 633, 634 [1995]; Rubin v Pecoraro, 141 AD2d 525, 526 [1988]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Murdock v. Stewart's Ice Cream Co.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2004 · confidence medium
The instructions given to the jury establish “the legal standard by which the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict must be judged” (Harris v Armstrong, 64 NY2d 700, 702 [1984]; see Rosas v Ishack, 219 AD2d 633, 634 [1995]; Rubin v Pecoraro, 141 AD2d 525, 526 [1988]).
discussed Cited "see" SAUTER, CLAUDETTE v. CALABRETTA, PETER A.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2013 · signal: see · confidence high
Although “[t]hat determination is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, ... if the verdict is one that reasonable persons could have rendered after receiving conflicting evidence, the court should not substitute its judgment for that of the jury” (Ruddock v Happell, 307 AD2d 719, 720 [2003]; see Harris v Armstrong, 97 AD2d 947 , 947 [1983], affd 64 NY2d 700 [1984]; Todd v PLSIII, LLC-We Care, 87 AD3d 1376, 1377 [2011] ; Parr, 77 AD3d at 1429-1430 ).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Wright v. Estate of Tartaglia
N.Y. App. Div. · 2005 · signal: see also · confidence low
Based upon the evidence presented at trial, it cannot be said that the jury’s verdict in the defendant’s favor was against the weight of the evidence and could not have been reached on any fair interpretation of the evidence (see Lolik v Big V Supermarkets, 86 NY2d 744 [1995]; see also Harris v Armstrong, 64 NY2d 700 [1984]).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Robert Harris
v.
Clarence E. Armstrong, as Executors of Lessie V. Cool
New York Court of Appeals.
Dec 18, 1984.
474 N.E.2d 1191
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL, Roger W. Avery for appellants., Lee S. Michaels and Robert K. Bergan for respondent.
Cited by 56 opinions  |  Published

OPINION OF THE COURT

Memorandum.

The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs.

In our court appellant executors of the estate of Lessie Cool* urge reversal on two grounds, namely, that the decision of the[*702] trial court setting aside the jury’s verdict and dismissing the complaint against them was proper, and that the trial court erred in its instructions to the jurors. Both contentions must be rejected. We address them in reverse order.

With respect to the latter contention, it suffices to observe that the assertion of error in the trial court’s charge to the jury has not been preserved for appellate review. The trial record, as the executors concede, establishes that no exceptions or requests to charge were made by trial counsel for the executors.

For related reasons the contention that the trial court properly set aside the jury verdict against the executors must also be rejected. In consequence of the failure to register any protest to the charge to the jury, the law as stated in that charge became the law applicable to the determination of the rights of the parties in this litigation (Up-Front Inds. v U. S. Inds., 63 NY2d 1004) and thus established the legal standard by which the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict must be judged. Under the charge as given defendants were considered collectively as a single unit for purposes of determining their liability to plaintiff (cf. Glielmi v Toys “R” Us, 62 NY2d 664, 666). Accordingly, the sufficiency of the evidence must be determined in the light of all the evidence against all defendants; discrete correlation of the evidence is not to be made to establish liability of each defendant separately. In light of the fact that, as the trial court properly concluded, the evidence was sufficient to establish liability on the part of defendant William Cool, under the law made applicable by virtue of the charge, it was necessarily also sufficient to support the verdict against the estate of Lessie Cool. It was therefore error for the trial court to set aside the verdict against the estate on the basis of the evidence against her alone.

Chief Judge Cooke and Judges Jasen, Jones, Wachtler, Meyer and Kaye concur; Judge Simons taking no part.

Order affirmed, with costs, in a memorandum.

The appeal taken by William Cool has been dismissed (62 NY2d 642) and a motion for reconsideration denied (62 NY2d 943).