collateral source rule in New York

2012(CPLR 4545 [“(t)he plaintiff may prove his or her losses and expenses at the trial irrespective of whether such sums will later have to be deducted from the plaintiffs recovery”]; see Alexander, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C4545:3; see also Kish v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 76 NY2d 379, 384 [1990], citing Healy v Rennert, 9 NY2d 202 [1961].) In Healy , the Court found that evidence of the plaintiffs collateral source payments which was submitted to a jury was prejudicial to the plaintiff since the jury “may well have considered that plaintiff had susta

2012(CPLR 4545 [“(t)he plaintiff may prove his or her losses and expenses at the trial irrespective of whether such sums will later have to be deducted from the plaintiffs recovery”]; see Alexander, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C4545:3; see also Kish v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 76 NY2d 379, 384 [1990], citing Healy v Rennert, 9 NY2d 202 [1961].) In Healy , the Court found that evidence of the plaintiffs collateral source payments which was submitted to a jury was prejudicial to the plaintiff since the jury “may well have considered that plaintiff had susta

2012(CPLR 4545 [“(t)he plaintiff may prove his or her losses and expenses at the trial irrespective of whether such sums will later have to be deducted from the plaintiffs recovery”]; see Alexander, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C4545:3; see also Kish v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 76 NY2d 379, 384 [1990], citing Healy v Rennert, 9 NY2d 202 [1961].) In Healy , the Court found that evidence of the plaintiffs collateral source payments which was submitted to a jury was prejudicial to the plaintiff since the jury “may well have considered that plaintiff had susta

2012(CPLR 4545 [“(t)he plaintiff may prove his or her losses and expenses at the trial irrespective of whether such sums will later have to be deducted from the plaintiffs recovery”]; see Alexander, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C4545:3; see also Kish v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 76 NY2d 379, 384 [1990], citing Healy v Rennert, 9 NY2d 202 [1961].) In Healy , the Court found that evidence of the plaintiffs collateral source payments which was submitted to a jury was prejudicial to the plaintiff since the jury “may well have considered that plaintiff had susta

2003In Kelly v Seager ( 163 AD2d 877, 877 [4th Dept 1990]), the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, held: “The collateral source rule set forth in CPLR 4545 (c) does not apply to subrogation actions seeking to recover moneys paid by an insurer on a fire loss.

1997Because that portion of the claim has been subrogated and En-con is .the real party in interest to NFTA’s insurer, the collateral source rule is not applicable (see, CPLR 4545 [c]; Kelly v Seager, 163 AD2d 877 ; Scinta v Kazmierczak, 59 AD2d 313, 316 ).

2024"To be entitled to a collateral source hearing, the defendant must [merely] tender some competent evidence from available sources that the plaintiff's economic losses may in the past have been, or may in the future be, replaced, or the plaintiff indemnified, from collateral sources" ( Nunez v City of New York , 85 AD3d 885, 887-888 [alteration and internal quotation marks omitted]).

2024The Supreme Court nonetheless denied that branch of the defendant's motion which was pursuant to CPLR 4545 for a collateral source hearing on the ground that "it is [the] plaintiff's prerogative whether or not to obtain coverage under the ACA[,] and CPLR 4545 simply cannot be interpreted as requiring him to do so." However, by showing that the plaintiff could reduce his own future medical expenses by millions of dollars by procuring an insurance policy available to him pursuant to the ACA, the defendant necessarily satisfied its burden of demonstrating that such expenses may be paid by a colla

2021Contrary to plaintiff's argument, he is not entitled to a credit against his counsel fee obligation in the amount of the payment made by the insurer, since the collateral source rule is inapplicable in this context ( see Isaacs v Jefferson Tenants Corp. , 270 AD2d 95, 96 [1st Dept 2000]; Board of Mgrs. of Foundry at Washington Park Condominium v Foundry Dev.

2021Contrary to plaintiff's argument, he is not entitled to a credit against his counsel fee obligation in the amount of the payment made by the insurer, since the collateral source rule is inapplicable in this context ( see Isaacs v Jefferson Tenants Corp. , 270 AD2d 95, 96 [1st Dept 2000]; Board of Mgrs. of Foundry at Washington Park Condominium v Foundry Dev.

2012However, defendants timely moved for a collateral source hearing and therefore are entitled to that hearing (Szpakowski v Shelby Realty, LLC, 48 AD3d 268, 269-270 [2008], lv denied 12 NY3d 708 [2009]).

2012However, defendants timely moved for a collateral source hearing and therefore are entitled to that hearing (Szpakowski v Shelby Realty, LLC, 48 AD3d 268, 269-270 [2008], lv denied 12 NY3d 708 [2009]).

2012Defendants failed to preserve their argument that a particular ANSI/AMSE standard did not form a proper basis for liability under General Municipal Law § 205-e, and we decline to review it in the interest of justice (Harris v Armstrong, 64 NY2d 700, 702 [1984]).

2012Defendants failed to preserve their argument that a particular ANSI/AMSE standard did not form a proper basis for liability under General Municipal Law § 205-e, and we decline to review it in the interest of justice (Harris v Armstrong, 64 NY2d 700, 702 [1984]).

1999Inasmuch “ ‘[a]s there can be no recovery for basic economic loss, there is no reason for application of the collateral source rule’ ” (Fiveson v Kondenar, 110 AD2d 749, 751 , quoting 1 NY PJI 2d 274 [Supp]) in this case; rather, the proper methodology is to calculate the amount of plaintiff’s basic economic loss, pursuant to Insurance Law § 5102 (a), and insofar as the verdict provides compensation for that loss, to reduce it accordingly (see, Fiveson v Kondenar, supra, at 750-751; see also, Hughes v Ryder Truck Rental, 125 AD2d 177, 178 , lv denied 69 NY2d 609 ).

1999Inasmuch “ ‘[a]s there can be no recovery for basic economic loss, there is no reason for application of the collateral source rule’ ” (Fiveson v Kondenar, 110 AD2d 749, 751 , quoting 1 NY PJI 2d 274 [Supp]) in this case; rather, the proper methodology is to calculate the amount of plaintiff’s basic economic loss, pursuant to Insurance Law § 5102 (a), and insofar as the verdict provides compensation for that loss, to reduce it accordingly (see, Fiveson v Kondenar, supra, at 750-751; see also, Hughes v Ryder Truck Rental, 125 AD2d 177, 178 , lv denied 69 NY2d 609 ).

1999Inasmuch “ ‘[a]s there can be no recovery for basic economic loss, there is no reason for application of the collateral source rule’ ” (Fiveson v Kondenar, 110 AD2d 749, 751 , quoting 1 NY PJI 2d 274 [Supp]) in this case; rather, the proper methodology is to calculate the amount of plaintiff’s basic economic loss, pursuant to Insurance Law § 5102 (a), and insofar as the verdict provides compensation for that loss, to reduce it accordingly (see, Fiveson v Kondenar, supra, at 750-751; see also, Hughes v Ryder Truck Rental, 125 AD2d 177, 178 , lv denied 69 NY2d 609 ).

1999Inasmuch “ ‘[a]s there can be no recovery for basic economic loss, there is no reason for application of the collateral source rule’ ” (Fiveson v Kondenar, 110 AD2d 749, 751 , quoting 1 NY PJI 2d 274 [Supp]) in this case; rather, the proper methodology is to calculate the amount of plaintiff’s basic economic loss, pursuant to Insurance Law § 5102 (a), and insofar as the verdict provides compensation for that loss, to reduce it accordingly (see, Fiveson v Kondenar, supra, at 750-751; see also, Hughes v Ryder Truck Rental, 125 AD2d 177, 178 , lv denied 69 NY2d 609 ).

2024See, e.g., Gusikoff v. Republic Storage Co., 241 A.D. 889, 889 (2nd Dept. 1934); Rinaudo v. Erichsen, 273 A.D.1040, 1040 (3rd Dept. 1948).

2000Co., 241 App Div 889 ), we should keep in mind that the nature of contract damages is quite distinct from that of tort damages (see generally, Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Contract Damages, 71 Cal L Rev 56, 60).

2008While an untimely request for a collateral source hearing constitutes a waiver of the right to the statutory setoff (see Boone v Hopkins, 298 AD2d 866, 867 [2002]; Ventriglio v Active Airport Serv., 257 AD2d 657 [1999]), the defendants’ hearing requests were formally made by motions that were served prior to the execution of the judgment on March 4, 2005, and its entry on March 25, 2005, and therefore, should have been entertained on the merits. 5 In any event, in this instance, the parties had agreed, with the consent of the court, that posttrial motions would not be due until 30 days from th

2001The Appellate Division, Second Department, has also held that the “failure to timely request a collateral source hearing constituted a waiver of [the] right to seek an offset for collateral source payments” (Ventriglio v Active Airport Serv., 257 AD2d 657, 657-658 [2d Dept 1999], citing Hill, supra).

2000While the collateral source rule has been applied in some contract cases, as the dissent notes (see, Rutzen v Monroe County Long Term Care Program, supra; Gusikoff v Republic Stor.

2000(Kish v Board of Educ., 76 NY2d 379, 384 , quoting Healy v Rennert, 9 NY2d 202, 206 .) This principle is based on the collateral source doctrine, which “holds that as a general rule damages cannot be mitigated or reduced because of payments received by an injured party from a source wholly independent of and collateral to the wrongdoer.” (Rutzen v Monroe County Long Term Care Program, 104 Misc 2d 1000, 1001 ; Silinsky v State-Wide Ins.

2009Even assuming, arguendo, that plaintiff was not a credible witness, we note that defendant failed to present any evidence from which the court could have determined that plaintiff was reasonably certain to remain entitled to Canadian health care benefits for the duration of the period in which damages for future medical expenses were awarded (see Kihl, 47 AD3d at 165-167 ; Ruby v Budget Rent A Car Corp., 23 AD3d 257 [2005], lv denied 6 NY3d 712 [2006]; see generally Young v Tops Mkts. [appeal No. 4], 283 AD2d 923 , 926 [2001]).

2008Agency, 87 NY2d at 86; Kihl v Pfeffer, 47 AD3d 154 [2007]; Young v Tops Mkts., 283 AD2d 923 , 926 [2001]; McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 301 [a]), contains no language applying the reasonable certainty standard to motions that merely seek the conduct of a collateral source hearing.

2008It has been held that an application for a collateral source hearing may be timely made any time before the judgment is entered (see Wooten v State of New York, 302 AD2d 70, 72 [2002]), unless the court directs otherwise (see Virkler v Shockney, 178 AD2d 966 [1991]).

2008Due to ambiguity in a stipulation adopted by order of the trial court, and because an application for a collateral source hearing is generally timely if made prior to the entry of judgment (Wooten v State of New York, 302 AD2d 70 [2002], lv denied 1 NY3d 501 [2003]), we conclude that the court improvidently denied defendant Shelby’s request for a collateral source hearing.

1980New York State has long belonged to a minority of jurisdictions which create an exception to the collateral source rule for wholly gratuitous services and payments received by an injured plaintiff for which he gave no consideration and which he is not obligated to repay, absolutely or contingently (Coyne v Campbell, 11 NY2d 372, 373-376 ; Drinkwater v Dinsmore, supra, pp 392-393; Silinsky v State-Wide Ins.

1980This exception to the collateral source rule originated in Drinkwater v Dinsmore (supra, p 393) where the Court of Appeals concluded that lost wages could form no part of a plaintiff’s damages where the defendant was able to show "that for some particular reason the plaintiff would not have earned any wages if he had not been injured, or that he was under such a contract with his employer that his wages wen, on without service, or that his employer paid his wages from mere benevolence.” The Drinkwater doctrine was reaffirmed by the Court of Appeals in Coyne v Campbell ( 11 NY2d 372, 374 , supr

2026Plaintiff failed to preserve his objections to the jury charge regarding the Labor Law § 240(1) claim as he did not object when the charge was given, and he renewed his objection to the court's refusal to give the requested instructions only after the jury retired to deliberate ( see CPLR 4110-b; Washington v Atenco , 103 AD3d 529, 529 [1st Dept 2013]).

2026Plaintiff failed to preserve his objections to the jury charge regarding the Labor Law § 240(1) claim as he did not object when the charge was given, and he renewed his objection to the court's refusal to give the requested instructions only after the jury retired to deliberate ( see CPLR 4110-b; Washington v Atenco , 103 AD3d 529 , 529 [1st Dept 2013]).