carrier doctrine in New York

1997Auth. ( 211 AD2d 285 , affd 88 NY2d 116 ), which came down six days after the verdict in this matter and which eviscerated the common carrier doctrine.

1997Auth., 88 NY2d 116 ) renders plaintiff’s reliance on earlier case law inappropriate (see, e.g., Green Bus Lines v Ocean Acc. & Guar.

1932(Magnin v. Dinsmore, 62 N. Y. 35 ; The Sarnia, 278 Fed. 459 ; certiorari denied, 258 U. S. 625 ; St.

1916R. v. Hooker, 233 U. S. 97 ); but the law remains that the carrier may not claim a limitation of liability to a certain amount for its affirmative wrongdoing (Magnin v. Dinsmore, 62 N. Y. 35 ), when the plaintiff makes proof thereof.

2007Co. ( 49 Misc 504 [1906]), should be abandoned in light of this Court's decisions in Adams v New York City Tr.

2007Co. ( 49 Misc 504 [1906]), should be abandoned in light of this Court’s decisions in Adams v New York City Tr.

2001Corp. v Insurance Co., 66 NY2d 820, 822 ).

1997Where a party fails to preserve its objection to a jury charge, the law as stated in the charge becomes “the law applicable to the determination of the rights of the parties in [the] litigation” (Harris v Armstrong, 64 NY2d 700, 702 ) and the trial court is not entitled to set the verdict aside based on legal principles which it later decides should have been included in its charge (supra; see also, CPLR 4110-b; Bowne of N. Y. v International 800 Telecom Corp., 178 AD2d 138 ).

1997Auth. ( 211 AD2d 285 , affd 88 NY2d 116 ), which came down six days after the verdict in this matter and which eviscerated the common carrier doctrine.

1997Defendant, however, argues that People v Moore ( 46 NY2d 1 , supra) limits the common carrier exception to situations where the location of the crime cannot be determined.

1997As the Court explained in Moore , the private vehicle exception was adopted in 1971 as part of the reformulation of the former Code of Criminal Procedure and "had no counterpart in prior law” (People v Moore, 46 NY2d at 7-8 , supra).

1997Where a party fails to preserve its objection to a jury charge, the law as stated in the charge becomes “the law applicable to the determination of the rights of the parties in [the] litigation” (Harris v Armstrong, 64 NY2d 700, 702 ) and the trial court is not entitled to set the verdict aside based on legal principles which it later decides should have been included in its charge (supra; see also, CPLR 4110-b; Bowne of N. Y. v International 800 Telecom Corp., 178 AD2d 138 ).

1995Co. ( 129 NY 506 ), a case decided just 10 years after Stewart , limited the foregoing doctrine to acts committed by carrier agents who are entrusted with duties with respect to the execution of contracts for the transportation of passengers, thereby excluding ticket agents, such as in the present case.

1995In Vanderhule v Berinstein ( 285 App Div 290, 297 ), the Appellate Division, Third Department, in discussing the common carrier rule, and recognizing its dated nature, stated that: "The rule originated in the early days of the railroads when travel was considered by many to be a dangerous adventure.

1995In Vanderhule v Berinstein ( 285 App Div 290, 297 ), the Appellate Division, Third Department, in discussing the common carrier rule, and recognizing its dated nature, stated that: "The rule originated in the early days of the railroads when travel was considered by many to be a dangerous adventure.

1985The short answer is that there is no inconsistency between the two clauses, for an insured is bound by the terms of the contract whether read or not (Pimpinello v Swift & Co., 253 NY 159 ) and can protect itself by either beginning an action before expiration of the limitation period or obtaining from the carrier a waiver or extension of its provision.

1982Co. v Gross, 27 NY2d 263 ).” Whether the theory by which the carrier is prevented from asserting such defense is called a “waiver” by the carrier of the defense, or a “preclusion” or “foreclosure” as a result of the failure to comply with the statutory notice, the defense of “lack of permissive use” by reason of the car being operated by a thief is no longer available to the carrier.

1967Claimants’ counsel contended that the State assumed the status of a common carrier in its operation of said chair lift; and, consequently, owed the infant claimant the duty “ to use the utmost foresight as to possible dangers and the utmost prudence in guarding against them.” (Vogel v. State of New York, 204 Misc. 614, 620 .) The common carrier doctrine was followed in Grauer v. State of New York ( 15 Misc 2d 471 , affd. 9 A D 2d 829) and Battalla v. State of New York (26 A D 2d 203).

1967Claimants’ counsel contended that the State assumed the status of a common carrier in its operation of said chair lift; and, consequently, owed the infant claimant the duty “ to use the utmost foresight as to possible dangers and the utmost prudence in guarding against them.” (Vogel v. State of New York, 204 Misc. 614, 620 .) The common carrier doctrine was followed in Grauer v. State of New York ( 15 Misc 2d 471 , affd. 9 A D 2d 829) and Battalla v. State of New York (26 A D 2d 203).

1954In this State, whatever the situation may have been theretofore, the door was closed to a judicial extension of the common carrier rule (at least by the lower courts), by the decision of the Court of Appeals in 1943 in Castorina v. Rosen ( 290 N. Y. 445 , supra).

1932(Magnin v. Dinsmore, 62 N. Y. 35 ; The Sarnia, 278 Fed. 459 ; certiorari denied, 258 U. S. 625 ; St.

1931Recently, in Guerin Mills v. Barrett ( 254 N. Y. 380 ), Chief Judge Cardozo (citing Davis v. Farmers Co-operative Co., supra, and Michigan Central R.

1928Although the report of our decision in Matter of Daly v. U. S. Trucking Corp. ( 248 N. Y. 515 ), upon which respondent relies, states no reason for affirmance, the fact is that we placed that decision upon the ground that no inference could fairly be drawn from the evidence except the conclusion that the injury resulted solely from intoxication.

1916(Wamsley v. Atlas S. S. Co., 168 N. Y. 533 .) This distinction between a limitation of liability for conversion and for negligence is clearly shown in the cases.

1916R. v. Hooker, 233 U. S. 97 ); but the law remains that the carrier may not claim a limitation of liability to a certain amount for its affirmative wrongdoing (Magnin v. Dinsmore, 62 N. Y. 35 ), when the plaintiff makes proof thereof.

1887The present respondent cites the case of The Kimball ( 3 Wall. 37 ), but on looking beyond the head note, into the opinion of Mr. J ustice Field, it is certainly not an authority in favor of the respondent..

1887In Chandler v. Belden ( 18 Johns. 157, 162 ), it was held that where, by the terms of the contract, freight was not to be paid until after the delivery of the goods, the carrier could not claim alien.

1854(S. C., 10 N. Y. 108 .)