Trummer v. Niewisch, 17 A.D.3d 349 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005). · Go Syfert
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Trummer v. Niewisch, 17 A.D.3d 349 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“the broad, sweeping language of the release was not sufficiently clear and specific to relieve them of liability arising from their own negligence.”
14 citation events (14 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Hoffmann v. Major Model Management, Inc. (nysd, 2022-03-31)
Top citers, strongest first. 10 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Hoffmann v. Major Model Management, Inc.
S.D.N.Y. · 2022 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
the broad, sweeping language of the release was not sufficiently clear and specific to relieve them of liability arising from their own negligence.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) SIMONE PRYCE and DAVID PRYCE v. TOWN SPORTS INTERNATIONAL LLC, d/b/a New York Sports Club
S.D.N.Y. · 2021 · confidence medium
Nov. 5, 2009), where the court held that a release signed by the plaintiff was enforceable to the extent of insulating Town Sports from liability for “injuries resulting from accidents or injuries of any kind which may be sustained by reason of or in connection with a member’s use of the facilities.” Id. at *3 (citing Trummer v. Niewisch, 792 N.Y.S.2d 596, 597 (2d Dep’t 2005)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bailey v. Peerstate Equity Fund, L.P.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2015 · confidence medium
Contrary to the defendants’ contention, the exculpatory clause in the subject amended and restated limited partnership agreement did not clearly and unequivocally insulate the defendants from liability for their own negligent acts and, thus, the agreement does not bar or conclusively dispose of a cause of action alleging that the defendants’ negligent conduct caused *741 or contributed to the plaintiffs’ damages (see Gross v Sweet, 49 NY2d 102, 107-108 [1979]; Glenn v Annunziata, 72 AD3d 886, 887-888 [2010]; Trummer v Niewisch, 17 AD3d 349, 349-350 [2005]; Conteh v Majestic Farms, 292 AD…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Layden v. Plante
N.Y. App. Div. · 2012 · confidence medium
School Dist., 59 AD3d at 843 ; Trummer v Niewisch, 17 AD3d 349, 349-350 [2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 712 [2005]; Alexander v Kendall Cent.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Layden v. Plante
N.Y. App. Div. · 2012 · confidence medium
School Dist., 59 AD3d at 843 ; Trummer v Niewisch, 17 AD3d 349, 349-350 [2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 712 [2005]; Alexander v Kendall Cent.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Laskowski v. 525 Park Avenue Condominium
N.Y. App. Div. · 2012 · confidence medium
The affidavit of the plaintiffs’ expert, submitted in opposition to the motion, regarding ladder safety failed to raise a triable issue of fact, as that affidavit was entirely conclusory and unsubstantiated (see Verma v City of New York, 62 AD3d 863 [2009]; Crawford v Jefferson House Assoc., LLC, 57 AD3d 822, 823 [2008]; Trummer v Niewisch, 17 AD3d 349, 350 [2005]; Ambrosio v South Huntington Union Free School Dist., 249 AD2d 346, 346-347 [1998]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Glenn v. Annunziata
N.Y. App. Div. · 2010 · confidence medium
Contrary to the determination of the Supreme Court, the release from liability executed by the plaintiff did not clearly and unequivocally insulate Courtyard and Carollo (hereinafter together the stable defendants) from liability for their own negligent acts and, thus, is not enforceable against the negligent acts of the stable defendants (see Gross v Sweet, 49 NY2d 102, 108-109 [1979]; Trummer v Niewisch, 17 AD3d 349, 349-350 [2005]; Conteh v Majestic Farms, 292 AD2d 485, 486 [2002]).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Rigney v. Ichabod Crane Central School District
N.Y. App. Div. · 2009 · confidence medium
Trummer v Niewisch, 17 AD3d 349, 349-350 [2005], Iv denied 5 NY3d 712 [2005]; Alexander v Kendall Cent.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Salerno v. Street Retail, Inc.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2007 · confidence medium
“The affidavit submitted by the plaintiff[’s] expert was conclusory and unsubstantiated, and therefore insufficient to defeat summary judgment” (Trummer v Niewisch, 17 AD3d 349, 350 [2005]).
discussed Cited "see" Delaney v. City of Mount Vernon
N.Y. App. Div. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
Furthermore, agreements to release parties from “any and all responsibility or liability of any nature whatsoever” will not bar claims based on ordinary negligence (Gross v Sweet, supra at 108 [internal quotation omitted]; see Trummer v Niewisch, 17 AD3d 349, 349-350 [2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 712 [2005]).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Michelle Trummer
v.
Reiner N. Niewisch, Doing Business as R.N. Equestrian Services
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Apr 4, 2005.
17 A.D.3d 349
Cited by 13 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 78%
Citer courts: S.D. New York (1)

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Nastasi, J.), dated December 8, 2003, which granted the motion of the defendants Reiner N. Niewisch, doing business as R.N. Equestrian Services and the separate motion of the defendants River Run Farm, LLC, C.M. Enterprise, LLC, and Christine Meister for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with one bill of costs payable to the defendants appearing separately and filing separate briefs.

On June 2, 2002, the plaintiff Michelle Trummer allegedly was injured when she fell from a horse during her riding lesson at the premises operated by the defendant River Run Farm, LLC. At the time of the accident, she was under the supervision of her instructor, the defendant Reiner N. Niewisch, doing business as R.N. Equestrian Services. Nearly two years earlier, in August 2000, the injured plaintiff had executed a “Release, Waiver, and Hold Harmless Agreement” (hereinafter the release) in which she agreed, inter alia, to “release, waive, discharge, and relinquish any and all claims, actions(s) [sic] or cause of action(s) [sic] of whatever kind” against the defendants. The defendants successfully moved for summary judgment based on the language of the release and on the further ground that the injured plaintiff had assumed the risk that resulted in her injury.

Contrary to the defendants’ contention, the broad, sweeping language of the release was not sufficiently clear and specific to relieve them of liability arising from their own negligence. “[A]greements to release from ‘any and all responsibility or li[*350] ability of any nature whatsoever for any loss of property or personal injury’ ” will not bar claims based on negligence (Gross v Sweet, 49 NY2d 102, 108-109 [1979]; see Alexander v Kendall Cent. School Dist., 221 AD2d 898 [1995]; Long v State of New York, 158 AD2d 778, 779-780 [1990]; Sivaslian v Rawlins, 88 AD2d 703, 704 [1982]). Nevertheless, the release is enforceable to the extent of insulating the defendants from liability for injuries resulting from a fall from a horse caused by reasons other than their negligence (see Conteh v Majestic Farms, 292 AD2d 485, 486 [2002]).

Here, the defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by showing that the injured plaintiffs fall was not due to any negligence on their part (see Conteh v Majestic Farms, supra), but rather, was caused by the horse becoming frightened, an inherent, usual, and ordinary risk associated with horseback riding and which the injured plaintiff had assumed (see Kinara v Jamaica Bay Riding Academy, Inc., 11 AD3d 588 [2004]; Becker v Pleasant Val. Farms, 261 AD2d 427 [1999]). In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to the defendants’ negligence (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320 [1986]). The affidavit submitted by the plaintiffs’ expert was conclusory and unsubstantiated, and therefore insufficient to defeat summary judgment (see Ford v Citibank, N.A., 11 AD3d 508, 509 [2004]; Nangano v Mount Sinai Hosp., 305 AD2d 473, 474 [2003]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly dismissed the complaint. Schmidt, J.P., Goldstein, Crane and Fisher, JJ., concur.