98 New York opinions name it 12 courts 1885–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Evansgreen2 sentences2015Initially, we reject plaintiffs contention that Supreme Court was required to rule that defendants were liable for breaching the agreement by the doctrine of the law of the case, which bars courts from reconsidering “pre-judgment rulings made by courts of coordinate jurisdiction” in the same case (People v Evans, 94 NY2d 499, 503 [2000]; accord Gadani v DeBrino Caulking Assoc., Inc., 86 AD3d 689, 691 [2011]). 2015Initially, we reject plaintiffs contention that Supreme Court was required to rule that defendants were liable for breaching the agreement by the doctrine of the law of the case, which bars courts from reconsidering “pre-judgment rulings made by courts of coordinate jurisdiction” in the same case (People v Evans, 94 NY2d 499, 503 [2000]; accord Gadani v DeBrino Caulking Assoc., Inc., 86 AD3d 689, 691 [2011]). | 2 | 2 |
Gadani v. Debrino Caulking Associates, Inc.green2 sentences2015Initially, we reject plaintiffs contention that Supreme Court was required to rule that defendants were liable for breaching the agreement by the doctrine of the law of the case, which bars courts from reconsidering “pre-judgment rulings made by courts of coordinate jurisdiction” in the same case (People v Evans, 94 NY2d 499, 503 [2000]; accord Gadani v DeBrino Caulking Assoc., Inc., 86 AD3d 689, 691 [2011]). 2015Initially, we reject plaintiffs contention that Supreme Court was required to rule that defendants were liable for breaching the agreement by the doctrine of the law of the case, which bars courts from reconsidering “pre-judgment rulings made by courts of coordinate jurisdiction” in the same case (People v Evans, 94 NY2d 499, 503 [2000]; accord Gadani v DeBrino Caulking Assoc., Inc., 86 AD3d 689, 691 [2011]). | 2 | 2 |
Brown v. Stategreen2 sentences2015The doctrine applies only when the prior ruling directly passed upon a question of law that is essential to the determination of the matter (see Scofield v Trustees of Union Coll., 288 AD2d 807, 808 [2001]; Brown v State of New York, 250 AD2d 314, 320 [1998]). 2015The doctrine applies only when the prior ruling directly passed upon a question of law that is essential to the determination of the matter (see Scofield v Trustees of Union Coll., 288 AD2d 807, 808 [2001]; Brown v State of New York, 250 AD2d 314, 320 [1998]). | 2 | 2 |
Scofield v. Trustees of Union Collegegreen2 sentences2015The doctrine applies only when the prior ruling directly passed upon a question of law that is essential to the determination of the matter (see Scofield v Trustees of Union Coll., 288 AD2d 807, 808 [2001]; Brown v State of New York, 250 AD2d 314, 320 [1998]). 2015The doctrine applies only when the prior ruling directly passed upon a question of law that is essential to the determination of the matter (see Scofield v Trustees of Union Coll., 288 AD2d 807, 808 [2001]; Brown v State of New York, 250 AD2d 314, 320 [1998]). | 2 | 2 |
Dzek v. Desco Vitroglaze of Schenectady, Inc.green2 sentences2013Given Bitner’s admission to the existence of the settlement and reliance on the letter for its terms, the court’s application of the Statute of Frauds and resultant determination that Norelli’s letter did not modify the original agreement was in error (see Dzek v Desco Vitroglaze of Schenectady, 285 AD2d 926, 927 [2001]). 2013Given Bitner’s admission to the existence of the settlement and reliance on the letter for its terms, the court’s application of the Statute of Frauds and resultant determination that Norelli’s letter did not modify the original agreement was in error (see Dzek v Desco Vitroglaze of Schenectady, 285 AD2d 926, 927 [2001]). | 2 | 2 |
Arici v. Pomagreen1 sentence2026There is nothing in the 2019 Agreement which states that the obligations in the 2017 Agreement were extinguished which is a key element to a finding of novation (see Arici v Poma, 202 AD3d 584, 585 [1st Dept 2022] ["the elements of a novation are a previously valid obligation, agreement of the parties to the new obligation, extinguishment of the old obligation, and a valid new contract"]). | 1 | 1 |
Facebook, Inc. v. DLA Piper LLP (US)green2 sentences2026Even if the complaint were not barred by the documentary evidence, it should still have been dismissed, as it fails to sufficiently plead all the elements of a cause of action for fraudulent inducement ( see CPLR 3211[a][7]; Eurycleia Partners, LP v Seward & Kissel, LLP , 12 NY3d 553, 559 [2009]; Facebook, Inc. v DLA Piper LLP [US] , 134 AD3d 610, 615 [1st Dept 2015], lv denied 28 NY3d 903 [2016]). 2026Further, plaintiff agreed to purchase the property "as is" and "where is." These terms in the parties' agreement bar plaintiff's claim arising out of reliance on the purported misrepresentations (<i>see</i> <i>Suber v Churchill Owners Corp.</i>, 228 AD3d 414 , 415 [1st Dept 2024]; <i>Dille v Zoelle LLC</i>, 220 AD3d 409 , 410 [1st Dept 2023]).</p> <p>Even if the complaint were not barred by the documentary evidence, it should still have been dismissed, as it fails to sufficiently plead all the elements of a cause of action for fraudulent inducement (<i>see </i>CPLR 3211[a][7]; <i>Eurycleia Par | 1 | 1 |
Eurycleia Partners, LP v. Seward & Kissel, LLPgreen2 sentences2026Even if the complaint were not barred by the documentary evidence, it should still have been dismissed, as it fails to sufficiently plead all the elements of a cause of action for fraudulent inducement ( see CPLR 3211[a][7]; Eurycleia Partners, LP v Seward & Kissel, LLP , 12 NY3d 553, 559 [2009]; Facebook, Inc. v DLA Piper LLP [US] , 134 AD3d 610, 615 [1st Dept 2015], lv denied 28 NY3d 903 [2016]). 2026Further, plaintiff agreed to purchase the property "as is" and "where is." These terms in the parties' agreement bar plaintiff's claim arising out of reliance on the purported misrepresentations (<i>see</i> <i>Suber v Churchill Owners Corp.</i>, 228 AD3d 414 , 415 [1st Dept 2024]; <i>Dille v Zoelle LLC</i>, 220 AD3d 409 , 410 [1st Dept 2023]).</p> <p>Even if the complaint were not barred by the documentary evidence, it should still have been dismissed, as it fails to sufficiently plead all the elements of a cause of action for fraudulent inducement (<i>see </i>CPLR 3211[a][7]; <i>Eurycleia Par | 1 | 1 |
Wilk v. Columbia Universitygreen2 sentences2025The court properly dismissed the claims for common-law indemnification, and contribution, [*2]which also require a finding of negligence ( see Wilk v Columbia Univ. , 150 AD3d 502, 503-504 [1st Dept 2017]). 2025The court properly dismissed the claims for common-law indemnification, and contribution, [*2]which also require a finding of negligence ( see Wilk v Columbia Univ. , 150 AD3d 502, 503-504 [1st Dept 2017]). | 1 | 1 |
Sager v. Friedmangreen1 sentence2018Sager v Friedman, 270 NY 472, 479-481 [1936]; see also Danaan Realty Corp. v Harris, 5 NY2d 317, 319, 323 [1959]). | 1 | 1 |
Danann Realty Corp. v. Harrisgreen1 sentence2018Sager v Friedman, 270 NY 472, 479-481 [1936]; see also Danaan Realty Corp. v Harris, 5 NY2d 317, 319, 323 [1959]). | 1 | 1 |
Glenn v. Annunziatagreen1 sentence2015Contrary to the defendants’ contention, the exculpatory clause in the subject amended and restated limited partnership agreement did not clearly and unequivocally insulate the defendants from liability for their own negligent acts and, thus, the agreement does not bar or conclusively dispose of a cause of action alleging that the defendants’ negligent conduct caused *741 or contributed to the plaintiffs’ damages (see Gross v Sweet, 49 NY2d 102, 107-108 [1979]; Glenn v Annunziata, 72 AD3d 886, 887-888 [2010]; Trummer v Niewisch, 17 AD3d 349, 349-350 [2005]; Conteh v Majestic Farms, 292 AD2d 485 | 1 | 1 |
Trummer v. Niewischgreen1 sentence2015Contrary to the defendants’ contention, the exculpatory clause in the subject amended and restated limited partnership agreement did not clearly and unequivocally insulate the defendants from liability for their own negligent acts and, thus, the agreement does not bar or conclusively dispose of a cause of action alleging that the defendants’ negligent conduct caused *741 or contributed to the plaintiffs’ damages (see Gross v Sweet, 49 NY2d 102, 107-108 [1979]; Glenn v Annunziata, 72 AD3d 886, 887-888 [2010]; Trummer v Niewisch, 17 AD3d 349, 349-350 [2005]; Conteh v Majestic Farms, 292 AD2d 485 | 1 | 1 |
Conteh v. Majestic Farmsgreen1 sentence2015Contrary to the defendants’ contention, the exculpatory clause in the subject amended and restated limited partnership agreement did not clearly and unequivocally insulate the defendants from liability for their own negligent acts and, thus, the agreement does not bar or conclusively dispose of a cause of action alleging that the defendants’ negligent conduct caused *741 or contributed to the plaintiffs’ damages (see Gross v Sweet, 49 NY2d 102, 107-108 [1979]; Glenn v Annunziata, 72 AD3d 886, 887-888 [2010]; Trummer v Niewisch, 17 AD3d 349, 349-350 [2005]; Conteh v Majestic Farms, 292 AD2d 485 | 1 | 1 |
Gross v. Sweetgreen1 sentence2015Contrary to the defendants’ contention, the exculpatory clause in the subject amended and restated limited partnership agreement did not clearly and unequivocally insulate the defendants from liability for their own negligent acts and, thus, the agreement does not bar or conclusively dispose of a cause of action alleging that the defendants’ negligent conduct caused *741 or contributed to the plaintiffs’ damages (see Gross v Sweet, 49 NY2d 102, 107-108 [1979]; Glenn v Annunziata, 72 AD3d 886, 887-888 [2010]; Trummer v Niewisch, 17 AD3d 349, 349-350 [2005]; Conteh v Majestic Farms, 292 AD2d 485 | 1 | 1 |
| Littman v. Mageegreen | 1 | 1 |
| In re the Accounting of United States Trust Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Matter of Bieleygreen | 1 | 1 |
Blackmon v. Estate of Battcockgreen1 sentence2011Notably, this principle of interpretation “is true despite the fact that a literal reading of the portion under construction might yield an inconsistent or contradictory meaning because of the use of awkward language inadvertently or carelessly chosen” (Matter of Fabbri, 2 NY2d at 240; see Matter of Bieley, 91 NY2d at 525 [“where the entire will manifests a general testamentary scheme, it is the duty of the courts to carry out the testator’s purpose, notwithstanding that general rules of interpretation might point to a different result” (internal quotation marks omitted)]; Blackmon v Estate of | 1 | 1 |
| Atkin v. Hill, Darlington & Grimmgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gillman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N. A.green | 1 | 1 |
| Town of Clarkstown v. M.R.O. Pump & Tank, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Kaf-Kaf, Inc. v. Rodless Decorations, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Eredics v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.green | 1 | 1 |
| Naginsky v. State Farm Life & Accident Assurance Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Silber v. Silbergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Storozynski v. Storozynskigreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gordon v. Ellimangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cunnison v. Richardson Greenshields Securities, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Westhill Exports, Ltd. v. Popegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Kel Kim Corp. v. Central Markets, Inc.
green
2 sentences2014Nor, as defendants contend, was it foreseeable at the time of contracting that plaintiff and Valenti would enter into an agreement to bar contact between each other (cf. Kel Kim, 70 NY2d at 902 ). 2014Nor, as defendants contend, was it foreseeable at the time of contracting that plaintiff and Valenti would enter into an agreement to bar contact between each other (cf. Kel Kim, 70 NY2d at 902 ). | 3 | 1996–2014 |
In Re the Accounting of Rhinelander
green
2 sentences1981To be violative of that statute, it must be shown that the agreement offered inducement to a spouse to end the marriage, usually with a promise of a larger sum of money than would be realized by the recalcitrant spouse if the action were litigated (Matter of Rhinelander, 290 NY 31, 37 ). 1945(Matter of Rhinelander, 290 N. Y. 31 ; 6 Williston on Contracts [Rev. ed.], § 1741.) But the agreement at bar is so directly and completely inconsistent with, and destructive of, plaintiff’s marriage, and defendant’s as well, as to be utterly void in our system of morals. | 3 | 1945–1981 |
Wilson v. Le Van
green
2 sentences1995(See, Wilson v La Van, 22 NY2d 131 [oral promise to convey farm property unenforceable despite improvements since such part performance is not unequivocally referable to an agreement to convey and is equally consistent with landlord-tenant relationship].)” (Cunnison v Richardson Greenshields Sec., 107 AD2d 50, 54 [1st Dept 1985].) Importantly, SLU, as in Gonyo v Drake Univ. ( 837 F Supp 989 [SD Iowa 1993]), continues to offer its financial assistance despite termination of the wrestling program. 1985(See, Wilson v La Van, 22 NY2d 131 [oral promise to convey farm property unenforceable despite improvements since such part performance is not unequivocally referable to an agreement to convey and is equally consistent with landlord-tenant relationship].) In New York, the part performance of an oral contract for employment, not to be performed within a year, does not remove the contract from the operation of the Statute of Frauds. | 2 | 1985–1995 |
Pallone v. New York Telephone Co.
neutral
2 sentences1994Co., 34 AD2d 1091 , affd 30 NY2d 865 ; Historic Estates v United Paper Bd. Co., supra, at 348; Sanzone v Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 36 Misc 2d 279, 283 , affd 19 AD2d 861 , lv denied 13 NY2d 601 ; see also, Loretto v Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 53 NY2d 124, 135, revd on other grounds 458 US 419 ). 1981Co., 34 AD2d 1091 , affd 30 NY2d 865 ; Historic Estates v United Paper Bd. Co., 260 App Div 344 , affd 285 NY 658 ; see Butterworth v Crawford, 46 NY 349 ; 17 NY Jur, Easements & Licenses, § 187, p 482; Ann., 74 ALR 1250 ). | 2 | 1981–1994 |
Pallone v. New York Telephone Co.
neutral
2 sentences1994Co., 34 AD2d 1091 , affd 30 NY2d 865 ; Historic Estates v United Paper Bd. Co., supra, at 348; Sanzone v Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 36 Misc 2d 279, 283 , affd 19 AD2d 861 , lv denied 13 NY2d 601 ; see also, Loretto v Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 53 NY2d 124, 135, revd on other grounds 458 US 419 ). 1981Co., 34 AD2d 1091 , affd 30 NY2d 865 ; Historic Estates v United Paper Bd. Co., 260 App Div 344 , affd 285 NY 658 ; see Butterworth v Crawford, 46 NY 349 ; 17 NY Jur, Easements & Licenses, § 187, p 482; Ann., 74 ALR 1250 ). | 2 | 1981–1994 |
1130 President St. Corp. v. Bolton Realty Corp.
green
2 sentences1980Corp. v. Bolton Realty Corp., 300 N. Y. 63, 68 ).” (Supra, p 333.) The court found that even though there were memoranda of agreement prepared after oral negotiations, there was no indication as to the date on which the arrangement was to be commenced nor as to the method of payment, nor as to the rights of the parties in the event of various contingencies coming to pass. 1960Corp. v. Bolton Realty Corp., 300 N. Y. 63, 68 ). | 2 | 1960–1980 |
Schmelzel v. Schmelzel
green
2 sentences1960(Hettich v. Hettich, 304 N. Y. 8, 14 ; Holahan v. Holahan, 298 N. Y. 798 ; Schmelzel v. Schmelzel, 287 N. Y. 21, 25-26 ; Goldman v. Goldman, 282 N. Y. 296 ; Galusha v. Galusha, 116 N. Y. 635, 645 .) The agreement at bar requires the provision for the support of the infant to be part of any divorce decree; consequently, the adoption by the Texas court of the said provision for support did not serve to merge the agreement with the decree. 1947(Johnson v. Johnson, 206 N. Y. 561 ; Stoddard v. Stoddard, 227 N. Y. 13 ; Goldman v. Goldman, 282 N. Y. 296 ; Schmehel v. Sehmelzel, 287 N. Y. 21 ; Oarlson v. Carlson, 269 App. Div. 21 .) It appears from the evidence that the defendant has faithfully performed his obligations under the separation agreement and that it is a valid and subsisting agreement. - The agreement is therefore a bar to this separation action and to plaintiff’s application for counsel fees. | 2 | 1947–1960 |
Galusha v. . Galusha
green
2 sentences1960(Hettich v. Hettich, 304 N. Y. 8, 14 ; Holahan v. Holahan, 298 N. Y. 798 ; Schmelzel v. Schmelzel, 287 N. Y. 21, 25-26 ; Goldman v. Goldman, 282 N. Y. 296 ; Galusha v. Galusha, 116 N. Y. 635, 645 .) The agreement at bar requires the provision for the support of the infant to be part of any divorce decree; consequently, the adoption by the Texas court of the said provision for support did not serve to merge the agreement with the decree. 1921So holding in the case of Galusha v. Galusha, supra, the court said: ‘ ‘ The argument that upon the granting of the decree of divorce there was a failure of consideration to support the agreement is without force.” Clearly that would be so. | 2 | 1921–1960 |
Goldman v. Goldman
green
2 sentences1960(Hettich v. Hettich, 304 N. Y. 8, 14 ; Holahan v. Holahan, 298 N. Y. 798 ; Schmelzel v. Schmelzel, 287 N. Y. 21, 25-26 ; Goldman v. Goldman, 282 N. Y. 296 ; Galusha v. Galusha, 116 N. Y. 635, 645 .) The agreement at bar requires the provision for the support of the infant to be part of any divorce decree; consequently, the adoption by the Texas court of the said provision for support did not serve to merge the agreement with the decree. 1947(Johnson v. Johnson, 206 N. Y. 561 ; Stoddard v. Stoddard, 227 N. Y. 13 ; Goldman v. Goldman, 282 N. Y. 296 ; Schmehel v. Sehmelzel, 287 N. Y. 21 ; Oarlson v. Carlson, 269 App. Div. 21 .) It appears from the evidence that the defendant has faithfully performed his obligations under the separation agreement and that it is a valid and subsisting agreement. - The agreement is therefore a bar to this separation action and to plaintiff’s application for counsel fees. | 2 | 1947–1960 |
Gould v. Gould
neutral
2 sentences1951Agreements which fall within the ban of the doctrine are those which “ promote ”, “ stimulate ” or “ facilitate ” the procurement of a divorce (Schley v. Andrews, 225 N. Y. 110 ; Gould v. Gould, 261 App. Div. 733 ; Matter of Rhinelander, 290 N. Y. 31, 37 ). 1945(Gould v. Gould, 261 App. Div. 733 ; Sweinhart v. Bamberger, 166 Misc. 256 , affd. 254 App. Div. 665 .) A like result is reached on other, if narrower, grounds. | 2 | 1945–1951 |
Reed v. . Randall
green
2 sentences1897(Reed v. Randall, 29 N. Y. 358 .) It is suggested by the appellant that the doctrine stated in Reed v. Randall (supra) does not apply to contracts for the erection of structures upon, and additions to real property, of such a character that- a mechanic’s lien will attach for the price of the material furnished. 1897Reed v. Randall, 29 N. Y. 358 . | 2 | 1897–1897 |
Board of Mgrs. v. Chavez
green
2 sentences2026Even if the complaint were not barred by the documentary evidence, it should still have been dismissed, as it fails to sufficiently plead all the elements of a cause of action for fraudulent inducement ( see CPLR 3211[a][7]; Eurycleia Partners, LP v Seward & Kissel, LLP , 12 NY3d 553, 559 [2009]; Facebook, Inc. v DLA Piper LLP [US] , 134 AD3d 610, 615 [1st Dept 2015], lv denied 28 NY3d 903 [2016]). 2026Further, plaintiff agreed to purchase the property "as is" and "where is." These terms in the parties' agreement bar plaintiff's claim arising out of reliance on the purported misrepresentations (<i>see</i> <i>Suber v Churchill Owners Corp.</i>, 228 AD3d 414 , 415 [1st Dept 2024]; <i>Dille v Zoelle LLC</i>, 220 AD3d 409 , 410 [1st Dept 2023]).</p> <p>Even if the complaint were not barred by the documentary evidence, it should still have been dismissed, as it fails to sufficiently plead all the elements of a cause of action for fraudulent inducement (<i>see </i>CPLR 3211[a][7]; <i>Eurycleia Par | 1 | 2026–2026 |
The People of the State of New York v., Sprint Nextel Corp.
neutral
1 sentence2021This includes the part of the claim seeking damages caused within the five-year contractual limitations period but not realized until after the period has expired, as the nature of reverse mortgages is such that a servicer, such as plaintiff, often does not see a loss until the loan is terminated, which is generally upon the sale of the property or the death of the mortgagee ( see Remet Corp. v Estate of Pyne, 26 NY3d 58 [2015]). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Counties of Warren & Washington Industrial Development Agency v. Boychuck
green
1 sentence2016Agency v Boychuck, 109 AD2d 1024 [3d Dept 1985].) Although the language used in the agency tax agreement herein is very similar to that found invalid in Barker, the court concludes that the IDA’s determination to enter into the agreement was not a violation of lawful procedure, affected by error of law, arbitrary and capricious, or an abuse of discretion. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Matter of Feinberg green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Carmine v. Murphy green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Scotto v. Mei green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| American Motorist Insurance Company v. Morris Goldman Real Estate Corp. green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Burkhart v. Quilici green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Curley v. Giltrop green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| TNS Holdings, Inc. v. MKI Securities Corp. green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Matisoff v. Dobi green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Matisoff v. Dobi green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| City of New York v. Local 333, Marine Division, International Longshoremen's Ass'n green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| City of New York v. Local 333, Marine Division, International Longshoremen's Ass'n neutral | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Gonyo v. Drake University green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Sanzone v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. neutral | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Carr v. Town of Fleming green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Darling v. Darling neutral | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| In re the Estate of Lynch green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Bock v. Bock green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Garguilio v. Garguilio green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| In re Tuthill green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Darling v. Darling neutral | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Szerdahelyi v. Harris green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Garfield v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of United States neutral | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Lawrence v. Smith neutral | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| In re the Estate of Maslanka green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| In re the Estate of Bowen neutral | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Marco v. Sachs green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.