134 New York opinions name it 11 courts 1929–2025 11 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Sommer v. Federal Signal Corp.green2 sentences2020We have previously considered the application of the gross negligence public policy rule only in cases where the contract provision at issue was an exculpatory clause, purporting to wholly immunize a party from liability, or a nominal damages clause limiting damages to, at most, $250 (see Abacus, 18 NY3d at 681 ; Colnaghi, 81 NY2d at 823; Sommer, 79 NY2d at 549 ; David Gutter Furs v Jewelers Protection Servs., 79 NY2d 1027, 1029 [1992]).5 We have not yet determined whether grossly negligent conduct may render 4 Plaintiff does not contend here that any statute or different public policy rule co 2015In this regard, the defendants submitted *444 the subject lease, which contained an exculpatory clause precluding the imposition of personal liability upon Rothschild for the nonperformance of the landlord’s obligations under the lease (see Colnaghi, U.S.A. v Jewelers Protection Servs., 81 NY2d 821, 823 [1993]; Sommer v Federal Signal Corp., 79 NY2d 540, 554 [1992]). | 9 | 11 |
Colnaghi, U.S.A., Ltd. v. Jewelers Protection Services, Ltd.green2 sentences2015In this regard, the defendants submitted *444 the subject lease, which contained an exculpatory clause precluding the imposition of personal liability upon Rothschild for the nonperformance of the landlord’s obligations under the lease (see Colnaghi, U.S.A. v Jewelers Protection Servs., 81 NY2d 821, 823 [1993]; Sommer v Federal Signal Corp., 79 NY2d 540, 554 [1992]). 2015The complaint did not contain any factual allegations of gross negligence or willful misconduct that could render the exculpatory clause in the lease unenforceable (see Colnaghi, U.S.A. v Jewelers Protection Servs., 81 NY2d at 823-824 ; Sommer v Federal Signal Corp., 79 NY2d at 554 ; Lawrence v Kennedy, 95 AD3d 955, 959 [2012]; Baquerizo v Monasterio, 90 AD3d 587, 587-588 [2011]). | 6 | 9 |
Gross v. Sweetgreen2 sentences2025Although plaintiff signed a release before she used the golf cart in which her injuries occurred, such a release must pass an "exacting standard," i.e., "unless the intention of the parties is expressed in unmistakable language, an exculpatory clause will not be deemed to insulate a party from liability for [its] own negligent acts" ( Gross v Sweet , 49 NY2d 102, 107 [1979]; see Barone v St. 2015Contrary to the defendants’ contention, the exculpatory clause in the subject amended and restated limited partnership agreement did not clearly and unequivocally insulate the defendants from liability for their own negligent acts and, thus, the agreement does not bar or conclusively dispose of a cause of action alleging that the defendants’ negligent conduct caused *741 or contributed to the plaintiffs’ damages (see Gross v Sweet, 49 NY2d 102, 107-108 [1979]; Glenn v Annunziata, 72 AD3d 886, 887-888 [2010]; Trummer v Niewisch, 17 AD3d 349, 349-350 [2005]; Conteh v Majestic Farms, 292 AD2d 485 | 5 | 16 |
Kalisch-Jarcho, Inc. v. City of New Yorkgreen2 sentences2025Even if § 33.09 were read as an exculpatory clause, it would be against public policy only if it applied to "willful or grossly negligent acts," where the wrongdoing is fraudulent, malicious, or done in bad faith ( see Kalisch-Jarcho, Inc. v City of New York , 58 NY2d 377, 384-385 [1983]; see also Matter of Part 60 Put-Back Litig. , 36 NY3d at 355). 2025This language incorporates the common-law rule that "an exculpatory clause is unenforceable when, in contravention of acceptable notions of morality, the misconduct for which it would grant immunity smacks of intentional wrongdoing" ( Kalisch , 58 NY2d at 385 ). | 2 | 18 |
Corinno Civetta Construction Corp. v. City of New Yorkgreen2 sentences2025A no-damages-for-delay clause, however, is not a condition precedent, but rather an exculpatory clause ( see Corinno Civetta , 67 NY2d at 309). 2025A no-damages-for-delay clause, however, is not a condition precedent, but rather an exculpatory clause ( see Corinno Civetta , 67 NY2d at 309 ). | 2 | 7 |
Baquerizo v. Monasteriogreen2 sentences2022Insofar as the exculpatory clause is applicable to the Lau defendants' actions taken in good faith as an escrow agent ( cf. Baquerizo v Monasterio , 90 AD3d at 587 ), the complaint sufficiently alleges that the challenged disbursement was not made in good faith or was the result of the Lau defendants' gross negligence, and the documentary evidence did not conclusively defeat those allegations ( see Elbayoumi v TD Bank, N.A. , 185 AD3d 786, 789 ; Lenoci v Secure Alarm Installations, LLC , 97 AD3d 800, 801 ). 2022Insofar as the exculpatory clause is applicable to the Lau defendants' actions taken in good faith as an escrow agent ( cf. Baquerizo v Monasterio , 90 AD3d at 587 ), the complaint sufficiently alleges that the challenged disbursement was not made in good faith or was the result of the Lau defendants' gross negligence, and the documentary evidence did not conclusively defeat those allegations ( see Elbayoumi v TD Bank, N.A. , 185 AD3d 786, 789 ; Lenoci v Secure Alarm Installations, LLC , 97 AD3d 800, 801 ). | 2 | 4 |
Ciofalo v. Vic Tanney Gyms, Inc.green2 sentences1990(Gross v Sweet, supra; Ciofalo v Vic Tanney Gyms, 10 NY2d 294 ; Boll v Sharp & Dohme, 281 App Div 568 , affd 307 NY 646 .) Judicial scrutiny of such provisions has frequently, as a threshold issue, focused upon the scope and sufficiency of the language of the particular exculpatory clause involved, including some between health care providers and their patients, and upon finding the subject clause unenforceable by reason of its failure to express an intent to exculpate with sufficient specificity or clarity, exploration of other considerations bearing on the validity of the clause has been unn 1985Thus, parties will not be presumed to have intended to exempt themselves from the consequences of their own negligence in the absence of express and unmistakable language to that effect (see, Van Dyke Prods. v Eastman Kodak Co., supra, at p 304 [language which is “absolutely clear”]; Ciofalo v Vic Tanney Gyms, 10 NY2d 294, 297 [language which is “sufficiently clear and unequivocal”]; Boll v Sharp & Dohme, supra, at p 570 [language which is “clear and explicit”]), or to put it another way, it must clearly appear that the “limitation of liability extends to [the] negligence or other fault of the | 2 | 4 |
Willard Van Dyke Productions, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.green2 sentences1987Corp., 107 AD2d 450, 451 , affd 65 NY2d 1038 ; see also, Van Dyke Prods. v Eastman Kodak Co., 12 NY2d 301, 304 .) Accordingly, unless the intention of the parties to -insulate one of them from liability for his own negligence is expressed in unequivocal terms, the exculpatory clause will not operate to effect such a result. 1985Thus, parties will not be presumed to have intended to exempt themselves from the consequences of their own negligence in the absence of express and unmistakable language to that effect (see, Van Dyke Prods. v Eastman Kodak Co., supra, at p 304 [language which is “absolutely clear”]; Ciofalo v Vic Tanney Gyms, 10 NY2d 294, 297 [language which is “sufficiently clear and unequivocal”]; Boll v Sharp & Dohme, supra, at p 570 [language which is “clear and explicit”]), or to put it another way, it must clearly appear that the “limitation of liability extends to [the] negligence or other fault of the | 2 | 3 |
Segale v. Nu Wave Marine, Inc.green2 sentences2024Segale v. Nu Wave Mar., Inc. , 244 AD2d 326, 328 (2d Dept 1997). 2024Segale v. Nu Wave Mar., Inc. , 244 AD2d 326, 328 (2d Dept 1997). | 2 | 2 |
HDI-Gerling America Insurance Co. v. Zurich American Insurance Co.green2 sentences2023Additionally, plaintiffs' implied covenant claim as to Field Point is not barred by the Credit Agreement's exculpatory clause because the agreement does not expressly address the alleged conduct at issue ( see Capone v Castelton Commodities Intl., LLC , 148 AD3d 506, 507 [1st Dept 2017]). 2023Additionally, plaintiffs' implied covenant claim as to Field Point is not barred by the Credit Agreement's exculpatory clause because the agreement does not expressly address the alleged conduct at issue ( see Capone v Castelton Commodities Intl., LLC , 148 AD3d 506, 507 [1st Dept 2017]). | 2 | 2 |
| Mahoney-Buntzman v. Buntzmangreen | 2 | 2 |
| In re the Estate of Labuagreen | 2 | 2 |
People v. Vallesgreen2 sentences2015For that reason, justification, as an exculpatory defense that if accepted eliminates any grounds for prosecution, should be presented to the grand jury when warranted by the evidence (People v Valles, 62 NY2d 36 [1984]). 2000(People v Valles, 62 NY2d 36, 38-39 [1984]; Penal Law § 35.05.) 3 When raised, an exculpatory defense, such ás justification, must be charged to the Grand Jury. | 1 | 9 |
Dubovsky & Sons, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc.green2 sentences1988It is undisputed that the exculpatory clause herein was negotiated by the parties in a commercial setting, and we find the language of the clause to be "clear, unequivocal and [expressed in] unmistakable language” (Dubovsky & Sons v Honeywell, Inc., 89 AD2d 993, 994-995 [1982]). 1985Alarm Co., 51 NY2d 793 , affg 73 AD2d 869 ; Dubovsky & Sons v Honeywell, Inc., 89 AD2d 993 , and cases cited therein), defendant’s allegation that the exculpatory clause in question is unconscionable is without merit. | 1 | 4 |
People v. Lancastergreen2 sentences2002Thus, while a grand jury instructed on an exculpatory defense might avoid an unwarranted prosecution, the same result would not follow if the grand jury were instructed on a mitigating defense (id.; see also People v Lancaster, 69 NY2d 20, 29 ). 1992Accordingly, an exculpatory defense, which would wholly vitiate criminal liability, must be charged where the evidence would reasonably support it (People v Lancaster, 69 NY2d 20, 26 ). | 1 | 3 |
Boll v. Sharp & Dohme, Inc.green2 sentences1990(Gross v Sweet, supra; Ciofalo v Vic Tanney Gyms, 10 NY2d 294 ; Boll v Sharp & Dohme, 281 App Div 568 , affd 307 NY 646 .) Judicial scrutiny of such provisions has frequently, as a threshold issue, focused upon the scope and sufficiency of the language of the particular exculpatory clause involved, including some between health care providers and their patients, and upon finding the subject clause unenforceable by reason of its failure to express an intent to exculpate with sufficient specificity or clarity, exploration of other considerations bearing on the validity of the clause has been unn 1985Thus, parties will not be presumed to have intended to exempt themselves from the consequences of their own negligence in the absence of express and unmistakable language to that effect (see, Van Dyke Prods. v Eastman Kodak Co., supra, at p 304 [language which is “absolutely clear”]; Ciofalo v Vic Tanney Gyms, 10 NY2d 294, 297 [language which is “sufficiently clear and unequivocal”]; Boll v Sharp & Dohme, supra, at p 570 [language which is “clear and explicit”]), or to put it another way, it must clearly appear that the “limitation of liability extends to [the] negligence or other fault of the | 1 | 3 |
Furs v. Jewelers Protection Services, Ltd.green2 sentences2020We have previously considered the application of the gross negligence public policy rule only in cases where the contract provision at issue was an exculpatory clause, purporting to wholly immunize a party from liability, or a nominal damages clause limiting damages to, at most, $250 (see Abacus, 18 NY3d at 681 ; Colnaghi, 81 NY2d at 823; Sommer, 79 NY2d at 549 ; David Gutter Furs v Jewelers Protection Servs., 79 NY2d 1027, 1029 [1992]).5 We have not yet determined whether grossly negligent conduct may render 4 Plaintiff does not contend here that any statute or different public policy rule co 2001While Miller Freeman’s failings in securing plaintiffs’ valuables at the trade show may be indicative of negligence, they do not evince the recklessness necessary to abrogate the exculpatory clause in the parties’ agreement (see Colnaghi, U.S.A. v Jewelers Protection Servs., 81 NY2d 821, 823-824 ; David Gutter Furs v Jewelers Protection Servs., 79 NY2d 1027 ; Hartford Ins. | 1 | 2 |
Union City Union Suit Co. v. Millergreen2 sentences2019Duane Reade v Reva Holding Corp ., 30 AD3d 229, 235 [1st Dept 2006] [plaintiff's claim for business interruption losses permitted where lease clause that provided that owner shall not unreasonably interfere with tenant's business took precedence over exculpatory clause that provided that "[e]xcept as specifically provided in Article 9 or elsewhere in the lease" there shall be no liability to tenant for injury to business, and there was a provision elsewhere in the lease]; Union City Union Suit Co. v Miller , 162 AD2d 101, 102, 104 [1st Dept 1990] [plaintiff's claim for damages arising out of f 2006This provision, which, by the terms of article 4 itself, takes precedence over article 4 to the extent of any conflict, and also takes precedence, pursuant to articles 58 and 91, as part of the typewritten rider, plainly contemplates that Duane Reade will have a legal remedy in the event Reva’s work on the building “unreasonably interfere[s] with the operation of Tenant’s business.” Accordingly, Duane Reade may seek damages for losses allegedly occasioned by any such “unreasonable] interfere [nee]” that can be proven to have resulted from Reva’s work on the roof (see Union City Union Suit Co. | 1 | 2 |
Lawrence v. Kennedygreen2 sentences2018Contrary to Ratner's contention, the exculpatory clause in the lease did not preclude or limit the personal liability of Beckie's general partners ( cf. Lawrence v Kennedy , 95 AD3d 955, 959 ; Kassover v PVP-GCC Holdingco II, LLC , 73 AD3d 626, 628 ). 2015The complaint did not contain any factual allegations of gross negligence or willful misconduct that could render the exculpatory clause in the lease unenforceable (see Colnaghi, U.S.A. v Jewelers Protection Servs., 81 NY2d at 823-824 ; Sommer v Federal Signal Corp., 79 NY2d at 554 ; Lawrence v Kennedy, 95 AD3d 955, 959 [2012]; Baquerizo v Monasterio, 90 AD3d 587, 587-588 [2011]). | 1 | 2 |
| Hartford Insurance v. Holmes Protection Groupgreen | 1 | 2 |
| Hogeland v. Sibleygreen | 1 | 2 |
| Crabb v. . Younggreen | 1 | 2 |
| Ryan v. IM Kapco, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| AHA Gen. Constr. v. NYCHAgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Periphery Loungewear, Inc. v. Kantron Roofing Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Reade v. 405 Lexington, L.L.C.green | 1 | 1 |
| Reade v. Reva Holding Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Metropolitan Life Insurance v. Noble Lowndes International, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Austro v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Ryan v. Giffordgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Wandel v. Jamesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Wietschner Ex Rel. JPMorgan Chase & Co. v. Dimongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Glenn v. Annunziatagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Trummer v. Niewischgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Conteh v. Majestic Farmsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| SNS Bank v. Citibankgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Golden Stone Trading, Inc. v. Wayne ElecTro System, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Leon v. Martinezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Adler v. Columbia Savings & Loan Ass'ngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Zuckerman v. City of New Yorkgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
O 'Hayer v. Honore de St. Aubin
green
2 sentences2020While the Katan Trust Agreement may exempt the trustee from the duty of undivided loyalty , trustee remains liable for self-dealing despite an exculpatory clause ( see id. ). 2020While the Katan Trust Agreement may exempt the trustee from the duty of undivided loyalty , trustee remains liable for self-dealing despite an exculpatory clause ( see id. ). | 5 | 1993–2020 |
Young Fehlhaber Pile Co. v. State
green
2 sentences1977Co. v New York State Thruway Auth. ( 34 AD2d 97, 99 , affd 34 NY2d 770 ), we said: 'In a construction contract between the State and an individual, which contains representations as to existing conditions affecting work thereunder as well as an exculpatory clause relieving the State of liability and requiring personal inspection of the contract site, liability, nevertheless, may attach to the State if said conditions are not as represented and (1) inspection would have been unavailing to reveal the incorrectness of the representations (Foundation Co. v State of New York, 233 N. Y. 177, 184-185 1977It is axiomatic, however, that "[i]n a construction contract between the State and an individual, which contains representations as to existing conditions affecting work thereunder as well as an exculpatory clause relieving the State of liability and requiring personal inspection of the contract site, liability, nevertheless, may attach to the State if said conditions are not as represented and (1) inspection would have been unavailing to reveal the incorrectness of the representations (Foundation Co. v. State of New York, 233 N.Y. 177, 184-185 ; Faber v. City of New York, 222 N.Y. 255, 260 ), | 4 | 1970–1977 |
Foundation Company v. . State of New York
green
2 sentences1977Co. v New York State Thruway Auth. ( 34 AD2d 97, 99 , affd 34 NY2d 770 ), we said: 'In a construction contract between the State and an individual, which contains representations as to existing conditions affecting work thereunder as well as an exculpatory clause relieving the State of liability and requiring personal inspection of the contract site, liability, nevertheless, may attach to the State if said conditions are not as represented and (1) inspection would have been unavailing to reveal the incorrectness of the representations (Foundation Co. v State of New York, 233 N. Y. 177, 184-185 1977It is axiomatic, however, that "[i]n a construction contract between the State and an individual, which contains representations as to existing conditions affecting work thereunder as well as an exculpatory clause relieving the State of liability and requiring personal inspection of the contract site, liability, nevertheless, may attach to the State if said conditions are not as represented and (1) inspection would have been unavailing to reveal the incorrectness of the representations (Foundation Co. v. State of New York, 233 N.Y. 177, 184-185 ; Faber v. City of New York, 222 N.Y. 255, 260 ), | 4 | 1970–1977 |
Jackson v. State
green
2 sentences1977Co. v New York State Thruway Auth. ( 34 AD2d 97, 99 , affd 34 NY2d 770 ), we said: 'In a construction contract between the State and an individual, which contains representations as to existing conditions affecting work thereunder as well as an exculpatory clause relieving the State of liability and requiring personal inspection of the contract site, liability, nevertheless, may attach to the State if said conditions are not as represented and (1) inspection would have been unavailing to reveal the incorrectness of the representations (Foundation Co. v State of New York, 233 N. Y. 177, 184-185 1977It is axiomatic, however, that "[i]n a construction contract between the State and an individual, which contains representations as to existing conditions affecting work thereunder as well as an exculpatory clause relieving the State of liability and requiring personal inspection of the contract site, liability, nevertheless, may attach to the State if said conditions are not as represented and (1) inspection would have been unavailing to reveal the incorrectness of the representations (Foundation Co. v. State of New York, 233 N.Y. 177, 184-185 ; Faber v. City of New York, 222 N.Y. 255, 260 ), | 4 | 1970–1977 |
Faber v. . City of New York
green
2 sentences1977Co. v New York State Thruway Auth. ( 34 AD2d 97, 99 , affd 34 NY2d 770 ), we said: 'In a construction contract between the State and an individual, which contains representations as to existing conditions affecting work thereunder as well as an exculpatory clause relieving the State of liability and requiring personal inspection of the contract site, liability, nevertheless, may attach to the State if said conditions are not as represented and (1) inspection would have been unavailing to reveal the incorrectness of the representations (Foundation Co. v State of New York, 233 N. Y. 177, 184-185 1977It is axiomatic, however, that "[i]n a construction contract between the State and an individual, which contains representations as to existing conditions affecting work thereunder as well as an exculpatory clause relieving the State of liability and requiring personal inspection of the contract site, liability, nevertheless, may attach to the State if said conditions are not as represented and (1) inspection would have been unavailing to reveal the incorrectness of the representations (Foundation Co. v. State of New York, 233 N.Y. 177, 184-185 ; Faber v. City of New York, 222 N.Y. 255, 260 ), | 4 | 1970–1977 |
Jackson v. State
green
2 sentences1977Co. v New York State Thruway Auth. ( 34 AD2d 97, 99 , affd 34 NY2d 770 ), we said: 'In a construction contract between the State and an individual, which contains representations as to existing conditions affecting work thereunder as well as an exculpatory clause relieving the State of liability and requiring personal inspection of the contract site, liability, nevertheless, may attach to the State if said conditions are not as represented and (1) inspection would have been unavailing to reveal the incorrectness of the representations (Foundation Co. v State of New York, 233 N. Y. 177, 184-185 1977It is axiomatic, however, that "[i]n a construction contract between the State and an individual, which contains representations as to existing conditions affecting work thereunder as well as an exculpatory clause relieving the State of liability and requiring personal inspection of the contract site, liability, nevertheless, may attach to the State if said conditions are not as represented and (1) inspection would have been unavailing to reveal the incorrectness of the representations (Foundation Co. v. State of New York, 233 N.Y. 177, 184-185 ; Faber v. City of New York, 222 N.Y. 255, 260 ), | 4 | 1970–1977 |
Sue & Sam Manufacturing Co. v. United Protective Alarm Systems, Inc.
green
2 sentences2008Co. v United Protective Alarm Sys., 119 AD2d 664 [1986]; Nuri Farhardi, Inc. v Albany Ins. 1990Co. v United Protective Alarm Sys. ( 119 AD2d 664 ), the failure of the alarm company to install two motion detectors as required by the contract did not constitute gross negligence, and the exculpatory clause was therefore controlling. | 3 | 1990–2008 |
Howard v. Handler Bros. & Winell, Inc.
green
2 sentences1987So, it has been repeatedly emphasized that unless the intention of the parties is expressed in unmistakable language, an exculpatory clause will not be deemed to insulate a party from liability for his own negligent acts * * * Put another way, it must appear plainly and precisely that the 'limitation of liability extends to negligence or other fault of the party attempting to shed his ordinary responsibility’ (Howard v Handler Bros. & Winell, 279 App Div 72, 75-76 , affd 303 NY 990 ).” Although the cases do not require use of the word negligence in the disclaimer, something more than a general 1985Thus, parties will not be presumed to have intended to exempt themselves from the consequences of their own negligence in the absence of express and unmistakable language to that effect (see, Van Dyke Prods. v Eastman Kodak Co., supra, at p 304 [language which is “absolutely clear”]; Ciofalo v Vic Tanney Gyms, 10 NY2d 294, 297 [language which is “sufficiently clear and unequivocal”]; Boll v Sharp & Dohme, supra, at p 570 [language which is “clear and explicit”]), or to put it another way, it must clearly appear that the “limitation of liability extends to [the] negligence or other fault of the | 3 | 1981–1987 |
Howard v. Handler Bros. & Winell, Inc.
green
2 sentences1987So, it has been repeatedly emphasized that unless the intention of the parties is expressed in unmistakable language, an exculpatory clause will not be deemed to insulate a party from liability for his own negligent acts * * * Put another way, it must appear plainly and precisely that the 'limitation of liability extends to negligence or other fault of the party attempting to shed his ordinary responsibility’ (Howard v Handler Bros. & Winell, 279 App Div 72, 75-76 , affd 303 NY 990 ).” Although the cases do not require use of the word negligence in the disclaimer, something more than a general 1985Thus, parties will not be presumed to have intended to exempt themselves from the consequences of their own negligence in the absence of express and unmistakable language to that effect (see, Van Dyke Prods. v Eastman Kodak Co., supra, at p 304 [language which is “absolutely clear”]; Ciofalo v Vic Tanney Gyms, 10 NY2d 294, 297 [language which is “sufficiently clear and unequivocal”]; Boll v Sharp & Dohme, supra, at p 570 [language which is “clear and explicit”]), or to put it another way, it must clearly appear that the “limitation of liability extends to [the] negligence or other fault of the | 3 | 1981–1987 |
Warren Bros. v. New York State Thruway Authority
green
2 sentences1977Co. v New York State Thruway Auth. ( 34 AD2d 97, 99 , affd 34 NY2d 770 ), we said: 'In a construction contract between the State and an individual, which contains representations as to existing conditions affecting work thereunder as well as an exculpatory clause relieving the State of liability and requiring personal inspection of the contract site, liability, nevertheless, may attach to the State if said conditions are not as represented and (1) inspection would have been unavailing to reveal the incorrectness of the representations (Foundation Co. v State of New York, 233 N. Y. 177, 184-185 1977It is axiomatic, however, that "[i]n a construction contract between the State and an individual, which contains representations as to existing conditions affecting work thereunder as well as an exculpatory clause relieving the State of liability and requiring personal inspection of the contract site, liability, nevertheless, may attach to the State if said conditions are not as represented and (1) inspection would have been unavailing to reveal the incorrectness of the representations (Foundation Co. v. State of New York, 233 N.Y. 177, 184-185 ; Faber v. City of New York, 222 N.Y. 255, 260 ), | 3 | 1976–1977 |
Warren Bros. Co. v. New York State Thruway Auth.
green
2 sentences1977Co. v New York State Thruway Auth. ( 34 AD2d 97, 99 , affd 34 NY2d 770 ), we said: 'In a construction contract between the State and an individual, which contains representations as to existing conditions affecting work thereunder as well as an exculpatory clause relieving the State of liability and requiring personal inspection of the contract site, liability, nevertheless, may attach to the State if said conditions are not as represented and (1) inspection would have been unavailing to reveal the incorrectness of the representations (Foundation Co. v State of New York, 233 N. Y. 177, 184-185 1977It is axiomatic, however, that "[i]n a construction contract between the State and an individual, which contains representations as to existing conditions affecting work thereunder as well as an exculpatory clause relieving the State of liability and requiring personal inspection of the contract site, liability, nevertheless, may attach to the State if said conditions are not as represented and (1) inspection would have been unavailing to reveal the incorrectness of the representations (Foundation Co. v. State of New York, 233 N.Y. 177, 184-185 ; Faber v. City of New York, 222 N.Y. 255, 260 ), | 3 | 1976–1977 |
Elbayoumi v. TD Bank, N.A.
green
2 sentences2022Insofar as the exculpatory clause is applicable to the Lau defendants' actions taken in good faith as an escrow agent ( cf. Baquerizo v Monasterio , 90 AD3d at 587 ), the complaint sufficiently alleges that the challenged disbursement was not made in good faith or was the result of the Lau defendants' gross negligence, and the documentary evidence did not conclusively defeat those allegations ( see Elbayoumi v TD Bank, N.A. , 185 AD3d 786, 789 ; Lenoci v Secure Alarm Installations, LLC , 97 AD3d 800, 801 ). 2022Insofar as the exculpatory clause is applicable to the Lau defendants' actions taken in good faith as an escrow agent ( cf. Baquerizo v Monasterio , 90 AD3d at 587 ), the complaint sufficiently alleges that the challenged disbursement was not made in good faith or was the result of the Lau defendants' gross negligence, and the documentary evidence did not conclusively defeat those allegations ( see Elbayoumi v TD Bank, N.A. , 185 AD3d 786, 789 ; Lenoci v Secure Alarm Installations, LLC , 97 AD3d 800, 801 ). | 2 | 2022–2022 |
Lenoci v. Secure Alarm Installations, LLC
green
2 sentences2022Insofar as the exculpatory clause is applicable to the Lau defendants' actions taken in good faith as an escrow agent ( cf. Baquerizo v Monasterio , 90 AD3d at 587 ), the complaint sufficiently alleges that the challenged disbursement was not made in good faith or was the result of the Lau defendants' gross negligence, and the documentary evidence did not conclusively defeat those allegations ( see Elbayoumi v TD Bank, N.A. , 185 AD3d 786, 789 ; Lenoci v Secure Alarm Installations, LLC , 97 AD3d 800, 801 ). 2022Insofar as the exculpatory clause is applicable to the Lau defendants' actions taken in good faith as an escrow agent ( cf. Baquerizo v Monasterio , 90 AD3d at 587 ), the complaint sufficiently alleges that the challenged disbursement was not made in good faith or was the result of the Lau defendants' gross negligence, and the documentary evidence did not conclusively defeat those allegations ( see Elbayoumi v TD Bank, N.A. , 185 AD3d 786, 789 ; Lenoci v Secure Alarm Installations, LLC , 97 AD3d 800, 801 ). | 2 | 2022–2022 |
| Birnbaum v. Birnbaum green | 2 | 2012–2012 |
| Boles v. Lanham green | 2 | 2012–2012 |
| In re Mankin green | 2 | 2012–2012 |
| Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co. green | 2 | 1998–1998 |
| Sanif, Inc. v. Iannotti neutral | 2 | 1990–1998 |
| Franzek v. Calspan Corp. green | 2 | 1982–1992 |
| Boll v. Sharp & Dohme, Inc. neutral | 2 | 1981–1990 |
| Peckham Road Co. v. State green | 2 | 1983–1986 |
| People Ex Rel. Wells Newton Co. v. . Craig neutral | 2 | 1983–1986 |
| Cauldwell-Wingate Co. v. State green | 2 | 1983–1986 |
| Peckham Road Co. v. State neutral | 2 | 1983–1986 |
| Florence v. Merchants Central Alarm Co. green | 2 | 1985–1986 |
| People v. Russell green | 2 | 1937–1981 |
| W. L. Waples Co. v. State neutral | 2 | 1967–1976 |
| In Re the Accounting of Fulton Trust Co. green | 2 | 1946–1965 |
| Barone v. St. Joseph's Villa green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| In re Jastrzebski neutral | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Abacus Fed. Sav. v. Adt SEC. green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc. v. Nomura Credit & Capital, Inc. green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Kassover v. PVP-GCG Holdingco II, LLC green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Metropolitan Life Insurance v. Noble Lowndes International, Inc. green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Won's Cards, Inc. v. Samsondale/Haverstraw Equities, Ltd. green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Polo Electric Corp. v. New York Law School neutral | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Lake Erie Warehouse neutral | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| People v. Candelaria green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| J & J Log & Lumber Corp. v. Dancose neutral | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Emerald Partners v. Berlin green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.