Qureshi v. Holder, 663 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2011)
Federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over claims brought under the Administrative Procedure Act when there is no final agency action.
The Qureshis were granted asylum based on Mr. Qureshi's support for a Pakistani militant group. USCIS later issued a notice terminating their asylum under the persecutor bar, and removal proceedings began. The Qureshis sued USCIS, and the district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding no final agency action. The question is whether termination of asylum is final agency action under the APA. Applying a flexible, pragmatic reading of finality, the court holds that termination does not consummate agency decisionmaking because removal proceedings follow and remain available to halt removal. The dismissal is affirmed.
At page 781Determining finality of agency action under the APA29 citing casesconcluding that federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over APA claims where there is no final agency action
- Lewis v. United States, No. 3:17-cv-01644 (M.D. La. Mar. 21, 2024). “Under the [APA], ‘final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court [is] subject to judicial review”
- State of Texas v. Becerra, 89 F.4th 529 (5th Cir. 2024).publishedThe Supreme Court takes a “pragmatic approach,” viewing the APA finality requirement as “flexible.” EEOC, 933 F.3d at 441 (quoting U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., 578 U.S. 590, 599 (2016); and then quoting Qureshi v. Holder, 663 F…
- Apter v. Dept of Health & Human Svc, 80 F.4th 579 (5th Cir. 2023).published The phrase “zone of interests” appears most often in cases discussing _____________________ 50 Qureshi v. Holder, 663 F.3d 778, 781 (5th Cir. 2011). 51 Alabama-Coushatta, 757 F.3d at 489 . 17 prudential standing,52 and it has also popped u…
- Cargill v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, No. 1:22-cv-01063 (W.D. Tex. July 18, 2023).In evaluating whether agency action is final, the Fifth Circuit treats the finality requirement as both “flexible” and “pragmatic.” Qureshi v. Holder, 663 F.3d 778, 781 (5th Cir. 2011).
- State of Texas v. Brooks-LaSure, 680 F. Supp. 3d 791 (E.D. Tex. 2023).publishedIn evaluating whether agency action is final, the Fifth Circuit treats the finality requirement as both “flexible” and “pragmatic.” Qureshi v. Holder, 663 F.3d 778, 781 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 , 149-5…
- Neese v. Becerra, No. 2:21-cv-00163 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 26, 2022).“flexible’ and ‘pragmatic”
- Data Mktg. P'ship, LP v. United States Dep't of Labor, No. 4:19-cv-00800 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2020).Qureshi v. Holder, 663 F.3d 778, 781 (5th Cir. 2011). 1.
- Sacal-Micha v. Longoria, 449 F. Supp. 3d 656 (S.D. Tex. 2020).published“If there is no final agency action, a federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction”
- Sacal-Micha v. Longoria, No. 1:20-cv-00037, 2020 WL 1518861 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2020).“If there is no final agency action, a federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction”
- A.Z. v. Nielsen, No. 1:18-cv-10511 (D. Mass. Oct. 23, 2018).See, e.g., Jama v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 760 F.3d 490, 495-47 (6th Cir. 2014); Qureshi v. Holder, 663 F.3d 778, 781 (5th Cir. 2011); Cabaccang v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 627 F.3d 1313, 1316-17 (9th Cir. 2010).
Show 19 more citing cases
- Franciscan All., Inc. v. Burwell, 227 F. Supp. 3d 660 (N.D. Tex. 2016).published“In evaluating whether a challenged agency action meets these two conditions, this court is guided by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the APA’s finality requirement as ‘flexible’ and ‘pragmatic”
- State v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 3d 810 (N.D. Tex. 2016).published “In evaluating whether a challenged agency action meets these two conditions, this court is guided by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the APA’s finality requirement as ‘flexible’ and ‘pragmatic.’” EEOC, 827 F.3d at 380 , 2016 WL 3524…
- Texas v. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n, 827 F.3d 372 (5th Cir. 2016).published “In evaluating whether a challenged agency action meets these two conditions, this court is guided by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the APA’s finality requirement as ‘flexible’ and ‘pragmatic”
- State v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 126 F. Supp. 3d 697 (E.D. La. 2015).published“In evaluating whether a challenged agency action meets these two conditions, this court is guided by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the APA’s finality requirement as ‘flexible’ and ‘pragmatic.’” Belle Co., 761 F.3d at 388 (quoting…
- Belle Co. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 761 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2014).published“In evaluating whether a challenged agency action meets these two conditions, this court is guided by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the APA’s finality requirement as ‘flexible’ and ‘pragmatic”
- Inst. of Marine Mammal Studies v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 23 F. Supp. 3d 705 (S.D. Miss. 2014).published“If there is no final agency action, a federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction”
- Jama v. United States Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 962 F. Supp. 2d 939 (N.D. Ohio 2013).published “when removal proceedings are pending, further administrative relief is available”
- Nimmrich & Prahm Reederei GmbH & Co. KG MS Sonja v. United States, 925 F. Supp. 2d 850 (S.D. Tex. 2012).published“In general, for agency action to be deemed final, it ‘must mark the consummation of the agency’s decision-making process’ and ‘must be [action] by which rights or obligations have been determined or from which legal con…”
- Juan Francisco Gamez v. Facility Warden, No. 5:26-cv-03808 (W.D. Tex. June 29, 2026).(concluding that federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over APA claims where there is no final agency action)
- Alexis Noel Baltodano Gusman v. Warden, Karnes Cnty. Immigr. Processing Ctr., U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf't (ice), No. 5:26-cv-01980 (W.D. Tex. June 17, 2026).(concluding that federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over APA claims where there is no final agency action)
- Wilman David Maestre Zambrano v. Warden, South Texas Immigr. Processing Ctr., Markwayne Mullin, No. 5:26-cv-03597 (W.D. Tex. June 16, 2026).(concluding that federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over APA claims where there is no final agency action)
- Oreste Israel Torres Hermida v. Warden, Karnes Cnty. Immigr. Processing Ctr., U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf't, No. 5:26-cv-03449 (W.D. Tex. June 15, 2026).(concluding that federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over APA claims where there is no final agency action)
- Alejandro Alonso Favela v. Facility Warden, No. 5:26-cv-03468 (W.D. Tex. June 15, 2026).(concluding that federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over APA claims where there is no final agency action)
- Medina-Gutierrez, No. 5:26-cv-03347 (W.D. Tex. June 3, 2026).(concluding that federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over APA claims where there is no final agency action)
- Jose Rafael Urdaneta Medina v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf't, No. 1:26-cv-01329 (W.D. Tex. June 1, 2026).(concluding that federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over APA claims where there is no final agency action)
- Lyons, No. 5:26-cv-03237 (W.D. Tex. June 1, 2026).(concluding that federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over APA claims where there is no final agency action)
- Friends of Lydia Ann Channel v. Lydia Ann Channel Moorings, LLC, No. 2:19-cv-00148 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 24, 2020).See Lydia Ann Remand, 701 Fed. App’x. at 359 (citing Qureshi v. Holder, 663 F.3d 778, 781 (5th Cir. 2011).
- Carlos Sandoval v. Rex Tillerson, 713 F. App'x 255 (5th Cir. 2017).unpublishedSee Qureshi v. Holder, 663 F.3d 778, 781 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 704 ). 4 Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment dismissing Lopez’s claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. * Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, t…
- Friends of Lydia Ann Channel v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 701 F. App'x 352 (5th Cir. 2017).unpublished(stating that a federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction if there is no final agency action under the APA)
At page 780Reviewing jurisdiction over asylum termination decisions4 citing casesstating that although “[njeither the IJ nor the BIA has authority to review USCIS’s decision to terminate asylum ... if the BIA upholds the final order of removal, the ex-asylee may then appeal to the appropriate circuit court to review ‘constitutional claims or questions of law1 underlying the fin…
- Mukantagara v. United States Dep't of Homeland Sec., 574 F. Supp. 3d 1055 (D. Utah 2021).publishedThe clerk of court is directed to close the case. 97 Id. 98 Id. (quoting Qureshi v. Holder, 663 F.3d 778, 780 (5th Cir. 2011)). 99 Id. (quoting Qureshi, 663 F.3d at 780 ). 100 Id. 101 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (b)(9). 102 Dkt. 14.
- Jama v. United States Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 962 F. Supp. 2d 939 (N.D. Ohio 2013).published “Pending removal proceedings make termination an intermediate, nonfinal action, because “when removal proceedings are pending, further administrative relief is available.’ ” Qureshi v. Holder, 663 F.3d 778, 781 (5th Cir.2011) (quoting Caba…
- Jama v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 760 F.3d 490 (6th Cir. 2014).published(stating that although “[njeither the IJ nor the BIA has authority to review USCIS’s decision to terminate asylum ... if the BIA upholds the final order of removal, the ex-asylee may then appeal to the appropriate circui…)
- A-s-j, 25 I. & N. Dec. 893 (BIA 2012).publishedSee, e.g., Qureshi v. Holder, 663 F.3d 778, 780-81 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing section 208(a)(1) of the Act).
Other citing cases
- State of Texas v. DHS, No. 23-50869 (5th Cir. Nov. 27, 2024).published
- Canal A Media Holding, LLC v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 369 F. Supp. 3d 1312 (S.D. Fla. 2019).published
v.
Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., U.S. Attorney General; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Janet Napolitano, Secretary; U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Alejandro Mayorkas, Director; Marie Hummert, Director, USCIS Houston Asylum Center, Defendants-Appellees
The Qureshis were originally granted asylum from Pakistan because of Mr. Qureshi’s support for the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front. Later, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) decided to terminate the Qureshis’ asylum based on that same support, applying the “persecutor bar” to Mr. Qureshi. When removal proceedings ensued, the Qureshis sued USCIS to challenge its application of the bar. The district court granted US-CIS’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that the termination was not a final agency action. Because we agree that termination of asylum does not consummate agency action and thus is not final, we affirm.
I.
The undisputed facts are that Ghazanfar Qureshi is a citizen of Pakistan who entered the United States and applied for asylum in 1999, claiming that he suffered persecution from his membership in the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (“JKLF”). The application was granted in 2000, followed by derivative asylum for his wife and children.
In January 2009, Qureshi received from USCIS a notice of intent to terminate asylum status that stated that he may not have been eligible for asylum, because his contributions to JKLF and participation in its activities “potentially” constituted persecution of others on account of a protected characteristic under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b) (2)(A)(i). At his termination hearing, Qureshi stated that he became the Secretary General of JKLF for the Mirpur District in 1991, donated money to the group, and arranged public protests. He asserted that he was not aware of any violent activities of JKLF and did not communicate with its members outside his district.
In March, USCIS issued to Mr. Qureshi a notice of termination of asylum status [1] because a preponderance of the evidence indicated that he had “participated in the persecution of another person on account of that person’s nationality and political opinion” as an “active and prominent member” of JKLF. Qureshi and his family[*780] were placed in removal proceedings, and their employment authorization was terminated.
In June 2010, the Qureshis sued the defendants (collectively, “USCIS”), claiming that termination of their asylum status, without a showing by specific evidence that Mr. Qureshi was a persecutor, violated the Constitution, multiple statutes, and federal regulations. The district court granted USCIS’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, reasoning that the termination was not a final agency action, because the Qureshis could renew their asylum claim in removal proceedings and because the termination decision was subject to administrative and judicial review. The Qureshis appeal.
II.
A.
This court reviews de novo a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir.2001). A grant of asylum does not convey a right to remain permanently in the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(2). An asylum officer may terminate asylum if the alien was not eligible for asylum when it was granted. Id.; see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.24(a)(1), (2). Under the “persecutor bar,” an alien who “ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion” is not eligible for asylum. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)®.
USCIS is authorized to terminate asylum previously granted under its own jurisdiction in two ways. It may terminate asylum itself through a multi-step process, consisting of a notice of intent to terminate, a termination hearing (where the alien may present evidence in support of asylum), and, if applicable, written notice of termination of asylum status and any accompanying employment authorization. 8 C.F.R. § 208.24(c). Alternatively, US-CIS may give an immigration judge (“IJ”) jurisdiction to terminate asylum by serving the alien with a notice of intent to terminate with or after a notice to appear — the document that initiates removal proceedings. § 208.24®.
In either event, USCIS must initiate removal proceedings before an IJ after every asylum termination, unless removal proceedings have already commenced. § 208.24(e). The ex-asylee is entitled to contest the charges of removability before the IJ. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4). Should the IJ find him removable, the alien may appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) and again contest his removability. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3), (9).
Neither the IJ nor the BIA has authority to review USCIS’s decision to terminate asylum. Bhargava v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 611 F.3d 168, 170-71 (3d Cir.2010). But if the BIA upholds the final order of removal, the ex-asylee may then appeal to the appropriate circuit court to review “constitutional claims or questions of law” underlying the final order of removal, including direct legal challenges to USCIS’s original termination decision. [2]
While directly contesting his removability, an ex-asylee may also re-apply for asylum during his removal proceeding. [3][*781] Aliens in removal proceedings who make a new asylum application are entitled to a full evidentiary hearing on the application. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4). They also shoulder the applicant’s evidentiary burden anew, however, see § 1158(b)(1)(B), whereas in termination proceedings USCIS has the burden of proof, 8 C.F.R. § 208.24(c), ffi.
B.
Under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), “final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court [is] subject to judicial review.” [4] “If there is no final agency action, a federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.” [5]
In general, for agency action to be deemed final, it “must mark the consummation of the agency’s decision-making process” and “must be [action] by which rights or obligations have been determined or from which legal consequences will flow.” [6] In evaluating whether a challenged agency action meets these two conditions, this court is guided by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the APA’s finality requirement as “flexible” and “pragmatic.” Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149-50, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967). [7]
Under a flexible, pragmatic reading, termination of asylum cannot be viewed as a “consummation” of agency decisionmaking. Instead, it represents only an intermediate step in a multi-stage administrative process, succeeded (or accompanied) by removal proceedings before an IJ and intra-agency appeal to the BIA.
Termination of asylum automatically triggers another stage of decision-making, the removal proceeding. Pending removal proceedings make termination an intermediate, nonfinal action, because “when removal proceedings are pending, further administrative relief is available.” Cabaccang v. USCIS, 627 F.3d 1313, 1317 (9th Cir.2010) (citation omitted). Even if the IJ and BIA lack jurisdiction to review asylum termination decisions, they both retain the power to halt removal proceedings altogether, either by an alien’s successful contest to removability via 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4) or by a successful new asylum application via 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1).
[*782] The Qureshis can point to only two published district court opinions to support their contention that USCIS’s termination of their asylum constitutes final agency action. In one case, [8] the court, based on its reading of 8 C.F.R. § 208.24(e), found termination of asylum distinct enough from removal to conclude that termination was not merely an intermediate step in a larger process. That regulation states: “When an alien’s asylum status or withholding of removal or deportation is terminated under this section, the Service shall initiate removal proceedings, as appropriate, if the alien is not already in exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings.” Id. (emphasis added). The court read “as appropriate” to “suggest[ ] that there may be circumstances where an action to remove an alien does not follow necessarily from the termination of the alien’s asylum status.” [9] But in context, the language of § 208.24(e) indicates that removal proceedings must follow all terminations of asylum. “As appropriate” merely refers to a circumstance in which removal proceedings were already pending at the time an IJ terminates asylum. See § 208.24(f).
In Singh v. USCIS, No. 10 C 8288, 2011 WL 1485368, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42019 (N.D.Ill. Apr. 19, 2011), the court held that USCIS’s termination of the plaintiffs asylum status constituted final agency action. Specifically, termination consummated agency decisionmaking when it increased the evidentiary burden on the plaintiff in applying for asylum anew. [10]
The burden-shifting occasioned by termination of asylum, however, does not consummate agency decisionmaking. Evidentiary burdens serve to inform a factfinder’s decisions, especially where parties have failed to produce adequate evidence. Although burdens sometimes dictate an agency’s eventual decision, that decision is not consummated until it is actually made.
In summary, termination of asylum does not “mark the consummation” of a decisionmaking process. Accordingly, it is not final agency action, so the Qureshis’ challenge is premature. [11] The judgment of dismissal is AFFIRMED.
. USCIS later issued a slightly revised version.
. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); Alvarado de Rodriguez v. Holder, 585 F.3d 227, 233-34 (5th Cir.2009); Rodriguez-Castro v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 316, 319 (5th Cir.2005).
. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) ("Any alien who is physically present in the United States ... irrespective of such alien's status, may apply for asylum in accordance with this sec[*781] tion....”); see also Silwany-Rodriguez v. INS, 975 F.2d 1157, 1161 (5th Cir.1992) (citing Matter of B-, 20 I. & N. Dec. 427 (BIA 1991) (holding that an asylum application in a removal proceeding is considered a new application)); Singh v. Chertoff, No. C 05-1454 MHP, 2005, 2005 WL 2043044, at *5-6, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47500, at *18-19 (N.D.Cal. Aug. 24, 2005) (“[A]ny alien whose asylum status is terminated has the opportunity to reapply for asylum....”).
. 5 U.S.C. § 704. The same section also recognizes "[ajgency action made reviewable by statute,” but no such statute applies here.
. Peoples Nat’l Bank v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency of the U.S., 362 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir.2004) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
. Id. at 337 (citations omitted).
. In addition to the two-pronged test used here, this court has also restated the Supreme Court’s "pragmatic” interpretation of the APA’s finality requirement as a multi-factor test, including: "(1) the legal and practical effect of the agency action; (2) the definitiveness of the ruling; (3) the availability of an administrative solution; (4) the likelihood of unnecessary review; and (5) the need for effective enforcement of the Act.” Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Herman, 176 F.3d 283, 291 (5th Cir.1999) (citing Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Standard Oil Co. of Calif., 449 U.S. 232, 242-43, 101 S.Ct. 488, 66 L.Ed.2d 416 (1980)).
. Singh v. Bardini, No. C-09-3382 EMC, 2010 WL 308807, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3824 (N.D.Cal. Jan. 19, 2010) (magistrate judge), followed by 2010 WL 2292320, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55706 (N.D.Cal. Jun. 7, 2010) (magistrate judge).
. Singh v. Bardini, 2010 WL 308807, at *5, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3824, at *15.
. Id. at *4-5, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3824 at *10-11. As explained in part I, an alien in a removal proceeding who makes a new asylum application is entitled to a full evidentiary hearing on the application, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4), but he also shoulders the applicant’s evidentiary burden anew, see § 1158(b)(1)(B), whereas in termination proceedings USCIS has the burden of proof, 8 C.F.R. § 208.24(c), (f).
.Because termination of asylum does not satisfy the consummation condition, termination would not be final agency action even if it did satisfy the legal-consequences condition. Accordingly, we decline to address whether burden-shifting or loss of employment authorization is a significant legal consequence. We also decline to address the government’s other arguments.