City of Kettering v. Hollen, 416 N.E.2d 598 (Ohio 1980). · Go Syfert
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City of Kettering v. Hollen, 416 N.E.2d 598 (Ohio 1980). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 6× by 5 distinct cases, 1993–2014↓ Fading · …the exclusionary rule will not ordinarily be applied to evidence which is the product of police conduct violative of state law but not violative of constitutional rights. ✓
cited 3× by 3 distinct cases, 2003–2024 · 2 courts · …the exclusionary rule has been applied by this court to violations of a constitutional nature only. at p. 234 ✓
342 citation events (154 in the last 25 years) across 17 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: State v. Sheckles (ohio, 2024-09-06)
Treatment trajectory · 1981 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1981 2003 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 38 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) State v. Sheckles
Ohio · 2024 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
the exclusionary rule has been applied by this court to violations of a constitutional nature only.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) State v. Sheckles
Ohio · 2024 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
the exclusionary rule has been applied by this court to violations of a constitutional nature only.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) State v. Brown
Ohio Ct. App. · 2014 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
the fruits of the arrest of the defendant, based on probable cause but unauthorized under existing state law, are not suppressible solely because of the fact of the arrest in dayton by a kettering police officer.
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Diaw
Ohio Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
State v. Campbell, 170 Ohio St.3d 278 , 2022-Ohio-3626, ¶ 22 , citing Kettering v. Hollen, 64 Ohio St.2d 232, 234 (1980).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Hipsher
Ohio Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
Kettering v. Hollen, 64 Ohio St.2d 232, 234 (1980); State v. Myers, 26 Ohio St.2d 190 (1971); State v. Campbell, 170 Ohio St.3d 278 , 2022-Ohio-3626 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Kellett
Ohio Ct. App. · 2022 · confidence medium
Thus, we will not apply the exclusionary rule “to statutory violations falling short of constitutional violations, absent a legislative mandate requiring the application of the exclusionary rule.” Kettering at 234, 416 N.E.2d 598 ; see also State v. French, 72 Ohio St.3d 446, 449 , 650 N.E.2d 887 (1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Buckley (2×)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
But first and foremost, we note that even if the officers were in the midst of unlawfully arresting Mr. Buckley, they would still be acting in their official capacity as peace officers in the performance of their official duties. “[A]n arrested person is not immune from prosecution merely because of the fact that his arrest was ‘unlawful’ or ‘unauthorized.’ * * * Rather, the issue is whether any of the evidence used to convict a defendant subjected to an unlawful or unauthorized arrest was inadmissible.” Kettering v. Hollen, 64 Ohio St.2d 232, 236 (1980), citing State v. Holbert, 3…
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Johnson
Ohio Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
Kettering v. Hollen, 65 Ohio St.2d 232 , 234-235, 416 N.E.2d 598, 600 (1980).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Coxwell
Ohio Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
Furthermore, for the reasons that follow, we do not need to reach the question of whether Kahn-Assian qualified as someone authorized to draw appellant’s blood in order to address appellant’s argument. {¶26} It is well-settled that "the exclusionary rule will not ordinarily be applied to suppress evidence which is the product of police conduct that violates a statute but falls short of a constitutional violation, unless specifically required by the legislature." State v. French, 72 Ohio St.3d 446, 449 (1995), citing Kettering v. Hollen, 64 Ohio St.2d 232, 235 (1980).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jenkins v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
See D.F., 682 So.2d at 154, 155 (Farmer, J., dissenting) (stating that the inclusion of the provision relating to remedies in section 901.211(6) "makes clear to me that the legislature intended for damages to be the remedy if the statute is ignored"); United States v. Thompson, 936 F.2d 1249, 1251-52 (11th Cir.1991) (holding that exclusionary rule was not applicable as remedy for statutory violation and stating that where "Congress specifically designates a remedy for one of its acts, courts generally presume that it engaged in the necessary balancing of interests in determining what the appro…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. McCoy, Unpublished Decision (1-5-2006)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
Kettering v. Hollen (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 232 , 234-235 , 416 N.E.2d 598,600; State v. Weidman, 94 Ohio St.3d 501 , 2002-Ohio-1484 , 764 N.E.2d 997 . {¶ 88} As noted by the court in State v. Klemm (1987), 41 Ohio App.3d 382 , 383 , 536 N.E.2d 14 , "[g]enerally, a police officer does not have the statutory authority to arrest someone outside his jurisdiction, Cincinnati v. Alexander (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 248 , 8 O.O.3d 224 , 375 N.E.2d 1241 , and in our judgment, the same jurisdictional limitation applies to the execution of search warrant." However, in Klemm , the court held that a violation …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Heath v. Johnson, Unpublished Decision (2-3-2005)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
Kettering v. Hollen (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 232 , 234-235 , 416 N.E.2d 598,600; State v. Weidman (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 501 , 764 N.E.2d 997 ; See also, Stow v. Riggenbach (1994), 97 Ohio App.3d 661 , 647 N.E.2d 246 ; State v. Filler (1995), 106 Ohio App.3d 731 , 667 N.E.2d 54 (For court to invoke exclusionary rule, police conduct ordinarily must rise to level of constitutional violation.) In Ohio, a warrantless arrest in a DUI case is constitutional so long as, at that moment, the officer had probable cause to make the arrest.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Gadsden
N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. · 1997 · confidence medium
See United States v. Shelton, 742 F.Supp. 1491, 1502-04 (D.Wyo.1990); United States v. Vasser, 648 F.2d 507, 510 (9th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 928 , 101 S.Ct. 1385 , 67 L.Ed.2d 360 (1981); United States v. Searp, 586 F.2d 1117, 1122-24 (6th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 921 , 99 S.Ct. 1247 , 59 L.Ed.2d 474 (1979); State v. Fixel, 744 P.2d 1366, 1368-69 (Utah 1987); People v. Vigil, 729 P.2d 360, 365-66 (Colo. 1986); State v. Schinzing, 342 N.W.2d 105, 108-09 (Minn.1983); State v. Bonds, 98 Wash.2d 1 , 653 P.2d 1024, 1030-31 (1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 831 , 104 S.Ct. 111 , 78 L…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) City of Hilliard v. Elfrink
Ohio · 1996 · confidence medium
Black’s Law Dictionary (6 Ed.1990) 1014, defines a “motion to suppress” as a “[d]evice used to eliminate from the trial of a criminal case evidence which has been secured illegally, generally in violation of the Fourth Amendment (search and seizure), the Fifth Amendment (privilege against self incrimination), or the Sixth Amendment (right to assistance of counsel, right of confrontation etc.), of U.S. Constitution.” Moreover, Black’s Law Dictionary (6 Ed.1990) 564, defines “exclusionary rule” as a rule which “commands that where evidence has been obtained in violation of the …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hilliard v. Elfrink
Ohio · 1996 · confidence medium
Although this court in Defiance v. Kretz (1991), 60 Ohio St.3d 1 , 573 N.E.2d 32 , and in State v. French (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 446 , 650 N.E.2d 887 , held that a motion to suppress is the proper pretrial procedure for challenging breath- alcohol results, those cases should by no means be interpreted as a general retreat from the well-established principle that suppression of evidence is a remedy normally reserved for alleged violations of constitutional rights. {¶ 14} Black’s Law Dictionary (6 Ed.1990) 1014, defines a “motion to suppress” as a “[d]evice used to eliminate from the tri…
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Wilmoth
Ohio · 1986 · confidence medium
In Kettering v. Hollen (1980), 64 Ohio St. 2d 232, 234-235 [ 18 O.O.3d 435 ], this court stated: “The exclusionary rule has been applied by this court to violations of a constitutional nature only.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Bernath
Ohio Ct. App. · 1981 · confidence medium
And a barn has been held to be within the curtilage of a dwelling house on a small farm, where there were tracks of vehicles and footprints leading both to the house and to the barn, and there was a driveway between the barn and the house.” (Footnotes omitted.) Relative to the application of the exclusionary rule in cases of misdemeanors not rising to the level of a constitutional right, cf. Kettering v. Hollen (1980), 64 Ohio St. 2d 232, 235 [ 18 O.O.3d 435 ].
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Allen
Ohio Ct. App. · 1981 · confidence medium
State v. Myers (1971), 26 Ohio St. 2d 190 [ 55 O.O.2d 447 ], In short, “the exclusionary rule will not ordinarily be applied to evidence which is the product of police conduct violative of state law but not violative of constitutional rights.” City of Kettering v. Hollen (1980), 64 Ohio St. 2d 232, 235 [ 18 O.O.3d 435 ].
discussed Cited "see" State v. Mansour
Ohio Ct. App. · 2016 · signal: see · confidence high
See Kettering v. Hollen, 64 Ohio St.2d 232 . {¶ 26} Contrary to appellant's argument, simply because the trial court found him not guilty of speeding does not establish that the traffic stop was illegal.
discussed Cited "see" State v. Jones (2×)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2014 · signal: see · confidence high
See Kettering v. Hollen (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 232, 234-235 , 416 N.E.2d 598 .
discussed Cited "see" State v. Dillehay
Ohio Ct. App. · 2013 · signal: see · confidence high
See City of Kettering v. Hollen, 64 Ohio St.2d 232, 235 (1980) (finding that the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine does not apply where the court finds that there is no Fourth Amendment violation).
cited Cited "see" State v. Geldrich, Ca2006-10-267 (6-2-2008)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See City of Kettering v. Hollen (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 232 , 234-235 .
discussed Cited "see" State v. Benner, Unpublished Decision (10-11-2005) (2×)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Weidman, 94 Ohio St.3d 501 , 504 , 2002-Ohio-1484 , 764 N.E.2d 997 , citing Kettering v. Hollen (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 232 , 416 N.E.2d 598 .
discussed Cited "see" State v. Fannin, Unpublished Decision (11-21-2002) (2×)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See Kettering v. Hollen (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 232 , 234-235 , 416 N.E.2d 598 .
discussed Cited "see" State v. Terrell, Unpublished Decision (9-19-2002) (2×)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See, Kettering v. Hollen (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 232 , 234-235 , 416 N.E.2d 598 .
cited Cited "see" State v. Paul, Unpublished Decision (2-14-2002)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See Kettering v. Hollen (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 232 , 234-235 .
discussed Cited "see" State v. Orihel, Unpublished Decision (1-28-2002) (2×)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See Kettering , 64 Ohio St.2d at 234 , 416 N.E.2d at 600 (stating that "[t]he exclusionary rule has been applied by this court to violations of a constitutional nature only").
discussed Cited "see" State v. Price, Unpublished Decision (6-26-2000) (2×)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See City of Kettering v. Hollen (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 232 , 416 N.E.2d 598 .
discussed Cited "see" State v. Jones, Unpublished Decision (2-19-1999)
Ohio Ct. App. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hollen , 64 Ohio St.2d at 235 ; see also State v. Droste (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 36 , 40 (finding that liquor agent's involvement in law enforcement, although prohibited by statute, was not unconstitutional).
examined Cited "see" State v. Myers (3×)
Ohio Ct. App. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See Kettering v. Hollen (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 232 , 18 O.O.3d 435 , 416 N.E.2d 598 ; State v. Myers (1971), 26 Ohio St.2d 190 , 55 O.O.2d 447 , 271 N.E.2d 245 .
discussed Cited "see" State v. Johnson (2×)
Ohio Ct. App. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
See Kettering v. Hollen (1980), 64 Ohio St. 2d 232 , 18 O.O. 3d 435, 416 N.E. 2d 598 ; State v. Downs (1977), 51 Ohio St. 2d 47, 64 , 5 O.O. 3d 30, 40, 364 N.E. 2d 1140, 1150-1151 ; State v. Myers (1971), 26 Ohio St. 2d 190 , 55 O.O. 2d 447, 271 N.E. 2d 245 .
discussed Cited "see" State v. Schinzing
Minn. · 1983 · signal: see · confidence high
See People v. Wolf, 635 P.2d 213 (Colo.1981) (declining to use the exclusionary rule as a remedy for a violation of state law by police in acting outside jurisdiction), and City of Kettering v. Hollen, 64 Ohio St.2d *109 232, 416 N.E.2d 598 (1980) (holding that fruits of defendant’s arrest, based on probable cause, are not suppressible solely because the officer was outside his jurisdiction in violation of state law).
cited Cited "see, e.g." State v. Leatherwood
Ohio Ct. App. · 2020 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Kettering v. Hollen, 64 Ohio St.2d 232, 234-235 (1980). 4 {¶8} A motion to suppress is the vehicle through which suppression under the exclusionary rule may be obtained.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Starkey
Ohio Ct. App. · 2012 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Kettering v. Hollen, 64 Ohio St.2d 232, 235 (1980); State v. Unger, 67 Ohio St.2d 65, 69-70 (1981); State v. Droste, 83 Ohio St.3d 36 (1998), syllabus. {¶26} In so doing, the Court has recognized “the violation of a state statute may rise to the level of a constitutional violation.” State v. Weideman, 94 Ohio St.3d 501, 505 (2002), citing State v. Jones, 88 Ohio St.3d 430, 432 (2000).
cited Cited "see, e.g." State v. Tissandier, Unpublished Decision (11-2-1998)
Ohio Ct. App. · 1998 · signal: see also · confidence low
See, also, Kettering v. Hollen (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 232 , 235 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Jolin (2×)
Me. · 1994 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare People v. Hamilton, 666 P.2d 152, 157 (Colo.1983) (extra-territorial arrest based on probable cause is reasonable) and City of Kettering v. Hollen, 64 Ohio St.2d 232 , 416 N.E.2d 598, 600 (1980) (evidence seized during extraterritorial arrest based on probable cause not suppressible solely because arrest is extraterritorial) with United States v. Foster, 566 F.Supp. 1403, 1412 (D.D.C.1983) (when officer acts beyond jurisdiction the resulting deprivation of liberty is just as unreasonable as an arrest without probable cause) and Commonwealth of Pa. v. Fiume, 292 Pa.Super. 54 , 436 A.2d …
examined Cited "see, e.g." State v. Weaver (3×)
Ohio Ct. App. · 1993 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Kettering v. Hollen (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 232, 235 , 18 O.O.3d 435, 437 , 416 N.E.2d 598, 600 ; State v. Cunningham (Feb. 14, 1992), Marion App. No. 9-91-32, unreported, 1992 WL 29257 ; State v. Jackson (Nov. 6, 1990), Franklin App. No. 90AP-457, unreported, 1990 WL 174069 ; State v. Myers (1990), 66 Ohio App.3d 717, 720 , 586 N.E.2d 155, 157 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Rocheleau (2×)
Vt. · 1982 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., City of Kettering v. Hollen, 64 Ohio St. 2d 232 , 416 N.E.2d 598 (1980) (evidence secured by arrest unauthorized under state law not to be suppressed); State v. Sundberg, 611 P.2d 44 (Alaska 1980) (evidence obtained after arrest which was effectuated by excessive force in violation of statute is not subject to exclusion) ; State v. Eubanks, 283 N.C. 556 , 196 S.E.2d 706 (1973) *67 (arrest determined to be illegal under state law does not require suppression of evidence).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
City of Kettering
v.
Hollen
No. 80-60.
Ohio Supreme Court.
Dec 23, 1980.
416 N.E.2d 598
1980 Ohio LEXIS 870
Mr. F. J. Newberry, prosecuting attorney, for appellant., Mr. Charles F. Buck and Mr. John B. Wyatt, III, for appellee.
Brown, Celebrezze, Dowd, Holmes, Locher, Sweeney.
Cited by 139 opinions  |  Published
Dowd, J.

As a general proposition, an extraterritorial arrest by a municipal police officer for an alleged misdemeanor is not authorized under existing Ohio law.[1] In this case, the ap[*234] pellant contends that the arrest is authorized because the arresting process commenced while the defendant and the officer were still within the officer’s municipality, i.e., the city of Kettering. The appellant contends alternatively that, assuming, arguendo, the unlawfulness of the arrest, the sanction of exclusion does not apply with respect to the officer’s testimony regarding the defendant’s actions after the arrest was successfully completed.

As to the legal characterization of the arrest, we find the record to be insufficient as to the factual issue of whether the arresting process commenced while the arresting officer and the defendant were still in the city of Kettering. Therefore, we assume that the defendant’s warrantless arrest in Dayton by Willcox for a misdemeanor was not authorized. We turn to a consideration of whether, under such circumstances, the exclusionary rule mandated upon this court in Mapp v. Ohio (1961), 367 U. S. 643, must be applied.[2]

The exclusionary rule has been applied by this court to violations of a constitutional nature only. In State v. Myers (1971), 26 Ohio St. 2d 190,196, this court enunciated the policy that the exclusionary rule would not be applied to statutory violations falling short of constitutional violations, absent a legislative mandate requiring the application of the exclusionary rule. In State v. Downs (1977), 51 Ohio St. 2d 47, 63-64, the violation of Crim. R. 41 with respect to the return of a search warrant was described as non-constitutional in[*235] magnitude and the exclusionary rule was not applied. Also, in State v. Davis (1978), 56 Ohio St; 2d 51, it was held that fingerprint evidence obtained in violation of a statute does not have to be excluded.

It is clear from these cases that the exclusionary rule will not ordinarily be applied to evidence which is the product of police conduct violative of state law but not violative of constitutional rights.

We turn now to examine the facts in this case to determine whether a constitutional violation occurred. We find none. At the outset, it is readily apparent that Willcox had probable cause to arrest the defendant after observing his erratic driving behavior. Accordingly, assuming the warrantless arrest of the defendant to be a seizure within the context of the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unlawful searches and seizures, we find no Fourth Amendment violation, given the probable cause to make the seizure.[3] Therefore, even assuming the arrest of the defendant was not authorized under existing Ohio law, it does not offend either the United States or Ohio Constitution. Under these circumstances, the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine enunciated in Wong Sun v. United States (1963), 371 U. S. 471, 488, does not apply. In short, the fruits of the arrest of the defendant, based on probable cause but unauthorized under existing state law, are not suppressible solely because of the fact of the arrest in Dayton by a Kettering police officer.

[*236] After the arrest of the defendant was completed in the city of Dayton, he performed field sobriety tests at the officer’s command. The officer’s testimony concerning his observations of the defendant’s conduct during the field sobriety tests constituted an essential part of the state’s proof in support of the allegation that the defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol in Kettering. It is well settled that the commanded performance of such tests is not a testimonial utterance and thus does not offend the privilege against self-incrimination protected by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Piqua v. Hinger (1968), 15 Ohio St. 2d 110, paragraph one of the syllabus.

Moreover, an arrested person is not immune from prosecution merely because of the fact that his arrest was “unlawful” or “unauthorized.” State v. Holbert (1974), 38 Ohio St. 2d 113. Rather, the issue is whether any of the evidence used to convict a defendant subjected to an unlawful or unauthorized arrest was inadmissible. Here, after careful analysis, we declare the testimony of Willcox with respect to the conduct of the defendant to be admissible, even assuming the unauthorized arrest.

Therefore, the judgment entered by the Court of Appeals is reversed.

Judgment reversed.

Celebrezze, C. J., W. Brown, P. Brown, Sweeney, Locher and Holmes, JJ., concur.
1

See Cincinnati v. Alexander (1978), 54 Ohio St. 2d 248; State v. Anderson (1976), 46 Ohio St. 2d 219; State v. Zdovc (1958), 106 Ohio App. 481. See, generally, 5 American Jurisprudence 2d 742, Arrest, Sections 50-51. See, also, Note, 4 Ohio No. L. Rev. 470.

The General Assembly has just recently adopted Am. Sub. S. B. No. 355, amending R. C. 2935.03, effective January 9, 1981, to speak to this problem.

R. C. 2935.03(D) will read:

“If a sheriff, deputy sheriff, marshal, deputy marshal, police officer, constable, or state university law enforcement officer appointed under section 3345,04 of the Revised Code is authorized by division (A), (B), or (C) of this section to arrest and detain, within the limits of the political subdivision, college, or university in which he is appointed or elected, a person until a warrant can be obtained, the peace officer may, outside the limits of the political subdivision, college, or university in which he is appointed[*234] or elected, pursue, arrest, and detain that person until a warrant can be obtained if all of the following apply:

“(1) The pursuit takes places without unreasonable delay after the offense is committed;

“(2) The pursuit is initiated within the limits of the political subdivision, college, or university in which the peace officer is appointed or elected;

“(3) The offense involved is a felony, a misdemeanor of the first degree or a substantially equivalent municipal ordinance, a misdemeanor of the second degree or a substantially equivalent municipal ordinance, or any offense for which points are chargeable pursuant to division (G) of section 4507.40 of the Revised Code.”

We observe in passing that both of these violations appear to be offenses “for which points are chargeable pursuant to division (G) of section 4507.40 of the Revised Code.” See R. C. 4507.40(G)(4) and (12).

2

See Cincinnati v. Alexander, supra (54 Ohio St. 2d 248, 255), where such an issue was noted but not considered, due to the limited nature of the state’s appeal. See, also, State v. Wallace (1976), 50 Ohio App. 2d 78.

3

People v. Burdo (1974), 56 Mich. App. 48, 223 N.W. 2d 358; State v. Eubanks (1973), 283 N.C. 556, 196 S.E. 2d 706. Cf. Michigan v. DeFillippo (1979), 443 U. S. 31 (evidence seized during search incident to arrest made upon probable cause for violation of ordinance later held unconstitutional need not be suppressed). The exclusionary-rule has generally been said to apply to the fruits of a search incident to an “illegal arrest.” See, e.g., United States v. Wynn (C.A. 5, 1977), 544 F. 2d 786, 791. Although we have been unable to discover a case in the federal system which has explicitly held an illegal arrest to be equivalent to an arrest made without probable cause, we have been equally unsuccessful in locating a case where an arrest made with probable cause has been declared unauthorized and the exclusionary rule applied. Cf. United States v. Fernandez-Guzman (C.A. 7, 1978), 577 F. 2d 1093, certiorari denied, 439 U. S. 954 (war-rantless arrest made upon probable cause not invalidated by subsequent filing of incomplete complaint at preliminary hearing), with United States v. Connolly (C. A. 7, 1973), 479 F. 2d 930, certiorari dismissed, 414 U. S. 897; and with United States v. Marlin (C.A. 7, 1972), 471 F. 2d 764 (arrests made without probable cause held unlawful and exclusionary rule applied).