61 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2026 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
cluster 2008green2 sentences2024See also Equal Rights Ctr., 602 F.3d at 604, fn. 2 (declining to consider “whether a state-law claim for contribution [was] preempted” by the FHA because the contribution claim being presented would shift the entire cost of the violation to another entity).2 {¶ 65} The Tenth District also concluded that “if Congress had wanted to provide for a right of contribution for violations of the FHA, it would have included such a right as a provision in the FHA itself—yet it did not.” 2022-Ohio-3442 at ¶ 16 (10th Dist.). 2024See also Equal Rights Ctr., 602 F.3d at 604, fn. 2 (declining to consider “whether a state-law claim for contribution [was] preempted” by the FHA because the contribution claim being presented would shift the entire cost of the violation to another entity).2 {¶ 65} The Tenth District also concluded that “if Congress had wanted to provide for a right of contribution for violations of the FHA, it would have included such a right as a provision in the FHA itself—yet it did not.” 2022-Ohio-3442 at ¶ 16 (10th Dist.). | 2 | 2 |
English v. General Electric Co.green2 sentences2024Co., 496 U.S. 72 , 79 (1990), quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 , 67 (1941). {¶ 40} In the Tenth District’s view, “a state law claim for contribution is an obstacle to the full purposes and objectives of Congress in the passage of the FHA.” 2022-Ohio-3442 at ¶ 15 (10th Dist.). 2024Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990), quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). {¶ 40} In the Tenth District’s view, “a state law claim for contribution is an obstacle to the full purposes and objectives of Congress in the passage of the FHA.” 2022-Ohio-3442 at ¶ 15 (10th Dist.). | 2 | 2 |
Hines v. Davidowitzgreen2 sentences2024Co., 496 U.S. 72 , 79 (1990), quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 , 67 (1941). {¶ 40} In the Tenth District’s view, “a state law claim for contribution is an obstacle to the full purposes and objectives of Congress in the passage of the FHA.” 2022-Ohio-3442 at ¶ 15 (10th Dist.). 2024Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990), quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). {¶ 40} In the Tenth District’s view, “a state law claim for contribution is an obstacle to the full purposes and objectives of Congress in the passage of the FHA.” 2022-Ohio-3442 at ¶ 15 (10th Dist.). | 2 | 2 |
Epcon Community Franchising, L.L.C. v. Wilcox Dev. Group, L.L.C.green2 sentences2024Co., 496 U.S. 72 , 79 (1990), quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 , 67 (1941). {¶ 40} In the Tenth District’s view, “a state law claim for contribution is an obstacle to the full purposes and objectives of Congress in the passage of the FHA.” 2022-Ohio-3442 at ¶ 15 (10th Dist.). 2024See also Equal Rights Ctr., 602 F.3d at 604, fn. 2 (declining to consider “whether a state-law claim for contribution [was] preempted” by the FHA because the contribution claim being presented would shift the entire cost of the violation to another entity).2 {¶ 65} The Tenth District also concluded that “if Congress had wanted to provide for a right of contribution for violations of the FHA, it would have included such a right as a provision in the FHA itself—yet it did not.” 2022-Ohio-3442 at ¶ 16 (10th Dist.). | 2 | 2 |
Baker, Watts & Company v. Miles & Stockbridge Timothy R. Casgar, Baker, Watts & Company v. Miles & Stockbridge Timothy R. Casgargreen2 sentences2024Consistent with the goal of holding all FHA violators responsible, Epcon’s state claim seeks to ensure that “common liability” is allocated “proportionately.” Compare Baker, Watts & Co. v. Miles & Stockbridge, 876 F.2d 1101 , 1107 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that federal securities laws did not preempt a state-law claim for contribution when such a claim would “further the regulatory purposes of the federal securities laws by holding all violators to account”). 2024Consistent with the goal of holding all FHA violators responsible, Epcon’s state claim seeks to ensure that “common liability” is allocated “proportionately.” Compare Baker, Watts & Co. v. Miles & Stockbridge, 876 F.2d 1101, 1107 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that federal securities laws did not preempt a state-law claim for contribution when such a claim would “further the regulatory purposes of the federal securities laws by holding all violators to account”). | 2 | 2 |
Ricardo Torres v. Precision Indus., Inc.green2 sentences2024Compare Torres v. Precision Indus., Inc., 938 F.3d 752 , 756-757 (6th Cir. 2019) (concluding that a district court erred by determining the constitutional issue of preemption before addressing the merits of a state-law claim). {¶ 19} Both the party presentment and constitutional avoidance considerations apply with equal force in this court. 2024Compare Torres v. Precision Indus., Inc., 938 F.3d 752, 756-757 (6th Cir. 2019) (concluding that a district court erred by determining the constitutional issue of preemption before addressing the merits of a state-law claim). {¶ 19} Both the party presentment and constitutional avoidance considerations apply with equal force in this court. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Perrygreen2 sentences2018Under 17 U.S.C. 301(a), a state common-law or statutory claim is preempted if: "(1) the work is within the scope of the 'subject matter of copyright,' as specified in 17 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103 ; and, (2) the rights granted under state law are equivalent to any exclusive rights within the scope of federal copyright law as set out in 17 U.S.C. § 106 ." Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp. , 256 F.3d 446 , 453 (6th Cir.2001) ; see State v. Perry , 83 Ohio St.3d 41 , 42, 697 N.E.2d 624 (1998). 2018Generally, Section 106 of the Copyright Act protects an owner's right to reproduce, distribute, perform, and display a copyrighted work, and to prepare derivative works based on a copyrighted work. 17 U.S.C. 106. {¶ 11} Because we have already held that First World's unregistered architectural drawings fell within the subject matter of copyright law, the only issue is the equivalency prong of the analysis. "[T]o survive a preemption challenge based on equivalency of protected rights, the state law claim must contain an extra element" that "distinguish[es] the claim from a claim in copyright" a | 2 | 2 |
Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc.green2 sentences2002That having been said, we agree with the trial court with respect to two of Milcor's theories and hereby adopt the following conclusions of the trial court: (1) Summary judgment is not warranted on the basis that Luginbihl's claims are preempted by federal labor law on the authority of Lingle v. Norge Div. Of Magic Chef, Inc . (1988), 486 U.S. 399 which states that a state-law claim is not subject to federal preclusion where that claim is independent of the collective bargaining agreement and presents purely factual questions that can be resolved without interpretation of the collective bargai 2001In Lingle, supra, at 407 , the United States Supreme Court held that a state-law retaliatory discharge claim was independent of the collective bargaining agreement and, thus, not preempted by federal labor law, when the state-law claim presented purely factual questions that could be resolved without interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. | 1 | 6 |
Tanya Martin v. City of Broadview Heightsgreen1 sentence2026See King, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS at *5 (noting that “the [trial] court denied summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment claim because it found that disputes of fact existed as to whether [the officer] or others in the area ‘were threatened with serious bodily injury’ when [the officer] shot [the decedent]”); see also Martin v. Broadview Heights, 712 F.3d 951, 963 (6th Cir. 2013) (recognizing that where “resolution of the state-law immunity issue is heavily dependent on the same disputed material facts as the excessive-force determination under § 1983, the district court properly denied summary ju | 1 | 1 |
Gwendolyn M. RIVERS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BARBERTON BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant-Appelleegreen1 sentence2024See also Rivers v. Barberton Bd. of Edn., 143 F.3d 1029, 1032 (6th Cir.1998) (It is of no consequence whether the Title VII claim was dismissed on the merits in the first case so 15 Case No. 2023-T-0067 long as some relevant portion of the first case was dismissed on the merits; this was a final decision on the merits of the race-discrimination claim by a court of competent jurisdiction, not only as to those legal theories, but also as to any other legal theory under which that claim might have been litigated). {¶64} Most fundamentally, Ms. Glenn did not appeal the federal court’s decision. {¶ | 1 | 1 |
Thermodyn Corp. v. 3M Co.green2 sentences2022The test to determine whether a state law claim is displaced by OUTSA is to determine whether “the claims are no more than a restatement of the same operative facts that formed the basis of the plaintiff’s statutory claim for trade secret misappropriation.” Id. at 485, quoting Thermodyn Corp. v. 3M Corp., 593 F.Supp.2d 972, 989 (N.D.Ohio 2008). 2022“Where the state-law claim has a factual basis independent from the facts establishing the OUTSA claim, the portion of the claim supported by an independent factual basis survives preemption.” Id., quoting Miami Valley Mobile Health Servs., Inc. v. ExamOne Worldwide, Inc., 852 F.Supp.2d 925, 940 (S.D.Ohio 2012). | 1 | 1 |
Miami Valley Mobile Health Services, Inc. v. ExamOne Worldwide, Inc.green2 sentences2022“Where the state-law claim has a factual basis independent from the facts establishing the OUTSA claim, the portion of the claim supported by an independent factual basis survives preemption.” Id., quoting Miami Valley Mobile Health Servs., Inc. v. ExamOne Worldwide, Inc., 852 F.Supp.2d 925, 940 (S.D.Ohio 2012). 2022“Where the state-law claim has a factual basis independent from the facts establishing the OUTSA claim, the portion of the claim supported by an independent factual basis survives preemption.” Id., quoting Miami Valley Mobile Health Servs., Inc. v. ExamOne Worldwide, Inc., 852 F.Supp.2d 925, 940 (S.D.Ohio 2012). | 1 | 1 |
Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Committeegreen2 sentences2017See 21 U.S.C. 337(a) (“proceedings for enforcement of the FDCA shall be by and in the name of the United States”); see also Buckman v. Plaintiff’s Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 349 , 121 S.Ct. 1012 , 148 L.Ed.2d 854 (2001), fn. 4 (“The FDCA leaves no doubt that it is the Federal Government rather than litigants who [is] authorized to file suit for noncompliance with the FDCA.”). {¶7} In their memorandum opposing the motions, the Tibbes argued that they may have a claim that fit within what they characterized as a “narrow exception” to preemption based on the “failure-to-update theory” articulated 2017See 21 U.S.C. 337(a) (“proceedings for enforcement of the FDCA shall be by and in the name of the United States”); see also Buckman v. Plaintiff’s Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 349 , 121 S.Ct. 1012 , 148 L.Ed.2d 854 (2001), fn. 4 (“The FDCA leaves no doubt that it is the Federal Government rather than litigants who [is] authorized to file suit for noncompliance with the FDCA.”). {¶7} In their memorandum opposing the motions, the Tibbes argued that they may have a claim that fit within what they characterized as a “narrow exception” to preemption based on the “failure-to-update theory” articulated | 1 | 1 |
Eleanor Fulgenzi v. PLIVA, Inc.green1 sentence2017See 21 U.S.C. 337(a) (“proceedings for enforcement of the FDCA shall be by and in the name of the United States”); see also Buckman v. Plaintiff’s Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 349 , 121 S.Ct. 1012 , 148 L.Ed.2d 854 (2001), fn. 4 (“The FDCA leaves no doubt that it is the Federal Government rather than litigants who [is] authorized to file suit for noncompliance with the FDCA.”). {¶7} In their memorandum opposing the motions, the Tibbes argued that they may have a claim that fit within what they characterized as a “narrow exception” to preemption based on the “failure-to-update theory” articulated | 1 | 1 |
| Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Department of Revenuegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Miller v. Sanilac Countygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Logsdon v. Hainsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Watson v. Parma Commun. Gen. Hosp., Unpublished Decision (2-16-2006)green | 1 | 1 |
| Graber v. Fuquagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Quinn v. Millsapgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Grupo Condumex, S.A. De C v. v. SPX Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Drostegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Valot v. Southeast Local School Districtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Trandes Corporation v. Guy F. Atkinson Company, and Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authoritygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Fenton v. Querygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Myers v. Schieringgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Bruce F. Botsford v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Montana, Inc. Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association
green
2 sentences2019Botsford v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Montana, Inc. (2002), 314 F.3d 390 . 2012Botsford v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Montana, Inc. (2002), 314 F.3d 390 . | 3 | 2003–2019 |
Robert Cromwell v. Equicor-Equitable Hca Corp.
green
2 sentences2013As the court in Cromwell, 944 F.2d at 1276 , stated, It is not the label placed on a state law claim that determines whether it is preempted, but whether in essence such a claim is for the recovery of an ERISA plan benefit. 1999Leasher , 96 Ohio App.3d 372 , citing Cromwell v. Equicor-Equitable HCA Corp. (C.A.6, 1991), 944 F.2d 1272 . | 3 | 1994–2013 |
Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing
green
2 sentences2016Where all four of these requirements are met, we held, jurisdiction is proper because there is a ‘serious federal interest in claiming the advantages thought to be inherent in a federal forum,’ which can be vindicated without disrupting Congress's intended division of labor between state and federal courts.” (Citations omitted.) Id. at 1065 citing Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 313-314 , 125 S.Ct. 2363 (2005). {¶18} In applying this test to the facts before it, Gunn held that the malpractice suit did not satisfy the third prong, i.e., the federal 2016Where all four of these requirements are met, we held, jurisdiction is proper because there is a ‘serious federal interest in claiming the advantages thought to be inherent in a federal forum,’ which can be vindicated without disrupting Congress's intended division of labor between state and federal courts.” (Citations omitted.) Id. at 1065 citing Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 313-314 , 125 S.Ct. 2363 (2005). {¶18} In applying this test to the facts before it, Gunn held that the malpractice suit did not satisfy the third prong, i.e., the federal | 2 | 2009–2016 |
Scott v. Gulf Oil Corporation
green
2 sentences2004Scott v. Gulf Oil Corp. (C.A. 6, 1985), 754 F.2d 1499 , 1504 . 2003Scott v. Gulf Oil Corp . (6th Cir. 1985), 754 F.2d 1499 . | 2 | 2003–2004 |
City of Kettering v. Hollen
green
2 sentences1999See State v. Droste (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 36 , 697 N.E.2d 620 ; Kettering v. Hollen (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 232 , 234-235 , 416 N.E.2d 598 , 600 . 1999See State v. Droste (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 36 , 697 N.E.2d 620 ; Kettering v. Hollen (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 232 , 234-235 , 416 N.E.2d 598 , 600 . | 2 | 1999–1999 |
United States v. Dean S. Hazel, (81-1616), James G. Lott, (81-1630)
green
2 sentences1998Citing United States v. Hazel (C.A.6, 1983), 696 F.2d 473, 475 , appellant contends that due process entitled him to a hearing because he presented sufficient facts to raise a reasonable doubt as to the prosecutor’s purpose. 1998Again, he raises both a federal constitutional claim and a state-law claim. {¶ 42} Citing United States v. Hazel (C.A.6, 1983), 696 F.2d 473, 475 , appellant contends that due process entitled him to a hearing because he presented sufficient facts to raise a reasonable doubt as to the prosecutor’s purpose. | 2 | 1998–1998 |
Del Madera Properties v. Rhodes And Gardner, Inc.
green
2 sentences1998Del Madera Properties v. Rhodes & Gardner, Inc. (C.A.9, 1987), 820 F.2d 973 , 977. 1998Del Madera Properties v. Rhodes & Gardner, Inc. (C.A.9, 1987), 820 F.2d 973, 977 . | 2 | 1998–1998 |
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck
green
2 sentences1997In AllisChalmers v. Lueck (1985), 471 U.S. 202, 220 , 105 S.Ct. 1904, 1915-1916 , 85 L.Ed.2d 206, 221 , *23 the United States Supreme Court held that when resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract, that claim must either be treated as a Section 301 claim or dismissed as preempted by federal labor-contract law. 1997In AllisChalmers v. Lueck (1985), 471 U.S. 202, 220 , 105 S.Ct. 1904, 1915-1916 , 85 L.Ed.2d 206, 221 , *23 the United States Supreme Court held that when resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract, that claim must either be treated as a Section 301 claim or dismissed as preempted by federal labor-contract law. | 2 | 1986–1997 |
Marchetti v. Kalish
green
1 sentence2025Id. at 107 . {¶ 38} In another case involving a lethal response on a suicide call, the Tenth District again distinguished between negligence and the reckless conduct necessary to impose liability under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Musa v. Gillett Communications, Inc.
green
1 sentence2022Musa v. Gillett Communications, Inc., 119 Ohio App.3d Stark County, Case No. 2021 CA 00133 15 673, 696 N.E.2d 227 (8th Dist. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Biddle v. Warren General Hospital
green
1 sentence2020HIPAA does not preempt a state-law claim under our decision in Biddle {¶ 29} In Biddle, we recognized an independent tort for the “unauthorized, unprivileged disclosure to a third party of nonpublic medical information that a physician or hospital has learned within the physician-patient-relationship.” 86 Ohio St.3d 395 , 715 N.E.2d 518 , at paragraph one of the syllabus. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Amanda Lawson-Ross v. Great Lakes Higher Education Corp.
green
1 sentence2020Id. at 919-20 . {¶ 44} Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently held that the HEA did not preempt a student loan borrower's state law claims that a federal student loan servicer made affirmative misrepresentations to the borrower while counseling her on her repayment plan options. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
327-42 Findlay, L.L.C. v. Hancock Cty. Bd. of Revision
neutral
1 sentence2019But the court determined that Miracle had abandoned Count Three’s wrongful-discharge claim for failure to assert any related assignment of error. {¶ 9} We accepted the state’s discretionary appeal, 153 Ohio St.3d 1402 , 2018-Ohio-2380 , 100 N.E.3d 422 , which presents two propositions of law: 1. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Wilkins v. Harrisburg
neutral
2 sentences2019But the court determined that Miracle had abandoned Count Three’s wrongful-discharge claim for failure to assert any related assignment of error. {¶ 9} We accepted the state’s discretionary appeal, 153 Ohio St.3d 1402 , 2018-Ohio-2380 , 100 N.E.3d 422 , which presents two propositions of law: 1. 2019But the court determined that Miracle had abandoned Count Three’s wrongful-discharge claim for failure to assert any related assignment of error. {¶ 9} We accepted the state’s discretionary appeal, 153 Ohio St.3d 1402 , 2018-Ohio-2380 , 100 N.E.3d 422 , which presents two propositions of law: 1. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
U.S. ex rel. Berge v. Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama
green
1 sentence2018Berge v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Alabama , 104 F.3d 1453 , 1463 (4th Cir.1997) ; see Wrench at 456 ; N. Am. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Wrench Llc, a Michigan Limited Liability Company Joseph Shields Thomas Rinks v. Taco Bell Corp.
green
1 sentence2018Under 17 U.S.C. 301(a), a state common-law or statutory claim is preempted if: "(1) the work is within the scope of the 'subject matter of copyright,' as specified in 17 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103 ; and, (2) the rights granted under state law are equivalent to any exclusive rights within the scope of federal copyright law as set out in 17 U.S.C. § 106 ." Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp. , 256 F.3d 446 , 453 (6th Cir.2001) ; see State v. Perry , 83 Ohio St.3d 41 , 42, 697 N.E.2d 624 (1998). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Quill Corp. v. North Dakota Ex Rel. Heitkamp red | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Johnson v. City of Aiken green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| CSAHA/UHHS-Canton, Inc. v. Aultman Health Found. green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Pyle v. Pyle green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Yaklevich v. Kemp, Schaeffer & Rowe Co. green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Fred Siegel Co., L.P.A. v. Arter & Hadden green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Hood v. Diamond Products, Inc. green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Cline v. American Aggregates Corp. green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp. green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15 green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Cipriano v. City of Houma green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Hill v. Stone green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Perry v. Thomas green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Pilot Life Insurance v. Dedeaux green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Street v. Gerstenslager Co. neutral | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Graham v. Ohio Board of Bar Examiners green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Marion Terwilliger and Doris Terwilliger v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., a Foreign Corporation, and James Shelby, Jointly and Severally, M.J. Jorgensen green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Decoe v. General Motors Corporation green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.