exclusionary rule in Ohio

2026“When police act under a warrant that is invalid for lack of probable cause, the exclusionary rule does not apply if the police acted ‘in objectively reasonable reliance’ on the subsequently invalidated search warrant.” Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 139-140 (2009), quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984). {¶19} Under the good-faith exception, suppression is appropriate when (1) the judge was misled by statements the affiant knew were false, (2) the issuing judge wholly abandoned his role, (3) the affidavit is so lacking in indicia of probable cause, no officer could r

2025United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); State v. Wilmoth, 22 Ohio St.3d 251 (1986). {¶ 31} In his first assignment of error, Williams argues that the trial court erred in finding that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule was applicable in this case.

2024See Kettering v. Hollen, 64 Ohio St.2d 232, 234-235 (1980) (“The exclusionary rule has been applied by this court to violations of a constitutional nature only.”), citing State v. Myers, 26 Ohio St.2d 190, 196 (1971), State v. Downs, 51 Ohio St.2d 47, 63-64 (1977), vacated on other grounds sub nom.

2024See Kettering v. Hollen, 64 Ohio St.2d 232, 234-235 (1980) (“The exclusionary rule has been applied by this court to violations of a constitutional nature only.”), citing State v. Myers, 26 Ohio St.2d 190, 196 (1971), State v. Downs, 51 Ohio St.2d 47, 63-64 (1977), vacated on other grounds sub nom.

2024In doing so, “ ‘trial and appellate courts should accord great deference to the magistrate’s determination of probable cause, and doubtful or marginal cases in this area should be resolved in favor of upholding the warrant.’ ” State v. Jones, 143 Ohio St.3d 266 , 2015-Ohio-483 , 37 N.E.3d 123, ¶ 14 , quoting State v. George, 45 Ohio St.3d 325 , 544 N.E.2d 640 (1989), paragraph two of the syllabus. 1 The probable cause “nexus” requirement is not to be confused with the “ ‘minimally sufficient nexus’ ” requirement that Ohio courts and the Sixth Circuit have applied in determining whether to appl

2024In doing so, “ ‘trial and appellate courts should accord great deference to the magistrate’s determination of probable cause, and doubtful or marginal cases in this area should be resolved in favor of upholding the warrant.’ ” State v. Jones, 143 Ohio St.3d 266 , 2015-Ohio-483 , 37 N.E.3d 123, ¶ 14 , quoting State v. George, 45 Ohio St.3d 325 , 544 N.E.2d 640 (1989), paragraph two of the syllabus. 1 The probable cause “nexus” requirement is not to be confused with the “ ‘minimally sufficient nexus’ ” requirement that Ohio courts and the Sixth Circuit have applied in determining whether to appl

2026“When a defendant moves to suppress evidence recovered during a warrantless search, the state has the burden of showing that the search fits within one of the defined exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.” State v. Banks-Harvey, 2018-Ohio-201, ¶ 18 . {¶29} “Courts must exclude evidence obtained by searches and seizures that violate the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Adams, 2015-Ohio-3954, ¶ 181 , citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (extending the exclusionary rule to the states). “‘The primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to remove incentive from the police to viol

2025“When a defendant moves to suppress evidence recovered during a warrantless search, the state has the burden of showing that the search fits within one of the defined exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.” State v. Banks-Harvey, 2018-Ohio-201, ¶ 18 . {¶26} “Courts must exclude evidence obtained by searches and seizures that violate the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Adams, 2015-Ohio-3954, ¶ 181 , citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (extending the exclusionary rule to the states). “‘The primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to remove incentive from the police to viol

2025Id. at 238 , 131 S.Ct. 2419 ; see also Herring at 144, 129 S.Ct. 695 (“To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system”).

2023However, the United States Supreme Court created the exclusionary rule to “ ‘compel respect for the constitutional guaranty.’ ” Id., quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).

2025In presenting to the grand jury, prosecutors are not encumbered by the Ohio Rules of Evidence, see Evid.R. 101(D)(2), or the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule, see United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974), leaving them free to rely upon hearsay or evidence seized unlawfully.

2024The State’s position in this regard misconstrues the gravamen of Smith’s argument, which is that the trial court’s determination that he violated the seatbelt ordinance was predicated on erroneous factual findings. 6 {¶16} “The exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy for Fourth Amendment violations.” State v. Castagnola, 2015-Ohio-1565 , ¶ 92, citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). “[E]vidence obtained as a result of an illegal arrest is inadmissible at trial.” State v. Henderson, 51 Ohio St.3d 54, 56 (1990). {¶17} Akron City Code 72.70(B)(3) provides, in relevant

2026See, e.g., State v. Wilmoth, 22 Ohio St.3d 251 (1986), syllabus (even if a warrant issued by a neutral detached magistrate is later ruled invalid, the exclusionary rule is not to be applied where the officers conducting the search acted in objectively reasonable, good faith reliance on the warrant).

2025United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); State v. Wilmoth, 22 Ohio St.3d 251 (1986). {¶ 31} In his first assignment of error, Williams argues that the trial court erred in finding that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule was applicable in this case.

2025State v. Johnson, 2014-Ohio-5021 , ¶ 40. “[A] motion to suppress is the proper vehicle for raising constitutional challenges based on the exclusionary rule[.]” State v. French, 72 Ohio St.3d 446, 449 (1995).

2025State v. Johnson, 2014-Ohio-5021 , ¶ 40. “[A] motion to suppress is the proper vehicle for raising constitutional challenges based on the exclusionary rule[.]” State v. French, 72 Ohio St.3d 446, 449 (1995).

2026“When police act under a warrant that is invalid for lack of probable cause, the exclusionary rule does not apply if the police acted ‘in objectively reasonable reliance’ on the subsequently invalidated search warrant.” Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 139-140 (2009), quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984). {¶19} Under the good-faith exception, suppression is appropriate when (1) the judge was misled by statements the affiant knew were false, (2) the issuing judge wholly abandoned his role, (3) the affidavit is so lacking in indicia of probable cause, no officer could r

2025Id. at 238 , 131 S.Ct. 2419 ; see also Herring at 144, 129 S.Ct. 695 (“To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system”).

2024See Kettering v. Hollen, 64 Ohio St.2d 232, 234-235 (1980) (“The exclusionary rule has been applied by this court to violations of a constitutional nature only.”), citing State v. Myers, 26 Ohio St.2d 190, 196 (1971), State v. Downs, 51 Ohio St.2d 47, 63-64 (1977), vacated on other grounds sub nom.

2024See Kettering v. Hollen, 64 Ohio St.2d 232, 234-235 (1980) (“The exclusionary rule has been applied by this court to violations of a constitutional nature only.”), citing State v. Myers, 26 Ohio St.2d 190, 196 (1971), State v. Downs, 51 Ohio St.2d 47, 63-64 (1977), vacated on other grounds sub nom.

2024The inevitable- discovery exception to the exclusionary rule provides that “illegally obtained evidence may be admitted in a proceeding once the state establishes that the evidence would inevitably have been discovered in the course of a lawful investigation.” State v. Banks-Harvey, 2018-Ohio-201, ¶ 27 , citing State v. Perkins, 18 Ohio St.3d 193 (1985), paragraph one of the syllabus.

2023However, “ ‘[i]f the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means * * * then the deterrence rationale [of the exclusionary rule] has so little basis that the evidence should be received.’ ” State v. Hunter, 153 Ohio App.3d 628 , 2003-Ohio-4204 , 795 N.E.2d 139, ¶ 20 (2d Dist.), quoting Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 , 104 S.Ct. 2501 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984) and State v. Perkins, 18 Ohio St.3d 193, 195-196 , 480 N.E.2d 763 (1985).

2024See Kettering v. Hollen, 64 Ohio St.2d 232, 234-235 (1980) (“The exclusionary rule has been applied by this court to violations of a constitutional nature only.”), citing State v. Myers, 26 Ohio St.2d 190, 196 (1971), State v. Downs, 51 Ohio St.2d 47, 63-64 (1977), vacated on other grounds sub nom.

2024See Kettering v. Hollen, 64 Ohio St.2d 232, 234-235 (1980) (“The exclusionary rule has been applied by this court to violations of a constitutional nature only.”), citing State v. Myers, 26 Ohio St.2d 190, 196 (1971), State v. Downs, 51 Ohio St.2d 47, 63-64 (1977), vacated on other grounds sub nom.

2022The doctrine is an exception to the exclusionary rule and provides that evidence discovered as a result of unconstitutional police conduct is admissible "when the connection between the unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance, so that 'the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained.'" Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232, 237-238 , 136 S.Ct. 2056 (2016), quoting Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 593 , 126 S.Ct. 2159 (2006). {¶ 36} In St

2022The doctrine is an exception to the exclusionary rule and provides that evidence discovered as a result of unconstitutional police conduct is admissible "when the connection between the unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance, so that 'the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained.'" Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232, 237-238 , 136 S.Ct. 2056 (2016), quoting Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 593 , 126 S.Ct. 2159 (2006). {¶ 36} In St

2025The Court stated: “the balancing approach that has evolved in various contexts—including criminal trials—‘forcefully suggest[s] that the exclusionary rule be more generally modified to permit the introduction of evidence obtained in the reasonable, good-faith belief that a search or seizure was in accord with the Fourth Amendment.’“ Leon, at 909, quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983); see also Sheppard, supra (exclusionary rule would not be applied since officers conducting the search acted in objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant issued).

2020Thus, the question whether the exclusionary sanction should be imposed is “ ‘an issue separate from the question whether the Fourth Amendment rights of the party seeking to invoke the rule were violated by police conduct.’ ” Leon, 468 U.S. at 906, quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 223 (1983). {¶30} Specifically, “the deterrence benefits of exclusion ‘vary with the culpability of the law enforcement conduct’ at issue.” Davis at 239, 131 S.Ct. 2419 , quoting Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 143 (2009) (“To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberat

2026“The exclusionary rule reaches not only primary evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure, but also evidence that is subsequently discovered and derivative of that prior illegality.” Id. {¶ 20} R.C. 4511.13(C)(2)(a), the basis of Goubeaux’s traffic stop for the red-light violation, states, in relevant part, that vehicular traffic “facing a steady red arrow signal indication shall not enter the intersection to make the movement indicated by the arrow and . . . shall stop at a clearly marked stop line; . . . and shall remain stopped until a signal indication or other t

2026“The exclusionary rule reaches not only primary evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure, but also evidence that is subsequently discovered and derivative of that prior illegality.” Id. {¶ 9} Ruhenkamp was charged with violating R.C. 4511.12, which governs obedience to traffic control devices, and states: “No . . . driver of a vehicle . . . shall disobey the instructions of any traffic control device . . .” R.C. 4511.13(C)(1)(a) states: “Vehicular traffic . . . facing a steady circular red signal . . . shall stop at a clearly marked stop line.” However, the statutor

2025No. 23AP-739 9 State v. Carter, 1994-Ohio-343 , 69 Ohio St.3d 57, 67 , citing Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939). {¶ 38} An exception to the exclusionary rule is the independent source doctrine which allows the admission of evidence discovered by means entirely independent of any constitutional violation.

2022"The exclusionary rule reaches not only primary evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure, but also evidence later discovered and found to be derivative of an illegality, or 'fruit of the poisonous tree.'" State v. Carter, 69 Ohio St.3d 57, 67 (1994), citing Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 , 60 S.Ct. 266 (1939).

2025State v. Adams, 2015-Ohio-3954, ¶ 181 , citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (extending the exclusionary rule to the states). “‘The primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to remove incentive from the police to violate the Fourth Amendment.’” State v. Eggleston, 2015-Ohio-958 , ¶ 17 (11th Dist.), quoting State v. Casey, 2014-Ohio-2586, ¶ 29 (12th Dist.), citing Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 394 , (1914) and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 649 (1961); see also Ellis at ¶ 25-27 . {¶44} One such exception to the warrant requirement is the automobile exception.

2025Thus, a motion to suppress is the proper vehicle for raising constitutional challenges based on the exclusionary rule first enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), and made applicable to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).

2025“The exclusionary rule reaches not only primary evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure, but also evidence that is subsequently discovered and derivative of that prior illegality.” Id., citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).

2025The exclusionary rule reaches not only primary evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure, but also evidence that is subsequently discovered and derivative of that prior illegality.” State v. McLemore, 2012- Ohio-521, ¶ 20 (2d Dist.), citing Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939), and Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).

2023However, the United States Supreme Court created the exclusionary rule to “ ‘compel respect for the constitutional guaranty.’ ” Id., quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).

2018Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court created the exclusionary rule, which precludes the use in a criminal proceeding of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, "to 'compel respect for the constitutional guaranty.' " Davis v. United States , 564 U.S. 229 , 236, 131 S.Ct. 2419 , 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011), quoting Elkins v. United States , 364 U.S. 206 , 217, 80 S.Ct. 1437 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960).

2022See also Castagnola at ¶ 96 (“The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct.”). {¶28} “The United States Supreme Court has applied the good-faith exception * * * to searches conducted in reasonable reliance on subsequently invalidated statutes * * *.” State v. Banks-Harvey, 152 Ohio St.3d 368 , 2018-Ohio-201, ¶ 33 , citing Krull, 480 U.S. 340 .

2021No. 08AP-264, 2008-Ohio-6916, at ¶ 33 ("we further conclude that, even if probable cause did not exist, the police executed the search warrant in good faith under Leon"); Washington, 380 F.3d 236 at 239 (upon finding that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied, the court assumed without deciding that probable cause did not exist). {¶ 30} "When evidence is obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the judicially developed exclusionary rule usually precludes its use in a criminal proceeding against the victim of the illegal search and seizure." State v. Johnson, 48 Ohio A

2021“The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct which has deprived the defendant of some right. * * * Where the official action was pursued in complete good faith, however, the deterrence rationale loses much of its force.” Washington App. 20CA17 34 Leon at 919 , quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 , 94 S.Ct. 2357 , 41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974). {¶42} Nevertheless, under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, suppression remains an appropriate remedy in four circumstances: 1) the

2021“The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct which has deprived the defendant of some right. * * * Where the official action was pursued in complete good faith, however, the deterrence rationale loses much of its force.” Washington App. 20CA17 34 Leon at 919 , quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 , 94 S.Ct. 2357 , 41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974). {¶42} Nevertheless, under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, suppression remains an appropriate remedy in four circumstances: 1) the

2026“Because the exclusionary rule’s purpose is to deter unlawful police conduct, evidence should be suppressed ‘only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.’” Leon at 919 , quoting United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542 (1975). {¶20} Here, Madaris does not contend, and the record does not support, that the police exhibited deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, judicial abandonment, or lack of specificity regarding the places to be searched and th

2025Because the exclusionary rule's purpose is to deter unlawful police conduct, evidence should be suppressed “ ‘only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.’ ” Leon, 468 U.S. at 919 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 , quoting United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542 , 95 S.Ct. 2313 , 45 L.Ed.2d 374 (1975).

2021Notably, the Ohio Supreme Court has, in limited circumstances, expanded the scope of Article I, Section 14 of Ohio Constitution to offer greater protections than those afforded by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. {¶ 53} Relevant here, in State v. Jones, 88 Ohio St.3d 430 , 727 N.E.2d 886 (2000), paragraph one of the syllabus, the Ohio Supreme Court held that “[a]bsent one or more of the exceptions specified in R.C. 2935.26, a full custodial arrest for a minor misdemeanor offense violates the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 14, Article I of

2021Notably, the Ohio Supreme Court has, in limited circumstances, expanded the scope of Article I, Section 14 of Ohio Constitution to offer greater protections than those afforded by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. {¶ 53} Relevant here, in State v. Jones, 88 Ohio St.3d 430 , 727 N.E.2d 886 (2000), paragraph one of the syllabus, the Ohio Supreme Court held that “[a]bsent one or more of the exceptions specified in R.C. 2935.26, a full custodial arrest for a minor misdemeanor offense violates the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 14, Article I of

2023However, “ ‘[i]f the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means * * * then the deterrence rationale [of the exclusionary rule] has so little basis that the evidence should be received.’ ” State v. Hunter, 153 Ohio App.3d 628 , 2003-Ohio-4204 , 795 N.E.2d 139, ¶ 20 (2d Dist.), quoting Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 , 104 S.Ct. 2501 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984) and State v. Perkins, 18 Ohio St.3d 193, 195-196 , 480 N.E.2d 763 (1985).

2023However, “ ‘[i]f the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means * * * then the deterrence rationale [of the exclusionary rule] has so little basis that the evidence should be received.’ ” State v. Hunter, 153 Ohio App.3d 628 , 2003-Ohio-4204 , 795 N.E.2d 139, ¶ 20 (2d Dist.), quoting Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 , 104 S.Ct. 2501 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984) and State v. Perkins, 18 Ohio St.3d 193, 195-196 , 480 N.E.2d 763 (1985).

2021Notably, the Ohio Supreme Court has, in limited circumstances, expanded the scope of Article I, Section 14 of Ohio Constitution to offer greater protections than those afforded by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. {¶ 53} Relevant here, in State v. Jones, 88 Ohio St.3d 430 , 727 N.E.2d 886 (2000), paragraph one of the syllabus, the Ohio Supreme Court held that “[a]bsent one or more of the exceptions specified in R.C. 2935.26, a full custodial arrest for a minor misdemeanor offense violates the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 14, Article I of

2017On appeal, appellant challenges only the trial court's determination of the infringement of his rights under the Ohio Constitution. {¶ 13} With respect to that issue, the trial court should have applied the balancing test of State v. Brown , 143 Ohio St.3d 444 , 2015-Ohio-2438 , 39 N.E.3d 496 , and State v. Jones , 88 Ohio St.3d 430 , 437, 727 N.E.2d 886 , overruled in part by Brown at ¶ 21. {¶ 14} The exclusionary rule is a judicially-created remedy to safeguard constitutional rights by excluding evidence from a trial which was obtained as a result of an unlawful (unreasonable) search and sei

2025"This constitutional guarantee is protected by the exclusionary rule, which mandates the exclusion at trial of evidence obtained from an unreasonable search and seizure." Id. {¶ 33} Searches and seizures conducted without a warrant are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, subject only to a few specific and well- established exceptions.

2024“This constitutional guarantee is protected by the exclusionary rule, which mandates the exclusion at trial of evidence obtained from an unreasonable search and seizure.” Id. {¶27} Searches and seizures conducted without a warrant are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, subject only to a few specific and well- established exceptions.