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Positive treatment
Quoted verbatim 9×
70.2 score
G Cite
cited 4× by 4 distinct cases, 2016–2022 · 3 courts ·
…the united states is the only proper defendant in an ftca action.
at p. 1095
✓
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Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
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discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Sherrill v. Bressor
the united states is the only proper defendant 6 in an ftca action.
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
California Fair Plan Association v. United States Department of Agriculture
the united states is the only proper 22 defendant in an ftca action.
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Aleck v. United States
the united states is the only proper defendant in an ftca action.
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Hines v. Mather V.A. Hospital
the united states is the only proper defendant in an ftca action.
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
(PC) Rodriguez v. United States of America
the district cou 2 also properly dismissed lance's action to the extent his complaint named does 1 through 20 ; 3 additional defendants: the united states is the only proper defendant in an ftca action.
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Michael McRae v. Bairamian Dikran
the united states is the only proper defendant in an ftca action.
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
William Kocol v. United States
the united states is the only proper defendant in an ftca action.
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Waddell v. United States
feca would therefore clearly bar an ftca suit .. . .
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
Esteghalian v. Department of the Navy
the district court also properly dismissed action to the extent 4 his complaint named does 1 through 20 as additional defendants: the united states is the 5 only proper defendant in an ftca action.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Mark A. Crozier v. Valley Health Team, Inc., et al.
Lance v. United States, 70 F.3d 1093, 1095 (9th Cir. 1995) 16 (“The United States is the only proper defendant in a FTCA action.”). 17 “The FTCA provides that the United States shall be liable for tort claims ‘in the same 18 manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.’” Gelazela v. 19 United States, No. 1:21-cv-01499-AWI-EPG (PC), 2022 WL 17368681 , at *9 (E.D.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Shannon O. Murphy Esq. Sr. dba Sheetmetal & Associates v. U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs
Lance v. United States, 70 F.3d 1093, 1095 (9th Cir. 18 1995) (citing Woods v. United States, 720 F.2d 1451 , 1452 n.1 (9th Cir. 1983)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Gallucci v. United States Postal Service
Lance v. United States, 70 F.3d 1093, 1095 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Woods v. United States, 720 F.2d 1451 , 1452 n.1 (9th Cir. 1983)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
(PS) Singh Randhawa v. Dept. of Homeland Security
Lance v. United States, 70 F.3d 1093, 1095 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing 4 Woods v. United States, 720 F.2d 1451 , 1452 n.1 (9th Cir. 1983)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Tonner v. United States
FTCA Jurisdiction Over NPS 10 Under the FTCA, courts have jurisdiction only over the United States, not any 11 federal agency. 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (a); Kocol v. United States, 670 F. App’x 489, 490 (9th 12 Cir. 2016) (“The United States is the only proper defendant in an FTCA action.”) 13 (quoting Lance v. United States, 70 F.3d 1093, 1095 (9th Cir. 1995)); Plater v. United 14 States, 359 F. Supp. 3d 930, 941 (C.D.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Godman v. United States Postal Service
Indeed, “[t]he United States is the only proper defendant in an FTCA action.” Lance v. United States, 70 F.3d 1093, 1095 (9th Cir. 1995).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Cuiriz-Lopez v. United States Navy
Proper Defendant 10 Under the FTCA, “[t]he United States is the only proper defendant.” Lance v. 11 United States, 70 F.3d 1093, 1095 (9th Cir. 1995).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
(PS) Humphrey v. Modesto Police Dept.
Lance v. United States, 70 F.3d 1093, 1095 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing 20 Woods v. United States, 720 F.2d 1451 , 1452 n.1 (9th Cir. 1983)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Davis v. Mercier
Lance v. United States, 70 F.3d 1093, 1095 (9th Cir. 1995).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
(PC) Dugger v. United States
With respect to the state law claims, “[t]he United States is the only 8 proper defendant in an FTCA action,” Lance v. United States, 70 F.3d 1093, 1095 (9th Cir. 1995) 9 (per curiam) (citation omitted), and an action under the FTCA is the exclusive remedy for 10 plaintiff’s claims other than those based on violations of the United States Constitution, 28 U.S.C. 11 § 2679(b) (remedy against the United States under the FTCA for personal injury based on 12 conduct of government employee acting within the scope of their employment is exclusive 13 remedy for damages except for actions based…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Hawkins v. United States
(Resp. at 3 10 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2671 ) (defining “[e]mployees of the government” to include “officers 11 or employees of any federal agency” and “persons acting on behalf of a federal agency in 12 an official capacity”).) 13 The Government is correct that “[t]he United States is the “only proper defendant 14 in an FTCA action.” Kennedy v. U.S. Postal Serv., 145 F.3d 1077, 1078 (9th Cir. 1998); 15 see also Lance v. United States, 70 F.3d 1093, 1094 (9th Cir. 1995) (same).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Gambel v. United States of America
As previously mentioned, under the FTCA, the only proper 9 defendant is the United States (see Lance v. United States, 70 F.3d 1093, 1095 (9th Cir. 1995)), 10 thus, Plaintiff cannot maintain an FTCA action against Off the Grid; and, given that the FTCA 11 claim was the only claim pleaded, Off the Grid was not a properly named Defendant in this single 12 count FTCA action to begin with.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Eagle Meadows Road and Property Owners' Association v. USDA Forest Service
(2×)
According to the 25 proof of service, the summons and complaint were personally served on the “United States 26 27 1 “The United States is the only proper defendant in an FTCA action.” Lance v. United States, 70 F.3d 1093, 1095 (9th Cir. 1995) (concluding district court properly dismissed the plaintiff's “action to the extent 28 [the] complaint named Does 1 through 20 as additional defendants”). 1 Department of Agriculture Office of General Counsel – DC Main Office” on February 13, 2023. 2 (Doc. 6 at p. 1.) 3 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(i), in order to serve a U…
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Fleming v. United States of America
Lance v. United States, 70 F.3d 1093, 1095 (9th Cir. 1995).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Pina v. United States
P. 12(b)(1). 19 Morales, 895 F.3d at 713 . 20 Because the FTCA grants federal court jurisdiction to hear “claims against 21 the United States, “[t]he United States is the only proper defendant in an FTCA 22 action.” Lance v. United States, 70 F.3d 1093, 1095 (9th Cir. 1995) (affirming 23 dismissal of Doe defendants in an FTCA case); see also Morris v. United States, 24 521 F.2d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 1975) (observing that tort claims against federal 25 employees and “were properly dismissed by the district court for lack of subject 26 matter jurisdiction”). 27 Because the Court lacks jur…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Reid v. United States Department of Interior
(Doc. 33 at 3.) “The United States is the only proper defendant in an FTCA 9 action.” Lance v. United States, 70 F.3d 1093, 1095 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding the district 10 court properly dismissed the plaintiff’s “action to the extent [the] complaint named Does 1 11 through 20 as additional defendants”).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Diamond v. Alaska Native Tribal Health Consortium
Under the Federal Rules, 18 [i]f a defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is filed, the court—on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff— 19 must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or order that service or order that service be made within a specified 20 time.”17 21 If the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court must extend the 22 time for service for an appropriate period.18 At a minimum, “‘good cause̕ means 23 excusable neglect.”19 To determine whether a plaintiff demonstrates excusable 24 13 Docket 31. 25 14 …
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Trinidad v. United States of America
“A district court does not err in 12 denying leave to amend where the amendment would be futile.” Id. (citing Reddy v. Litton 13 Indus., 912 F.2d 291, 296 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 921 (1991)). 14 ANALYSIS 15 Defendant requests dismissal with prejudice of the instant action for lack of subject- 16 matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim under Rule 17 12(b)(6) on three grounds: (1) Plaintiff’s FTCA cause of action must be dismissed as to the 18 CBP because the United States is the only proper defendant, (see Mot. at 2–3 (first citing …
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
JENKINS v. GIRL'S HOPE OF PITTSBURGH, INC.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1346 ; Lance v. United States, 70 F.3d 1093, 1095 (9th Cir. 1995); Allgeier v. United States, 909 F.2d 869, 871 (6th Cir. 1990).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
DD v. United States of America
It is 15 || unclear exactly what claim, if any, plaintiff may be raising under the FTCA but, in 16 || any event, plaintiff cannot state an FTCA claim against the BOP or any of the 17 || individual defendants since the “United States is the only proper defendant in an 18 | FTCA action.” Lance v. United States, 70 F.3d 1093, 1095 (9th Cir. 1995) (per 19 || curiam); Kennedy v. United States Postal Serv., 145 F.3d 1077, 1078 (9th Cir. 20 || 1998) (per curiam); see also Federal Deposit Ins.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
(PC) Hand v. Management and Training Corporation
Lance v. United States, 70 F.3d 1093, 1095 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting 11 Woods v. United States, 720 F.2d 1451 , 1452 n.1 (9th Cir. 1983)), Therefore, Plaintiff fails to 12 state a claim under the FTCA.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Sabelita Hawkins v. United States
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
The panel held that Lance v. United States, 70 F.3d 1093, 1095 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (holding that “when Congress gave federal employees the right to recover for an injury under FECA, it took away their right to sue the government in tort for medical malpractice arising out of the injury”), did not control the outcome here because the injury for which plaintiff sought medical treatment was not job-related.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
N.K. v. Air Force
Lance v. United 12 States, 70 F.3d 1093, 1094 (9th Cir. 1995) (affirming dismissal of Doe defendants in FTCA 13 action).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Kelley v. Wilper
In an FTCA case “the United States is the only proper defendant.” Lance v. United States, 70 F.3d 1093, 1095 (9th Cir. 1995).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Kelley v. Wilper
In an FTCA case “the United States is the only proper defendant.” Lance v. United States, 70 F.3d 1093, 1095 (9th Cir. 1995).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Zeiny v. United States of America
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
“The United States is the only proper defendant in a[] [Federal Tort Claims 17 Act] action.” See Lance v. United States, 70 F.3d 1093, 1095 (9th Cir. 1995). 18 In any event, as presently drafted, Plaintiff presents a litany of complaints about serious 19 events that have been detrimental to his health, including death threats, poisoning, and medication 20 tampering.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Hawkins v. United States
(See 7/31/17 Order (Dkt. # 23) 21 at 1-2 n.1 (citing Lance v. United States, 70 F.3d 1093, 1094 (9th Cir. 1995); Kennedy v. United States Postal Serv., 145 F.3d 1077, 1078 (9th Cir. 1998); Heine v. Vilsack, No. 22 1:12-CV-01992-AWI-SMS, 2014 WL 7447619 , at *2 (E.D.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Walker v. United States
The district court properly dismissed Walker’s claims challenging the denial of his request for disability benefits because the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act (“FECA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101 et seq., provides an exclusive and comprehensive program of workers’ compensation for government employees injured in work-related accidents, see Lance v. United States, 70 F.3d 1093, 1095 (9th Cir.1995) (per cu-riam), and district courts have no jurisdiction to review final judgments in FECA matters rendered by the Department of Labor, see Staacke, 841 F.2d at 281 .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Walker v. United States
The district court properly dismissed Walker’s claims challenging the denial of his request for disability benefits because the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act (“FECA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101 et seq., provides an exclusive and comprehensive program of workers’ compensation for government employees injured in work-related accidents, see Lance v. United States, 70 F.3d 1093, 1095 (9th Cir.1995) (per cu-riam), and district courts have no jurisdiction to review final judgments in FECA matters rendered by the Department of Labor, see Staacke, 841 F.2d at 281 .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Petersen v. United States
The district court properly dismissed the action because the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act (“FECA”), 5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq., provides an exclusive and comprehensive program of workers’ compensation for government employees injured in work-related accidents, see Lance v. United States, 70 F.3d 1093, 1095 (9th Cir.1995) (per curiam), and district courts have no jurisdiction to review final judgments in FECA matters rendered by the Department, see Staacke, 841 F.2d at 281 .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Petersen v. United States
The district court properly dismissed the action because the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act (“FECA”), 5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq., provides an exclusive and comprehensive program of workers’ compensation for government employees injured in work-related accidents, see Lance v. United States, 70 F.3d 1093, 1095 (9th Cir.1995) (per curiam), and district courts have no jurisdiction to review final judgments in FECA matters rendered by the Department, see Staacke, 841 F.2d at 281 .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Spinelli, Gianpaola v. Goss, Porter
See Elman v. United States, 173 F.3d 486, 490-92 (3d Cir.1999); Lance v. United States, 70 F.3d 1093, 1095 (9th Cir.1995) (per curiam); Votteler v. United States, 904 F.2d 128, 130-31 (2d Cir.1990); Wilder v. United States, 873 F.2d 285, 289 (11th Cir.1989) (per curiam); Vilanova v. United States, 851 F.2d 1 , 7 & n. 24 (1st Cir.1988).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Petersen v. United States Department of Labor
Lance v. United States, 70 F.3d 1093, 1095 (9th Cir.1995) (per curiam).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Wolff v. Hood
Lance v. United States, 70 F.3d 1093, 1095 (9th Cir.1995) (citing Woods v. United States, 720 F.2d 1451 , 1452 n. 1 (9th Cir.1983)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Hightower v. United States
FECA provides the exclusive remedy against the federal government for work-related injuries sustained by federal employees. 5 U.S.C. § 8116 (c); Votteler v. United States, 904 F.2d 128, 130 (2d Cir.1990). 2 See also Lance v. United States, 70 F.3d 1093, 1095 (9th Cir.1995).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Charles M. Vander v. United States Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Prisons, Western Regional Office United States of America
We have interpreted that to mean that the Act “took away [employees’] right to sue the government in tort for medical malpractice arising out of the injury, as well as for the injury itself.” Lance v. United States, 70 F.3d 1093, 1095 (9th Cir.1995).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Dubee v. Henderson
Lance v. United States, 70 F.3d 1093, 1095 (9th Cir.1995) (“when Congress gave federal employees the right to recover for an injury under FECA, it took away their rights to sue the government in tort *433 . ,.”). 1 FECA is the exclusive remedy for injured federal employees within its coverage, Edwards v. United States, 833 F.Supp. 521 (E.D.Pa.1993); and it preempts federal workers’ tort claims.
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
District of Columbia v. Washington Hospital Center
(3×)
also: Cited "see"
Lance v. United States, 70 F.3d 1093, 1095 (9th Cir.1995); Cokas, supra, 252 F.Supp. at 565 (citing Balando v. United States, 267 F.2d 135, 137 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 875 , 80 S.Ct. 139 , 4 L.Ed.2d 114 (1959) (other citations omitted)). 5 However, we have said that “ ‘it would defy reason to hold the physician liable for injuries caused by the original wrongdoer which were not the consequences of his own carelessness_’ ” Lamphier, 524 A.2d at 732 n. 2 (citing Kyte v. McMillion, 256 Md. 85 , 259 A.2d 532, 541 (Md.1969) (quoting from Derby v. Prewitt, 12 N.Y.2d 100 , 236 N.Y.S…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Patricia Waddell v. United States
See Hanauer v. Reich, 82 F.3d 1304, 1309 (4th Cir.1996) ("[If] the Secretary did not violate a clear statutory mandate [in determining the FECA claim], the case must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction."); Lance v. United States, 70 F.3d 1093, 1095 (9th Cir.1995) ("FECA would therefore clearly bar an FTCA suit...."); Doe v. United States, 914 F.Supp. 945, 949 (W.D.N.Y.1996) ("Where FECA applies, the federal courts have no jurisdiction to entertain FTCA claims asserted by injured parties."); Kelley v. United States, 792 F.Supp. 793, 795 (M.D.Fla.1992) ("[If] FECA is applicable …
discussed
Cited "see"
Solobay v. Presidio Trust
See Lance v. United States, 21 70 F.3d 1093, 1094 (9th Cir. 1995). 22 On September 25, 2024, the United States appeared for the limited purpose of requesting 23 that the October 15, 2024 case management conference be continued because the United States 24 had not yet been served.
discussed
Cited "see"
Dahlstrom v. Biden
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346 (b), 2672. 6 First, the Court shall dismiss Plaintiff’s FTCA claims against all Defendants but 7 Defendant United States because the “United States is the only proper defendant in an FTCA 8 action.” Lance v. United States, 70 F.3d 1093, 1095 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Woods v. United 9 States, 720 F.2d 1451 , 1452 n.1 (9th Cir. 1983). 10 “Sovereign immunity protects the United States from lawsuits unless that immunity has 11 been waived.” Koe v. United States, No. C13-1708-JCC, 2014 WL 3739417 , at *2 (W.D.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
95 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 8912, 95 Daily Journal D.A.R. 15,597 Irving Lance
v.
United States
v.
United States
94-56579.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Nov 27, 1995.
Barry S. Zelner, Beverly Hills, California, for plaintiff-appellant., Suzette Clover, Assistant United States Attorney, Los Angeles, California, for defendant-appellee.
Farris, Brunetti, Kozinski.
Cited by 62 opinions | Published
Citer courts: S.D. California (1)
PER CURIAM:
Lance was a volunteer worker at a Veterans Administration hospital. He was injured at the hospital and received treatment for the injury there. He’s now suing the government under the Federal Tort Claims Act for medical malpractice based on the treatment.[*1095] As explained below, the Federal Employees Compensation Act preempts FTCA suits based on medical malpractice arising out of federal employees’ injuries at work. The district court therefore properly dismissed Lance’s FTCA suit.
FECA provides the exclusive remedy against the federal government for federal employees injured at work. 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c). Volunteer workers at Veteran’s Administration hospitals are “employees” for FECA purposes. 5 U.S.C. § 8101(1)(B); 38 U.S.C. § 513. FECA would therefore clearly bar an FTCA suit by Lance to recover for the injury he suffered at work. Although Lance isn’t suing for the injury he suffered at work, but for medical malpractice arising out of the injury, this is a distinction without a difference.
When it comes to federal employees, FECA benefits are the only “liability of the United States ... because o/the injury.” 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c) (emphasis added). As a matter of textual interpretation, there’s a strong argument that liability based on medical malpractice arising out of an injury is liability “because of the injury.” FECA’s rationale confirms this reading of the statute. Congress enacted FECA to give federal employees smaller but more certain and less costly recoveries in exchange for the right to sue the government in tort. See Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 460 U.S. 190, 194, 103 S.Ct. 1033, 1036-37, 74 L.Ed.2d 911 (1983). Under traditional tort causation principles, a plaintiffs right to recover for an injury generally includes the right to recover for medical malpractice arising out of the injury. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 457 (1965). Therefore, when Congress gave federal employees the right to recover for an injury under FECA, it took away their right to sue the government in tort for medical malpractice arising out of the injury, as well as for the injury itself. See, e.g., McCall v. United States, 901 F.2d 548, 550-51 (6th Cir.1990) (citing eases).
The district court also properly dismissed Lance’s action to the extent his complaint named Does 1 through 20 as additional defendants: The United States is the only proper defendant in an FTCA action. See Woods v. United States, 720 F.2d 1451, 1452 n. 1 (9th Cir.1983).
AFFIRMED.