United States v. Mosquera, 95 F.3d 1012 (11th Cir. 1996). · Go Syfert
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United States v. Mosquera, 95 F.3d 1012 (11th Cir. 1996). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
29 citation events (24 in the last 25 years) across 10 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: United States v. James Peterson (ca4, 2019-12-16)
Treatment trajectory · 1997 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1997 2011 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 16 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. James Peterson
4th Cir. · 2019 · confidence medium
Section 3162(a)(1) reads: If, in the case of any individual against whom a complaint is filed charging such individual with an offense, no indictment or information is filed within the time limit required by section 3161(b) as extended by section 3161(h) of this chapter, 3 Accord Walker, 545 F.3d at 1086 ; United States v. Hemmings, 258 F.3d 587 , 591- 92 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Berry, 90 F.3d 148, 151 (6th Cir. 1996); United States v. Mosquera, 95 F.3d 1012, 1013 (11th Cir. 1996); United States v. Orbino, 981 F.2d 1035, 1037 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Castellano, 848 F.2d 63,…
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Priscilla Ann Ellis
11th Cir. · 2019 · confidence medium
United States v. Mosquera, 95 F.3d 1012, 1013 (11th Cir. 1996).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Anthony Collins v. United States
11th Cir. · 2012 · confidence medium
United States v. Mosquera, 95 F.3d 1012, 1013 (11th Cir.1996).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Hasan (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
E.D. Va. · 2010 · confidence medium
See Hemmings, 258 F.3d at 592-93 (distinguishing Van Brandy and finding that the Government did not violate the Speedy Trial Act by filing a superseding indictment more than forty days before trial); United States v. Mosquera, 95 F.3d 1012, 1013 (11th Cir.1996) (distinguishing Van Brandy and finding that the Government did not violate the Speedy Trial Act by filing a superseding indictment almost two months before retrial); see also Lefbenant, 341 F.3d at 343 (citing Mosquera, 95 F.3d at 1014 ).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Walker
D.C. Cir. · 2008 · confidence medium
Likewise, in United States v. Mosquera, 95 F.3d 1012, 1013 (11th Cir.1996), the Eleventh Circuit held that a superseding indictment filed on March 23, 1995 did not violate section 3161(b) when the original indictment was filed on November 3, 1994, the trial on the original indictment (resulting in a hung jury) was held on March 16, 1995, and the superseding indictment alleged new counts against the defendant.
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Komolafe
3rd Cir. · 2007 · confidence medium
United States v. Gastelum-Almeida, 298 F.3d 1167, 1173 (9th Cir.2002); United States v. Hemmings, 258 F.3d 587, 591-92 (7th Cir.2001); United States v. Mosquera, 95 F.3d 1012, 1013 (11th Cir.1996).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Rahamin
3rd Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium
Although outside the 30-day period, a “superseding indictment that issues more than 30 days after the arrest, but before the original indictment is dismissed, does not violate § 3161(b).” United States v. Mosquera, 95 F.3d 1012, 1013 (11th Cir.1996); see United States v. Budzyna, 666 F.2d 666, 669-71 (1st Cir.1981).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) William Steve Greenup v. United States
6th Cir. · 2005 · confidence medium
The Eleventh Circuit has explained: “The Speedy Trial Act does not guarantee that an arrested individual indicted within thirty days of his arrest must, in that thirty-day period, be indicted for every crime known to the government, failing which he may never be charged.” United States v. Mosquera, 95 F.3d 1012, 1013 (11th Cir.1996); see also United States v. Clay, 925 F.2d 299, 302 (9th Cir.1991) overruling on other grounds recognized in Rodriguera v. United States, 954 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir.1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Isabel Rodriguez De Varon (2×)
11th Cir. · 1999 · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 139 F.3d 820, 821-22 (11th Cir.1998) (“A sentencing court’s determination of a defendant’s role in an offense is a factual finding reviewed for clear error.”); United States v. Everett, 129 F.3d 1222, 1224 (11th Cir.1997) (per curiam) (“We consider the district court’s determination of appellee’s role in the offense a factual finding, and thus review it for clear error.”); United States v. Fernandez, 92 F.3d 1121, 1123 (11th Cir.1996) (per curiam) (holding that the district court’s factual determination of a defendant’s role in the offe…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. De Varon
11th Cir. · 1998 · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 139 F.3d 820, 821-22 (11th Cir. 1998) (“A sentencing court’s determination of a defendant’s role in an offense is a factual finding reviewed for clear error.”); United States v. Everett, 129 F.3d 1222, 1224 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (“We consider the district court’s determination of appellee’s role in the offense a factual finding, and thus review it for clear error.”); United States v. Fernandez, 92 F.2d 1121 , 1123 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (holding that the district court’s factual determination of a defendant’s role in the …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. De Varon
11th Cir. · 1998 · confidence medium
De Varon, however, does not challenge the district court's order of deportation on appeal. 5 defendant's role in the offense was not clearly erroneous); United States v. Mosquera, 95 F.3d 1012, 1014 (11th Cir.1996) (per curiam) ("A sentencing court's determination of the defendant's role as a 'minor' or 'minimal' participant in an offense is also reviewed for clear error."); United States v. Veloza, 83 F.3d 380, 381 (11th Cir.1996) (holding that the district court's factual finding that the defendant did not play a minor role in the offense was not clearly erroneous); United States v. Camargo-…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Archer
E.D. Pa. · 1997 · confidence medium
The other counts of the indictment were not contained *325 in the complaint and thus are not subject to dismissal. 3 See United States v. Mosquera, 95 F.3d 1012, 1013 (11th Cir.1996) (“The Speedy Trial Act does not guarantee that an arrested individual indicted within thirty days of his arrest must, in that thirty-day period, be indicted for every crime known to the government, failing which he may never be charged.”); United States v. Giwa, 831 F.2d 538, 541 (5th Cir.1987) (“every circuit ... has adopted a narrow interpretation of section 3162(a)(1), holding that if the Government fails…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Gomez-Olmeda
D.P.R. · 2003 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
United States v. Hemmings, 258 F.3d 587, 592 (7th Cir.2001); see, e.g., United States v. Mosquera, 95 F.3d 1012, 1013 (11th Cir.1996) (stating that “[t]he Speedy Trial Act does not guarantee that an arrested individual indicted within thirty days of his arrest must, in that thirty day period, be indicted for every crime known to the government failing which he may never be charged”); United States v. Orbino, 981 F.2d 1035, 1037 (9th Cir.1992) (holding that not all charges against a defendant must be issued within thirty days after arrest); United States v. Castellano, 848 F.2d 63, 65 (5th …
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Ashon Leftenant
4th Cir. · 2003 · signal: see also · confidence medium
To the contrary, “[a]n unrelated charge can be brought at any time.” United States v. Heldt, 745 F.2d 1275 , 1279 n. 9 (9th Cir.1984); see also United States v. Mosquera, 95 F.3d 1012, 1015 (11th Cir.1996) (per curiam) (“[T]he Speedy Trial Act does not guarantee that an arrested individual indicted within thirty days of his arrest must, in that thirty-day period, -be- indicted for every crime known to the government, failing which he may never be charged.” (alteration in original and internal quotation marks omitted)).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Rodney E. Hemmings
7th Cir. · 2001 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. Mosquera, 95 F.3d 1012, 1013 (11th Cir.1996) (finding no Speedy Trial Act violation when superseding indictment adding new charges was filed following a mistrial based on the fact that the initial indictment was filed within the thirty-day period); United States v. Orbino, 981 F.2d 1035, 1037 (9th Cir.1992) (“A superseding indictment [adding charges] issued before the original indictment is dismissed may issue more than thirty days after the arrest.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Hemmings, Rodney E.
7th Cir. · 2001 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. Mosquera, 95 F.3d 1012, 1013 (11th Cir. 1996) (finding no Speedy Trial Act violation when superseding indictment adding new charges was filed following a mistrial based on the fact that the initial indictment was filed within the thirty-day period); United States v. Orbino, 981 F.2d 1035, 1037 (9th Cir. 1992) ("A superseding indictment [adding charges] issued before the original indictment is dismissed may issue more than thirty days after the arrest.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Carlos MOSQUERA, Defendant-Appellant
95-3084.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
Jul 31, 1996.
95 F.3d 1012
Albert F. Telleehea, Orlando, FL, for Appellant., Edward L. White III, Asst. U.S. Atty., Orlando, FL, for Appellee.
Tjoflat, Hatchett, Black.
Cited by 18 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM:

Appellant Carlos Mosquera was originally indicted on November 3, 1994, on one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. He was arrested on November 8, 1994. Appellant proceeded to trial, and after a hung jury, the district court declared a mistrial on March 16, 1995. On March 23, 1995, the Government filed a superseding indictment which included additional charges. Appellant proceeded to trial on the superseding indictment on May 15, 1995, and was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2, and use of a communication facility in the commission of a felony in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b). He was sentenced to 78 months’ imprisonment and 4 years’ supervised release. Mosquera appeals his convictions and sentence.

Appellant contends the superseding indictment was issued more than 30 days after his original indictment and arrest in violation of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b), and must therefore be dismissed under 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(1). A superseding indictment that issues more than 30 days after the arrest, but before the original indictment is dismissed, does not violate § 3161(b). United States v. Orbino, 981 F.2d 1035, 1037 (9th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 893, 114 S.Ct. 256, 126 L.Ed.2d 208 (1993).

[T]he Speedy Trial Act does not guarantee that an arrested individual indicted within thirty days of his arrest must, in that thirty-day period, be indicted for every crime known to the government, failing which he may never be charged. In short, the Speedy Trial Act is not a statute of limitations.
... [The applicable statute of limitations] specifies the time within which an arrested indicted defendant may be charged with additional crimes by superseding indictment.

United States v. Wilson, 762 F.Supp. 1501, 1502 (M.D.Ga.1991). [1] It is undisputed that the charges brought in the superseding indictment are within the applicable five-year statute of limitations.

Appellant’s reliance on United States v. Van Brandy, 563 F.Supp. 438 (S.D.Cal.1983), is misplaced. In Van Brandy, the district court dismissed counts added in a superseding indictment where the government was in possession of all facts needed to proceed with the superseding indictment, but did not file the superseding indictment until the eve of trial. 563 F.Supp. at 441. Contrary to Appellant’s contention, the record reveals that the Government did not file the superseding indictment on the “eve of trial” as in Van Brandy, but filed it almost two months before retrial. Therefore, no Speedy Trial Act violation has occurred, and Appellant’s argument is without merit. [2]

Appellant argues that insufficient evidence exists to support his convictions. Although sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law subject to de novo review, in[*1014] doing so, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government to determine whether the jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Morin, 33 F.3d 1351, 1352 (11th Cir.1994). “The Court need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence or find guilt to be the only reasonable conclusion.” Id. (quoting United States v. Garcia, 13 F.3d 1464, 1473 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 2723, 129 L.Ed.2d 847 (1994)). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, we conclude that a reasonable jury could find that the evidence establishes Appellant’s guilt on each charge beyond a reasonable doubt.

Appellant contends the district court erred in attributing 4 kilograms of cocaine to him in sentencing and in failing to sentence him as a minimal participant, rather than as a minor participant, under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. We review a sentencing court’s determination of the quantity of drugs involved in a conspiracy for clear error. United States v. Alston, 895 F.2d 1362, 1369 (11th Cir.1990). A sentencing court’s determination of the defendant’s role as a “minor” or “minimal” participant in an offense is also reviewed for clear error. Id. Having reviewed the record, we find no error on the part of the district court.

AFFIRMED.

1

. Appellant's attempt to distinguish Wilson is not convincing. That a mistrial due to a hung jury may have occurred in the instant case is not relevant to whether a superseding indictment may issue more than 30 days after original indictment and arrest.

2

. Further, we note that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit the issuance of a superseding indictment after a mistrial, even if it alters, adds, or deletes charges. United States v. Corona, 804 F.2d 1568, 1570-71 (11th Cir.1986), cert. denied; 481 U.S. 1017, 107 S.Ct. 1896, 95 L.Ed.2d 503 (1987).