United States v. Samuel Alan Morton, 364 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2005). · Go Syfert
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United States v. Samuel Alan Morton, 364 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2005). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
29 citation events (29 in the last 25 years) across 5 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: United States v. Robert Thayer Stevens (ca9, 2006-09-13)
Treatment trajectory · 2005 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2005 2015 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 6 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Robert Thayer Stevens (4×) also: Cited "see"
9th Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium
In Morton , the Eleventh Circuit considered whether a base offense level en- haneement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4) involving “a pattern of activity involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor” was properly imposed where the “minor” in question was actually a law enforcement officer masquerading as a minor. 364 F.3d at 1301.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Stevens (2×) also: Cited "see"
9th Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium
In Morton, the Eleventh Circuit considered whether a base offense level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4) involving “a pattern of activity involved the sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor” was properly imposed where the “minor” in question was actually a law enforcement officer masquerading as a minor. 364 F.3d at 1301.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Iles
E.D. Va. · 2005 · confidence medium
In United States v. Morton, 364 F.3d 1300, 1301 (11th Cir.2004), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit concluded that an undercover officer posing as a minor met the definition of minor for purposes of a similar enhancement.
cited Cited "see" United States v. Samuel Alan Morton
11th Cir. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Morton, 364 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir.2004) (per curiam).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Wainwright, Stephen
7th Cir. · 2007 · signal: compare · confidence medium
Compare United States v. Morton, 364 F.3d 1300, 1304 (11th Cir. 2004), vacated and remanded, 543 U.S. 1136 , opinion 1 The first application note to § 2G2.2 defines “[d]istribution to a minor” as “the knowing distribution to an individual who is a minor at the time of the offense, knowing or believing the individual is a minor at the time.” Id.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Wainwright (2×)
7th Cir. · 2007 · signal: compare · confidence medium
Compare United States v. Morton, 364 F.3d 1300, 1304 (11th Cir.2004), vacated and remanded, 543 U.S. 1136 , 125 S.Ct. 1338 , 161 L.Ed.2d 95 , opinion reinstated by 144 Fed.Appx. 804 (11th Cir.), and cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1053 , 126 S.Ct. 785 , 163 L.Ed.2d 608 (2005) (holding that an undercover law enforcement officer qualified as a “minor” under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4) based on the interchangeable use of “minor” and “victim” in the commentary to that guideline, as well as the definition of “victim” in the commentary), with United States v. Stevens, 462 F.3d 1169, 1172 (9th Cir…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Samuel Alan MORTON, Defendant-Appellant
02-16809; D.C. Docket 02-80042-CR-DMM.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
Aug 10, 2005.
364 F.3d 1300
Lisette M. Reid, Anne R. Schultz, U.S. Attorney’s Office, and Carol E. Herman, Miami, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellee., Richard L. Rosenbaum, Law Offices of Richard L. Rosenbaum, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Defendant-Appellant.
Birch, Kravitch, Farris.
Cited by 6 opinions  |  Unpublished

ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

PER CURIAM.

This case is before us for consideration in light of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.-, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). Morton v. United States, — U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. 1338, 161 L.Ed.2d 95 (2005). We previously affirmed Morton’s sentence. See United States v. Morton, 364 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir.2004) (per curiam). On appeal, Morton had argued that the district court erred by finding that an undercover law enforcement officer posing as a minor qualified as a “minor” and that Morton’s contact with that officer constituted a pattern of activity involving sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor. Id. at 1303-04. We held that the officer qualified as a minor under the sentencing guidelines and upheld the district court’s enhancement of Morton’s sentence. Id. at 1304. The Supreme Court vacated our prior judgment and remanded for further consideration in light of Booker.

Morton did not assert any error based on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) or any other case extending or applying the Apprendi principle during sentencing, in his initial brief on appeal, or in a petition for rehearing to this court.

In United States v. Dockery, 401 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir.2005) (per curiam), we addressed a similar procedural situation: a remand from the Supreme Court with instructions to consider our opinion in light of Booker in an appeal in which the appellant did not raise either a constitutional or Apprendi challenge to his sentence. Id. at 1262. We applied “our well-established rule that issues ... not timely raised in[*806] the briefs are deemed abandoned,” reinstated our previous opinion, and affirmed Dockery’s sentence. Id. at 1262-63 (quoting United States v. Ardley, 242 F.3d 989, 990 (11th Cir.2001) (per curiam)). Such is the procedure we will follow in this case because Morton failed to raise an Apprendi challenge to his sentence in his initial brief. [1]

We reinstate our previous opinion and, upon reconsideration in light of Booker, pursuant to the Supreme Court’s remand, affirm Morton’s sentence.

OPINION REINSTATED; SENTENCE AFFIRMED.

1

. Even if we assumed Morton had raised a constitutional challenge to his sentence in his initial brief, his argument that the district court erred would not merit a reversal of his sentence under the plain error standard. On remand, Morton mentions that the district court commented during the plea hearing that it was "obligated to sentence” under the Sentencing Guidelines. R5 at 7-8. However, such a statement is insufficient to satisfy Morton’s burden to show that there is a reasonable probability of a different result if the district court resentenced him under an advisory version of the guidelines. United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1298 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. 2935, 162 L.Ed.2d 866 (2005). The district court neither sentenced Morton on the low end of the guideline range nor expressed any reservation about imposing such a sentence. R6 at 6 at 160-61; see United States v. Shelton, 400 F.3d 1325, 1331 (11th Cir.2005).